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This thesis sets out to explore some of the ways in which the methods
of inquiry employed in urban planning tend to guide the perspective
taken on substantive concerns in that field. It endeavours to
accomplish this task by showing that there are certain underlying
presuppositions that are implicitly rather than explicitly accepted
by making use of any method of inquiry, but focuses on aspects of
models of social/spatial phenomena as these are employed in urban
planning as instruments for prediction and control rather than copies
of segments of reality—either making existential claims about it
or postulating structural isomorphisms.
Urban planning is taken to be a "social practice" within which thought
and action are mutually determined through continuous dialectical
processes involving the planners and those who are being investigated
and affected by plans. The strong presence of a knowledge component
in the thought/action continuum of planning makes relevant a range
of ontological and epistemological problems linked with the view
taken of science and its methods and procedures of inquiry, and with
the way the world of man and society and its manifestation in urban
life is looked at. It is argued that the way in which society is
theorised about has implications for the methods employed in its
study and hence for the planning process seen as a process of inquiry.
(xxv)
To the extent that alternative theoretical perspectives on society-
are possible — indeed,three such perspectives are identified and
explored: naturalism, interpretative or humanistic approaches,
critical theory of society — there are corresponding approaches to
"social practice" including the mode of planning to be adopted in
the regulation of societal affairs in the city. Technological and
humanistic approaches to urban planning are distinguished, the latter
comprising interactionist and critical modes. The technological
model derives its strength from a policy science approach which is
informed by a view of science akin to positivistic naturalism.
It introduces a range of sharp divisions into inquiry — theory from
observation, method from substantive content, values and norms from
facts as the unassailable foundations of empirical knowledge, ends
from means — which are taken to be unacceptable at least in the realm
of ethically relevant action that planning consists of.
Rejection of this conception of a technological planning approach is
advocated but this does not necessarily entail rejection of scientific
approaches to planning as a whole. Rather, the strictures concern
the particular view of science, and its methods and procedures, which
informs the technological model. It is that view of the "logic of
science" which is held to impose unnecessary restrictions on what is
to count as legitimate knowledge of the world, and its replacement
seems particularly urgent. The conceptualisations that are to be
found in the "newer" philosophy of science are taken to provide
plausible alternatives to the "old empiricism", though they do not
afford as unified a view of knowledge as may appear at first glance.
Such views of science, however, render the application of scientific
methods and procedures in urban planning much more credible.
(xxvi)
The view of knowledge which the author finds most convincing is one
that recognises the important role played in it by human contribution;
accepts the many culturally given elements in any cognitive endeavour;
acknowledges the strong presence of metaphorical elements in theories
and models of aspects of reality; concedes that there are alternative
equally valid ways of conceptualising experience and that assessment
of their validity as correspondence with "objective" facts may have
to take second place in the light of considerations such as
convenience, instrumental effects, or aesthetic criteria; regards
a strict separation of the realm of theory from the realm of
observation as untenable; and does not suffer epistemological shock
from any consequences of relativism that such views might entail.
For this is accepted as part of man's epistemological predicament.
Such a perspective on knowledge would have implications for the
proliferation of theories and models accounting for the same set of
phenomena, and for pluralism and tolerance in goals and methods
of inquiry; and implications for the way in which knowledge is to be
related to "practice" in the realm of ethics, politics, and planning.
(xxvii)
INTRODUCTION (*)
It is often said that the first sentence of an Introduction to
a dissertation must capture and declare the "essence" of the work.
If this should he the case then it has to he admitted that it is
exceptionally difficult to meet such a requirement given the nature
of this work. It is guided hy many-sided interests and introduces
multiple perspectives on seemingly disparate domains and this renders
any attempt at constructing one statement which encapsulates its
results highly problematic if not outrightly impossible. This situation
might illustrate one of the main issues that are raised below regarding
the conditions in which some methodological rule or conventional
procedure can be applied to some substantive realm without giving due
regard to the question of compatibility of the perspective introduced
by that procedure with the nature of that to which it is applied
and without examining what is presupposed by adopting such a perspective
on the subject matter of interest.
It could be said that the thesis is about views that are taken for
granted and not inquired into in the course of theoretical and "practical"
(1)
activities in urban planning.v ' Its principal concern is with
(*) The footnotes of this Introduction as well as those of all other
chapters are to be found at the end of the main text and before
the Appendices and Bibliography. They are arranged at the very
beginning of Volume III of this work.
(xxviii)
the ways in which nrhan planners perceive the world, theorise about
it, and engage in attempts to control and change it. These are taken
to be founded on a range of implicit presuppositions regarding the
nature of that world and the most appropriate methods and procedures
that are to be applied in mastering it. A number of distinctive themes
emerge from these considerations, which set out the kinds of
presuppositions that are associated with particular perspectives on the
world of man/environment relations in the city.
The idea that presuppositions guide and sustain systems of beliefs about
the world is not very new though it has recently acquired prominence in the
context of the developing "newer" philosophy of science with its talk
(2)of "paradigms", "world views", "Weltanschauungen", "research programmes"^
and related concepts such as "problematiques","language games",etc.,
(3)
bearing close affinities with the hermeneutic philosophical tradition.
The main issue seems to be that scientific theories exist only within
an unarticulated and ascientific "Weltanschauung" or world view which
not only renders the theories meaningful but also indicates to the
scientist what to see in the world. This world view is in turn
sustained by the research results which it fosters. It is underlain
by unquestioned or unquestionable "axioms" or presuppositions which
could be regarded as "incorrigible propositions" (MEHAU and WOOD, 1975:
ch.1). Their status may be taken as loosely analogous to that
of "formal truths" I any empirical information denying mathematical
truths of the sort: "i4.+U=8", is explained away (POLANYI, 1958: pp.
190-193; 257- 261).
Failures do not challenge the conceptual system itself: beginning
with the incorrigible belief in science, all events reflexively become
(xxix)
evidence for that belief. For instance if results of the kind:
are obtained in attempts to apply the methods and procedures
of the natural sciences in the study of social/spatial phenomena —
say, failures of models to predict, or theories which break down —
then various reasons are invoked to explain such failures. Thus,
it could be argued that the empirical evidence employed T-*as -not
appropriate or in the right form; or that the categories of the data
were not correctly defined so as to correspond conceptually with the
theoretical categories; or that existing knowledge of some subject
matter of interest is incomplete; or that the methodological apparatus
and instruments used in inquiry are not sufficiently refined; or that
the subject matter being investigated is inherently complex and
difficult to analyse and study; etc. Such considerations reaffirm
the reality of a world in which science is a fundamental element:
contradictions serve to re-endorse "incorrigible propositions".
One such proposition is the assumption regarding the existence of
stable material things which remain the same over time irrespective
of the position of the observer and his/her identity.An adherent
to the Copernican system taking the sun as a star rather than a
planet recognises an error in the earlier Ptolemaic system which
regarded the sun as a planet. He does not question, say, the
constancy of the sun itself, only of his beliefs about it. Failure
of the sun to be as believed does not question the reality of the
system of basic beliefs. However, assuming the permanence of objects
eliminates alternative formulations. It is an assumption which cannot
be corrected; it is taken for granted. If there are alternative
definitions then one must be selected as real. In so doing, the others
are automatically excluded, revealed as false and thus become
(xxx)
unavailable. The possibility of alternative descriptions of one and
the same set of phenomena — as suggested in the "newer" philosophy
of science — might be explained away by invoking errors in perception,bias
a-nH prejudice in knowledge, the idiosyncracy of the observer, etc.
Alternative descriptions are not regarded as features of the object
itself or of the relation between the observer and the object of his
study. Since alternative accounts are eliminated in this way, what
is accepted performs the role of evidence for the assumption regarding
stable material things, which rendered that account appropriate in
the first place. Thus, some frame of meaning, system of beliefs,
world outlook, and the like, with its presuppositions guides what is
to be taken as a meaningful assertion; and this assertion in turn
serves as evidence for the appropriateness of that frame of meaning.
Presuppositions guide research that validates them, and that research
justifies itself afterwards in the reality it has created. This
essentially reflexive process is an aspect of the reasoning referred
(6)
to as the hermeneutic circle.* '
This involves a continuous oscillating movement between meaningful parts
or "data" and hypothetical "whole", or conceptual framework, or frame
of meaning. The way in which the "parts" are looked at is determined
by the hypotheses regarding the "whole"; while the "whole" and the
hypotheses and presuppositions that are associated with it are in turn
intelligible only in the light of the parts. As a result there is no
way of carrying out independent tests of hypotheses about the"parts"
for the "parts" themselves are perceived in terms of those hypotheses
and presuppositions: they are constituted by them. Hypotheses can
be adjudged in terms of their coherence and plausibility within
(xxxi)
a general interpretation of some frame of meaning, totality, paradigm.
Reflexivity affords grounds for believing that some piece of knowledge
is valid. Assuming that science, as one among many modes of knowing,
yields knowledge of facts, provides grounds for believing in the
results from cognitive endeavours undertaken within that mode of
knowing. Presuppositions of one mode of knowing, say science, furnish
criteria for assessing other ways of knowing. Taking some mode of
knowing as "incorrigible" enables those who accept it to eliminate
other modes as false.
Given its range of presuppositions and implicit assumptions, some of
which are culturally provided, some mode of knowing — say, science —
yields a coherent system of knowledge as revealed upon analysis.
Its characteristics are sustained by the methods employed by the
inquirers and scientists in the study of their subject matter. There is
an interdependence between method of inquiry and its substantive concerns
to the extent that particular methods introduce their own perspective
on some subject matter, viz. presuppose some particular way of looking
at it which derives from the frame of meaning within which such methods
have developed and are employed. Consider the following visual
metaphor.
(a)truncated cone (b)indentation (c)reversed funnel
(xxxii)
U,) (b,) (c,)
The same drawing (or "facts") may be interpreted in a number of different
ways, but without interpretation it is not a meaningful object. The
statement which provides an interpretation does not only accomplish the
task of reporting on the drawing but also constitutes it as a reasonable
object; and at the same time justifies its presence as part of that
object. It is not necessary to produce the corresponding drawings
(a.j), (b^, and (c^), above, to illustrate to the observer what a truncated
cone, an indentation on a plaque, or a funnel turned upside down looks
like. The statements accompanying (a), (b), and (c) in themselves
perform this role. The statement "indentation" immediately results in
the modification of the perspective taken on the preceding drawing
whose corresponding statement dictates perception of a protruding object
(truncated cone).
A method of inquiry may be said to operate in an analogous manner: it
constitutes the subject matter to which it applies as meaningful within
some conceptual framework, and also justifies itself as part of its
(7)
substantive concern. For instance, constructing a model '— as one of
the methods of cognitive inquiry — to study and systematise a set of
empirical data in some domain of investigation introduces a particular
perspective on those data which constitutes them as meaningful within
some broader theoretical context or paradigm. In so doing the model
(xxxiii)
justifies its presence as part of those data, there "being no independent
reason for its existence apart from them.
The method employed in the study of some subject matter finds its
justification in the context of some frame of meaning within which
results derived by applying the method are intelligible. For example,
a method for the "intuition of phenomena" as may be expounded in the
framework of phenomenological philosophy^ produces results the use
of which is conceptually excluded from the frame of meaning of empirical
science. Similarly, a model of some domain of empirical phenomena
(q)
conceived according to a realist w/ view of science can find no place
in the context of the rival positivist^^ epistemology. If the realist
argues that models are potentially true copies of usually unobservable
underlying structures and mechanisms that are causally productive of
the range of phenomena being modelled — thus making existential claims
regarding the reality of the entities referred to in the model —
the positivist finds no place in his version of science and scientific
research for models so conceived.^1^
Paradigms or frames of meaning reflect particular points of view, ways
of looking at things in the world of nature and of man and social life.
They guide the process of cognition and organisation of knowledge and
render the results of inquiry intelligible within their context. But
they also give rise to the problem of moving between perspectives in
the sense of establishing rules for mediating between different
conceptual frameworks. The problem of incommensurability of paradigms
arises as a result of the way in which each perspective guides thought
and excludes other ways of looking at the world. Each may be said
to possess its own vocabulary of explanation, its own language for
conceptualisation, and its own rules and procedures for acquiring and
(xxxiv)
validating knowledge; and all of these features reflect its consistency.
But these characteristics are not the result of the passive observation
of nature. Rather they are socially produced and sustained rules of
procedure and method decided by some community of scientists. This
does not mean that scientific knowledge emerges as a. subjective
construction. There is social, historical and cultural influence on
knowledge and on the rules and procedures that are conventionally
agreed upon for its acquisition and legitimation. But given these
elements and other presuppositions of a metaphysical and moral nature,
questions of objectivity and truth of knowledge can be settled
unequivocally.^^^
Frames of meaning provide the context or "whole" within which methods,
concepts, and social practices become meaningful and are intelligently
and intelligibly connected with other methods, rules, procedures and
practices. Each frame of meaning involves presuppositions, more or
less well conceived, regarding the nature and grounds of knowledge
and the kind of world which constitutes the subject matter of inquiry.
It attempts to discover what these presuppositions are by acquiring
knowledge which is inevitably founded on them. This renders the
problem of knowledge obtained within some frame of meaning a
hermeneutic task. It may be said to involve understanding and
interpreting the empirical material within a broader cultural and
historical context of social practices, metaphysical assumptions,systems
of beliefs and forms of life. This task would involve the inquirer
in an act of relating parts — i.e partial aspects of some substantive
realm, methods and procedures of inquiry, etc. — to wholes in the sense
of conceptual frameworks.
(xXXv)
Mediating between different frames of meaning in order to compare and
assess one against another may be impossible if such frameworks aire
conceived as overly unified, self-contained, closed systems of thought.
However, if they are not taken as discrete conceptual universes each
excluding all others but are seen as part of man's cultural and
cognitive tradition, then there may be grounds on which to argue ,that
perspectives are not created independently, unrelated to antecedent
knowledge. Bather they emerge as critiques of existing frames of
meaning and in order to criticise they presuppose knowledge of the
"language" of those other frameworks. Rules, conventions, procedures
and methods fostered by some paradigm as a set of social practices
cannot be learned in isolation from other alternatives that are replaced
or discarded by its adoption. It is necessary to learn what a frame
of meaning is in order to learn what it is not.
This argument seems sufficiently convincing to justify discussion of
alternative perspectives on urban planning and of their taken-for-
granted, unexamined, and often mis-specified epistemological and
methodological tenets which originate not so much from empirical as
from axiological predicates derived from assumptions about the world
and everything in it. Thus, advocacy of systematic theorising and
model building for planning is to be seen as part of a broader
framework of methodological naturalism in the social sciences.
This view takes as unproblematic the application of the methods and
procedures of natural science to the substantive domain which concerns
/ -j J N
planning, which must be regarded as essentially social^ ' in" nature
{ 1^Humanistic v criticisms of this view take many forms some of which are
investigated in the context of the ensuing discussion, labelled as
"interpretative" and "critical" — but these are conventions adopted
(xxxvi)
in this thesis, and their meaning will he illuminated in the course of
the argument.
Firstly, the humanism of the pragmatists^ revolves round a more
human-centred version of science and its process of inquiry, allowing
for the interplay between experience and human interests in attaining
particular ends. Secondly, there are versions of humanism which
focus on the category of meaning as distinct from the category of
being and advocate that inquiry into matters of social life should
concentrate on the former and should involve interpretation and
understanding which is an approach distinct from the methods and
(17)
procedures of the natural sciences.v '' Finally, there are humanistic
theories of society (and planning) which accept the scientific
contribution in the study of social life but confine it to limited and
specific functions in the whole edifice of the knowledge/action
continuum. They combine this with the introduction of interpretative
/ -j Q\
categories of meaning as well as with social criticism. '
These perspectives are examined and assessed against a normative
conception of urban planning which takes it to be a "social practice"
within which knowledge and action guided by it are mutually determined.
That it is necessary to know in order to act appropriately is seen
as a corollary of the definition of planning as reasoned action.
Consequently, questions about the nature of knowledge and the procedures
and methods through which it is to be obtained and validated acquire
particular relevance in planning. This is so, of course, not only
assuming that planning will develop and employ its own body of
knowledge, but also in circumstances in which knowledge enters planning
from other cognitive realms. For in the latter case it is necessary
(xxxvii)
to know whether such knowledge is relevant in the field of planning
and, even more important, whether the presuppositions upon which
such knowledge is founded are compatible with the "model of man"
that is accepted as most appropriate in the field. These requirements
inevitably involve the planner qua social/spatial theorist in the
full range of epistemological questions that are to be settled prior
to calling some utterance a piece of knowledge.
However, it is not the problem of knowledge itself that should preoccupy
the planner most but rather the ways in which knowledge is to be related
to action. It is in this area that the epistemological questions
should prove particularly vexing. This is because the relation of
knowledge to action involves problems of"practice", that is, problems
relating to ideologies, political and moral beliefs, and negotiation
and bargaining among interest groups in society whose concerns are
affected by proposed courses of action, (i) The presence of agents,
such as planners and administrators, who act purposefully with some
ends in view as well as rationally within the social context of urban
life to effect changes in it; and (ii) the application of knowledge
of this social context as a subject matter in order to develop
prescriptive statements of how such changes are to be brought about,
are characteristics of planning that might provide grounds for claiming
that there are affinities between planning and technology or applied
science.
The mechanistic metaphor which informs a problem-oriented (as opposed
to a process-oriented) technological approach to planning should not be
regarded as shocking in its extension to society. A large number of
theoretical schemes and models are developed within such a mechanistic
(xxxviii)
(19)frame of meaning. ' Moreover, the predictive problems of technological
approaches are not totally dissimilar from forecasting uncertainties
in urban planning. Predicting how some mechanical construction will
operate within an environment is often a highly complex affair
characterised by a high degree of uncertainty in prediction. It is
also impossible to take for granted Lixat the construction which
ensues from some technological solution to a well-defined problem will
in fact attain the social goal which prompted its undertaking. The
many undesirable consequences that have often followed some
technological breakthrough illustrate this point (BEIN, 1976: p.265).
Thus, it could be argued that planning is to operate on the principles
of technology, seeking solutions to individually and clearly identified
social problems (POPPER, 1957/1961).
In a conception of planning founded on the model of technology, what is.
i.e. the empirical knowledge of the world, is strictly separated from
what ought to be. Specific goals which guide the rational search for
means to satisfy them are supplied externally to the process of inquiry.
The task of planning becomes one of carrying out disinterested, value-
indifferent analyses of facts; applying positive knowledge of the world
to predict consequences of combinations of means which satisfy stated
ends; assessing the results on some measurement scale of utilities
to arrive at firm choices; providing these as information inputs to
the decision making process which is essentially political and outside
of "planning proper"; and charting the implementation and phasing of
the proposed course of action. In this account, the goals of planning
cannot legitimately enter into scientific discourse for they are
sociologically relative, pertaining to the domain of individual
preferences rather than relating to universally acceptable norms whose '
pursuance has specific empirical implications.
(xxxix)
However, there are fundamental differences between planning and
technology which cannot be intelligently reconciled. Firstly, there
cannot be clear separation between means and ends — in a way which
coincides with the distinction between facts and values. Secondly,
goals in planning are never well-defined and single as in technological
problems. Thirdly, failure of some plan is not always traceable to
the plan itself for it may be a question of wrong planning or ill-
conceived implementation. Fourthly, the experimental testing of
action hypotheses cannot be performed with any acceptable degree of
accuracy comparable to that attainable in, say, wind-tunnel experiments.
Models of the urban structure are often employed as vehicles for testing
action hypotheses to trace their consequences for some system of
interest. This practice gives rise to a number of difficulties
associated with the construction and use of such devices and the
results often do not justify the considerable effort and expense
(21)
involved in these tests. ' The application of conclusions from
such experimental tests to the real world is not warranted to the
degree that the use of scientific "instruments" should be expected
to make possible.
However, the major drawback of such a technological approach is the
nature of the connection it postulates between knowledge and action:
these two aspects of planning are seen as clearly distinct. There
results a separation of theoretical from "practical" questions and
their reconciliation seems to be effected by way of some form of
political and elite domination in the absence of active, rather than
(22)
iconic, public participationx 7 in a dialectical relationship with
the planners and decision makers. The view of science which most
often informs the technological conception of planning and policy
(xl)
(23)
making is some version of positivistic naturalism.v Ji This view
falls among the conceptions of science which do not espouse the
paradigm view of scientific knowledge and reject the strong connections
between form and content of inquiry that were discussed above.
It takes methods as neutral, atheoretical instruments whose application
in research does not alter in any way its substantive content. Moreover,
it regards cognitive inquiry as a one-way process from the environment
(nature) towards man and rejects any interaction between the knower
and the known. It differentiates sharply between facts, as the
unassailable foundations for knowledge, and evaluative, moral,
e t hical and political issues which are regarded as relative to
sociological circumstances and as arational, viz. not amenable to
scientific investigation. One of the peculiarities of this account
is that while it postulates moral relativism it rejects cognitive
relativism at the level of meaning. There follows that discussions
of factual questions of means arrangements are to be kept strictly
separate from questions regarding moral and political consequences of
such proposals for action, the latter being studied in a detached,
value-neutral, and objective way following universally valid canons
of"scientific method".
But is it possible to meaningfully divorce the positive from the
normative and ideological aspects of knowledge and action in planning?
The negative answer that is given in this thesis to that question^
seems to be corroborated by the developments in the "newer" philosophy
of science and corresponding reformulations of the conception of
knowledge in the social sciences. Thus, the acceptance of science
as an essentially social activity, the recognition of the strong
(xli)
presence of culturally and ideologically given elements in knowledge
of the world of nature but especially of the world of man and society,
the identification of guiding interests in cognition, tend to suggest
that the kind of pure and value-neutral knowledge of social life
founded on independent, theory-free facts — according to the claims
of most-positivist/naturalists — is unattainable.
The alternative conceptualisations of the relationship between
knowledge and action that were mentioned above tend to reject this
view of technological planning and postulate a much closer relationship
between theory and method, facts and values, knowledge and political
and moral decisions, theory and "practice", and hence the "planners"
and the "planned". Their humanistic interests direct them to either
eliminate or strictly limit the function to be performed by science
in planning. Thus arises the controversy between two opposing
attitudes in planning societal arrangements, conventionally referred
(25)
to as "technicism" and "humanism". '
The former takes for granted the capabilities of science (and technology)
to tackle even the most intractable and perennial problems of humanity.
Such a belief in the pragmatic benefits of instruments devised by
human beings for the solution of human problems seems to permeate
the field of "social engineering". It charges humanism with romanticism,
sophistry, and lack of the "pragmatic or instrumental spirit" which
is seen to pervade all human endeavours: from the highest cognitive
realm of scientific theorising to the simplest mundane activities and
practical projects, survival, and adaptation to a changing environment.
This is because humanism stresses human values and ideals, the meaning
aspects of social life, which it- takes as irreducibly human qualities
(xlii)
that are incapable of being captured or even taken properly into account
in the scientific/technological approaches to the planning of societal
affairs. Such approaches are seen as eroding values pertaining to
culture, art, freedom and personal liberty, and the private enjoyment
of "the good things in life".
Humanistic criticism, in its basic form, expresses fear of collectivist/
technological methods applied in the planning of human arrangements
because it takes these to constrain unnecessarily one of the most
treasured human values, that of the individual's freedom in his
environment. Moreover, it views such approaches as suppressing the
individual's right to determine the course of his/her life unimposed
by the institutionalised domination effected by way of a technology
inspired planning which excludes the dialogue and communication with
those concerned from the processes of rational/scientific determination
of appropriate means which are to satisfy given ends. Humanism
stresses dialogue and communication which is seen as excluded from
a scientific perspective on planning.
Technicism is attacked not necessarily as something concrete but rather
as an attitude which has developed as one aspect of a collective
mentality characterised by a set of unconsciously built-in, taken-for-
granted presuppositions. As a total moral outlook the scientific/
technological attitude is not immediately obvious but has to be
brought to the surface and to the consciousness of those who implicitly
accept it through enlightening criticism which will hopefully result
in the emancipation of the "planned" from forms of accepted domination.
Critical Theorists raise this issue most emphatically. They concur
with other humanists in rejecting technology-inspired approaches to
(xliii)
planning as employing "techniques" for manipulation and control of
social life in the pursuit of some goals, in a way which deprives
human agency and volition of its status as a primary ontological
category.
The belief that science and its conceptual ana methodological apparatus
can and ought to be employed in the study of all aspects of the world
that might interest man is not a claim that can be justified by
scientific reasoning. Eather it is an 'a priori' assumption, or
"prior philosophy" which appears to guide a way of looking at the world.
The same status may be attributed to the claim that whatever can be
said to make a claim to knowledge of social life is to be acquired and
validated by employing the methods and procedures of the natural
sciences. In this sense, methodological naturalism may not be claimed
to have "objectively" sounder foundations than the humanistic approaches
which place emphasis on interpretative categories. Thus,naturalistic
methodological programmesadvanced by,say, Popper, Quine, or Marxist
historicists, may be taken as equally valid with humanistic programmes
with respect to the grounds on which they justify themselves.
Nonetheless, there are good reasons to argue that humanistic approaches
tend to preoccupy themselves with meaning (ideal) categories of social
knowledge and as a result they tend to neglect those aspects of social
life that are the result of processes of interaction involving material
concerns. Relations of power and authority, of work, of institutions,
of material production cannot be overlooked in any plausible account
of aspects of social life. These issues are taken into consideration
in the work of the Critical Theorists, though the extent to which they
are successful in their synthesising undertakings is subject to much
controversy.
(xliv)
To argue in favour of some peculiarly humanistic approach to the study
of "theoretical" and "practical" aspects of planning need not entail
agreement with more or less extreme views of humanists such as Dilthey,
Heidegger, or Gadamer who appear to advocate wholesale rejection of
all methodological programmes informed by naturalism. The alleged
uniqueness of human episodes, and the introduction of meaning
categories do not justify total rejection of any form of scientific
study of social life. The issue seems to be whether the view taken
of science and its methods and procedures is an adequate or
appropriate one for the particular requirements imposed by the social
(27)
subject matter of planning.v ' The conception of science advanced
in the "newer" philosophy of science seems to offer greater flexibility
in handling questions of value and ideology — though it may still
be regarded as fostering at least in part the non-participatory,
paternalistic attitude of the expert/adviser as a "producer" of
knowledge and plans for the "consumption"of the public.
In discussing the areas of potential contribution of science in urban
planning, increasing attention is given to the constructs that are
known as models for these are often said to constitute an essential
component of "scientific method", but also because they are widely
used vehicles for theoretical formulation and conceptualisation
in research for planning. Planners seem to take a pragmatic view
of models as more or less appropriate, useful, convenient instruments
to be employed in the context of the planning process. They adjudge
such devices in terms of their performance in forecasting, control,
monitoring plan performance, testing action hypotheses, and the like.
They do not often concern themselves with the substantive content
of these constructs or with the range of implicit ontological and
(xlv)
epistemological presuppositions that underlie their formulation
and application.
Indeed, in its original conception — several years ago — this thesis
set out to investigate various contentious issues connected with the
use of models of the urban structure in the planning.process, their
advantages and theoretical problems, and the assessment of anticipated
benefits of model use in comparison with what was actually
achieved. Most of these questions were not expected to require any
analysis which went beyond the confines, say, of operations research
or geography — these being disciplines in which the use of models
appeared highly systematic and more or less sin integral part of their
processes of inquiry. As the research progressed it became obvious
that the investigation had to enter other domains of knowledge which
were dealing with such issues at a much more abstract and general
level. This had an effect similar to opening Pandora's box of
highly disputed and hotly debated questions in the philosophy of
natural and social science, epistemology and methodology.
It thus became necessary to extend the investigation into such areas
as was thought appropriate in order to gain the necessary insights
to substantiate a number of claims that are to be made regarding the
nature and cognitive status of models, their role in scientific
inquiry, and the presuppositions that underlie their development and
use in urban planning. The investigation has revealed that models
are wrongly seen as neutral instruments which accomplish specific
objectives. The way in which a model is conceived has implications
for the view taken of science and its method of inquiry, and vice
versa, and is also founded on a number of presuppositions of a
(xlvi)
metaphysical nature. It is attempted to expose such implicit and
taken for granted assumptions though the task is rather greater than
the scope of this thesis and hence the discussion is necessarily
restricted and selective.
Given the interdisciplinary nature of,planning, many perspectives
intersect in the study of the city and urban life each of which is
characterised by its own sub-culture, social practices, and disciplinary
viewpoints. Consequently, it is not possible to cover all aspects
of models that may be of relevance in planning in a study such as this.
Three research - traditions are singled out and the models that are
developed within these are investigated in terms of their epistemological
and philosophical debts to Logical Positivism and their connection
with the guiding metaphor of the machine. The conception of science
advanced in positivist philosophy is 'par excellence' that which promotes
a technological approach to the planning of societal affairs.
The role of models, analogies, and metaphors — these being terms referring
to essentially different things — is seen as a highly important one
not only in its heuristic contribution to inquiry but also as providing
knowledge-extending devices. Human thought and knowledge is taken
to be frequently based on metaphorical relations which bring together
two seemingly disparate items or domains to produce a new reality out
of their fusion. Social theories are said to perform this metaphorical
task. Moreover analogical relationships between ideas are frequently
the source of insightful theoretical conceptualisation in science.
Traditional views of science allow only "objectivist" methods in
acquiring and validating claims to knowledge. This tends to create
a situation in which the way in which theories are invented is not
(xlvii)
accounted for — viz. what is referred to as "the context of discovery"
— and the process of discovery is often delegated to the realm of
psychology and divorced from "scientific method" proper which is allegedly
(29)
concerned with problems of the logic of justification.v
These views which are associated with the positivists' "logic of science"
(but also with, other positions) is criticised mainly from two quarters:
(1) Those who accept "objectivist" methods but seek to incorporate
into "scientific method" an account of discovery as well as justification.
One set of views referred to as realism takes models (and analogies)
as providing the linking medium between theoretical invention and
justification. (2) Tljose who regard scientific knowledge as a
social activity sustained by some community of scientists with its
own rules of practice and procedural conventions; and consequently
as not independent of culturally and historically given elements.
They regard models as devices which must maintain their "as if"
qualities, their fictionalism, if they are to provide an awareness
of the metaphorical element in what is taken as literal.
The distinction between those two broad views is often referred to
(11)
as the dispute between "realism" and "instrumentalism". yIt relates
to a fundamental issue in the philosophy of science which concerns
the way in which knowledge is conceived: (i) as the product of
disinterested contemplation of individual scientists objectively
and passively observing nature and formulating descriptions which
are to correspond to it — much like a picture is to correspond to
real appearances; (ii) as a social product and part of the cultural
tradition of man, which is developed and redeveloped and adjusted
to serve particular interests such as prediction and control —
(xlviii)
knowledge whose understanding must he related to the specific
socio-cultural context within which it arises. As will become
clear, this thesis sides with the second view, but it should be
stressed that there are many different philosophical formulations
that could be labelled instrumentalist and hence the term is not
unambiguous. The particular conception.of science;that is accepted
in this thesis will become clear in the course of the ensuing
discussion.
Taking nature as known externally by the behaviour it exhibits and
man and social life as known internally by way of interpretatively
understanding his motives, intentions, feelings, reasons, etc. for
action would result in a complete separation of man from his
environment as an ontological belief. This is an absurd conclusion to
reach in seeking a conceptual framework for knowledge guiding action
in planning — a field which essentially concerns itself with the
interrelationships between man and environment. It is however as
unacceptable as the brand of positivistic naturalism which rejects
any distinction between man and nature. Neither of these views may
be shown to be supported by the implications of science. If a method
of human studies is required to be informed by hermeneutics on the
dialogue model of knowledge, then the necessary understanding of
social life cannot be meaningfully divorced from an understanding of
the ways in which man's environment impinges upon his conduct and
the ways in which man affects and conducts himself towards the
(12^
environment.v J '
The discussion of the above issues is carried out at an often abstract
level of philosophical discourse and there may be occasions where
the need for concrete examples may be strongly felt. However, the extent
(xlix)
of the material that had to be covered was such that any significant
additions to an already substantial piece of work would not be to
its advantage. Philosophy is drawn upon as a resource rather than
contributed to, the main concern of this thesis being the epistemological
and methodological issues arising from the adoption of scientific
methods and procedures in urban planning, the alternative,
conceptualisations that may be claimed as potential replacement for
science, and the range of presuppositions underlying these perspectives.
No claim is made regarding the possibility of "presuppositionless
enquiry"; even phenomenologists who first sought to achieve such
investigation seem to have discarded this principle from their
methodological programmes. In fact it is argued that there can be
no inquiry without some implicit presuppositions which reflect the
contribution of "prior philosophies", the culturally and historically
deriving elements in the production of knowledge of the world.
Hence it is necessary to know what perspective on society is associated
with particular methodological approaches prior to adopting some one
of these in acquiring and validating knowledge to guide action
in planning.
The philosophical orientation of this work and its attempt to introduce
a planning perspective into several apparently disparate areas of
cognitive endeavour exposes it to criticism from two directions.
The pragmatic planner might find the material and its handling at best
loosely related and at worst irrelevant to the field of planning.
The philosopher, scientist, or social scientist might find the planning
perspective at best unorthodox and at worst odd or even misdirected.
This is an inevitable risk connected with this type of synthesising
(1)
perspective which draws on many seemingly unrelated domains to create
a different reality. It is conceded that disciplinary subdivision
in knowledge has considerable advantages for division of labour,
specialisation and in-depth investigation, and economy of thinking
ensuing from established taxonomies. However, it also carries with
it the luggage of historical contingency, social practices and
conventions, and cultural affinities. These interests tend to
organise knowledge into distinct categories which are inevitably
human constructions. They carve out segments of the "seamless web"
of knowledge — to borrow Quine' s famous phrase — and study it from
their own point of view.
Planning is an interdisciplinary subject which must introduce a
synthesising perspective if the various disciplinary contributions
are to cohere within its frame of meaning. Hence as an interdisciplinary
synthesis planning should not find expansionism incompatible with its
concerns, or contemplation beyond pragmatic tolerance. Feyerabend's
account of scientific education and the drawing of disciplinary
boundaries provides ample warning of the stultifying effects it might
have upon the advancement of knowledge" (FEYERABETID, 1970s p.76):
"First a domain of research is defined. Next, the domain is separated
from the remainder of history (physics, for example, is separated from
metaphysics and from theology) and receives a 'logic' of its own.
A thorough training in such a logic then conditions those working in
the domain so that they may not unwittingly disturb the purity (read:
the sterility) that has already been achieved. An essential part of
the training is the inhibition of intuitions that might lead to a
blurring of boundaries".
(li)
It is hoped that the ensuing forays into the realm of philosophy and
science will not be held against this work. For neither the social
scientist nor the practitioner of an art can promote his interests in
knowledge, accomplish his tasks properly, and improve on his methods
of studying his subject matter unless he decides to become seriously
involved with and think out the deeper implications of the phenomena
with which he has to deal. Conceptualisation and broad schematisation
is not possible unless a sufficiently abstract and global view is
taken of some substantive realm. To this it might be objected that
any directions or schemata that may ensue from this kind of exploration
would be liable to collapse in the light of more detailed analyses.
This is conceded; however this approach has been adopted as a pointer
for future work rather than as a conclusive statement. If there is
no initial direction to criticise, criticism cannot operate. But would
knowledge advance in the absence of critique?
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chapter one
Metaphors, paradigms, and forms of social thought.
1. The paradigms of science.
2. The man-environment relationship and fundamental forms of
social thought.
3. Implications for approaches to the study and planning of
the environment.
1. The paradigms v 'of science
The world may not he structured in the same way that our understanding
of it is organised. The necessity to file the continuously
accumulating contents of human knowledge has resulted in the creation
of scientific disciplines (ACKOFF and EMEKY, 1972). Historically,
(2)
philosophy has played the role of originator of all "episteme11: v
each branch of science emerged out of philosophical analysis of its
subject-matter and of its methods of inquiry. The formal separation
of science from philosophy was the starting point for the ongoing
process of specialisation of knowledge. Grouping phenomena into smaller
and smaller classes resulted in multiplication of disciplines, each
increasing in depth and decreasing in breadth (CHEERY, 1957)*
Science divided itself into chemistry and physics. Chemistry
of living organisms was recognised as biology, from which psychology
was quickly detached and formed a distinct field of study. By the
beginning of this century the social sciences had emerged out of
k.
psychology. The proliferation of disciplines has persisted until
today and it seems likely that new branches of knowledge will continue
to emerge over time. The common origin of disciplines has had
important implications for the organisation and methodology of
acquisition of knowledge in the various fields of intellectual
endeavour. As it is thought relevant to consider some of these
implications, introduction of a certain historical perspective is
in order here.
The evolution of science has no strict chronology nor can it be
accounted for within technological or social deterministic frameworks;
or within other frameworks that are endogenous to science.
Periodically, new or existing ideas assume predominance and, having
their origin in science, technology or society,attract a range of concepts
in all three domains and provide the unifying intellectual
(3)
character which identifies a specific period. Metaphors w/ often
supply clues to these unifying themes which have been called
"paradigms" (EUHN, 1962/1970). The clock and the living
organism are familiar metaphors in the context of science.-
The evolution of science and the expansion of its scope — both in
terms of variety of subjects and in terms of methods of approach
to their study — appears as a succession of such metaphors. This
has helped the gradual assimilation of problem-issues originating
in philosophy and the humanities, into legitimate science; and it
is evidenced in the importance which matters of organisation, social
structure, and form have assumed within the range of subjects dealt
with by twentieth century science.
Pour stages may be distinguished in the development of science,
5.
depending on the position occupied "by man in the paradigms that
dominate these evolutionary phases. The first, early stage
represents the "science of external nature" culminating in Newton.
Man was at the centre of that scheme but did not participate in it;
he was the subject but not the object of knowledge. Science dealt
with the study of the laws of nature that were external to man.
The second identifiable stage suggests a significant shift of emphasis
from a science of nature as external to man towards a science which
included man as a subject of interest and study. This stage
relates to the "sciences of man" and roughly corresponds to the
development in classical philosophy of the opposing theories of
knowledge commonly known as nationalism and Empiricism, in the
late seventeenth and eighteenth century.
nationalists assert primacy of man's intellect and reasoning faculties
over the world of experience and sense perception of nature;
empiricists argue from the view that the world of nature and its
experience by man are the foundations of human knowledge. Both
theories attempt to investigate man's physiological and psychological
constitution by providing their own answers to questions regarding
the origin of human knowledge, the nature of reality, and many basic
metaphysical problems concerning general and fundamental characteristics
of the cosmos, both physical and spiritual.v 1' However, man still
remains epistemologically and scientifically separated from nature,
much like in the first stage. Thus it can be easily seen that neither
the view that mind (reason) alone can provide substantial knowledge
of the physical world (rationalist thesis) nor the view that the
physical world, as it is experienced by man's sensory apparatus,
is to provide the foundations of human knowledge (empiricist thesis)
attribute any great importance to the interplay between man
6.
(or living organism) and the world of nature (or the environment).
In the nineteenth century, the view that there is an interplay
between organism and its environment, between man and the physical
setting in which he lives and organises his social life, receives
definitive formulations and becomes predominant in scientific
thinking. It may be taken to represent the third stage in the
development of scientific thought: the so-called "man-environment"
paradigm. This world outlook succeeds the teleological view of
nature and man's place in it which took man to be a part of nature —
for his life cycle conforms to the laws of nature — but also clearly
distinct from narure — because of the manner in which he was created
(by "design", through the hand of the Creator). The teleological
view of the world was exposed to the strong criticism of Spinoza
("Ethics", Pt. I, Appendix), Hume ("Dialogues concerning natural
religion", 1779)* and Kant ("Critique of Judgment", 1790)- Its
assumption of unity and harmony in the natural world, where man and
nature do not work at cross purposes, was to be proved wrong in the
last one hundred years and was replaced by the idea of the fragility
of nature in relation to the power of the human element in it
(nature as an ecosystem). The antecedents of the "man-environment"
world view may be found in philosophy, physics, biology and the
sciences which study the physical environment (such as geography).
Since the "man-environment" paradigm is still dominant to date in the
disciplines whose subject matter is the environment — including
man's role in it — it is worth exploring more fully its origins.
(1) In philosophy the work of Immanuel Kant (172I4.-180I4.) reflects
concern with the formulation of a dualistic theory of knowledge
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in which both reason (or mind, the life element) and experience of
the physical world (or matter) would be essential foundations of
human knowledge. Kant regards both Bationalism and Empiricism as
partial (monistic) and biased accounts of the structure and content
of human knowledge. In his mature philosophy — best known as
"Critical Philosophy", beginning with his "Critique of pure reason"
(1781) — Kant attempts to develop a synthesis of the rationalist and
empiricist theories of knowledge which goes beyond a mere combination
of their principal tenets. For Kant, knowledge of what exists
and what occurs must have two foundations: (i) it must be founded
on the formal and therefore uncontradictable truths of pure reason
which would provide the principles for organising sense-impressions;
and (ii) it must be based on the impressions of the senses as the
concrete material to be organised and interpreted by the truths of reason.
For instance, if pure geometry is assumed to be an exemplar of
a formal science based on pure reason, whose truths can be established
without contradiction by reasoning alone, it could not reveal much
that would be of interest to a science of physical (terrestrial) space,
say geography. It could not establish the position or even the
existence of a hill or island for pure reason reveals no matter of
fact. On the other side, a strictly empirical science of geography
could not advance much without the reasoning afforded by geometry.
On this account, knowledge of the world is an exercise of both mail's
senses which supply the content, of such knowledge and his reasoning
faculties which provide the form in which it is known. The form
represents the 'a priori' (necessarily and uncontradictably true)
conditions supplied by the mind; it determines the kinds of answers
that can be given, but not the specific content which only experience
can determine. Although the possibility of mistakes always exists
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(mistake-proof knowledge being a Utopian ideal), there is also
always the possibility of detecting, correcting and preventing errors
both perceptual and judgmental.
Kant's theory appears to bring together man and the physical world
which surrounds him. In this view, man can only make sense of the
world by imposing some structure originating from the mind upon it.
The structure is reflected in certain 'a priori' conditions which ma.n
imposes upon his experiences of the world. These conditions are,
in Kant's terminology, the forms of intuition, the organising principles,
(9)
and the categories. v / They can only be applied to material originating
in experience. The use of experiential material presupposes them
and thus they cannot themselves be derived from experience but
"belong to the understanding a priori". However, these 'a priori'
conditions, which may be the subject of scientific inquiry, are
exclusively conditions that apply to the "phenomenal" world or world
of "appearances" — i.e. what is given to man in experience.
They cannot be shown to apply to the "things-in-themselves", that is,
to the real objects that may exist behind the world of appearances —
i.e. the so-called "noumenal" or non-empirical world.
(2) The philosophers' concern with the problem of environment versus
organism also permeated much of the thinking in the natural sciences
and the sciences studying man. Obviously, the question of the
relation between man in society and the physical or geographical
environment in which he lives is an old one — it dates back to Hippocrates
in the fifth century B.C. Certain Pre-Socratic philosophers
contended that the world order, including man's social organisation,
emerged by virtue of the generative power of nature—"physis" or
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without design (" t£Aos» or purpose). Theirs was the view that nature was
alive like an organism which can initiate changes to which it is itself
subject; and this led directly to an evolutionary conception of
living things. The subsequent appreciation and dominance of the
philosophies of Plato and Aristotle arrested the development of such
early evolutionary thinking. The influence of Platonism and
Aristotelianism in human thought proved pervasive, lasting over two
thousand years. The world view of an unchanging, fixed, strictly
determined universe, strongly supported by the Christian Church,
prevailed -until its collapse which was precipitated by the Copernican
(11)
revolution.x ' The latter was followed both by the rise of new
(12)
speculative theories of cosmogony v ' and by the decisive scientific
advances reflected in Newton's "Principia Mathematica" (1687).
This post-Renaissance period saw the re-emergence of forms of
evolutionism in scientific thought and the coming into prominence of
the problem of the interplay between organism and environment. Two
developments seem important in this context. On the one side, the
new cosmogony included theories postulating that the universe (and
nature) had a history and was evolved from an originally chaotic state
through a sequence of orderly changes, governed by the laws of physics
(the mechanistic laws of cause and effect), to its existing complex
structure. Although Newton had simply given an account of the existing
structure of the cosmos, without venturing into hypotheses concerning
its origin and development over time, the Newtonian principles were
extended to the new cosmogonic theories of orderly development from
chaos. Indeed, it may be argued that one of the sources which
inspired the creation of the concept of "environment" is Newton's
principles which introduce the hitherto inconceivable notion of
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action of one body upon another at a distance without the intervention
of anything else. The term "ether" was employed to refer to the
universal medium or "milieu" through which physical forces could be
transmitted and act upon something whether organic or material.
On the other side, the rise of geology and paleontology and the
accumulation of new information by these disciplines established
conclusions that supported evolutionist views of the world. The
discovery of fossils and the recognition that they were remains of
organisms that lived in the past; the conclusion that the age of
the earth is much greater than was originally estimated; the
recognition that the characteristics of the earth's surface change
gradually as a result of the influences of constant physical forces;
all these findings were taken as supporting evidence for theories
of evolution.
Now, the concept of evolution is. common to many realms of thought
in natural science, the sciences of man, and philosophy. Different
theories of evolution result according to the subject matter to which
the concept is applied and depending on the principles accepted in
these theories. ' However, all such theories share the general
claim that the universe and/or all of its parts have undergone
irreversible and cumulative changes such that the number, variety,
and complexity of the parts have increased. These ideas reached
maturity in eighteenth century biological science which had
already begun to be attracted by an organismic view of the world —
that of nature as a self-organising system functioning in accordance
with inner dynamic forces — in preference to the earlier, mechanistic
view of nature as a mechanical system governed by external cause-effect
laws. The linking of the metaphysical doctrine of "progressionism"
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i.e. the historical evolution of beings towards increasing perfection —
(16)
with transformist evolutionism '— i.e.evolution over time of
living things involving their transformation from simple to more
complex forms — created the background from which Darwinian
evolutionism was born. Unlike earlier versions of evolutionism,
Darwin's (1809-1882) theory ("On the origin of the species", 1859)
offers a well-organised and coherent body of evidence to show that
evolution has occurred and a plausible explanation of how it has
occurred. His theory stresses the survival value of adaptation of
organisms to the environment or nature which acquires a new, dynamic
force. Changes in the environment, which on one account result from
evolution of the earth over time, necessitate corresponding
readjustments in the organisms living in it. Thus, a conception of
a delicately adjusted balance between organisms and their surroundings
is advanced which has fundamentally influenced the thinking of the
(17)
biological and even social sciences •, ' an influence which is still
present to date.
The organismic world-outlook of contemporary biological science
contrasts with the purely chemical view of the world in its claims of
interaction between organism and environment. Especially where
man is concerned, the man-environment relationship is taken to involve
both action by man on his environment and influence of the environment
upon man. The former results from the development of man's everyday
activities which impose on the environment characteristics reflecting
his biological and social nature. The latter is taken to emerge by
way of influences of environmental stimuli upon man's perceptual
apparatus. Man's sensory experiences of the external environment
are seen as being shaped or conditioned by it.^^ The hypothesis
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that the survival of organisms in a changing environment can only
be achieved through the operation of mechanisms which enable them
to maintain internal stability by resisting external environmental
impacts led to the recognition that there is a so-called "internal
environment" in the organism and that it must remain essentially
stable even if the external environment fluctuates. In the case of
the human organism, the view was developed that maintenance of stable
conditions in the body is controlled by the nervous system.
W.B. Cannon introduced the term "homoestasis" to refer to the
phenomenon of the maintenance of internal equilibrium in the organism
("The wisdom of the body", 1932). On this view, homeostatic mechanisms
control the responses of the organism to biological and mental
environmental changes and help it to function adequately — in the
sense of "adjusting to" — under changing conditions. Thus, maintenance
of identity in spite of external pressures, and adequate adaptive
response to such pressures are established as the two principal demands
for survival of both individual biological systems and whole populations
of such systems. The concepts of homeostasis and adaptation are
taken to be valid for all levels of biological organisation, from the
lowest level of a single-cell organism to the highest level of large
social aggregates. The theory of physiological responses has been
linked with cybernetics in the work of Norbert Wiener ("I am a
mathematician", 1956). Thus, the theory of evolution and the
cybernetic theory of physiological responses provide a dynamic approach
to some of the problems posed by the interplay between man and
environment.
Concern with the problems of the relationships between man and
environment has been particularly lasting in geographically oriented
sciences {e.g. human geography) and the new disciplines studying the
planning and control of change in the environment (e.g. regional
science). The sounds of the debate between different accounts of
environmentalist and possibilist doctrines can still be heard
(19)
today. Extreme environmentalism leads to views of necessitarianism
and p^fedestinarianism in the world — accounts of the world as a
machine which operates according to the invariable laws of nature.
Compatible with such accounts are static conceptions of the environment
as a once-and-for-all given thing in itself. In contrast, extreme
possibilism leads to an emphasis on the particular, the empirical
study, the distrust of generalisation and theory, and the conception
of environmental sciences as entirely idiographic rather than nomothetic
disciplines. The dichotomy between environmentalism and possibilism
seems to be rendered redundant if it is decided to accept the
metaphysical view that there exists no distinction between man
and nature (as in physicalism : cf.Appendix to Part II,entry:"The Mind/
Body problem").
The last three decades have witnessed the emergence of approaches
attempting to provide a synthesis of these two contrasting outlooks.
That the exploration of such syntheses is fruitful is indicated by
practical studies of environmental problems and problems of control
and planning of change in the environment. These kinds of problems
require attention to "influence factors" directly attributable to
man's environment. Although the new quantitative approaches to the
study of man-environment systems have strong deterministic — even
mechanistic — overtones (e.g. the so-called "social physics" approaches
adopted in spatial interaction models used in urban planning) they
are also strongly probabilistic and move towards generalising rather
than individualising methods. The development of mathematical
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descriptions (generally Imown as mathematical models ) of social and
physical arrangements in geographical space, including urban built-up
areas, is one result of the notable influence that such thinking has
had on the disciplines which study the environment.
The"man-environment" paradigm — being the third stage so far identified
in the development of science — can still be seen to provide the context
within which much of the activity of the sciences of man and society
is taking place. However, certain writers have distinguished a fourth
stage.This appears to be dominated by the recognition that the
entities relating to man, which form the subject and object of science —
such as, computers, languages, epistemology, society, cities — are
already made by man. They are artifacts that man does not understand
sufficiently well; he resorts to science and its "methodology" in the
hope and belief that he will be able to proceed with the study of such
artifacts in a more systematic way. The characterisation of a science
that deals with such artifacts as "the science of the artificial"
(SIMON, 1969) has been appropriately employed to refer to this fourth
paradigm of science especially in the twentieth century. Artifacts
can be seen as linkages of man with nature. The concentration of
contemporary science on the study of these artificial entities seems
to be the principal catalyst in the approach of science to society
and the adoption of a perspective which tends to unify these two
domains.
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2. The man-environment relationship and fundamental forms of
social thought.
The views taken of the relationship between man (or, more generally
organism) and environment have given rise to certain fundamental forms
of social thought. It is possible to identify three main groupings
of views (STAEK, 1962: Ch.1):^21^
(1) The physical environment is taken to be dominant over the human
individual and includes it in the sense that the nature of human
individuals is not seen as anything distinct from the environment.
In this account,the emphasis is on matter rather than on the animate
element (life, individual). Knowledge of the laws governing the
phenomena of nature would also provide the key to knowledge of
regularities which govern all that there is, including man and social




materialism, such as naturalism,v ' physicalism, epiphenomenalism
(which takes life and thought as mere epiphenomena of material reality).
The question whether mental states or events have an independent existence
of their own in some realm of the mind apart from nature, or they pertain
instead to the same realm as nature — being, say, actually events in
the brain or the nervous system — is an aspect of one of the perennial
problems of philosophy. It has come to be known as "the mind/body
problem"; and the view taken of the relation between the mind and
the material world has important implications for a number of relevant
methodological and epistemological issues in many cognitive domains —
issues such as the relation between values and facts, ends and
means, the "knower" and the "known", method of inquiry and subject
matter, etc.
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The linking science in the conception of a dominant nature is said
to be rational mechanics and, to a lesser extent, astronomy — while
physics is regarded as the paradigm of all sciences. On this account,
everything in the world is taken to rest on and result from the interplay
of mechanical,mathematically expressible, and calculable forces.
The guiding metaphor is mechanism and this gives rise to a
"pan-mechanistic" ontology.
The social thought that is informed by this view takes society ( the
social system) to be nothing more than an aggregate of individuals, a
multiplicity. Their properties, suitably aggregated,would be the
properties of the society that they form. This atomistic view of
society connects up with methodological individualism and
(25)
nominalism, 'the latter regarding only individuals as real and
society as a name, a convenient shorthand expression to refer to an
aggregation of human beings. In this line of reasoning, the social
world is traditionally seen as an equilibrium system. If only the
individual is real, then the coherence of society — i.e. of
individuals in society — must depend on the balancing of individual
forces. The underlying rationale of nominalism imposes a mechanistic
approach to society. Thus, institutions, organisations, government
are objective results of subjective energies. Human individuals
manage to co-exist much like celestial bodies avoid mutual destruction
because their attractions and repulsions ultimately fall into an
abiding pattern. A classic account of mechanism in social theorising
is (CABEY, 1858/1859) where the well-known "social physics" approach
is developed. This approach has informed the modern formulations of
the gravity model and a family of models of spatial interaction which
are the most widely used models in urban planning today (BATTY, 1976);
(WILSON, 197U); (OLSSON, 1965). These connections are explored below.
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The basic problem with this view is, of course, its inability to account
for aspects of individual free will and creative performance. Though
its methodological approach is said to be "individualist", the model
of man that it accepts is only "spuriously individual"; it is an
"objective" individual with physical characteristics, a body. It
lacks a self to focus upon (HOLLIS, 1977s P«12) in order to apply its
causal models and explanations. As a consequence, explanations
couched in mechanistic terms tend to appear incomplete and partial.
(26)
The empiricist theory of knowledge,v 'according to which it is not
possible to acquire knowledge about the world except through experience
(sense perception) and observation received by the mind through the
senses from the environment is an epistemology that is compatible
with this view of the man-environment relationship. The environment —
nature and society — is the protagonist and "stages the show" while
man is a "spectator": he theorises (in Ancient Greek, "0eojp£Tv"
literally means "being a spectator") about the environment on the
basis of what he manages to perceive through his sensory apparatus.
Thus comes into being one of the most pervasive and still faithfully
followed epistemologies: empiricism, or the "spectator theory of
knowledge" (John Dewey), or the "bucket theory of mind" (Karl Popper).
The latter expression illustrates the claim of "orthodox"
empiricism that the mind is a blank sheet onto which observational
data are inscribed solely through the senses excluding say,
intuitionist and introspectionist "modes of knowing", such as
(27)
phenomenological or hermeneutic v 'approaches involving "understanding"-
(2) In another set of views, the emphasis is placed on the animate
rather than the inanimate element in the world; on the organism
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rather than the environment. The universe is seen as permeated by-
life, mind, "soul-substance". The scientific ideal of this position
is the science of biology and, to a lesser extent, physiology; all
other sciences must model themselves on it. The cosmos is taken to be
an entity that is constituted in the same manner as the smallest
living creature in it. The guiding metaphor here is the organism
which is said to differ from a mechanism (or mere aggregate of
individual parts) due to its characteristic parts/whole relations,
viz. the position of the parts in relation to the whole organism
governs their nature and existence, much like legs, arms, etc. are what
they are as long as they are joined to a living body.
The tradition of social thought informed by organicism takes society
as a unity, a whole rather than a multiplicity. Societies as wholes
are seen as organisms whose component parts are interdependent: a
change in one will introduce corresponding changes in the others.
Moreover, they are said to possess holistic properties, i.e. peculiar
to the whole, over and above the properties of their constituent parts
or their aggregates. A society as a whole could be said to possess
cultural,institutional, linguistic traits that cannot be derived by
aggregating individuals' characteristics. This holistic view of
society is associated with methodological holism and philosophical
(29)
realism * '— though not invariably. Organicism in social theorising
has emerged in a variety of forms, of which two are said to be
primary. The positive or •positivistic variety of social organicism
(e.g. the views of Herbert Spencer) appears as a peculiar mixture
of methodological holism and positivist epistemology.
It regards society as an evolving organism and seeks to study social
phenomena in terms of totalities, aiming at discovering the natural laws
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which govern its evolutionary change. The organic analogy suggests
self-generated growth and is inimical to any form of externally
(
imposed , planned intervention in the process of societal development.v
In this sense, it differs from the other guiding metaphor, i.e.
mechanism. The latter takes social problems as dysfunctions or
breakdowns in the operation of a mechanism. These could be "repaired"
by intelligent (social) engineering. Alternatively, the machine could
be made to operate more efficiently, parts of it could be renovated,
etc., and hence planned change and artificial construction is easily
accommodated subject to technical knowledge of the operation of the
machine.
There is also a normative form of social organicism which takes society
• as a potential organism, in the sense that it is ideally and not
necessarily and actually an organism. Rather, society is seen as
organismic in "design", along organic lines. In normative organicism.
a "design" need not be realised: the emerging structure need not be
identical to its "design".^2) Society is regarded as fundamentally an
"organic system" : it ought to become so in the full sense of the
term ( on the Aristotelian version of the view). Holistic conceptions
of society as an organism have generated other forms of organicism
which generally recognise society as a whole (as a unity) but sidestep,
to a greater or lesser extent, the ontological issue of whether society
is really an organism or it appears as if it were one.^3)This is
(34)
for instance,the approach taken by Talcott Parsons. The latter's
("social systems" view of society w/is drawn from the concept of a
"system" which embodies the "essense" of an organism. The relations
among parts internal to the system/organism and the way in which they
relate to the whole (what function they perform) are best understood
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by studying interdependencies among parts and between parts (or their
aggregates) and whole and their contribution in generating change.
This approach opposes mechanistic causal analyses of social phenomena
and favours teleological accounts in terms of goals. Furthermore,
holism cum organlcism, combined with recent trends towards
interdisciplinary research and the cybernetic study of systems have
provided the foundations for General System Theory (SUTHERLAND, 1973s
pp.6-7); (LASZLO, 1972); (KLIR, 1972); (CHURCHMAN, 1968).^36^
However, these versions of positivistic organicism are founded on
a materialist metaphysics and hence cannot be said to lie in the same
intellectual tradition as the forms of organlcism which presuppose
idealism and the primacy of mind, intellect, intuition over the
material environment as a foundation for epistemology. The
metaphor of the organism has also informed views of what constitutes
a self, a person, a human being. The commonly used expressions:
"I am my own master"; "he is a slave to his passions"; "man is
slave to nature"; illustrate a distinction that is often drawn
between a "dominant self" — oriented towards the higher ideals of
life and a "lower" self that is not so oriented. The former has
received various interpretations: "reason", "higher nature",
"selector and pursuer of long-term goals", "autonomous self", etc.
The latter "self" is not concerned with such "higher values"; it is
often identified as "the lower nature of an individual", "irrational
impulse", "uncontrolled desires", "pursuer of immediate pleasures",
and the like. This is seen as a "self" that needs to be constrained
and disciplined in order to reach the "higher ideals" of its "real"
nature.
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Now, the organic metaphor is employed to suggest that the "dominant" or
"real" or "true" self is something broader than the "imperfect", or
"irrational" individual. In this sense, some form of "whole" : is
postulated to come prior to its individual elements and, being the
"true self", to freely impose its collective or organic single will
upon its imperfect members so as to achieve their emancipation from
constraints imposed ty their own "inferior nature" and secure their
movement towards the realm of "higher freedom".^37) The use of the language
of organic metaphors to justify the coercive actions of some
individuals upon others, or less extremely to advocate normative
reconstruction of some society as a whole, or even comprehensively
re-plan a whole city so as to make it conform to some ideal conception
of the "good urban life", has been extensively criticised for its
dangers. However, the issue appears to be more complicated. For it is
conceded that coercion of others in their interest is often justified
in view of some collective goal, such as environmental pollution, social
justice, preservation of natural resources, war effort. Such goals
are not ordinarily pursued by individuals of their own volition
allegedly due to their corruption, ignorance, blindness, indifference,
selfishness: individuals are not always the best judges of their own
interests (HESCHER, 1972).
But it might also be claimed — as it has been — that there is a
"true" or underlying purpose inside the individual human beings
which is their "real self" and not their apparent, empirical self in
space and time which may not know anything of that "real self".
Even though the individuals appear to resist that "true" or underlying
purpose, it is the latter that needs to be taken into account in
deciding about planned societal arrangements. This kind of reasoning,
dear to proponents of normative planning and to Marxist approaches
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to radical social reconstruction, involves commitment to a set of values,
goals, and objectives which are to be attained by some normative
conception or plan. It may lead to strict coercion of individuals
by justifying the sidestepping of their apparent wishes in the name
of their "real" or "underlying" wishes. But this involves the
paradox of (BERLIN, "1967/"• 977s P• 1 ) s "equating what X would choose
if he were something he is not, or at least not yet, with what X
actually seeks and chooses" and this is "at the heart of all political
theories of self-realisation. It is one thing to say that I may be
coerced for my own good which I am too blind to see: this may, on
occasion, be for my benefit; indeed it may enlarge the scope of my
liberty; it is another to say that if it is my good, then I am not
being coerced, for I have willed it, whether I know this or not, and
am free — or "truly" free — even while my poor earthly body and
foolish mind bitterly reject it, and struggle against those who
seek however benevolently to impose it, with the greatest desperation".
In this sense, the view taken of what constitutes a "self" suggests a
corresponding conception of freedom, including freedom from coercion
that may be imposed by planning.
Some views which take the subject, that is, the human individual, as
first and foremost are also referred to as "humanistic".They tend to
advocate so-called "subjectivist" approaches to the study of social life.
Such "subjectivist" approaches are characterised by strong individualist
emphases though , they may not be said to be individualist in the atomistic sense
of mechanicism. They seem to face a number of difficulties when they
attempt to reconcile the existential individual with the structural
elements that may be identified in a society, such as relations of power,
authority, domination, material production, social stratification.
When they are advanced as theories of society, those views that are
informed by idealism tend to neglect aspects of the material world that
could be shown to be important in structuring social life (GZDDENS,
1976).
(3) Finally, the last group of views is seeking to synthesise the
other theses and postulates interaction between the human individual
and the environment, the "knower" and the "known", subject and object —
though these views,too, are highly diverse in philosophical orientation
and substantive contributions. In one account associated with Wilhelm
Dilthey (STAEK, 1962: Ch.1), monistic intepretations of reality are
rejected (i.e. that reality is all matter or is all mind or life
element) and a form of dualism is postulated. It is accepted that
the nature of reality is dichotomous: there is a realm of matter which
forms the substructure of the universe; against it stands a principle
of life, spirit, and will, which is caught in conflict with matter,
and strives to give it form and meaning. The linking discipline
in this tradition is history. If the essense of reality is the contest
between the "higher" form-giving forces of existence and life and the
"lower" form-resisting masses of matter (as Plato has argued) then - -
historiography will reveal the most significant aspect of being as
the record of man's fight against fate: the fight of a value-conscious
species against a morally indifferent universe. For Kant and Fichte,
what is important is not "phenomenal" man — as a material entity or
as an animal — but rather "noumenal" man who rises above the state
of a creature and asserts his moral purpose and character, and his
(39)
essential freedom. '
The kind of social thought that emerges from this tradition is a
mediating view which takes society both as a unity with real
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integration of social order and a multiplicity with real independence
of individual members constituting the community. The emphasis here
is on process, that is the dynamic progression of society from
multiplicity to unity. Society appears as a struggle from conflict
to order, from chaos to cosmos, as a cultural formation and not as a
creation of natural laws, either mechanical or organismic, either
of irreducible multiplicity or of pre-established unity. This is
said to be the cultural tradition (STARK, 1962: Ch.1). In this ' sense,
"individuals" and "society" are not regarded as separate or even
separable realities for existence of the one implies existence of
the other. The stress on process or interaction between the human
individual and the environment, between mind and matter, is also
adopted in A.N.Whitehead"s writings on metaphysical issues.
Envisaging"organic connections between things in terms of something
like feeling" Whitehead takes the reality of the universe to be the
fundamental activity of process: "simply the becoming or growth of
a new way of feeling the rest of the world" (JOAD, 1936/1957? P«575).
He sees the world of science as totally stripped from human values
and hence impoverished: "the science of nature stands opposed to the
presuppositions of humanism" which are as universal and as deserving
of respect as those of science (ibid.: pp.£67-568). jje rejects the
"bifurcation of nature" (WHITEHEAD, 1926: pp.26 ff.) which is imposed
by natural science in its insistence to distinguish between "substance
and qualities, cause and effect, thing and environment, ... mind and
body, life and matter, spirit and nature" (JOAN, 1936/1957? P«571)«
These things taken by themselves are only abstractions from their
context. "The cosmos is a unity; it is a patterned process" in .
which things are interdependent (ibid.: p.573)? "the relations of things
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to other things, to their environment, .. to their past, to their
future, and to the minds that know them, literally, constitute part
of the being or essense of the thing". Thus, neither man nor
nature can be understood in isolation: they must first be fused
"together as essential factors in the composition of 'really real'
things whose interconnections and individual characters constitute
the universe" (ibid. : p.582).
Another tradition which advances reconciling views transcending dualisms
between man and environment, mind and matter, knowledge and action,
values and facts, theory and practice, is the philosophical movement
of pragmatism. Apart from its purely philosophical contributions^2^
this tradition of thought has been influential in analyses of social
issues. This influence can be felt in current intellectual activity
in the social sciences, but also in urban planning, if it is properly
examined in its own right and not taken for granted as is usually
the case. The view taken of knowledge in this tradition opposes the
classical empiricist epistemology which separates the "knower" from
the "known" . It maintains that thought and knowledge are biologically
and socially evolved modes of adaptation to and control over experience
and reality. (The process of knowing is essentially motivated, and
knowledge is justified, by conditions of efficacy and utility in
serving human aims and needs. It is not a contemplative activity
detached from human interests and aimed at procuring increasingly
perfect copies of a world unaffected by human values.
Because human needs, purposes and interests are diverse, there are
many ways in which experience may be apprehended, systematised, and
anticipated. In this sense, pluralism and tolerance to different points
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of view and ways of looking at the world is advocated. Knowledge
of the world is essentially subject to the critical objective of
maximum usefulness in serving human goals, needs, and interests.
However, decisions on what is most useful or needed are relative to
some given point of view and purposes (THAYER, 1968; p.l+3)«
The meaning and justification of human beliefs about the environment
are thus interpreted in terms of their practical effects or their
substantive content. Moreover, knowledge is seen as an instrument
for action and hence integrally connected with the latter. The
rational beliefs that are entertained by human individuals are the
outcome of deliberate experimental -interaction with the environment
(QTJIHTON, 1977s p.U) • John Dewey elaborates a theory of intelligence
and knowing by conceiving of thinking as an active interchange
between organism and environment (SCHEEFLER, 197^+s p.2) which is
seen as a learning -process . The traditional empiricist distinction
between beliefs and knowledge is transcended in pragmatism.
Instead, it is accepted that statements about the objective world
may depend for their "truth" on whether they are believed and so
become "true"■ by agreement or convention (HOLLIS and HELL, 1975s p.I4-).
Knowledge emerges as a social activity, a process of learning from
the environment directed towards practical human purposes and needs:
an essentially evaluative activity "apprehending the future as
qualified by values which action may realise" (LEWIS, 19^6: p.U)'
The pragmatists' interpretation of thought as intimately intermeshed
with action in a goal-directed context suggests the continuity of
mind and nature : the mind acquires knowledge by way of physical
interactions within its environment; it shapes and is shaped by it.
The conceptions of the environment that enter into such knowledge
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always reflect the active and purposive life of the knowing organism.
There is an interaction between the knower and the known. This
conception of knowing indicates the presence of strong humanistic
elements in pragmatism. This is further .ascertained by the attempt
to transcend the classical dualisms between the human life and the
natural environment in which it arises; betweeen the knowledge that
man acquires, i.e. his facts, with the values that he espouses;
between the concepts and symbolic abstractions in terms of which human
knowledge is couched and the realms of willing, feeling, and acting
for the latter are as much parts of his life as an organism as his
cognitive activities. In this undertaking to overcome the
"bifurcation of the universe" the pragmatists are in agreement with
Whitehead, in the sense that the distinction between the abstract
and the concrete, between the things "as they are" and the things
"as they are perceived", is bypassed through: (i) the introduction
of a new way of conceiving of abstractions as relative, and (ii)
acceptance of the functional or instrumental nature of thought
(SCHEFFIiEE, 1971+: pp.6-7).
The concern of pragmatist social thinkers with the problems society
is facing in its continuous transformation in history was a natural
extension of their epistemological position regarding the close
interrelation of knowledge and action, and the attempt to re-integrate
the hitherto separate elements of "technical skills" and "ideal goals"
(THAYER, 1968: p.U57) in a conception of knowledge guiding action.
They take intelligent life to aim at maintaining itself through
continuously changing environments by evolving techniques of adaptation
and control : the effective modification and direction of existing
conditions by way of intelligent, planned action. They advocate
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inquiry into future consequences of action and direct thought to
future possibilities. In his "instrumentalism"John Dewey puts
forward a philosophic/scientific method for solving social anri
political problems through knowledge-directed planned action: a first
approach to a "planning science". In this undertaking Dewey stresses
historical, organic, and cultural aspects of society. He ascribes
to history the important role of ally of all social disciplines for
it studies how things came to be as they are . Furthermore, he
advocates a form of "cultural organicism" and "evolutionary naturalism"
which asserts that social life should be investigated in context.
Social inquiry should come to grips with life, experience, process,
growth, context, function; it should seek to understand the present
as a means of controlling the future. The problem of the individual
versus the community is seen to necessitate construal of social
policies and plans under conditions enabling increased control to be
vested in those who are affected by planned action and development
programmes.
Continuous and critical reflection and understanding as well as continuous
and fresh reflection on beliefs, ideals, and social goals appropriate
in the solution of pervasive social problems represents the two-fold
effort involved in the pragmatist ideal of social reconstruction
(THAYER, 1968: p.lil+S). This ideal presupposes that organically related,
unified, harmonious social conditions are more desirable than
situations of conflict in society. Thus the ideal of order becomes
a norm and directs social theorising and planning. Such an ideal
conception may be accepted or rejected on its own merits:
pragmatism or "instrumentalism" do not assert its "truth" but
implicitly presuppose it. Though many of the views expressed
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in the "instrumentalist" theory of inquiry appear to be possible and
applicable in planning and social policy making, pragmatists have
never been specific enough as to a programme of social reconstruction
which goes into more particular areas of the key pragmatist notions
of "reflective intelligence" and "organic growth in society". The
pragmatists1aversion to making societal goals for planned action fixed
and absolute, and their determination to keep them relative to changing
circumstances, and their mistrust of fixed and inflexible social action
programmes and policies renders planning of societal arrangements weak
and ineffective: a pragmatist theory of planning and social reconstruction
faces the paradox of the lack of pragmatic results.
The key concepts of pragmatism may be found incorporated into the
recent movement in urban planning theory referred to as the "new
humanism" which has been informed by the works of (DUNN, 1971) and
(PHIEDMANN, 1973)> while (EEIN, 1976) advances a formulation based
on such views for the policy sciences. The "general theory of
planning" developed in (OZBEKHAN, 1969) also draws heavily on
pragmatism and interprets its holistic, evolutionist perspective in
terms of the methodological instrumentality of systems analysis.
In most of these works, pragmatists are seldom referenced. In the
context of the "new-humanism", planning is viewed as a process of
social learning, leaning on history for accounts of how things came
to be as they are and seeking to understand social life in its
social milieu of culture and instutitions, rather than simply within
strict disciplinary boundaries. This introduces a holisitc
perspective in analysis of social phenomena. In the views of Dunn
and Friedmann, social evolution is a process of social learning, and
planning is one stage of that process. Planning is said to involve
the application of knowledge of social life to guide social action
30.
and development, the two being interdependent and integrated: theory
and practice, substantive and procedural concerns of planning are
seen as interrelated.
The "new humanism" clearly reflects the pragmatists' views on the
nature of learning and society as evolutionary processes and on
the pluralistic character of knowledge (theory) as well as • of society
and its political arrangements (social practice). As a consequence,
it takes a view of decentralised power and decison-making functions
and seeks to invest in those whose lives are affected by policies
and planning the power to play a meaningful part in the shaping of
their future. The idea of active participation of the public in the
planning of societal affairs, which is currently fashionable, suggests
connections with the pragmatists' notion of "social experimentation"
by way of a dialectical relationship between knowledge and action,
theory and practice, and is taken to be a fundamental element in
the planning of change in society. The kind of uni-directional
decision-making associated with urban planning conceived on the model
of a policy science or social technology is strongly criticised for
its inability to reconcile in any convincing manner questions of means
with questions of social goals and objective issues. Planning
conceived of as a process of social learning places heavy emphasis
on communication between the "planners" and the "planned" which would
promote mutual learning and adjustment and readjustment of views,
goals, and plans. The title of a recent book by Donald Michael,
"Learning to plan and planning to learn"(MICHAEL, 1973) captures rather
well this conception of planning as a dialectical process of experimental
learning.
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But this view of planning also incorporates another ingredient of
pragmatism, that of "critical reflection". Criticism of the ideology
that is implicitly presupposed by social thought, as well as reflexive
critique or self-criticism, is taken as an essential component of
the "new humanism" in planning. Thus, planning is viewed as a
process of inquiry based on learning and dialogue and evaluative of
the future; as a way of investigating problems and clarifying and
establishing communication rather than as a fixed system of methods
and procedures aimed at ultimate and final answers and great truths.
This account is closely related to Dewey's view of knowing as an
evaluative activity. Ta.ki.ng thought and human conduct (action)
as expressions of social contexts and historically evolved institutions,
Dewey argues that education (learning) and critical revision of
social institutions are ways of controlling and directing social
conditions. Intelligent, planned action predicated upon goals
assigning value to something in the future, and upon the entertaining
of predictions that specific efforts would bring about satisfactory
outcomes, is seen as an evaluation of the future. In this sense,
thought and ideas as knowledge are referred to future potentialities
as action. The nature of knowledge in planning is therefore
•predictive in the sense that it takes as one criterion of meaning
the consequences for future experience that some planned action
would have. Knowledge is seen as the modification of the world.
The conception of planning which takes the generation and evaluation
of alternatives as a "learning process" of exploration and testing
(GORDEY-HAYES, 1970: p.362) seems to have only terminological affinities
with the thesis of the "new humanists". The fundamental difference
between them lies in the scope that is allowed for learning. In this
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latter view, the "learning process" postulates a recycling of the
results from a sequence of planning operations: (i) statement of
general goals; (ii) formulation of tentative objectives; (iii)
derivation of standards and design criteria reflecting objectives;
(iv) generation and elaboration of alternatives; (v) evaluation
(ibid. : pp.362-363). Repetitions of the cycle would, presumably,
result in increasingly detailed and refined proposals. Hence learning
is explicitly confined within the framework of technical considerations
and does not transcend its boundaries to reach out to the "planned".
There is no "mutual learning" in this conception of the learning process
of planning: the learning concerns the "knower" not the "known",
the "planner" not the "planned". Hence this account of the planning
process could be said to be akin to a "technological" model of planning
as opposed to a "humanistic" approach.
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3. Implications for approaches to the study and planning of
the environment <
Despite its great scope the above discussion has not covered all
relevant aspects in such depth as to allow any significant conclusions
to be drawn at this stage. The three traditions referred to above,viz.
mechanicism', organicism, and historicism, have tended to give rise
to corresponding forms of social thought in terms of ways of looking
at society and the relation of man to his environment. All three
kinds of social philosophy that emerge from the "root metaphors"
(PEPEER, 19^+2) of the machine (clockwork) and the organism, and the
perspective of history and culture possess their own value and validity .
Thus, it might plausibly be claimed that :
(i) society often emerges as a multiplicity, an aggregation of
competing and conflicting individuals, rational pursuers of their own
values and interests in a self-centred and short-sighted manner,
indifferent towards collective goals and purposes — however these may
be defined. In this way, it is not dissimilar, in principle, from
systems of weights and counterweights in mechanical, more or less
unstable equilibrium (mechanicism);
(ii) society also appears as a well-knit and cohesive unity, an organic
whole, characterised by a kind of coherence which transcends individuality
and focuses on the communal, the collective, the survival of the whole
body social, and is thus akin to an organism in nature (organicism);
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(iii) society may frequently be seen as progressing from a state of
loose towards a state of firm integration; it appears as a purposeful
and continuing effort over time tending to lead from a state of
loose connectivity to one of organisation, from individual near-
independence to almost organic unity and cooperation over collective
goals (perspective of history, culture, and process).
The way in which the metaphors ■ of the machine and the organism are
taken will have a bearing on the way in which society is viewed.
An important epistemological point is involved here: i.e. whether
human individuals and their social life are really the way they are
described in these outlooks or whether they are constrained ( by social
processes and cultural assumptions operating in historically developing
societies) to conduct themselves as if they were so describable.
In the first case, the models developed on the basis of these
metaphors sire tsiken in either of two senses:
(1) As abstractions or idealisations from only observable conditions
of social life — if terms refer to unobservables they have to be
expressed in terms of observables — whose structural properties are
shared with, in the sense of corresponding to or being isomorphic
with, some actual system upon which they are modelled. Such
abstractions or idealisations are constructed so as to provide useful
points of comparison with, and suggest fruitful hypotheses about, the
real world of man and society: models as heuristic devices of
strictly psychological interest in the development of theories about
social life.^^^
(2) As hypothetical descriptions of structures and mechanisms underlying
the domain of phenomena concerned, which are taken to correspond
to what exists in reality — subject to testing against empirical evidence.
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Such sometimes unobservable,hidden, or obscured, but potentially real
structures and mechanisms would be taken to constitute the "essence"
(or essential properties) of some aspects of social life which causally
produce and account for observable conduct and behaviour.
Construction of models so conceived would be necessary for the
formulation of objectively true theories of social life.
Although interpretations (1) and (2), above, exhibit important
differences they can be identified for the purpose of contrasting
them against the second case above — the "as if" case. For both
(1) and (2) recognise some version of the correspondence theory of
truth. The real world of social phenomena is said to have a structure,
whether observable or underlying and unavailable to observation, which
the model pictures or copies or represents or is isomorphic to.
Now, in the "as if" case, it might be maintained that people conduct
themselves in a way which appears as if it is describable by drawing
on the vocabulary of the metaphors of the organism and mechanism.
The models that would be constructed on the basis of these metaphors
would be essentially regarded as fictional constructs. They would
be formulated to provide simple and economical devices with the aim
of predicting observable features of the phenomena of interest.
The use of a model so conceived would be justified on purely pragmatic.
instrumental grounds, that is, in terms of how adequately it performs
functions that are taken to be relevant for the purpose at hand:
e.g. as an aid to the imagination, as a predictive device, as an
economical idealised representation — one among many possible
representations — of some set of empirical data. Being fictional,
"as if" constructs by definition, such models would not be regarded as
either true or false, only more or less useful or appropriate
instruments given the purposes of the inquiry. They would not make
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any ontological claims regarding the real existence of systems,
mechanisms, organisms, structures,feedback loops, and other elements
in the language of the metaphors. The models would not be concerned
with establishing isomorphisms or describing '"'underlying structures ",
but would employ and organise concepts in a way which best serves
the particular cognitive objectives that are pursued in inquiry.
It might be argued that the modes of knowing that correspond to
these conceptions of models and metaphors have identifiable links
with the view taken of the relationship between man and environment.
Thus, in (1) the mind attempts to match the structure that it sees
in nature but it is the latter that directs the relation for only
what can be observed, i.e. what is apparently in nature, can count
as knowledge. In (2) the mind is regarded as capable of arriving
at descriptions of real, existing structures of the environment
and grasping the "essence" of its features even though it has not
received sensory messages from the latter. The mind subsequently
seeks empirical validation of its conceptualisations of the environment.
Finally, in the last view, the mind is seen to construct instruments
by drawing upon the environment but also introducing into the
construction the human perspective of goals, purposes,
and interests — and this reflects an interactionist view of ma.n
and environment. The environment shapes the instruments but is also
shaped by them. The connections that may be identified between the
above three modes of knowing and the respective traditions of social
thought might be intelligible, but they cannot be said to be necessary.
Now,it is clear that — barring extreme cases — the metaphors are not
employed in a literal sense. Society is not taken as a real machine
in terms of its coherence and equilibrium; it is not viewed as a real
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living organism in terms of its organic integration. Bather, these
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metaphors are drawn upon as "ideal types" a la Max Weber as
sources of useful insights in the attempt to develop hypotheses about
social organisation and social life, or as aids in conceptualisation,
or as instruments for prediction and control. Their relation with
their referrent environment would be a relation of purposive construction
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with the order revealed in inquiry.^ ' The traditions of social
thought that are informed by the guiding metaphors of the machine and
the organism are often said to suggest particular answers and attitudes
towards questions of ethics, metaphysics, politics, and policy making
and planning over and above their clear methodological implications
for the study of social life (DEAY, 1967s P»33)« This would also
hold for the historical/cultural tradition.
The latter would be naturally suspicious of "mechanistic" forms of
planning and policy making in response to clearly identifiable
problems or "breakdowns" in the operation of the social machine.
In this case of objectively determined and unanimously agreed upon
goals (viz. repair of the "machine" through intelligent social
engineering) ,planning emerges as an applied science or technology.
Man applies knowledge — originating from a value-insensitive
environment and filtered through the human senses and remaining,
somehow miraculously,objective and free from cultural traits, and
human interests — to solve expertly and uniquely defined problems.
The atomistic world outlook of mechanism fosters disjointed, problem-
oriented, ideally value-free planning of societal affairs a3 a social
technology looking at society and its institutions "as machines
rather than organisms" (POPPER, 1937/1961: p.63). The historical/
cultural tradition would accept the individualism of disjointed,
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mechanistic problem-solving but would not divorce it from context and
would seek to grasp in addition the historical, cultural, processual
dimension of some social collectivity. In this sense it would both
agree but also differ from forms of policy making and planning
informed by the organismic metaphor.
It would accept the latter's emphasis on becoming,wholeness and
comprehensiveness but would be suspicious towards both: (i) the
unique, objective and rational determination of pathological states
of the "body social" associated with positive forms of organicism
(through empirical social surveys and rational considerations of
efficiency); and (ii) the unique and normative (ideological or
intuitionist) conception of the ideal or "true" form of social
organisation of the whole, to which all planning effort ought to be
committed and for whose implementation into actual social life it
should be striving, with means that are predetermined by the overriding
collective considerations. As a reconciling or mediating approach, the
historical/cultural tradition would advocate pluralism and tolerance
of individual views, competing goals, and alternative accounts of
"what is really the case", without being totally removed from the
social context and organic integration of social life.
The historical/cultural tradition might even be inimical towards the
cybernetic metaphor which was advanced in the last thirty years as
capable of subsuming and synthesising the assumptions and language
of the two guiding metaphors of the machine, and the organism, and
thus, leading to more effective organisation and planning of social life.
The cybernetic metaphor informs approaches to planning and social
policy making oriented toward improvement of human conditions.
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They attempt to achieve this by establishing criteria for the
effectiveness of policies, say, through analyses and balancing of costs
and benefits, utilities and disutilities, unit costs, and the like;
or through controls aimed at minimi sing the impact of undesirable
consequences of purposive social action — as implied in the key notion
of "feedback loops" for system self-correction. Social thought in
the historical/cultural tradition is fearful of the demands for masses
of information and data entailed by the cybernetic conception of
societal planning.
This enormous appetite for data is said to justify extensive social
data-gathering and storage procedures allowing the tapping of this
information in planning and policy making exercises. The pessimistic
and slightly romantic view taken of a centralised information -policy
revolves around the detrimental totalitarian effects of such a policy
upon the free pursuance of human values by cooperating individuals.
But there is, perhaps, a more plausible cause for concern in this
respect. By establishing procedures of information gathering and
fixing data categories that are relevant in "social accounts" and
"social indicators" the rarge of concepts and possibilities that enter
into the realm of creative policy making is artificially restricted.
The cultural fixation of data categories is thus said to effect
a premature closure on the aspects that are taken to be relevant in
policy making by directing the search for planned measures towards
the data categories that are already — some say arbitrarily — fixed.
Moreover, it is not at all certain that the fixed categories of data
correspond conceptually with what there is in social reality. The
uncritical acceptance of such statistical material as "rock-bottom"
foundations for generalisations and explanations regarding social
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phenomena has been seriously criticised (HHIDESS,1973); (CICOUEEL, 1962+).
Writers in the historical/cultural tradition view pessimistically
the so-called "technicist" language and ideology of the cybernetic
metaphor which relies upon the conception of self-regulating cybernetic
controls (servomechanisms) and neglects the processes of self-realisation
and learning through which real people participate in the arrangement
of their affairs. But would this mediating position of process,
history and culture be free from criticism? Probably not; perhaps
the most severe criticism that may be levelled against it is its
ineffectiveness in producing concrete proposals and programmes for
action. Planned action involves more than pluralism of goals,
organic and cultural integration, and proliferation: it involves
a level of specificity and commitment which seems to be conceptually
excluded from the historical/cultural tradition which argues that all
options should be kept open at all times. Answers to these problems
could be sought and eventually found. However, by maintaining a
poly-theoretic and relativist view of knowing and acting this tradition
seems to be self-negating for it cannot justify itself. If it is
put forward as the "correct" approach to planning and policy-making
then it logically contradicts precisely what it preaches: pluralism
and proliferation of views, programmes of action, policies, goals,
and ideologies. If it is not advanced as the "right" approach then
there is no overwhelming reason why it should be regarded as more
credible than other approaches. This may appear as a banal criticism
of relativism, and so it is; but it is one which the historical/cultural
tradition may find it difficult to refute.
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Yet this tradition appears to be most appropriate in environmental
studies; for it places emphasis on the processes of interaction
between man and environment which constitute the main concern of such
studies, and so reconciles the tension between the existential
individual and structural aspects of the environment ( natural and
social). Unlike other disciplines which study man and social life
aspatially, environmental planning and policy making is a field where
social organisation should be studied in its interaction with spatial
context. By focusing on the purely physical aspects of space the
latter is objectified, reified: it becomes a "container of things"
and is divorced from the meaning it might have for different
individuals. By focusing solely, on the meaning aspects of space,
so-called social conceptions of space, and how these inform human
action the structural and enduring aspects of the environment (including
structural aspects of social life) tend to be neglected.
In either of these cases, the ensuing accounts of the man/environment
relationship appear impoverished in one or another sense. Although
it cannot be claimed that any perspective of society will ever be
complete, viz. providing a "total picture" which includes all points
of view and all aspects of social reality, it could be argued
that placing emphasis only on the environment or only on man affords
knowledge that is incomplete in the wrong way for each of these
viewpoints tends to exclude the other: the limitations on the
perspective are not due to the enormity and complexity of things in
the world which the human mind may never grasp in its totality, but
rather are artificially imposed by the particular way of looking
at the world. By accepting that society appears as if it were a
mechanism one excludes the possibility of society appearing as if
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it were an organism or something else. In this way, it could be
said that these perspectives — and others that are developed within
these traditions — reflect some particular point of view, sane way of
looking at things and organising them so that they acquire meaning
within their broader context and thus become intelligible (BERRY,
Ch.1).
Each perspective gives rise to a frame of meaning; and it may not be
possible to establish rules mediating between different frames of
meaning much like the case of translating between two languages.
Each perspective guides thought in a particular way and excludes
other ways of conceiving of its subject matter. Each may be said
to possess its own vocabulary, its own language for conceptualisation,
and its own rules and procedures for acquiring and validating
knowledge, its own consistency. Its corresponding frame of meaning
or paradigm provides the context or whole within which methods,
concepts, and social practices become meaningful and are intelligently
and intelligibly connected with other methods, rules, procedures,
and practices. Each frame of meaning involves implicit presuppositions
and seeks to discover what these presuppositions are by acquiring
knowledge which is inevitably founded on these. This renders the
problem of knowledge obtained within a frame of meaning a question
of understanding and interpreting the data of experience within
a broader historical and cultural context of social practices,
metaphysical presuppositions, systems of beliefs, and forms of life.
This essentially hermeneutic problem involves the observer in an act
of relating parts (particular substantive aspects of some subject
matter) to wholes (frames of meaning) with full consciousness of his
own historicity and relativity and its implications for the "true"
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meanings of episodes of social life.
This view gives rise to the problem of comparing and assessing different
perspectives against one another which involves the construction of
rules of mediation between different frames of meaning. Now if the
internal unity of paradigms is exaggerated they tend to emerge as closed
systems of thought, self-enveloping universes; and the task of moving
from one to another becomes impossible to accomplish. One way to
overcome this problem is to attempt to redefine it: instead of
accepting frames of meaning or paradigms as discrete, self-contained
enclosures each excluding all others, it might be argued that
(GIEDENS, 1976: p. 114I4.) j "all paradigms ... are mediated by others".
For instance, if the rational/comprehensive and the disjointed/
incrementalist forms of planning are viewed as two fundamentally
different, mutually exclusive paradigms^-^ of planning (GALLOWAY
and MAHAYNI, 1977) — the "older" and the "succeeding" one, respectively —
then the latter mode of planning cannot be fully grasped apart from its
relation to the former as a critique. The rules, conventions,
methods and procedures of a paradigm as a set of social practices
cannot 'be learned in isolation from other alternatives that are
replaced or discarded by its adoption. Learning what a paradigm is
not is as important as learning what it is.^3)
chapter two
The art and science of urban planning.
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CHAPTER TWO
The art and science of urban planning.
Introduction and outline.
1. Social science and the "scientific revolution".
2. The emergence of urban planning.
3. Urban planning and the social sciences: the "borrower" and
the "lenders".
3.1 Cities as the focus of interest of a variety of
scientific disciplines.
(A) The "social physics" tradition: social/spatial
interaction as a "law" of nature.
(B) Ecological models of the city.
(C) Location theory.
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(D) Common underlying presuppositions of the three
traditions of modelling social/spatial phenomena.
(E) The metaphor of the machine: its model of knowledge,
man, and societal arrangements and planning.
3.2 "Incommensurability" of paradigms and interdisciplinary
research: multidisciplines and some "interdisciplines".
3.3 The movement towards comprehensive planning.
Footnotes to chapters one and two.
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Introduction and outline
This chapter is, perhaps, the longest in the thesis and its structure
may prove difficult to grasp for there are many themes that are
intertwined in it. It was the first to be written, and was
subsequently revised and redrafted in the light of results from
investigation into the philosophical and epistemological underpinnings
of models as components of scientific inquiry. The original goal
was supplemented with a number of subsidiary objectives. This has
resulted in a rather complex articulation of the material.
It has proved necessary to subdivide the chapter into two separate
units: chapters two and three. However, this eutline covers both of
them and traces very roughly the main lines of the argument. Though
sharing common themes these chapters must be seen as making
independent contributions.
The discussion begins with a review of the way in which the methods
and procedures of the natural sciences were introduced in social
science (section 1). There follows an examination of the origins
and foundations of the field of urban planning, and links with
certain social sciences are traced (section 2). It is section 3 of
chapter two that presents a more involved argument. On the one
hand, it attempts to explore the reasons why urban planning and
other social science disciplines are connected and how the latter
have contributed to planning research. Two main reasons are given:
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(i) Due to the way human knowledge is compartmentalised into
disciplines, each one of them looks into the world from some
disciplinary perspective peculiar to it and selects aspects that
are relevant to its interests. Interdisciplinary integration is
not always effective or even possible but in urban planning, where
several disciplinary perspectives converge, it is at least one
prerequisite for successful results. If the trend towards holistic,
comprehensive, systems approaches does not recede then
interdisciplinary research becomes even more necessary.
The contributing disciplines in planning are drawn mostly from the
social sciences (sub-section 3-1)-
(ii) The rapidly changing social context of urban planning creates
problems of adaptability of old methods and practices to new conditions.
The social sciences have contributed to planning literature a number
of critiques of the social consequences of older planning approaches
and have pointed to ways for possible improvements. Moreover, the
critique of the humanists, which sometimes emerges as blindly
"anti-planni.ng", has warned of the dangers of placing overwhelming
emphasis on technique and scientific procedure at the expense of
irreducibly human qualities of social life (chapter three, sections 1-3).
On the other hand, it is sought to demonstrate that the methodological
tradition of social scientific research which has been absorbed in
urban studies is not independent of particular philosophical and
epistemological positions akin to the view of science advanced by
philosophical positivism. Even if positivism (in the sense specified
below) is not to be found easily in discussions of contemporary
philosophy of science, its methodological inheritance to the social
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sciences has had a lasting effect and has cultivated a particular
attitude towards social enquiry (sub-section 3.1 ). Three research
traditions of urban studies are considered in terms of the models
of aspects of social/spatial organisation they have given rise to:
"social physics", urban ecological models , and location models .
Greater emphasis is placed on spatial interaction models due to their
special relevance in planning and transportation studies (items A,B,
and C).
The linkages between these research traditions and positivist
epistemology and methodology are shown to be intelligible and the
well-known critique of positivist views is extended to them (item D).
It is suggested that the guiding metaphor of this world outlook is
the machine. Considerations regarding the "model of man" that is
accepted by the mechanistic world view and the style of planning
that would be compatible with it lead to certain reservations as to
the appropriateness of mechanism as a source of insights into
the study of social life and the planning of societal affairs (item E).
The main theme of chapter three is about the role of the ideological
elements of urban planning. These are taken to be inseparable
from any planning undertaking. A scientific, technological approach
to problem-solving in planning will therefore have to allow for such
value elements. These may be impossible to reconcile if the view
taken of science is one which postulates a shaxp division between
facts and values (section 1+). Finally, the chapter concludes with
a discussion of one such synthesis put forward by Britton Harris
in which scientific, humanistic, and problem-solving aspects of urban
planning are seen in an integrated framework (section 5)*
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1. Social science and the "scientific revolution".
The paradigm of a science of the artificial emerged from the interaction
of different but interdependent streams of intellectual activity in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which were in turn founded
on the spectacular successes of science after the seventeenth century.
Resorting again to the history of science proves rewarding in this
specific context. With the termination of Medievalism in science
intensive scientific activity in the seventeenth century sparked off
what has been called a "scientific revolution" (BOCHNER, 1966: p.108).
The major developments in physics achieved by Newton through his laws
of the motion of heavenly bodies — which gave that period its
characterisation as the "age of physics" — impressed contemporary
and subsequent generations of scientists. The symmetry, economy and
structural qualities of the Newtonian system was considered an ideal
toward which scientists strove. They attempted to establish the
reasoning that lead from a fragmentary state of knowledge about the
movement of the planets to the abstraction of certain principles which
explained in synoptic form a large body of seemingly unrelated data.
The rapid development of modern physics during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries was the outcome of concentration of research
efforts on a central division of physics called "rational mechanics"
which made extensive use of mathematics.With the beginning of
the nineteenth century, mechanics became a model of mathematisation
for all physics and gradually for all the other disciplines
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of science as well. Although there was some reaction among philosophers
against the wisdom of letting the use of mathematics expand too far
and too deeply in science, the trend towards mathematisation was not
arrested and it has been an integral part of science since.
It is unnecessary to follow the historical development of science in
any greater detail. Its phenomenal successes to date have achieved
the accumulation of vast amounts of theoretical and empirical knowledge
and have deeply influenced mankind. Ever since Newton formulated
his theoretical scheme, scientists dealing with man rather than the
physical world were contemplating the possibilities of duplicating
the successes of the physical sciences in the fields of intellectual
endeavour that were studying man and society. It was presumed
that this would be attained by adopting into these fields the basic
rules and procedures governing the reasoning of the physical sciences.
The transposition of the methodology was justified on the assumption —
which was also a conclusion at that time — that the physical and social
worlds were at least sufficiently similar so that the fundamental
method of reasoning applicable to one could be transferred, with
suitable adjustments, to the other.
The intellectual movement of Utilitarianism in the eighteenth century
epitomises the influence of scientific method on the thinking of the
(57)
period. w ' By deliberately trying to exclude from their reasoning
all traces of 'a priori' knowledge and to base every premise on facts,
the pursuers of the movement to apply the mind to social issues acted
as if the mere self-conscious application of reason on the way men
behave was the essence of science. By the beginning of the nineteenth
century the pervasive desire to be scientific and to lean on observation
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had permeated the thinking of most researchers dealing with man and
society, and had initiated a vast output of social research. Called
the age of scientific method the period saw workers like Comte, Mill and
Spencer dominate the field of the study of society.
Their approach to acquiring knowledge of the natural and social world
was mainly founded on Empiricism ^^and the concomitant effort to
eliminate intuitive, 'a priori', and metaphysical assumptions from
what was to he accepted as legitimate scientific knowledge. Auguste
Comte(1798-1857) introduced both the word "sociology" and the term
"positive philosophy" into the scientific vocabulary. In his view,
the science of man and society — i.e. sociology — was to be the
culmination of "positivism" (GIDBENS, 197^* PP.1-3)« ^ Now,
positivism as a -philosophy may entail a number of theses which have
not been formulated by Comte but have a much longer tradition in
philosophy. However, Comte's use of the term refers to a definite
view of the "logic of science" — or "scientific method" — which
dominated the scientific thought of the nineteenth century. In that account,
scientific knowledge was taken to be the paradigm of all valid knowledge.
Science was seen as the potential provider of solutions to all major
practical problems facing the world of man and society.
Positivism in the social sciences usually — but not necessarily —
amounts to the programmatic rule of methodological naturalism, that is,
the view that the social sciences and even the humanities have basically
the same aims and methods as the natural sciences. This doctrine
must rely upon some stated or unstated conception of the character
of natural science and, consequently, is to some extent connected with
(61)
the epistemological assumptions of philosophical positivism.^ '
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One set of such assumptions which is usually associated with positivism
is an extreme form of Empiricism, which reduces science to statements
about directly observable facts and eliminates as meaningless any
(62}
sentence that is neither analytic nor synthetic or empirical: '
e.g. metaphysical statements. In a very broad sense, it is possible
to refer to an approach towards doing research in social science as
positivistic — or as containing positivist elements — if it strongly
emphasises the anti-speculative attitude with regard to the development
of theories, the ideals of caution, clarity and precision, and the
preference for scientifically solvable and practically useful problems.
In a stricter sense, positivism in the social sciences — as it is
presented in discussions in contemporary antipositivist literature —
may be seen to involve three main groups of issues which appear
connected, although acceptance of one set of assumptions does not
necessarily entail the other two. Thus, (GIEDENS, "\97hi pp.3-^+)•
(i) The social scientist is taken to be a detached ("neutral")
observer of social "reality" which he studies by employing the methods
of the natural sciences — with the aims of the latter in mind.
Social and human conduct is observed and studied as an "object"
equivalent to the objects of the natural sciences. The phenomena
of individual subjectivity and purposeful behaviour are not taken to
require any different approach to that employed in the study of
physical phenomena.
(ii) The goal of social scientific inquiry is taken to be the
formulation of"law-like" generalisations, as is the case in the
natural sciences. This involves the social scientist in analysis
or "interpretation" of his subject matter.
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(iii) The social sciences are taken to be "neutral" with respect to
values and normative issues, just as the natural sciences are claimed
to be. On this account, the outcome of social scientific inquiries
has a technical character: the knowledge acquired is purely
instrumental in form and does not carry any logically given implications
for practical -policy issues or for the pursuit of particular values.
This is especially relevant for any discussion or critique of scientific
approaches to the study of social phenomena in the context of disciplines
which place strong emphasis on policy issues — such as urban planning
and economics.
The introduction of the positivist attitude in the social sciences
has had a profound and pervasive influence on the development of
theoretical knowledge and the methodological apparatus of the
disciplines studying man and society; an influence which is still
present to date despite the dominant antipositivist tendency in
contemporary philosophy of social (and natural) science (EEGED DOY
and KLEIN, 1970: pp.311-326). The generalisation of the use of
mathematics in natural science subsequently affected the social sciences,
too. Economics was a "moral " philosophy -until its transformation,
mainly through the seminal work of Cournot(C0lIRN0T, 1838/1927),
into an extensively mathematised discipline. Fechner introduced
quantitative concepts in psychology (FECHNER,i860);
and the efforts of nineteenth century biologists to apply mathematics
in various areas of their field were described by (THOMPSON, 1917/1942).
Quetelet's work on "social physics" (QHETEIET, 1835/1869) and Le Play's
"Methode d'observation" (LE PLAY, 1879) deeply influenced the thinking
and methods of emerging social sciences, such as sociology
(LAZARSFELD, 1961: pp.164-202).
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The steady acceleration in the increase of knowlegde in the natural
sciences and the concomitant achievements of technology established
confidence in scientific reasoning to such an extent that by the first
quarter of the twentieth century most social sciences that had developed
a distinct field of study were either using or experimenting with
scientific methods and the tools traditionally employed by the
scientists. These disciplines were moving towards more exacting
standards of inquiry, and were being converted to the belief that
many concepts of the natural sciences provided useful analogies for
theory development in the social sciences.
The deep methodological changes in the social sciences did not take
place without strong and at times sensible opposition. Several
social scientists and philosophers have argued that scientific
reasoning is unable to show the way to the solution of augmenting
social problems, especially moral ones; and have insisted upon
the need to revive emotional attachment to ideology. Already
since the nineteenth century — the age of the universal recognition
of the almost unlimited powers of reasoning based on scientific methods
— social science had been accused that it sought to derive human
goals by empirical inquiry. Contemporary critics of naturalistic
ethics point out that on the one hand, scientific resoning cannot
determine the nature and the content of values that are held, or ought
to be held, by society; and on the other hand, that it is impossible
to discover generalisations about human activities that correspond
both in universality and in durability to the laws of the physical
sciences. Therefore, it is claimed, the effort to attain the
methodological rigour and precise formulations of the physical sciences
is not founded on contentual correspondence between the two domains,
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but it originates in scientism: the premature and slavish imitation
of the physical sciences (vonHAYEK, 19^2); (von HAYEK,1943)? (von HAYEK,
191+1+) • Whatever the underlying sources of the growing disbelief that
it is possible to discover universal generalisations about society,
there appears to emerge in contemporary social science a tendency to
abandon 'reason' in favour of emotion, cultural and moral values, and
tradition. Social scientists are on the verge of an "age of
subjectivity" in contrast to the past search for objectivity through
scientific reasoning. The circle is almost complete.
2. The emergence of -urban planning
The process of disciplinary subdivision of science had an important
parallel development. Distinct areas of application of knowledge
were identified and were functionally labelled as professions; and,
subsequently,as separate disciplines. Notable examples are agriculture,
architecture, various branches of engineering, and spatial planning.
It is possible to employ the term "planning" to refer to a number
of distinct activities for it is a generic term. It is being applied
to the management of businesses, organisations, operations, economic
development, social change, and the like. This also holds when the term
is qualified as "spatial planning".In the context of physical
(or geographical) space, "planning" appears in expressions such as
"urban planning", "town planning", "town and country planning",
"environmental planning", etc. Depending on the socio-political context
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within which these expressions are applied, the term "planning" may
denote totally different activities and its use is, therefore, not
unambiguous. For example, "planning", in the above expressions may
mean any of the following activities (ALLISON, 1975s P«55)s
(i) Whatever occurs is a course of action publicly chosen from among
possible alternatives — a state of affairs which is characteristic
of a holistic, Utopian world marked by the absence of "individuals".
(ii) Coordination of courses of action in terms of specific goals and
objectives.
(iii) Subjection of the actions of both individuals, .and. groups of
individuals or organisations (wholes) to some form of public control
which need not be guided by any specific goals and/or objectives.
(iv) Provision for future "growth", "development", or other
eventualities by projecting current trends and contingencies; such
projections serve as the basis for formulating strategies and policies
by administrative bodies — planning as the provision of "instrumental"
knowledge in an advisory rather than decision-making capacity.
(v) Projections of trends combined with forecasts of future situations,
based on certain given conditions (e.g. goals and objectives) and
leaving other factors open to choice; leading to a listing of
strategies and policies with preferences attached to them after
relevant assessment.
It is not difficult to see that the type of planning which has been
taking place in the .United States belongs to category (iv), above;
while in the United Kingdom planning has taken the form of categories
(iii) and (v). In the ensuing discussion, the expressions "urban
planning", "spatial planning", "planning", and "urban spatial analysis
and planning" will be taken to refer to one and the same type of activity
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(but accepting reasonable variations). This is the activity of
planning and control of change in urban settlements, within the
political framework of Western pluralist democracies.
Although the practice of designing human settlements has existed
almost ever since man began to build towns and to make decisions about
their future, the emergence of modern town planning as a more or less
well-defined field of professional activity is a relatively recent event.
Both in Britain and the United States there had been concern over the
effects of uncontrolled urban growth on living conditions in towns as
early as the 181+0's. Such growth was due to . the massive shale of" ~
industrialisation that took place in most Western nations, starting
(66}
with the eighteenth century industrial revolution in Britain.^ '
Alarmed contemporary thinking is best illustrated in (BOOTH, 1892-97/
1906), (ENGELS, 1892), (ROWNTHEE, 1876) and later (MASTER^!!, 1909/
i960); they represent the "Victorian protest literature".
The fundamental causes of that situation were manifold (WEBER, 1899)-
However, the absence of effective control over urban development was
soon identified as an important factor in the environmental deterioration
of the cities. The Civic Reform movements that were formed in America
shortly before the Civil War; and increased consciousness in Britain
concerning the undesirable consequences for urban societies of
indiscriminate and unregulated urban growth without the necessary
supporting services, resulted in the introduction of legislation
principally aimed at the environmental improvement of the cities.
This concept of a physical "evil" amenable to a physical "solution"
was instrumental in bringing into being the activity of controlling
and planning the system of urban land uses, and in delimiting
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the professional scope of that activity. Visionaries like Owen,
Howard, and Geddes ^ deeply influenced the formative years of land
use planning and laid the foundations for its ideology. That is,
that physical, environmental and control measures could, and should,
solve the problems created by the "evils" of the large city (CLAWSON
and HAIL, 1973: p.33).
Thus, the activity of urban planning may be said to have been the
outcome of the fusion of an ideological and a pragmatic perspective.
The former was reflected in the thinking of the social reformers and
"Utopians" — of both liberal and socialist political beliefs —
who held various visions of some ideal combination of urban settlement
and human community. Their conceptions entailed the ideals of
individual freedom and social equality, on the one side, and of a
harmonious man-environment relationship, on the other. These they
advanced as normative conceptions of how towns and cities ought to.be
and the kind of life and society that their inhabitants should have.
Planning was a systematic effort at reconciling individual freedom
and social equality (the man-man relations) and regulating the
relations between man and his environment in terms of these ideals.
The pragmatic perspective was exemplified by considerations of the
"problems" of the "physical evils" that had befallen most human
settlements. Such "problems" were pressing and it was practically
useful to try and provide "solutions" to them. This approach was
well within the tradition of "pluralistic empiricism" — characteristic
component of philosophical pragmatism — which represented a method
of investigating piecemeal, but in context, the physical, biological,
psychological, linguistic, and social problems which are not resolvable
by a simple metaphysical formula or 'a priori' system (e.g. of the type
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advanced by Karl Marx) (WIENER, 191+9 s Ch.9).
In terms of the backgrounds of those involved in the early planning
movement, the most vociferous, articulate and well-organised bodies
concerned were those with the construction and design skills of
engineering, architecture, and surveying, together with professionals
in the field of law. Thus, the Town Planning Institute and the
American Institute of Planners were founded early in the twentieth
century by people who had received training in areas other than
planning, and who attempted to provide "... a new type of professional
skill, or a milieu of existing skills..." (McLOUGHLHJ, 1969: p.214.)
to deal with the increasingly serious problems of the cities.
The interest of these professionals in planning was a by-product of
their principal occupational concern and was permeated by disciplinary
orientation. Architects tended to approach planning as a large-scale
architectural design exercise, while engineers viewed it as the task
to establish standards which achieved objectives such as the provision
of sufficient light, air or public services. At the other end
of the professional range, surveyors considered planning as the problem
of wise management of land within the confined interest of the public
authority that they served.
During the inter-war period, this first generation of town planners —
with their newly acquired professional consciousness and orientation,
but limited in their effectiveness by lack of supporting planning
legislation — were faced with a complex of rapidly changing socio¬
economic and technological circumstances.^^ These were manifested
in the accumulation of severe social, economic and environmental
(71)
problems that began to seriously disrupt urban life.
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In Britain,awareness of the social undesirability of these trends com¬
pelled the Government to consider the introduction of radically
interventionist policies concerned with the imposition of controls
over industrial location and the use of land. A series of official
(72)
commissions of inquiry, initiated in 1937> culminated in the
introduction of the first purposefully developed planning legislation:
(73)
the 19U7 Town and Country Planning Act; and in the authorisation
of the preparation of a number of ambitious plans for certain towns
and urban regions.With the foundation of the first effective
legislation the field of town planning had reached the stage of some
disciplinary recognition and integrity.
The preceding brief historical review greatly assists in the tracing
of the developmental trajectories of certain fundamental concepts
of urban planning that appear to be relevant in the context of the
ensuing discussion. Up to the early 19U0s, the writings of the
visionaries of planning (alias Utopians)had influenced practising
planners to the extent that an ideology of planning was clearly taking
shape: a normative concept of the environment — the village, the city,
the region, and their clear-cut functions — together with a normative
('7<)
notion of man — his needs, his aspirations, in short his way of life. '
In Britain, this orientation towards an ideal spatial structure at
equilibrium was implicit in the new planning legislation of the 19i+0s,
although the latter dealt more explicitly with methodological and
practical implementation problems of town planning rather than with
theoretical issues. ( ^6)
The emerging post-war planning paradigm — what is referred to as
the "natural social harmony model" (HEBBEET,1973: P»22) — took as
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its starting point the data on population categories, that is,
households, firms, motorists, and so on, as a system of individuals
located in physical space, rather than as entities within a field
of competing social groups. Thedr needs were assessed on the basis
of certain empirically established technical requirements (e.g.
residential densities)as well as on the basis of certain fixed concepts
of an ideal environment.
The underlying assumption of this "model" was that these groups of
individuals would tend towards a "natural" (harmonious) equilibrium —
coinciding with the ideal structure of the city — under specified
spatial conditions (HOWARD, 1902); (ASHWORTH, 195U)S (FOLEY, 1960);
(BENEVOLO, 1967). Solutions to social problems would be sought
through a manipulation of the physical setting within which the given
population of individuals conducted its affairs. Adjustments of
the environmental setting would act as equilibrating forces upon the
population. Thus, it was generally accepted that "a well-designed
physical environment could promote and guarantee an ideal social
order" (BUTTIMER, 1971: p.11*6).
This concept of urban planning as "ameliorative problem solving"
(BERRY, 1973s P-16) led to the assumption by the planners of the role
of social (or collective) engineer. To create the set of specified'
spatial conditions that were considered as prerequisite for the
existence of an "ideal social order" the planners had to manipulate
directly the urban environment and, by implication, the social
organisation of the population. The social engineering function
of the planners was established upon two premises (HEBBERT, 1973s P»2£).
Eirst, that there exists an identifiable, single public interest:
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universal social imperatives should transcend the sectional interests
( 77)
of population groups. Vl,/ Second, that the planning professionals
possess privileged knowledge of that public interest. The
"neighbourhood" conception (FURDOM, p.199); (WOODBURY, 1953);
(WILSON, 1966) leading to comprehensive slum clearance operations
and redevelopment at the community level; and the principle of
(79)
separation of non-conforming land uses, ' leading to strict land
use controls, zoning, and extensive surgery on existing structures at
the urban and metropolitan levels emerged as the standard, "physical
determinist" solutions of the social engineering approach to tackling
the problems of urban societies (MEYERSON and BANFLELD, 1955);
(A1TSHULER, 1965).
Benefiting from the advantages afforded by hindsight, it is not difficult
to see that with these conceptual and tactical developments town
planning had reached the stage of a certain internal structuring.
This becomes manifest in its two distinct yet intertwined focuses
of interest:
(i) The ideological or "theoretical" component whose seeds are to be
found in 19th century social theory (in the positivism of Comte, Spencer
and Mill) and in the ideals of the first visionaries of planning.
(ii) The methodological or "procedural" aspect of planning which,
guided by "theoretical"concepts, is concerned with the operationalisation
of these ideals and the application of the principles in real life by
approrpiate means and procedures.
6b.
3- Urban planning and the social sciences: the "borrower" and
the."lenders".
The long and arduous process of evolution of the urban planning
activity and its reaching a stage of maturity such that planning
could be identified as a distinct profession and, subsequently, be
examined in terms of whether or not it constituted a discipline in its
own right did not take place in isolation from other fields of
scientific endeavour. The forming of its theoretical background and
set of methodological rules involved planning in a long process of
borrowing in terms of both concepts and techniques from other
disciplines, notably the social sciences in the 1930s and the
behavioural sciences in the early 1950s (ROBINSON, 1972: p.23).
The perceptible inevitability surrounding the process of adoption and
adaptation by urban planning of conceptual frameworks, methods of
reasoning , and techniques from other disciplines can be attributed
to two principal groups of factors, the following:
1. The prevailing conditions with regard to the ways human knowledge
was organised during the formative years of planning. Three distinctive
but closely interdependent sets of circumstances can be identified:
(i) Interest in human settlements is shared by a number of disciplines.
(ii) Inter-war period trends towards multidisciplinary, then
interdisciplinary research.
(iii)Realisation of the need to expand the scope of urban planning by
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taking into consideration other relevant factors in addition to the
traditional purely physical and environmental ones.
2. The emergence of significant new social needs — generated by
fundamental changes in the fabric of urban society; and the availability
of improved technological capabilities initiated a process of change
in the methods and ideology of urban planning. The latter's lack of
success with its earlymodes of operation was an additional impetus
towards such reorientation of approach.
These issues are explored below: those under (1), in this cMpter,
those under (2), in chapter three; and implications are drawn for the
current -urban planning "paradigm" — if it is accepted to employ this
term to refer to a generally agreed way of "doing planning".
3.1 Cities as the focus of interest of a variety of scientific
disciplines.
Involvement of a number of disciplines in the study of human settlements is
a logical consequence of the way in which man's cognitive processes
are organised. The same phenomenon attracts the attention of different
disciplines. Disciplinary perspectives may result in different objective
definitions of otherwise identical phenomena. Consequently, any event
that is being experienced is characterised by a certain number of
relevant contexts which correspond to the points of view held by
different disciplines which are concerned with that event (ABLER etal.,
1971 '• p.55). Consider, for example, the construct ^^"town".
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This is intersected by several contexts within which the construct
may be validly viewed. Obvious dimensions of "towns" are time and
space; their relevance gives rise to the interest of historians
and geographers. However, other important contexts of the same
construct, such as economic, political, social, psychological,
anthropological, administrative, regulatory( planning) generate
distinct fields of study which attract the respective disciplines
which aim at describing and explaining the construct "town" each
from its own particular perspective. Within each of these disciplines
certain ways of looking at the subject-matter of interest may come
to be established as dominant over other perspectives andmay assume
the status of a locally sovereign paradigm — in the Kuhnian sense.
Although there may not be any "ultimate" grounds for suggesting that
some particular way of looking at the world is "true" and ought to be
adhered to exclusively in any research undertaking, it is possible to
agree to assess the fruitfulness of a "paradigm" by its results in
scientific inquiry; or — alternatively — to pursue some particular
perspective until an improved version of it or a totally new perspective
becomes established and accepted by the community of scientists in the
discipline concerned.
The study of the city has been approached in different ages from various —
often contrasting — points of view. "Utopian"thinking of early
philosophers such as Plato and Thomas More, and of "functionalists"
like Leonardo Da Vinci, preceded the more practical, nineteenth century
"utopian" social reformers such as Bellamy, Howard, Buckingham, and
Salt; and twentieth century visionaries like Geddes, Le Corbusier,
Wright, and Puller — the latter being called a "technological
utopian". The thinking of Patrick Geddes deserves special mention
for it is important not only because it has laid the foundations for
the emergence of urban planning as a dinstict field of professional
activity focusing on the city-, but also because it has fostered an
entire tradition of urban studies.Geddes clearly saw (GEDDES 1915)
that the so-called "problems" of the city — e.g. problems of public
hygiene, of industry and economics, of social and community organisation
in urban space — were not amenable to individual "solutions" that were
independent of one another. He took such "problems" to be inextricably
interrelated aspects of one indivisible -whole that is, of the life
and activities of human beings as social agents within a definite
space. Viewing this social/spatial complex as a whole rather than
as a mere aggregate of component parts, Geddes advocated a "synoptic"
approach to its study: the "together-seeing" of the "trinity of land,
people, and work". This reflects an essentially holistic approach
to the city, with urban planning assuming a dual role: (i) interrelating
the various aspects of urban life viewed as a whole; and (ii) bringing
together the various disciplines which study each of these aspects
separately, into an integrated, interdisciplinary synthesis; with
synergistic effects over and above corresponding uni-disciplinary
contributions. Thus, it may be unjustified to call Geddes a strictly
"utopian»thinker. Bather he should be seen as a gifted visionary
for he developed a range of powerful ideas that are still valid
today, as is shown by the proliferation of holistic approaches to
urban planning via the conceptual platform of General System Theory.
The movement of the city from the pre-industrial to industrial status
generated the impetus for the development of a number of theoretical
approaches to the study of human communities and urban growth.
The emergence of social science in the second half of the nineteenth
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century (LAZARSFELD, 1961: pp.1i+8 ft.) provided the framework within
which a number of prominent thinkers endeavoured to study social
organisation in space at the urban level, to solve the "problems"
of the growing cities, and to consider the future form and function
of such urban concentrations of population, industry, and services.
These workers conceded that the "utopian" thinking of social reformers,
which was seen to be founded on some combination of 'a priori' and
empirical conceptions of the "problems" and roles of the city in the
context of their view of society, did provide intuitive sources for the
development of"plausible stories" about the city and its "problems".
However, they tended to reject "utopian" approaches as "theories" of
the city for they took them to be more or less speculative and not
founded on experience and observation, and inductive reasoning in
accordance with the canons of the predominant conception of the method
of natural science in late-nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Arguing that such speculative approaches could lead to serious
misunderstanding of the "real" nature of, and constitution of the
"structure" of, urban settlements social scientists attempted to gain
an understanding of urban affairs and social-spatial processes by
resorting to the methods of rigorous scientific analysis and inquiry
that had proved so successful in the natural sciences. Empirically
based research into the social and spatial organisation of urban
societies, carried out from a variety of disciplinary perspectives,
yielded several pioneering conceptual frameworks which did provide
the foundations for corresponding research traditions. Some of these
have had important latent implications for "theories" in urban planning
and for methods of study of its subject-matter. Some of the research
traditions that have proved fruitful in urban planning are discussed
below.
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It should be emphasised that reference to these theoretical schemes
is made in order to achieve objectives other than explicating the actual
substantive content of research approaches such as "social
physics", ecological theories of the city, location theory, etc. —
for which the bibliographical citations of the original works, and
of important later contributions and commentary should be consulted.
This is standard textbook material and its inclusion here lies
outside the scope of this dissertation. The purpose of the ensuing
discussion is to try and substantiate the argument that the city has
been the subject of interest of a variety of disciplines, but the
results of the research efforts did not produce any "general theory
of the city", only partial accounts of aspects of the city. Moreover,
the form of the inquiry in these research traditions will be commented
upon; and will be seen that it seeks to emulate — at least in
principle — some conception of the canons of scientific method akin
to philosophical positivism. Finally, the allegiance of these
research approaches to some overriding world outlook, such as
mechanicism, will be explored.
(a) The "social physics" tradition: social/spatial interaction as
a "law" of nature.
The approach which has come to be known as "social physics" may be
seen as the first conscious attempt to provide a description of human
social organisation in terrestrial space, including the city.^^
It was developed within a framework of a strong naturalistic programme
which took mind and the life element as dependent upon, included
within, or emergent from, material nature — and not as being prior
to or in some way more real than it. It further assumed that human
beings are essentially physico-chemical systems, and can be studied in
exactly the same way as the rest of the physical world by employing
the conceptual apparatus and methods of the natural sciences.
The nineteenth century tradition of "social physics" emerged as the
result of the attempt to follow the operation of the supposedly
fundamental laws of physics from one level of being to another, until
a consistent mechanistic world view was built up which streched from
the molecule, at the one extreme, to the total space or universe, at
the other — including man, society, cities. Everything in the world
of man was taken to rest on, and result from, the interplay of
mechanical, mathematically measurable and quantifiable forces.
This mechanistic world view lent support to, and received it from,
social thinkers who held a conception of society as nothing more than
a collection of individuals — viz. a nominalistic, individualistic, or
atomistic view of the social world. It was opposed by those social
philosophers who viewed society as a unity or whole and who usually —
but not always — associated their holistic conceptions with organismic
views of the social world. Individualistic views of society tend
to regard it as essentially an equilibrium system. Only the individual
being is real; an aggregate, group, or totality made up of such
individuals is nothing more than a simple collection of constituent
parts. The whole has no reality of its own apart from the reality of
its constituent parts. "Wholes" or "systems" are merely names given
to such collections of individuals, and have no properties of their
own apart from those of their constituent parts. On this view, the
coherence of society — or the coherence of individuals in society —
must be due to the balancing of individual forces. Social institutions
are seen as objective resultants of subjective energies (POPPER,IJkZ/
1973: II; P.98).
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The coexistence of individual human beings is taken to be analogous
to the coexistence of say, the "heavenly bodies" of astronomy. Each
one of these latter has its own push and pull, and all manage to get
along with each other without mutual destruction because their
attractions and repulsions ultimately balance one another.
Mechanics and astronomy thus link naturalism and nominalistic social
thought.
The tradition of'social physics" provided the conceptual foundation
for the development of a number of macro-descriptions concerning social
interaction in geographical space. Although such descriptions
proved invalid at the micro-level, say, the level of the individual
man (OLSSON, 1965: P.14+), they found wide application, especially
after the early 19l+0s, in many disciplinary contexts including
geography, sociology, demography, economics of retail trade; and
after the mid-1950s, in transportation studies and urban planning.
In the field of urban planning, in particular, the most widely employed
modeLs in the development of structure plans for cities — viz.
various forms of spatial interaction models — have originated in the
"social physics" tradition. It is perhaps significant that one of the
commonest criticisms of this approach is that it provides descriptions
(87)
of an empirical regularity which has not yet been explained.
The "gravity model", whose contemporary formulations have been renamed
"spatial interaction models", is underlain by an "implicit philosophical
belief: that the development of the city followed natural laws, rooted
in the tendency of societies to follow economising rules, or what Zipf
called the principle of least effort" (HALL, 1975: P«297)« The search
for "natural laws" of urban development and human arrangements in
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geographical space shows the strong conceptual links of this approach
with the tradition of nineteenth century positivism. Apart from Carey's
substantive contributions, John Stuart Mill's methodological and
epistemological theses are clearly reflected in the underlying rationale
of the "gravity model".^88) Mill's philosophy of science was developed
along the lines of the' thoroughgoing empiricism and inductivism of
Francis Bacon, and involved the establishment of rules governing the
logics of induction and deduction. His advocacy of the inductive-
deductive scheme of reasoning as the account of scientific method which
is universally applicable both to the natural and the social world
alike — these being taken to be amenable to investigation by the same
methods and procedures,i.e. those of natural science — has been
prominent until Popper's treatment of the logical problem of induction
(POPPER, 1957/1972) and the emergence of the hypothetico-deductive
scheme as the explanation of the "method of science".
Mill's views regarding the systematic investigation of social life and
of man in society (MILL, 19^5) were that social science should be
modelled upon Newtonian mechanics. The positivist conception of
explanation and the non-necessitarian account of causation as "constant
conjunction of events" are consistent with Newtonian mechanics. On this
model, social science should enable prediction of events so that they
can be more effectively controlled. Its task would be to allow
calculation and solution of the problems of an emergent industrial
society: social conflict,competition, conceptions of free enterprise,
etc. Social and political beliefs would be matched to what was
scientifically possible. The approach would be to first establish
scientifically the feasibility of some solution, and second to match
social and political beliefs, goals and objectives to this.
Scientific calculation of the feasible would be effected by applying
the laws of "social physics" which would be discovered inductively
by empirical observation of social phenomena. This would be"scientific
knowledge" hence absolutely "certain" and positive and would thus
ensure that people would accept its findings and would pursue only
those changes that were possible given that knowledge . Moreover,
Mill's atomistic view of the universe led to an individualist
interpretation of the social sciences. The basic "elements" or "atoms"
in society were individuals. Hence the laws governing the behaviour
of people in social interaction were to be inferred from the laws
which govern the behaviour of individuals apart from society. In this
view, the laws of psychology were to provide the basis for all the
laws and regularities in social life; and the reasons for this claim
were both ontological and epistemological.
There is little difference between this brand of nineteenth century
positivism and the "gravity model" formulations that are in currency
today. Even the rationale of social problem solving has remained
more or less unaltered in its principles. The "gravity model" in its
various formulations exemplifies the search for regularities and
laws of social behaviour — say, the "physics" of population distribution
(STEWART and WARNTZ, 1958). The fact that it deals in large aggregates
of people rather than individuals has been criticised and advocacy of
studies of behaviour at the micro-level (HARRIS, 1968) as well as
attempts at disaggregation of the model's components (WILSON, 1969)
indicate recognition of the potential contribution of the laws of
the behavioural sciences. Probabilistic derivations rather than
earlier deterministic formulations of the model (HARRIS, 196U), (WILSON,
1967), attempted to account for the "fact that individual behaviours
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do indeed contain elements of free will and of social and personal
history which are inaccessible to us for analysis and prediction"
(HARRIS, 1968: p.378). Thus, hy introducing elements of a tautological
arithmetical theory, viz. the theory of probability, there was the
implicit admission of "considerable ignorance" (CTJRRY, 1966),(GINSBERG,
1972), regarding what is taking place in people's minds and consciousness
— if such unobservable "things" are accepted at all in this
conception of society.
The source of the "gravity model" ^0; is SyStem of celestial
bodies for which the Newtonian law of universal gravitation holds.
The model is related by analogy to this already understood natural
phenomenon. Its subject is a range of phenomena concerning the
movement (flows) and settlement (location) of people in geographical
space — and by extension, of activities — which it seeks to describe.
In this sense, it attempts to depict lawful relationships in "flows"
between locations. The analogy between Newtonian mechanics and
aspects of human organisation in physical space has contributed
to the transference of the vocabulary of physics into the realm of
social life. Thus, "gravitational pull" becomes "interaction"
between, say, two areas or spatial units (zones). "Mass" of the
heavenly bodies is interpreted variously as "size" — e.g. population,
number of workers, residents or households, shoppers, travellers to work,
and the like — depending on the nature of the interaction that is to
be accounted for. Alternatively it could be taken to refer to
"attractiveness" which, suitably "operationalised", is expressed as
"employment opportunities", "housing vacancies"/'shopping floor space",
"available expenditure", etc.
(92)
of their spatial interdependence.* '
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Temporary movements of people — viz. interaction between locations in
the form of the journey to work, shopping trips, etc. — are viewed as
"flows'* which do not alter the pattern of locations but rather reflect
it. They are said to be "impeded" in terms of the "friction of
distance" separating their origins and destinations; or in terms
of costs, not necessarily pecuniary, involved in travelling. Interaction
is variably expressed, say, as trips people make between locations of
people and locations of businesses, recreation facilities, and other
people. The model has also been explored in investigations of
permanent movements of population, in the context of geography, which
reflect adjustments in location — for instance, migration (OLSSON,
1965). Now "interaction" is not a term referring to directly
observable and measurable entities or behaviour; it is a theoretical
term which has to be "operationalised" if it is to be of any use in
predictive applications of the models. The concept was found to
correlate well with migration, retail trade, journeys to work,
telephone calls, etc. (EEE, 1968: pp.3/7-3/9 )•
Other terms of the spatial interaction models (S.I.M. *s) which refer
to non-observables — e.g. "impedence" or "friction" of distance —
have tended to be more difficult to express "operationally", i.e. to
state them in terms which refer to observables and which are amenable
to quantification. Thus, "impedence" has been interpreted in a number
of ways: (a) as purely physical distance between two locations (either
airline or over-the-road distance); (b) as a number of "opportunities"
intervening between two areas (STOUFFER, 19U0) — which eschews
considerations of physical distance (HAEVEY, 1967s P»56o), though it
involves rendering operational the notion of "opportunities" which is
capable of being interpreted in a number of ways; (c) as a generalised
cost function; cost of transport; travel time; general measures of
76.
access; etc. (LEE, 1968: p.3/8)* The model parameters, e.g. the
exponent of the inverse power function of distance in a S.I.M.,
tend to vary substantially from case to case which indicates that the
importance of the influence of distance in spatial interaction is
context-dependent.
Life styles, cultural traits, local travel patterns, structural
components of the city, etc., would be likely to affect the correspondence
between model description and some actual state of affairs (COWAN, 1972).
This seems to present no great difficulty for the researchers who concern
themselves with the technology of building and using the models. The
techniques and procedures of parameter estimation or calibration are
numerous and quite effective in what is demanded of them; they are well
explored in (BATTY, 1976: chs.6-8). Model parameters are fitted
statistically to local conditions prior to application of a S.I.M. to
"predict" magnitudes or locations. However, the problems that may be
created by uncritical acceptance of the established categories of
official statistics in terms of variance between them and the concepts
they are intended to illuminate have been lucidly pointed out in
(HINDESS, 1973), (CICOUREL, 196U), and (HOLLIS and NELL, 1975).
In general,statistics and statistical facts are the product of some
specific system of concepts (conceptual categories) imposed upon
"raw experience"; they are very closely associated with some set of
technical instruments of measurement which presuppose acceptance of
theories of measurement and instrumentation. Hence all statistical data
may be taken as theory-dependent and their use as "purely" observational,
theory-neutral evidence is therefore not to be taken for granted.
Often the requirements for operationalisation and calibration result
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in conceptual distortion of original theoretical formulations
(BROABEENT, 1970a), (BARRAS, 1972). However, in any kind of empirical
inquiry of the sort that is involved in developing and using S.I.M.s
it is impossible to avoid operational definitions of theoretical terms
to enable the latter to have empirical import. The main problem
is to determine the precise nature of this empirical import.
Philosophers of science differ on this issue. There are those who
take operationalisation as a doctrine and regard concepts that are
not objectively specified as applying to, or measuring, something in
the world of experience as invalid or unacceptable in scientific
discourse. While such an extreme view is not to be found among
contemporary writers in the philosophy of science, its adoption by
the "scientific" social sciences of the 1950s and early 1960s has
still left its marks today in those disciplines. The logical status
of statements effecting the connection between terms reffering to
non-observables and observation terms is being disputed by rival schools
of the philosophy of science. The discussion is directly relevant
to the role of models in cognitive inquiry and hence is examined in
some detail in Part II, where other views on this issue are introduced.v
The spatial interaction models developed on the basis of the "gravity
model" have been found to describe fairly well a wide variety of
movements of population aggregates or flows between locations, though
they seem to fail to account for spatial behaviour at the level of the
individual household or small group — at least in their .
non-disaggregated formulations. This problem has received considerable
attention and pioneering work by (WILSON, 19^9) has introduced several
modifications and improvements of the original "gravity model". This
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research dealt with questions of (a) disaggregating the "mass"
variables of "demand" (origin) and "supply" (destination) leading
to a more realistic representation of the market mechanism; (b)
providing more detailed specifications of "attractiveness" of residential
zones to different classes of individuals (types of households or
occupations); (c) relaxing assumptions of static equilibrium in
S.I.M.s (SENIOR, 1973)» (ECHENIQUE, et al., 1971;). Moreover,
allowance was made for different modes of transport, and constraints
were introduced on flows both at the producer zones (origins) and at
the attractor zones (destinations) as well as on the overall system
budget, to yield the constrained S.I.M.s (WILSON, 197U)»
(WILSON, 1975).
These modifications have transformed a simplistic formulation, such as
the original "gravity model", into a much more realistic statement and
allegedly capable of better capturing the complexity of the city and
of providing more informed, reliable, and relevant predictions.
Although disaggregation took care of criticisms regarding the grossly
aggregative nature of S.I.M.s which was thought to impair their
capability of capturing complex relations in the city, the strictures
concerning the inadequate theoretical foundation of the "gravity model"
were not thereby answered. The main concern seems to be that the
"gravity" hypotheses are based on a "spurious analogy with Newtonian
physics", and that they have been"modified, without any justification,
to fit human contexts. The derivation is at best heuristic and not
theoretical", and is based on an analogy which may be misleading (SENIOR,
"1973) , (NEDO, 1970) • Now in this line of criticism one should clearly
distinguish between the -process of developing a model of some unknown
set of phenomena based on the drawing of an analogy with a set of
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phenomena that are already understood, and the; way in which this kind
of reasoning was applied to the "gravity" hypothesis.
As a process of moving from the familiar to the unfamiliar the drawing
of analogies is a well-established and much acclaimed practice in
(95}
natural and social science. But there are good and bad ways of
carrying it out. Whether analogies are to be regarded as mere
heuristic devices — as is suggested, say, in (HEMFEL, 1965) — or
anything more than that is open to philosophical argument. However,
in the particular case of the "gravity hypothe sis" it may be claimed
that there was no exploration of the initial analogy in terms of
substantive hypotheses which would give a coherent account of how the
phenomena concerned did in fact take place, or whv they were generated
in that particular way. Hence the criticism of the "gravity hypothesis"
for its inadequate theoretical exploration of the analogy with Newtonian
physics is sound. There is, of course, a more general level of
criticism concerning the appropriateness of drawing analogies from
phenomena of physics to describe aspects of social life. This is
associated with the methodological debate in the social sciences,
i, e. whether or not there are methods and procedures for the study
of the world of man and society that are different from the methods
of natural science and peculiar to social studies. As this problem
is explored later in the thesis, there will not be any discussion of
it at this stage.
A criticism which is concomitant with that about the adequate
theoretical basis of S.I.M.s concerns their "mere" descriptive as
opposed to their explanatory function in inquiry. ^6) mo^e^s
have been found to describe fairly well a set of phenomena (at the
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aggregate level) though placing credibility on predictions derived from
them, even if they are statistically acceptable, may be open to
discussion from a logical point of view. In an older view of science,
so-called "descriptivism", which is not currently fashionable, all
that was required of inquiry was a complete and parsimonious
description of the facts. This would automatically explain for it
would leave nothing unaccounted for. But if something was so
explained it would be possible also to predict its future occurrences,
for explanation and prediction were seen as "sides of the same coin",
having the same logical structure. Extreme "descriptivism" is not
to be found in contemporary philosophy of science though there are
still those who espouse the thesis of logical symmetry between
explanation and prediction. The latter has been subjected to
damaging criticism (SCHEFFLER, 1963) •
In another view of science, description and explanation are essentially
different. Explanation provides answers to "why"-questions which
involve postulating some causal mechanism or structure underlying the
phenomena of interest, or constructing some coherent causal narrative
(97)
which accounts for the generation of those phenomena.v ' As Cowan
correctly points out (COWAU, 1972), the models developed in the
tradition of "social physics" do not attempt to explain why the
phenomena they describe should take place. Their lack of "causal
explanation" is not satisfying even though the models have had
predictive success. This shortcoming is particularly obvious when
the models are applied interculturally: models developed on the
basis of empirical material from advanced nations often fail to account
for states of affairs obtaining in less developed nations or societies
(ibid.). But this is not uncommon with other methods that are employed
in urban planning, and indicates that the methods are not neutral,
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atheoretical instruments which can be applied indiscriminately irrespective
of cultural context. They presuppose "theories of instrumentation",
and impose a specific kind of order on the reality that they seek
to investigate which is not inherent in that reality. Hence the
dimensions of that, order have to be investigated and their
compatibility with existing forms of life should not be taken for
granted but should be regarded as a subject for investigation in its
own right.
In the absence of explanatory accounts of phenomena of spatial
interaction, it could be argued that a predictive instrument such as
the "gravity model" might be useful in its role in planning. If
this view is taken, then S.I.M.s could be regarded as "black boxes":
it would not be known why what happens does in fact happen, but
predictions would tend to be more or less reliable. The models would
be taken as "as if", "fictional" constructs useful for some specific
purpose, say, prediction, without making any claims as to realism of
interpretation — though they would have to reflect the world in
some very basic way: not anything can give reliable predictions
of complex phenomena. If it generates useful predictions, then the
model could be preserved as an instrument for that particular
purpose, but not criticised for its lack of realism and crudity.
The problem here is that if one has a good instrument of prediction,
and prediction is all important in his activities, one relaxes
the search for improving knowledge.and attaining better understanding
of social/spatial phenomena, and focuses on technical refinements of
the instrument: improved calibration techniques, better statistical
treatment of variables, computerised applications and algorithms, and
other advances in technique rather than substance. Unfortunately,
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this is an obscurantist view of intellectual progress in the field of
planning whose success is predicated as much on accuracy of predictions
and forecasts as on an improved understanding of its subject-matter.
As Popper has so convincingly argued, if prediction (and control) were
the only goal of science then the Ptolemaic geocentric theory of the
cosmos would still be in currency today for it yields sufficiently
accurate predictions in relation to its successor, i.e. the Copernican
heliocentric theory (POPPER, 1963* ch.3). However, there are many
who would regard a model (as well as a theory) successful if it
simply produced required predictions and enabled anticipation and
control of some set of phenomena, instead of providing a rational
account,i.e. explanation, of the -process by which prediction is
arrived at. If a model is taken as a predictive device, as an
instrument for prediction or a technique which is aimed at
accomplishing some specific function, then the adequacy of the model
is to be assessed pragmatically by its results in application.
For instance, are predictions from S.I.M.s accurate and reliable?
Has the design and calibration of the models — a prerequisite for
prediction — reached a level that is appropriate to the demands made
of the models? Are the results produced by the models cast in usable
form or do they need further disaggregation to meet the needs of the
planning exercise? Are the substantive assumptions of the models
adequate or do they require modification? Could the predictive
mechanism of the models be made more "transparent" ? With regard
to the latter question, several workers have attempted to improve
the theoretical basis of S.I.M.s with encouraging results (HARRIS,
(NIEDERCORN and BECEDOLT, 1969), (WILSON, 1970).
Irrespective of the validity of the substantive content of these
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contributions — and there may be several points that are weak in
these formulations (KING, 1976) — they do represent steps in the
right direction of much needed theoretical development. Indeed, A.G.
Wilson has conceded that enough energy has been expended in the
1960s in discovering and refining "techniques", perhaps at the
expense of conceptual clarification and theoretical advance (WILSON,
1972) — a view that is shared by (OZBEKHAN, 1970).
Providing the search for improved knowledge and understanding is
not arrested by accepting the convenience of relatively accurate
predictions as an ultimate end in itself, there is nothing wrong
in making use of S.I.M.s in their predictive instrumentalist capacity.
For as Hippocrates declared in what must be one of the earliest
statements on "muddling through" and pragmatism, "life is too short;
the craft is too hard to learn; the occasion so urgent". But this
discussion has not explored . the issue of whether models as elements
of what might be loosely referred to as the "methods and procedures
of natural science" are appropriately applied to the description
and prediction of social/spatial phenomena. To argue that they are
is to accept at least that the subject matter of the social sciences
and urban planning is in principle amenable to study and investigation
by the same methods and procedures as the world of inanimate nature —
i.e. a weak programme of methodological naturalism^1001- though the
models that are being investigated may be said to have been developed
within an underlying framework of a strong naturalistic programme
connected with positivism, which rejects any differences between the
"natural and the "social" as well as any differences in the methods
employed to study them.
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Now, to accept methodological naturalism either in its strong or weak
form cannot he regarded as self-evident. It raises a number of
important issues which revolve around the kind of "model of man"
that urban planners adopt in their model building efforts and the
issue of compatibility of their methods of study and analysis with
that "model". In the very few lines that Batty devotes to this
question of naturalism (BATTY, 1976: V'3Sk) he takes it to be a "matter-
of judgment and experience" whether the "natural" and the "social"
(101)
are substantively distinct. However, as is argued elsewhereN, '
this is not an empirical question to be settled by "scientific
method"; and answers to it axe not independent of some "prior
philosophy" or system of beliefs. Hence, what was argued above
with respect to S.I.M.s was contingent upon acceptance of some form
of methodological naturalism in investigating social/spatial
phenomena — though no commitment to this view has been made by
the author.
The "gravity model" and its derivative spatial interaction models
were reviewed at some length— unlike the two classes of models of
social/spatial phenomena that are to be examined below — for they are
the kinds of models that have been most expensively employed in
modern urban planning and transportation studies (in the 1960s and
early 1970s). Their use as instruments for prediction involves
forecasting likely consequences of alternative action hypotheses
regarding development and/or control measures and policies.
They are said to have discharged what was asked of them relatively
satisfactorily although there will always be room for improvement
of predictions contingent on further refinement of the models and
theoretical advances in the understanding of social/spatial phenomena.
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Without embarking on the "humanistic" critique of scientific approaches
to the study of aspects of social life — at this stage at least —
it may be conceded that: if the epistemological and ontologieal
presuppositions underlying these models are accepted; and if
criticisms regarding their substantive content and other more technical
issues are well taken; the models themselves have accomplished their
predictive task within the range of acceptable predictions that are
attainable in fields such as planning.
Therefore, in such specific.circumstances as those stated above
these models cannot be said to have been useless. They may be
criticised as theoretical failures and there is much to agree with
in this line of critique. However, in the absence of theory one has
to start from somewhere and these models could be seen as appropriate
starting points. Even if spatial interaction models are viewed as
failures, the fact that they have initiated precise statement of a
set of assumptions concerning aspects of social/spatial organisation
renders them more instructive than the eventual success of some other
confused or inadequate theoretical schema. ' For the failure of
a precisely stated model is likely to suggest specific modifications
that would be required in developing more realistic and more
explanatory models. Hence the model building activity as such
should not be confused with the success or failure of particular
models to make specific contributions to the planning process.
Models should not be viewed as mere techniques but as tentative
end results of some cognitive process. What could be criticised
is the epistemological framework within which models have been
developed and the range of presuppositions that are implied by the
acceptance of such a framework, viz. some particular view of knowledge
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and science. Moreover, taking models as one element of the "methods
and procedures of natural science", their use in fields outside
of science could he questioned on the basis of claims to the effect
that there are fundamental differences between the subject matters
of the natural and social sciences. The "methodological debate"
and some of the complex issues it gives rise to will be investigated
below. At this stage, suffice it to state that there is much effort
expended and satisfactory results obtained from scientific investigation
of social life. Within their frame of presuppositions naturalist
approaches produce knowledge of society which is consistent. A critique
of naturalism will therefore have to start from the underlying
premises of this methodological doctrine and its incorporation into the
logical empiricist programme. For it is the latter's epistemological
theses that are attracting most criticism in contemporary antipositivist
philosophy of science.
(B) Ecological models of the city.
The development of another conceptual approach to the study of socio-
spatial organisation, as it is reflected in the pattern of urban
land uses, originated in the application of certain of the principles and-
processes of (biological) ecology to the field of social sciences
giving rise to human or social ecology/This so-called "ecological
approach" to the study of the city was rapidly adapted from the field
of human ecology into a variety of urban studies with diverse
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disciplinary emphases. Over the past forty years, it has been the
starting point for most considerations regarding the utilisation
of urban land (CAR1EH, 1972/191$'• ch.9). ^ The underlying concepts
of the "ecological approach" were forged into a systematic spatial
model of urban uses by E.V.Burgess, which has come to be known as the
ecological theory of city growth. The main idea of Burgess' "concentric
zone model" is that urban land uses tend to display zonal organisation
concentrically arrayed around the centre of the city. The processes
of"competition" and "dominance", the latter associated with "invasion"
and "succession", are invoked to account for the underlying mechanism
whereby the postulated concentric arrangement of urban land uses
emerges.
The"ecological approach" keeps well within the same mechanistic world
view that nurtured the "social physics" tradition: it sees the urban
land use pattern as the concequence of a number of operative forces
analogous to those that exist in nature. It further subscribes to
methodological naturalism in its use of the methods and principles
of the natural sciences to study aspects of human social organisation
in urban space. It is founded on extensive empirical analysis of
urban phenomena and inductive reasoning leading to a rationale and
a theoretical underpinning which subsumes hitherto unrelated and
fragmented observations under an ordered and predictively fruitful
set of categories. It also resembles "social physics" in teims of
the level at which it pursues the study of its subject matter:
it focuses on the macro-level, surveying the whole land-use pattern
of the city in the search for an overriding explanation. However,
it appears to differ from "social physics" formulations in that it
represents the first systematic, "scientific" attempt to develop
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a quasi-explanatory account or "theory" of urban structure, as opposed
to the "mere" descriptive statements of "social physics". (^5) For it
affords, by way of analogy with familiar processes, a synoptic view
of the mechanisms underlying the "functioning" of the urban area.
Despite later criticism concerning the lack of transparence in the
description of such mechanisms as the operation of the impersonal
allocative mechanism of competition as well as the simplistic constitution
of the postulated mechanisms, the importance of the theoretical work
of the Chicago School cannot be denied.
It stimulated a general interest towards systematic theorising and
empirical hypothesis formulation regarding aspects of socio-spatial
organisation at the level of the city. A number of elaborations of
the early "ecological models" were introduced, notable among them being
the so-called "sector theory" of the city (HOY!T, 1939) an& the multiple
nuclei conception (HARRIS and UUMAN, 19^4-5) • The ecological focus on
sub-social processes of competition for space and reference to price
mechanisms regulating the value of urban land was an obvious pointer
for urban economists. It gave rise to a strong trend in urban
studies, which stressed economic forces and variables and resulted
in direct statements of urban land-use structure in the context of
the market for urban land and of economics(CAHTER, 1972/1975: p. 172)•
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(C) Location theory.
The research tradition in urban studies which has come to be known
as "location theory" is the third conceptual scheme which has guided
the search for models and empirical generalisations in the context
of urban planning and aspects of spatial organisation. "Location
theory" is the term commonly employed to refer to a number of different
approaches which appear united in their task of investigating
concentrations of human activity ^1<^in geographical space, but
may differ with regard to spatial scale of analysis, nature of "factors"
or "forces" that are hypothesised to determine location patterns in
(109)
space, ' and level at which analysis is carried out — viz. micro-
(110)
or macro-level.v ' The conceptual and theoretical debt of "location
theory" to classical economic theory is indisputable. Most locational
analyses employ concepts such as competition (either perfect or
imperfect); attribute great importance to the role of the markets
for goods and services and urban or agricultural land; postulate
(111)
land values and rents, on the one side, and land uses, on the
other , as mutually determining; consider functional measures of
(112)
distance, such as cost of transport and the "friction of space".v '
These analyses yield descriptive statements and/or empirical
generalisations by adducing various"forces" (^3) w^ich. are taken
to induce concentration of activities at point agglomerations ^
or in areas. Such "forces" are then employed to construct a
framework within which the location of concentrations and distribution
of activity is analysed, and the empirical laws which govern spatial
organisation and other aspects of activities are sought. Interest
is focused on "places" of activity concentration which are characterised
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by agglomeration of two or more activities carrying out functions for
( 1 1individuals or firms. ' It is postulated that the mechanism of
the market is operational in the process of competition among some
firms to occupy the same location within a "place", which results
in rent payments. Most location studies and models adopt a
reductionist approach in their use of the all-unifying and all-
C1 "16^
embracing concept of "economic man" ^ ' who is assumed to always
behave rationally in his spatial context — viz. behaving so as to
(usually) minimise costs.
"Location theory"was of interest originally to economists alone; but
even among economists there initially was a strong belief that locational
analysis was one of the least interesting and least significant areas
of economics. However, in the last twenty five years, "location
theory" has come to be established in the forefront of at least four
disciplines. Thus,geography treats it as one of its main subjects. Urban and
regional economics takes it to be one of the theories of economics:
much of the work in that field was stimulated by earlier developments
in "location theory" and the so-called land economics (AL0NS0, 1961+:
pp.6-9). Regional science, which is claimed to be a new social
science discipline, has been substantially contributing to the
development of location studies. Finally, urban planning and "systems
engineering" — the latter activity concerned with location and
management of urban public services and facilities, and urban
transportation systems — employ many of the findings of "location
theory" as central parts of their comprehensive approaches to solutions
of the "problems" of the city (ISAED, 1972: p.vi).
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Despite the strong influence of location theory on many systematic
empirical studies of the city and of social/spatial organisation,
there have been many well-aimed criticisms of the various location
{. 1 1 1 ^
models. ' Strongest among such strictures seem to be : (i)
those referring to the simplistic structure of the models
(ii) those criticising the range of unrealistic assumptions made
(119)
in these models.v ' One line of argument against the latter sort
of criticism does concede that the assumptions may be unrealistic
and not applicable to empirically observable situations. However,
it claims that it is possible to maintain such assumptions if they are
taken in an "as if" sense (MOEEILL, 1970: pp.70-73), (WEBBER, 1972: p.8).
In this view, which is associated to an instrumentalist conception
(120)
of science v ' and scientific method, assumptions such as rational
behaviour based on the principle of benefit maximisation — viz. the
"economic man" or "rational man" postulate — need not be taken literally;
people may be viewed "as if" they behaved rationally, etc.^1^^
So long as accurate predictions can be derived from the models, the
nature of their assumptions need not cause concern. The models are
seen simply as instruments for deriving predictions and not as true
representations of actual states of affairs. The test of their
success lies in their usefulness in yielding accurate predictions
(122)
which will enable control of the real world situation.v '
Most of these criticisms, and others that have not been mentioned,
may be valid — depending on the view taken of science and the process
of scientific inquiry. However, they should not obscure the importance
of "location theory" as a body of systematic studies which has provided
strong stimuli for the proliferation -of research activities regarding
urban social/spatial organisation. Most locational analyses have
focused on aggregate patterns of location and land use and attempted
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to provide descriptions of the formation of these patterns as a result
of the influence of various "forces" or "factors". Thus, the
conceptual scheme of "location theory" may he seen to lie within the
mechanistic world outlook common to the two approaches discussed
earlier. It sets out to provide an account of the pattern of land
uses and the function of central places by abstracting a restricted
number of economic variables (or "forces") from the universe of such
variables affecting land use structure, and by seeking points of
equilibrium of such "forces" in the spatial context.
It is concerned with the macro-level and takes it to be the mere
aggregate of individual locational choices rather than seeing it as
possessing properties peculiar to the whole. Having originated in
the context of economics, locational analyses have been developed by
adherence to the principles of scientific reasoning flowing from
the prevailing view of science in that discipline. The methodological
naturalism of location studies is associated with a thoroughgoing
empiricism which is manifested in the search for solid empirical
foundation for locational hypotheses, in the adherence to the regularity
view of causation^(as constant conjunction of events), in the
pursuance of "positive knowledge" of the sort that natural sciences
such as physics and chemistry regard as ideal, in the disregard of
all but the simplest and most quantifiable aspects of social values and
norms, in the rejection of value-laden analyses of ideological elements,
of human action, of the world of power and politics, and of subjective
states of mind of social agents acting in a spatial context. These
observations suggest that most location studies have been carried out
based on the implicit presupposition of a particular conception of
science and its associated epistemology and methodology, which may be
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identified as positivist. More recent studies have tended to assume
an instrumentalist position with regard to the cognitive status of
theories and models, which takes these to be instruments for prediction,
rules of inference, and the like.
(D) Common underlying presuppositions of the three traditions of
modelling social/spatial phenomena.
The research traditions that were discussed above — namely, "social
physics" or spatial interaction models, urban ecological models, and
location models —have concerned themselves with description and
explanatory sketches of the spatial consequences of social organisation
at the level of the city and, occasionally, of the region. Each of
these traditions takes a different view of the same social/spatial
reality it is concerned with; each stresses some aspects of it and
excludes others; each imposes a different order on the same set of
phenomena. Although they may be said to have certain core notions
in common, e.g. the concept of distance and its influence on human
arrangements in geographical space, their substantive differences are
more important than their similarities. However, these research
traditions share a common ontological and epistemological foundation
which may be akin to philosophical positivism — though not necessarily
in the form in which the latter was stated in the second quarter of
the twentieth century. Moreover, they have been informed by the
underlying "root metaphor" (HEPEER, 19^2) of that foundation, the
metaphor of the machine. Some of these debts to and linkages with
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positivism and mechanicism are explored below for they have important
implications for the kind of knowledge of social/spatial reality that
•urban planning ought to be pursuing, and for the ways in which such
knowledge is to be acquired.
The foundations of the tradition of thought in terms of which spatial
theorising and model building (of the kinds that were reviewed above)
have been couched are to be found explicitly in the positivist account
of the "logic of science" which is connected with a particular
methodological approach, and implicitly in the ontological and
epistemological assumptions of philosophical positivism in the Comtean,
Millian, and "Vienna Circle" tradition. Spatial research has been
concerned with the discovery,and suitable expression into some symbolic
language, of lawful regularities and uniformities in phenomena of
human arrangements in geographical space. It has been reluctant to
ascribe, even inimical towards, any particularly important role to
considerations of ideals, values, societal norms, and beliefs that
might be, among other things, significant in influencing the spatial
movements and locations of individuals, households, businesses, etc.
It has been seeking to maintain a value-neutral attitude towards such
"unobservable" aspects of human conduct. In so doing, it has
implicitly eliminated as non-legitimate or non-meaningful a range
of non-empirical categories of concepts whose absence may be said
to have impoverished social/spatial analyses and models.
Further, it has tended to disregard processes which are significant
in-use in everyday life and hence ought to be empirically acknowledged.
Considerations of, say, the world of power and politics are totally
absent from the spatial research traditions that are being
investigated. Their search for "positive" knowledge of their subject
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matter has limited the scope of their inquiries to the strictly empirical
and calculable. The objectives of a positivist programme are clearly
identifiable in these research undertakings, though they are implicitly
accepted rather than explicitly stated and pursued. They become
manifest as "dispositions of thought". Thus, research findings in
terms of lawful generalisations and/or models are to be non-evaluative,
purged from speculative or metaphysical notions of willing, feeling,
purpose, intuition, consciousness, and other such concepts pertaining
to the "meaning" aspects of social life. Instead, they are expected
to stress knowledge founded on the solid empirical bases of observation,
facts, data, experience, and other"empirical-sounding things".
However, this is a very loose characterisation of what may be referred
to as a "positivistic attitude"; and if the criticisms are to be of
any substance some idea must be given of what a positivist programme
would generally comprise. ^12^Now, identifying "the" positivist
programme may be as elusive as, say, investigating phenomena of
consciousness is to positivists. Broad features of a positivist
attitude towards social inquiry have been sketched above but this is
not an adequate presentation to support the critique of positivism
in spatial modelling. (There are many interpretations of what is
entailed by the positivists' programme both among positivists themselves
and, even more so, among their critics.
Other empiricists criticise the positivists for narrowness of
methodological programme, for introducing into scientific inquiry a
version of empiricism which'unnecessarily restricts what is to count
as legitimate knowledge of the world, and for failing to provide a
plausible descriptive account of how science is to be practised or
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a prescriptive account of how it ought to be practised which both
adequately reflects conditions in scientific inquiry and guides it.
Hence their argument is not aimed against empiricism as a theory of
knowledge but rather concerns the way in which empiricist epistemology
is to be adhered to in scientific research.
In contrast, non-empiricists criticise positivism mainly for its
emphasis on the strictly empirical and observable to the exclusion
of phenomena of consciousness and mental states knowledge of which
is impossible for positivists, unless they are manifest in overt
behaviour (as in, say, behaviourism), but is allegedly possible for
intuitionists, introspectionists and certain "apriorists" — though
they would differ as to how they would go about obtaining such
knowledge. These "subjectivists" may be said to concentrate their
attack on behaviourism^ ' rather than on the other epistemological
issues that seem to occupy antipositivist/empiricist thinkers.
Following (GlKUYMHJ, 1975s p.276), the tenets that may be said to
constitute a "strict positivist" programme might be stated in the
form shown below.
(i) There is no knowledge other than scientific knowledge of natural
and social phenomena; mathematics and logic (the formal sciences)
are included in scientific discourse but are non-factual. Other'
realms, such as ethics, in which enquiry and belief cannot be firmly
established, are to be excluded from legitimate scientific discourse.
(126)(ii) Extreme empiricism advanced either as phenomenalism or as
physicalism. B0-fch of these restrict scientific statements to
only those about observable "facts" and reject as meaningless all
sentences that are neither analytic nor synthetic.For instance,
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metaphysical statements referring to human feelings, desires, values,
beliefs, norms are to be excluded from science as meaningless ( on the
(129)
"verification theory of meaning"). ' This requirement is to be
met by value-free inquiry in which the scientist is to operate as a
neutral and detached observer of "facts out there".
(iii) Philosophy is to be reduced to philosophy of science, viz.
the "logic of science",(1^0) Qf q0gic mathematics.
(iv) Methodological naturalism in the social sciences predicated on
the assumption of the unity of method and identification of the
aims of natural and social science.
(v) Norms in general, and ethical norms in particular, are to be
regarded as sociologically relative.
(vi) Scientific knowledge conceived as above is viewed as having
great social value, and its practical applications are stressed.
Now, Giedymin points out that each of these descriptive [apart from
(vi)) statements or rules can be either accepted or denied by
positivists.. This creates a large number of philosophical
positions which could be labelled positivist (sixty four, to be precise
and this is not an exhaustive,list). It is a matter of convention
to decide how many and which of the above tenets have to be
maintained by any writer to justify his being characterised as a
positivist. Therefore, the term "positivism" is not unambiguous
and has to be applied with caution and giving full- recognition to
the complex combinations of various doctrines that may be legitimately
referred to as positivist. Especially in connection with the social
sciences and humanities, tenets (ii) and (iv) above have played
an important role in shaping the positivistic attitude towards
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those realms, and it is these that are predominantly criticised in much
(131)
of contemporary antipositivist literature.
Apart from these more general doctrines of positivism there are specific
epistemological theses which are criticised by other empiricist,
antipositivist writers.^^ Very roughly these are : (a) the "dual
language" thesis requiring the clear separation of terms referring
to observables and those that refer to non-observables, i.e. theoretical
terms. This was shown to be untenable.^^3) predictivist
account of explanation, in which prediction and explanation are
regarded as having the same logical structure; and its interpretation
in the claim that predictive accuracy is entirely equivalent to
explanatory power renders predictive performance a fundamental
criterion for the acceptance of theories. In realms of cognitive
endeavour in which scientific criteria of adequate explanation are
hard to satisfy (e.g. in spatial theories) the tendency prevails
to regard predictive accuracy as necessary and sufficient criterion
for explanation. The assumption of structural equivalence between
explanation and prediction has been criticised by many writers
(HANSON, 1958), (SCHEFFHER, 1963).
For instance to explain why an eclipse of the moon occurs, or why an
industry locates where it does, is not simply to predict exactly when
it will take place, or where it will locate, respectively. Although
an adequate explanation has to be able to do that, it is not only
that that it is required to do. In addition, it has to provide a
plausible causal narrative or account of why things came to be as they
are. But this involves one in going beyond what is revealed strictly
in experience and observation. Moreover, if to explain means to make
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literal claims about underlying structures and processes that may be
taken to generate a set of phenomena, then the theoretical entities
(non-observables) that are postulated in these claims cannot
meaningfully be conventionally or stipulatively expressed in terms
of observables — viz. operationalised. If they are to be taken
in an "as if" sense then this might be acceptable- but if they are
to be shown to refer to real entities and processes then their
correspondence with statements of observation or experience is itself
an empirical matter.
(c) The positivist account of models and analogies in science
takes these to be mere heuristic devices and regards their role in
scientific inquiry — in theory construction and testing — as
a subsidiary and dispensable one. They are merely of psychological
interest, intellectual crutches for the tender-minded and are not
allowed to make any ontological claims about real existing entities
and processes which are only made in theories. Their contribution
is to be restricted to establishing isomorphism of structure with
some theory and interpret it in some way which aids the imagination.
They may also be used in prediction, and the test of their adequacy
is the success of their predictions.However, the requirement
of isomorphism with some theoretical schema precludes their being
mere instruments for prediction irrespective or their substantive
content (i.e. whether or not there is any correspondence with
experience) as in the "instrumentalist" account of models.
(d) The privileged status of the language of observation is disputed
by many writers. What is to constitute the "unassailable" foundations
for knowledge of the world is variously and interchangeably referred
to as "facts", "evidence", "experience", or "observation". Firstly,
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these terms do not refer to the same item, and what they refer
to may not he reconcilable. Thus, "experience" — as a first
person account of some occurrence — may oppose what was hitherto
accepted as "facts"; "observation" may invalidate as irrelevant to
some issues what was regarded until then as relevant "evidence".
Moreover, rock-bottom indisputable "facts" are not to be found, say, in
official statistics of government agencies. Hence, there is no
qualification of what is to count as evidence, but rather an emphasis
on regarding empirical "evidence" as decisive in the testing of
theories. But empirical evidence may be found in data of historical,
sensory, census statistics, or introspectionist kind. The latter is,
of course, rejected as a source of knowledge about an individual8s
reasons, motives, etc. for acting,since only overt behaviour ( in
physical movement and speech) can provide empirical foundations for
knowledge of social and human phenomena. Further, the possibility
of maintaining a sharp dichotomy between theory and facts is
rejected for facts are perceived subject to some guiding theory
or way of looking at the world. Now, if the theory-ladenness of
facts is accepted, and there are many convincing arguments that it
should be, then the search for positive knowledge that is free from
theoretical frameworks, ways of looking at the world, and culturally
given elements in knowledge, ought to be abandoned. Facts cannot by
themselves dictate knowledge; their interpretation may be regarded
as having potential for knowledge.
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(e) The way in which models and analogies are used in the positivist
conception of science has attracted considerable criticism from writers
(137)
who defend different views of science — also empiricistv . Models
and analogies are employed as essentially heuristic devices by positivists.
They perform the function of a scaffolding which assists in the
formulation of a coherent body of lawlike relations. Once the scaffolding
is removed, the lawlike relations remain,standing by themselves, to be
assessed against empirical evidence. Models are taken as attempts to
establish structural isomorphisms between some domain of phenomena
(accounted for in some theory)and its symbolic representation in a model.
The structure that is depicted in the model is to exhibit laws and
regularities that are found to hold between observable phenomena.
Now, this position is criticised from two different viewpoints; one
which shares with the positivists the idea that the structure of
relations depicted by some model resides in the domain of phenomena
itself (realist account of models), and another which regards such
a conception of structure as a fictional construct which is devised
to assist inquiry and yield useful predictions (instrumentalist
account of models). The former view regards the positivist account
as problematic for it is founded on an inadequate investigation of
the ways in which the external causes entailed by laws are accounted
for. It takes models as descriptions of the system of relationships
(potentially real structures and mechanisms) which underlie and
generate the observable relations and invariances.
The latter view accepts that there are several equally valid ways
of conceptualising experience. The idea that there are structured
relations in nature is essentially a mental construct devised for
102.
specific purposes of inquiry, e.g. to provide single and economical
accounts of phenomena, and predict their observable characteristics.
Producing a model of some empirical domain is not intended to establish
isomorphisms but rather to postulate relationships that are
predictively useful. The use of such a model is purely instrumental
and the construction of the model is to be governed by criteria of
purpose of use — e.g. prediction — rather than criteria of conformity
with the structure of reality. For a model is not viewed as an element
of contemplative activity but rather an instrument specifically
designed to achieve certain results. To illustrate these differences
in the conception of models (and analogies) take the case of a building
and its structure. The kind of interpretation that might be given
to the relation between the observable building and its structure —
the latter not being usually subject to sensory perception — roughly
corresponds to the way in which models are conceived in different
accounts of science. Here structure denotes elements of style that
are related into a coherent whole in which the relationships between
elements are more important than the constituent elements themselves.
A structure so conceived cannot be apprehended other than by
abstraction from observable characteristics of the building. In an
Ancient Greek temple, it is not the element of columns or of the
pediment or even both of them that could be said to identify it as
belonging to the Doric style, but rather some set of elements and
their interrelations which could be said to constitute the structure
of the building.
One way to view the structure of the building is to regard it as
constituting the way in which the elements are actually related and
arranged so as to create the physical reality of the building.
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The structure may be represented in a model in which, say, arrows
correspond to forces applied by some elements upon others; or circles
correspond to functional spaces within the building. The model would
be taken as pictorially correct if each element of structure and its
relations to other elements correspond to an element in the model
and its relations to other elements, viz. a relation of isomorphism.
Hence, even though the structure is not available to direct observation,
it does refer to real relations between constituent elements of the
building. This view would be held both by positivists and realists
up to the point of examining the nature of the relationships between
elements of structure that are postulated in the model.
The former would regard these as depicting laws and regularities
holding between observable phenomena. The latter would take the
relations of structure as underlying and generating the observable
relations between elements. But positivists would take the model
which represents the unobservable structure as a heuristic device
used to arrive at the lawlike relations between elements and not as
referring to something real, since for them real=empirical. Realists,
however, would not restrict ascription of reality only to what is
observable and would accept that the model could refer to a potentially
real structure — subject to the scrutiny of experience. For them,
the structure when identified as real constitutes the "essence" of the
building. Therefore, to know the building it is necessary to know
its structure and this can only be achieved by building a model and
testing it against experience. Another way to view the structure
of the building is to take it as a fictional construct which is
developed to assist systematisation of relations between the elements
of the building, from which to draw inferences concerning, say,
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the behaviour of the elements in an earthquake,and the like. There is
no criterion of conformity of the model to any real structure, only
of fruitfulness in purposeful application. The model is simply an
instrument serving specific purposes of the investigation.
It should be obvious by now that the analogy with Newtonian mechanics
upon which the "gravity model" and its derivatives are based was taken
in the postivist manner as a heuristic device, a scaffolding to be
removed after the completion of the intellectual exercise. This
exercise was aiming at deriving a set of lawlike relations between
observable social/spatial phenomena. As applied to spatial
interaction the gravity analogy does not presuppose direct, perfect
and specific analogy between interaction between population centres
and the attraction and repulsion of celestial bodies. The contention
is that there are merely certain analogical similarities in the ways
in which , say, distance between "masses" • or their sizes affect their
relations.
There are also dissimilarities (negative analogy): e.g. population
"masses" consist of conscious individuals exhibiting free will
performance as against the deterministic behaviour of planets.
The source of the gravity model is not selected so as to provide
the means for describing underlying mechanisms and processes
generative of observable invariances — as the realist would require.
Bather, it is employed in a positivist fashion to produce a model
of social/spatial interaction which comprises a set of lawlike
relations between observables: the analogy is drawn upon and then
removed, leaving the lawful relations subject to the test of
experience — thus developing a coherent body of inductions.
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In contrast to both positivist and realist accounts, an instrumentalist
approach to the "gravity model" would not place emphasis on establishing
correspondence between the structure of relations depicted in the
model and the structure of physical reality. Since the notion that
reality is structured in some ways is regarded as a fictional but
convenient construction for systematising experience and enabling
prediction and control, there is no real structure to look for in
checking the conformity of the model to facts. Thus, the model
has to be complex enough to handle the events it sets out to model
and produce required predictions enabling anticipation and control
of events. But it need not enable a rational account to be given
of the process by which prediction is arrived at. There is an upper
limit to the complexity of ideas that can be understood by man, as
well as an upper limit to the complexity of the unit of analysis of
the phenomenon . being studied which can be intelligently apprehended:
would a study of spatial interaction at the level of the molecular
structure of the bodies of individuals be intelligible?
Hence prediction and control is all that may be possible rather than
understanding and explanation. On this account, "gravity models"
should aim at enabling forecasting and control of the events which
they depict. They can be developed on the basis of quite unrealistic
assumptions about the nature of the phenomena they are concerned with.
This will not necessarily invalidate the models since the criterion
of their adequacy is to be the success of their predictions (TOUEMIN,
1961: p.30): " To discover that events of a certain kind are
predictable — even to develop effective techniques for forecasting
them — is evidently quite different from knowing an adequate theory
about them, through which they can be understood". If social/spatial
phenomena are difficult to deal with due to their complexity, the reason
why they are not impossible to deal with is that they do not occur
in all the ways in which they might — to paraphrase (CAWS, 1963 sp. 161+).
Most of the preceding antipositivist criticisms originate from other
empiricist philosophers who see in positivism an inadequate and
restrictive view of science. However, when the antipositivist
critique moves into issues of the social sciences then : (i) not all
of those who might be referred to as antipositivist/empiricistsmake
contributions that are relevant to the social sciences and the
"methodological debate"; and (ii) the strongest objections come
from so-called humanists who tend to subsume all scientific approaches
to the study of social life under "positivism" — but differ as to
their views of how to attain their ideal of human-centred inquiry of
the world of man and society. (^8) some humanists do not exclude
scientific approaches from the study of human phenomena but make special
demands on what a "science of man" could and ought to study — demands
that have a bearing on the view taken of science, which is not to be
a positivist one.
The so-called "subjectivists"from among the humanists tend to criticise
the materialist ontological foundations of most of science and its
denial to "mind" and mental states of any separate existence apart
from matter or of one that cannot be reduced to material states.
The ontological postulates that are criticised concern the view that
the universe is all matter which is apprehended more or less
completely through the human senses: knowledge of the world is
ultimately founded on experience. In this view, there is no
distinction between the "natural" and the "social", between
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the material universe and man and social life. The latter are seen
as part of the orderly material cosmos and are subject to the same
principles of cause and effect that apply to nature. Hence the laws
which determine the pattern of the universe would also include the
"laws" which determine human behaviour. Notions referring to human
conduct — for instance, choice, motive, free will, voluntary action,
reason — are to be understood in terms of the "laws" of social life.
Restricting discussion to the positivist conception of science,
those who accept the general view that was roughly outlined tend to
stress systematic empirical observation, and the development of
"formal" hypothetico-deductive ( or inductive-deductive) rational
accounts of phenomena. They pursue quantification and measurement
of all observables — for they take observables to be measurable
and their relations reduced to relations of magnitude, this being an
important aspect of modern positivism — and seek to operationalise
theoretical concepts in terms of observables. Thus, concepts referring
to non-material, subjective states — e.g. values, norms, goals,
purposes — are to be anchored in experience and expressed in terms
which refer to observables — e.g. behavioural indices of such
mental or subjective states.
Moreover, the testing of hypotheses against factual evidence, the
employment of "objective" methods and techniques of social inquiry,
the sharp distinction between questions of fact and evaluative
statements and between facts and theories, and other methodological
and epistemological positions referred to above, are generally
connected with the positivist account of the "logic of science" and
(139)
duly criticised.v J The assumption that the only source of
108.
knowledge derives from the logic, methods, and senses of the inquirer
rather than from the "subjects" he studies is also criticised by
"subjectivists". The view that potentially "true" knowledge of the
social world is gained only through independent, detached observation
of actual happenings — excluding the observer's biases or prejudices
— and the requirement that the inquirer stand outside his subject
matter to ensure objective observation of social phenomena is also
attacked by "subjectivists".
The latter regard the positivists' approach to investigating the
relation of thought and beliefs to action as highly problematic.
For the process of explaining social phenomena following their
"logic of science" seems to provide accounts of these that do not
correspond with what the social agents themselves would recognise
or give as motivational accounts for their own actions. They argue
that what is important is to study how beliefs and actions are
connected in the mind and consciousness of social actors through
the process of constructing meaning. They require that terms and
categories employed by the inquirer to account for social action
are to be couched in terms that are both intelligible to the social
agents and derive from their own accounts of their actions.
The positivist view that patterns of human behaviour can be explained
in terms of general "laws" of social life, and that social inquiry
should address itself to discovering such "laws" from which to derive
empirically testable consequences, is criticised by many writers.
In one non-positivist account, discovering laws of social behaviour
is problematic for it is based on an inadequate analysis of the ways
in which the external causes that are entailed by the "laws" are
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actually experienced and interpreted by social agents and so cause
patterns of observable behaviour. The latter requirement is to be
satisfied by detailed description, at the level of meaning, of the
mechanisms and structures that underlie human behaviour and cause
people to conduct themselves in particular ways (this being a realist
account). . The explanation of social phenomena by subsumption under
general "laws", on the"model of science", is also said to deprive
human subjects of their freedom of choice to behave as they will.
Moreover, the requirement that such "laws" be general results in
their accounting for only some characteristics of the situation they
apply to.Such features are normally selected for their causal import.
But the abstractive nature of general "laws" of behaviour seems to
neglect the full richness and idiosyncracy of individual cases
(GELLNER, 1973: p.8o).
The positivists' insistence that science involves only the
establishment of lawlike relations between observable phenomena
imposes the requirement that theoretical terms — defined as terms
referring to non-observables — be given operational definitions,
be operationalised. The view which takes operationalisation as
ensuring that the meaning of statements containing theoretical
terms becomes their method of verification has been exposed to
much criticism and is now defunct in the natural sciences, though
emphasis on operationalisation is still placed in the context of
the social sciences. Strict operationalist criteria need not be
applied to giving to theoretical terms some empirical import — as
required by empiricist epistemology. This is, however, a procedure
which is fraught with difficulties for many theoretical concepts seem
to loose their originally intended meaning when defined operationally
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for there may not exist corresponding observational terms to account
for them.
This brings the discussion to the crucial issue of empirical data
or the facts that are to provide the unassailable foundations for
knowledge of the world of nature and society. The epistemologically
and ontologically privileged observational (empirical) foundation
for general "laws" of social life is to be provided by official
(census) statistics or specially collected data through various
surveys. These are the empirical facts to be sharply distinguished
from both values, norms, beliefs held by human individuals, and from
theories of social life. Now, the main criticism of the positivist
use of such statistical material is its being uncritically accepted as the
rock-bottom foundations of knowledge of society. All statistics
and statistical facts are the product of a specific system of concepts
and related technical instruments of measurement. Therefore they
are theory-dependent for they involve theories of measurement and
instrumentation. Their use as purely observational evidence is
thus unwarranted.
There are many conceptual inadequacies in social statistical
measurements but the ready availability of such material is always
an attraction factor for social inquiry. But the categories employed
to collect data for official purposes are not necessarily the
categories of theory, viz. they may be seriously at variance with
the social concepts and categories which they are intended to
illuminate. Statistics are not collected by various agencies for
the sake of social inquirers in various disciplines: for the
economist, the sociologist, or the town planner. However, such
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agencies are usually the only ones to produce such data. Ensuring
conceptual correspondence between the variables entering the models
of, say, the planner and the existing official categories of data
is a major difficulty in any model-building and application exercise.
The official categories tend to be imposed on the models; any new
data that may be collected tend to follow the established pattern.
This seems to restrict conceptual exploration and effect closure
of the investigation often prematurely.
For example, consider the case of statistics collected for official
records of housing conditions in the city. These go through a
fairly complex social process which involves judgments as to whether,
say, some building is sub-standard, and to what extent it is below
standard. Thus, the individuals involved in producing the official
statistics are operating on the basis of implicit meaning systems
and concepts which lead them to determine one building as below
some acceptable standards and another as meeting them. Moreover,
these meanings may well vary both within a single society and between
different social contexts(notice the difference between official
housing standards in, say, Indonesia, Greece, and the U.K.).
Thus, what has to be made explicit is that many of the categories
of official statistics are socially rather than naturally defined
forms of behaviour or meaning.
While it is necessary to have some broad conception of what it is
intended to study, adherence to the strictly defined categories of
official statistics may prove detrimental to the outcome of social
inquiries and development of models and theories. Hence the
categories of official statistics should not be taken for granted
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but should be seen as problematic in themselves and as varying over
time and location. Perhaps the essential nature of social
phenomena should attract the attention of the investigators who ought
to try and experience it as directly as possible. The question of
empirical data is one of the most important and problematic issues
in developing models of urban social/spatial structure. The empirical
foundations of models can be traced to census statistics, specially
collected data —e.g. from transportation studies, origin-destination
surveys, social surveys, and the like — and from the pool of validated
empirical knowledge. Models pragmatically employed as instruments
for prediction and control sire essentially oriented towards
quantitative data. Their manipulation according to the analytical
structure of the model results in specification of magnitudes of
variables.
Admittedly, much of planning has to deal with quantities at the level
of practice, viz. at the level of proposing concrete measures to
further the objectives of some planning exercise. It is, of course,
when it derives and manipulates quantities in ways whichconceptually
exclude and are divorced from "subjective qualities" that the success
of planned proposals becomes problematic when seen in its social
context of acceptance of policies by those whose lives are affected
by them. More specifically on the question of factual data, it is
often the case that quantitative information by itself,i.e. without
being related to an analytical construct or an argument, enables the
drawing of some conclusions in planning — for instance, "a consistently
declining population of a city. Nonetheless, this reflects only a
trend which is -unaccounted for by theory, and whose reliability and
endurance is always in doubt. Hence there is need for well confirmed
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theories which would guide interpretation of facts and selection of
only relevant ones for the purposes of the inquiry. All data,whether
in natural or social science,must necessarily be viewed through the lens
of theory or accumulated together with a series of background assumptions
which render the data less than neutral: either in terms of cognitive
interests or in terms of values."Brute facts" are not to be found
Problems regarding the deterministic nature of accounts of
regularities in social/spatial phenomena must inevitably be faced
in all attempts at developing models of such phenomena. Por example,
the "gravity model" and its derivatives postulate deterministic
relations in the movement and locational behaviour of human individuals.
This raises questions of adequately accounting for the freedom of the
will. The issue has serious implications for the nature and form
of systematic inquiry into social/spatial phenomena, events and
processes, most of which may be traced to one of the fundamental
problems of philosophy: the mind/body problem^. ^ ^Ef voluntary human
conduct is regarded as the outcome of non-physical causes, then mental
states of social actors become very significant in any inquiry into
human conduct which can only be understood (in the sense of identifying
its causes) in terms of such mental states. The latter may be
themselves caused by physical factors; but unless they are so
caused it is not certain that the same influence will always evoke
the same physical response in human behaviour.
In the realm of social/spatial influence factors, the individual
responds after deciding on some course of action. Hence "natural
laws" of spatial behaviour are not to be found easily if it is
accepted that mental states are not part of nature. Moreover, their
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predictions of "natural" phenomena from other "natural" phenomena
are bound to be subject to the peculiar characteristics of human
actors, and hence highly unreliable. Such "laws" and their
predictions of behaviour will be founded on evidence which does not
relate to mental states apart from nature (i.e. natural ^ mental),
but predicted behaviour would be explained as caused by mental
states. This would render invalid the positivists' predictivist
account of explanation (since prediction and explanation would cease
to have the same logical structure, and each would be based on
evidence which is different in nature). However, if prediction and
explanation are not logically symmetrical how is it possible to tell
which empirical generalisations — in which no cause of phenomena is
specified — are projectible? That is, how is it possible to
establish that such and such a generalisation will continue to hold
into the future? This leads one. to an aspect of the problem
of induction (HOLLIS and HELL, 1975: pp.116-118).
Several directions have been pursued in order to discover a way out
of the problem of determinism in human conduct. The simplest and
most obvious solution, which also happens to be the least satisfactory
one, is to introduce elements of probability in the models accounting
for the spatial behaviour of human individuals. However, probability
is a derivative concept and depends on some solution to the inductive
problem (HOLLIS and HELL, 1975: Ch.3).1^^ Alternatively, some
assumptions may be introduced into the models regarding, say, rational
behaviour, the principle of minimisation of costs of travel or the
principle that people will select their residences in a way which
minimises their costs of commuting to work, and the like. In such
cases failure of the models to accurately predict behaviour is not
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regarded as model deficiency but rather as failure of the model
assumptions to hold.
If the assumptions are highly unrealistic then the predictive
results of the models have very low substantive content for behaviour
would be actually assessed by its conformity to the model. If, on
the other side, realistic assumptions about mental states are built
into the models then this implies that information other than
relating strictly to physical behaviour is entering the models.
Other views on this problem are, very briefly, (i) to claim that
whatever human individuals think or do the "natural laws" of behaviour
will hold at least statistically; (ii) to reject mental states
as such and accept a materialist view denying existence of mental
events. The latter issues in, among other things, so-called
behaviourism, xS a doctrine stipulating that all
explanations of social phenomena are to be couched in teims that refer
or can be made to correspond to publicly observable events, physical
movements and speech, i.e. unambiguously given elements in human
behaviour — though it need not deny the existence of mind, only that
the "spiritual" cannot enter intelligibly into explanations (DIXON,
1973: PP.5-8).
The above discussion was aimed at illustrating a range of common
ontological, epistemological, and methodological presuppositions that
are implicitly rather than explicitly accepted in certain research
traditions within which models of social/spatial phenomena are
developed and are subsequently employed as predictive and
systematising instruments in urban planning. It is conceded that
the discussion has not penetrated into the philosophical issues
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involved to an extent that could justify any wide-ranging philosophical
conclusions. However, this was not the purpose of this exploration;
rather, it was attempted to reveal the kinds of epistemological and
methodological commitments that are implied by taking certain stands
in social/spatial research. There are many and well-aimed
philosophical critiques of the positivist view of science and of
its methodological implications for the social sciences, and most
of the philosophical arguments are highly specialised and hence
incompatible with the limited objectives of this thesis.
However, enough has been said to substantiate the argument that
models and other "methods" of inquiry are not neutral instruments
of research but rather their application involves a range of
presuppositions which should not be taken for granted but
investigated in their own right. They are not the interest-free
devices that are alleged to be, instruments for organising thought
in rational ways, indifferent to questions of values, beliefs, and
world views. They may be said to form part of a language which
imposes its own categories and ways of looking at the world (TRIBE,
1972). In actual research of social/spatial phenomena, the abstractions
in such intellectual devices as models, conceptual frameworks and
general theoretical categories tend to select and institutionalise
an inflexible and insensitive set of distinctive features (e.g.
variables) as the relevant facts for analysis. The models
are the trappings of a more or less residual positivist ideology:
theories that do not declare themselves, disguised as programmes
for "objective" observation and analysis (STRETTON, 1970: p.52).
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(e) The metaphor of the machines its model of knowledge, man, and
societal arrangements and planning.
The positivist programme, as presented in the above rough sketch, may
be taken to have intelligible though not necessary connections with
the guiding metaphor of the machine. The ensuing discussion attempts
to explore such associations and draw implications for the kind of
planning that may be compatible with such views. The notion of
mechanism is fundamental in the metaphor of the machine. It has
received various interpretations of which the one referring to the
Newtonian world machine is taken here to reflect relatively accurately
the conception of mechanism associated with the theoretical traditions
being discussed. The following quotation is thought to adequately
explicate that notion of mechanism (EINSTEIN and INFELD, 1938):
"In mechanics the future path of a moving body can be predicted and
its past discussed if its present condition and the forces acting
on it are known. Thus, for example, the future paths of all planets
can be foreseen. The active forces are Newton's gravitational
forces depending on distance alone. The great results of classical
mechanics suggest that the mechanical view can be consistently
applied to all branches of physics, that all phenomena can be explained
by the action of forces representing either attraction or repulsion
depending only upon distance and acting between unchangeable particles
The metaphor of the machine may be seen as informing the mechanicist
framework in terms of which these research traditions have been couched
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It provides a source for the drawing of several analogies between
concepts belonging to the vocabulary of the natural sciences and aspects
of social experience. Notions such as "force"; "equilibrium";
"entropy"; "movement" as change of position, but also "movement" as
an analogy to physical movement which mentally suggests the
application of a "force" or "power" to some social entity; "number of
persons" as an analogy to number of"bodies" or "particles"; physical
and social measures of distance; etc. are examples of such analogies.
Associated with an empiricist epistemology mechanicism entails a mode
of social inquiry which focuses on observable relations between
individuals (micro-variables) or between aggregates of individuals
(macro-variables) and seeks to establish empirical societal "laws"
governing such relations — in the manner of the empirical laws of
natural science. It deals with relationships of parts to parts,
or wholes (in the sense of mere aggregates of individuals) to wholes;
it does not concern itself with whole-parts relationships or with
properties which may be peculiar to social wholes over and above those of
their constituent elements (the latter being individuals, firms, or
institutions).
Mechanicism meets "par excellence" a range of empiricist and positivist
epistemological and methodological criteria:
(a) The entities referred to in its models have properties that are
most accessible to direct observation, and if terms have no direct
empirical referent (theoretical terms) they must be translated into
the language of observables by means of, say, bridge principles
(correspondence rules)^1^^— in short, they must be operationalised.^1^^
The loss of meaning which ensues from operationalisation, as well as
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the dual-language thesis itself are the most widely criticised points
of this view.
(b) The macro- and micro-variables entering these models are, ideally,
amenable to quantitative or precise qualitative measurement.
The assumption of measurability of the entities of mechanistic models
is carried through to social phenomena.
(c) The variables are amenable to manipulation within some form of
controlled laboratory environment.
(d) Such variables are ideally tractable for they can be meaningfully
reduced to empirically manageable sub-components and then reassembled
without loss of meaning or errors in synthesis(SUTHERLAND, 1973s
pp.96 ff). A whole is seen as an aggregation of constituent parts,
individuals, or atoms: providing that the rules of aggregation axe
"appropriate", no peculiarly holistic quality may reasonably be
claimed to have been lost in such a synthesis. Indeed, denial of
any "holistic qualities" reaches doctrinal status.
(e) The principle of "causal atomism". Mechanism may be said to
connote the type of causation which is held by many to operate in
the world of physical science: every event is and must be determined
by an Immediately preceding event. If this assumption were not made,
scientific calculation and prediction would not be possible (JOAD,
1936/1957: p.187).
The notion of the machine lends itself naturally to the drawing of an
analogy between it and this conception of causation, for in a machine
every state is the result of some preceding state. This view of
causation is said to be atomistic in that it is concerned with
discrete,sequential states or events — much like links of a chain —
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each being directly attributable to the one preceding it. The idea
that it is possible to study things, whether they be people, concepts,
or mental states, in terms of discrete units which could be mechanically
manipulated has found wide application in social scientific theorising —
but also in philosophy and morals.
The conception of events as discrete, atomic entities raises problems
of connection between events. One account of such connection between
events — still widely entertained, though not without some serious
criticisms — derives directly from Hume's view of causation as a
"constant conjunction" of events. It is always contingent — some say
arbitrary — in the sense that there is no necessity about such
connection between discrete events. Further, it is given to,rather
than understood by, the observer in the sense that the observer simply
experiences one particular event following another regularly. Since,
on this account, it is not possible to say that A causes B, but only
that A is regularly succeeded by B, there emerges one form of the
extensively debated logical problem of induction: "How can it be
established that observed past conjunctions of events will hold for
the future? "(SCHON, 1963/1969: p.151); (JOAB, 1936/1957: pp.220-221).
"How can one justifiably argue from past events to future events,
from the known to the unknown?" (KEAT and BERY, 1975: P»15).^^°^
Mechanicism correlates with individualism (WATKlNS, 1953: PP«723-7U3)
which, as a methodological doctrine, stipulates that large-scale social
events and conditions should be treated as mere aggregates or
configurations of the actions, attitudes, relations, and circumstances
of the individual actors participating in them. As a prescription
for explanation, methodological individualism rejects those explanations
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of social phenomena which are not couched wholly in terms of facts
about individuals (LUEES, 1977s p.180), e.g. explanations which employ
holistic or collective concepts — such as "social system" — and
macro-laws essentially pertaining to the whole rather than to
individuals which "make up" that whole.
Thus, just as macro-properties of a gas (e.g. its temperature) are
explained, in physics, as a resultant of the micro-properties of its
molecules, so macro-states of the market are explained, in classical
economics, as resultants of the dispositions and consequent activities
of individual producers and consumers. Much the same kind of
reasoning is employed in the well-known derivations of the gravity
model of spatial interaction (in the "social physics" tradition)
through the entropy maximisation principle (WILSON, 197°); (WILSON,
197^); (GOULD, 1972: pp.689-700). Although there axe negative as
well as positive elements in this analogy, methodological
individualists take the positive elements to be more instructive
(DRAY, 1967s P»53)» However,the important point is that the entropy
maximisation approach is an individualistic approach even though it
foouses on the macro-level of analysis.
But the kind of individual human being that enters in the explanations,
models, and theories of this outlook is said to be only "spuriously
individual" (HOLLIS, 1977s P«12). It is a "model of man" which takes
human individuals "as mechanisms that, like less complex physical
objects, respond to the push and pull of forces exerted by the
experimenter or the environment" (HARHE and SECORD, 1972s pp.30-31)•
This is the model of a "Plastic Man" as an object in nature,
responding adaptively to the interplay between man and environment
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(HOLLIS, 1977: P«12). Its main weakness may be identified as the
"lack of a self" to apply causal models and explanations formulated
within a naturalist/positivist framework. However, this "model of
man" is not unique to the theoretical tradition based on mechanicism
and individualism but is also accepted by many thinkers who espouse
the other "root metaphor" guiding the fundamental forms of social
thought: the metaphor of the organism.
When applied to social theorising the metaphor of the machine gives
rise to a number of important issues regarding the "model of man" that
it presupposes. In this context, the main problems seem to revolve
around the extent to which a mechanistic system may be said to
plausibly capture some account of the fundamental characteristics of
human nature (WAHTOFSKY, 1968: pp.380-386). Firstly, one of the main
features of the conception of mechanism referred to above , is that
it is deterministic in the sense that one is able to predict its
operation. Since it is postulated that each state which the
machine is in is causally related to the state that follows it,
the latter is predictable on the basis of full knowledge of the
immediately preceding state (SCHON, 1963/19^9s p.1^i5)«
Employing the metaphor of the machine in social theorising entails
acceptance, to a greater or lesser extent, of the assumption that if
adequate knowledge of some present state of affairs is available
it will be possible, in principle, to predict what individuals, firms,
institutions will do. This assumption of strict determinism in human
conduct seems to have lost the support it enjoyed in earlier social
studies having been subjected to damaging criticism. Although
it has been replaced by newer approaches involving stochastic
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conceptions of human behaviour, the essential principle of mechanical
determination has remained much the same.
Deterministic mechanisms are subject to physical laws which do not
admit activity of thought — in the sense of free, non-determined
by laws thought. Their use as the basis for analogies in theorising
about thinking organisms raises considerations of freedom of the
will against determinism. Although machines cannot be said to
have"free will", it may be contended that they could be made to act
in terms of some degree of unpredictability. Such statistical
rather than strict physical determinism could be said to provide
a model of some degree of freedom in the performance of a mechanistic
system, with certain built-in probability functions and relative
randomness of operation. The development of probabilistic models
of spatial interaction and location indicates an attempt to move
away from strictly deterministic mechanistic systems and present a
more realistic image of man as an individual with some degree of
freedom in his activities. This "freedom" is expressed in terms of
probability functions and randomness — e.g. in models employing
Monte-Carlo simulation techniques (CHAPIN,et al., 1965) or Markov
processes (DHEWETT, 1969) — which may also be interpreted as .
"admission of considerable ignorance" regarding human conduct.
Secondly, a machine always performs some function; it is seen as an
instrument, always the means and never the ends. Examples of
useless or purposeless machines can indeed be found among the
creations of modern artists such as Marcel Duchamp (1887-1968)
or Paul KLee (1879-19^0), but even these may be said to serve some
"purpose" in terms of symbolically expressing and communicating
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to the public their creator's attitude, say, against a predominantly
technicist world outlook which neglects moral and cultural values.
A machine does not select goals but operates towards attainment
of some pre-selected goal(s). Only human individuals may be said to
select goals. This may indicate the difference between free and
non-free action, between conscious thought and mere performance.
Machines cannot, but human beings can, be said to be moral or immoral;
thay cannot create values as humans can, but may at best be
instructed to discern among alternatives on the basis of some pr'e-
chosen, built-in principle or norm of evaluation.
Such a principle frequently turns out to be "maximisation of benefits"
or "minimisation of costs" — benefits and costs reflecting in money
terms the utilities and disutilities accruing to individuals or groups
of individuals from some chosen course of action. In this sense,
it may be argued that certain widely used techniques of evaluation
of alternative courses of action that are open to some public agency —
techniques such as cost/benefit analysis, cost/effectiveness analysis,
threshold analysis, the planning balance sheet, etc.— have been
developed within a predominantly mechanistic world outlook. Such
techniques take utilities and disutilities expressed as benefits
and costs to be clearly additive and cumulative, and values and other
so-called "intangibles" to be expressible in money terms. The assumed
measurability of such "subjective" values and their conversion into
"objective" facts by means of quantification enables the application
of the market principle — viz. excess of benefits over costs —
in order to direct public choices. The ideological affinity of
the market concept to an atomistic, mechanistic, utilitarian world
view has already been pointed out (STANLEY, 1972: p.299)*
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But are human beings totally free to do as they please or can it be
claimed — as it has been — that their conduct is determined by a set
of socially accepted norms (culture, values, roles, class structure)
to which they are expected to conform at the penalty of social
sanctions? (PARSONS, 191+9); (PARSONS, 195*1 )• Although it may not
be reasonable to claim that human beings possess "total freedom",
they are nonetheless capable of making mistakes, selecting the wrong
alternatives, acting inappropriately in view of some situation.
Machines only malfunction: they do not "make mistakes". A mechanicist
social or ethical theory might expend the analogy of the mechanism
to cover such cases as: human error, fallibility, ignorance, irrational
conduct; behaviour which does not appear to conform to established
norms; deviation from some given social blueprint or some ideological
conception of the best urban environment; and the like. It would
then take such states as instances of "malfunctioning" in the "social
mechanism" (dysfunctions) requiring corrective action by means of
some appropriate mixture of "social engineering".
Planning that is evoked in response to dysfunctions — euphemistically:
"problems" — may be said to fall within this intellectual tradition.
However, in the context of the rival doctrine of organicism, it could
also be claimed that the "social organism" may fall into some
pathological state requiring remedial treatment by means of planning,
much like the treatment that is prescribed in medicine following
diagnosis of pathological states of individual organisms.
In both cases the problem of establishing criteria for distinguishing
the "normal" from the "pathological", the "function" from the
"dysfunction", has to be faced. Whether or not there can be a value-
neutral way of arriving at such clear-cut criteria is open to much
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discussion and relates to the alleged distinction between ideological
(or normative) and scientific approaches to the study of social
problems.
Finally8 there are certain other distinctive characteristics of the
freedom of conscious organisms and human beings which may be said
to be imperfectly captured by the mechanistic metaphor. These are:
(1) the self-consciousness and self-identity of the human being which
goes beyond the mere "objective" or brute existence of a behaving
organism with no self-consciousness; (2) the human being's
consciousness of other members of his species which involves
considerations of communication and socialisation. In this context,
it is argued that human societies are verbally or symbolically
linked organisations; they are conscious users of language which
enables production of social relations going beyond mere common
action. Usual replies to such criticisms are: (i) that machines
may be equipped so as to recognise themselves (self-recognition);
and (ii) to recognise other machines of their kind.
But machines do not use a language to communicate and create
meaning, they only operate on one. They do not socialise as
conscious language-users; they are not capable to show the infinite
adaptability to emerging social situations which is a distinguishing
characteristic of self-conscious, free-thinking human individuals.
Now, mechanicists might accept such strictures but they might
reply that such limitations result from the extent of available
knowledge. It cannot, in principle, be precluded that knowledge will
not advance to a level which permits such aspects of the nature
of human individuals to be taken into account in mechanistic systems.
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Although this prospect may give rise to a host of moral issues, one
cannot sensibly avoid at least entertaining such a possibility —
especially in the light of outstanding recent advances in the field
of artificial intelligence and the theory of automata.
The emergence of cybernetics is highly significant in this context
for it has initiated the search for theories about and construction
of self-governing machines (automata). Development of feedback
mechanisms has allowed a self-governing device to achieve and
maintain some predetermined state. Further, development of programming
techniques and languages has enabled such a device to solve a wide
range of problems by following detailed sets of instructions.
The outcome of these efforts has been to achieve machine analogues
of both purposeful behaviour and reasoning. The latter are two of
the characteristics that have traditionally been associated with
the "essence" of the "mental" and the "spiritual". There are many
researchers in this and associated fields who believe that it is
possible to gain valuable insights into the question of "mind" being
distinguished from "body", by pursuing analogically the exploration
of the issues involved in the development of self-governing machines.
The advances in machine technology have been truly remarkable over
the past ten years, and their results have not yet been assessed
or fully exploited. Apart from their widely known computational
function, machines have been constructed which can prove theorems
(Turing machines), play games (chess-playing machines), translate into
different languages, and even compose music and write poetry —
often performing better in these fields than the individuals who built
them. Further, machines can now be developed so as to learn from
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experience, adapt to new circumstances, or develop new problem-solving
heuristics. The channelling of so much effort into this field is not
of course without its critics who express doubts as to whether
scientific research ought to take such direction. But this is an
r
issue outside the scope of this dissertation though no less important.
As a methodological corollary of philosophical nominalism (POPPER, 1957/
1962 : p.132), methodological individualism is often associated —
though not invariably — with issues which go beyond questions of
method of inquiry of social phenomena into the fields of metaphysics,
ethics, and politics (DRAY, 1967s P«53)« Thus, in political economy
the principle of methodological individualism is said to be associated
with the liberal individualist tradition of Western democratic
societies (BRODBECK, 1958s pp.1-22). The "laissez-faire" version
of liberalism that it suggests takes "society" to be "simply a name
for the products of contractual agreements between individual
calculators of utility" (STANLEY, 1972s p.299)» Beyond the economic
role imputed to the mechanism of the market., its "laissez-faire"
version suggests connections with a world view influenced by
atomic events and individual human beings, mechanistic analogies, and
utilitarianism. This still remains the main organising principle of
the ideals of individual autonomy and freedom of choice.
Some social thinkers have even taken such ideals as social consequences
of the principle of methodological individualism (HAYEK, 1952); (pOPPER,
1957/1961). They have argued against "the threat" of collective,
comprehensive, or holistic planning of societal affairs and have
advocated "piecemeal social engineering". This is seen as a form
of technologically oriented planning addressed to practical social
problems and operating through small adjustments and readjustments
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of arrangements in society in its attempts to provide solutions to
clearly identified problems (POPPER, 1957/1961: pp.6Ii.-70). Planning
is seen as an institutionalised process which tends to constrain
the freedom of the individual and, consequently, its scope is proposed
to be kept down to a minimum.
Comprehensive, holistic planning is said to be associated with the
rival doctrine of methodological holism which claims that there may
be properties of social aggregates and institutions which pertain
solely to the whole rather than their individual constituent parts.
The contrast between these two methodological doctrines, individualism
versus holism, is coming to be recognised as increasingly unreal for
in social theorising both individuals and wholes play their important
roles (RYAN, 1970)» much like a wood cannot be conceived of without
individual trees or the structure of a building without its individual
components and materials. The implications of the individualist
position for the planning of social organisation at various
administrative levels have been clearly indicated in the so-called
strategy of disjointed incrementalism as developed in (BRAYBROOKE,
and LINDBLOM, 19^3)5 (LIKDBLOM, 1965: ch.9); (LINDBLOM, 1968).
The approach of disjointed incrementalism dictates that planning
should focus on aspects of unit-problems rather than on comprehensive,
holistic ramifications of such problems for the societal totality
within which they emerge. Public decisions taken in a piecemeal,
incremental manner without comprehensive planning and coordination
are assumed to be in the best interests of the democratic processes
which guarantee maximum freedom for the individual in terms of
autonomy and choice. Taking the public decision process to operate
in a pluralistic disjointed mode, the planner may be seen to operate
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in a decision framework which is only one among many others.
The contribution of the planner can only be partial since his knowledge
can only be partial and can never extend so as to cover all conceivable
aspects of some social whole. It focuses on specific aspects of the
problem at hand which fall within his competence. The planner's
aim is to arrive at a solution to some problem which is satisfactory
and sufficient for the time being and for all practical purposes:
he "satisfices" (SIMON, 1957) rather than seeks for "best" overall
solutions, that is, proposals which take into account as many as
possible eventualities concerning the whole community. He is
problem-motivated rather than embarked on some grand project to
reshape the whole of society according to some Utopian vision of
a "best" end-state. He acknowledges that such an approach may
require him to attack the same problem again and again but is
prepared to do so.
The proponents of the disjointed incrementalist strategy of planning
adduce in its support the evidence from the actual state of affairs
in the process of making public decisions. The character of current
policy-making processes is seen as incremental, disjointed, discontinuous,
lacking some guiding conception of how the whole society should be,
taking place within a fragmented and decentralised structure
(RONDINELIiI, 1975' P«5U). This is said to provide sufficient empirical
grounds on which to suggest that the style of planning advanced
by disjointed incrementalism conforms to the actual state of affairs:
to what takes place in government and the administrative and
political machinery. Such evidence may even be taken to justify
the incrementalist strategy.
131.
One line of argument against such reasoning might be that this
approach entails a normative view of how things "ought to be done"
on the basis of how things "are being done", without venturing into
an examination of whether or not "things as they are" could be made
better. It may be said that it takes the satisfactoriness of the
"status quo" — of "what is" — as given and recommends "more of
the same". The role of planning tends to be delegated from its
initial position as an activity creative of the future to one
employed to maintain and perpetuate the present. Such a view
of disjointed incrementalism might be associated with the political
"luggage" of conservatism: indeed this characterisation follows
naturally in this line of criticism.
It would not be too contentious to look for the roots of incrementalist
thinking in Cantean positivism. Comte's programme sought to integrate
and harmonise the "order" and "progress" notions of society under a
structural-functional conception of social organisation where "order"
reigned supreme. In this view, the science of society becomes one
of justification of the "status quo": it is guided by certain
subjective or societal "interests of cognition" (HAEEHMAS, 1968/1971s
ch.9) which direct the way of looking at society, and hence social
theorising, toward the perspective of "order" — maintenance of social
reality as it exists. This is said to be pursued at the expense
of the perspective of "progress", viz. the investigation of social
potentiality, the seeing of empirical social reality through the
lenses of the possible and the normative: in terms of what could
be or ought to be rather than what already is (STRASSER, 1976: pp.
5-6).(152>
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If it is accepted that both the normative universe of values and
norms and the explanatory universe of the social "things as they are"
are created by man — the former wholly and the latter at least partly
so — then neither may be said to be a statement about reality and
neither can thus be strictly deducible from observation. Hence the
attempt to justify the incrementalist model by adducing empirical
evidence relating to what actually happens in the course of planning
of societal arrangements should be abandoned as impossible. What may
be more acceptable is. the articulation of arguments advanced from
some explicitly stated normative point of view which render such
an interest-loaded formulation open to social criticism. For the
divide between factual and normative issues may be misconstrued equally
easily either by mistaking the meaning of "facts" or by distorting
the meaning of "norms" and "values" — though the integrated factual
and normative questions may be analysed independently for discussion
purposes. Thus, one might argue in support of the disjointed
incrementalist approach by contending, for instance, that policies
should not be "framed for and on behalf of the population as a whole
by an elitist political and technical hierarchy" but should instead
be developed "from the grass roots rather than lead from above"
(CHEEKY, 1971+: p.80); or by making some other interest-guided statement
in favour of that approach while, at the same time, stating explicitly
the particular set of interests that guide one to make such a
statement.
The preceding discussion raises a number of important questions.
First whether there are any identifiable links and interdependencies
between an epistemological and methodological outlook and the view
taken of society and its political arrangements, including the style
of planning that is seen as most compatible with such a view.
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This problem is explored in a later section of this thesis.
Secondly, the expectation that the social and natural sciences will
reach a level of integration of a unified science where there will
not be any significant distinction between the subject matters
and methods employed in these two realms is an assumption which
underlies much research for prediction and forecasting in social/
spatial analysis and planning.
However, this assumption is not to be taken for granted and may
be unwarranted to accept as a whole package without important
qualifications. There may be some validity in such claims of
methodological naturalism. Nonetheless, there may be major points of
difference regarding the constitution of human individuals, viz.
the "model of man" that is to be accepted and to guide the search
for predictive instruments. Purposive behaviour is the characteristic
of human individuals which is not to be found among the features of
inanimate nature. Evidently, man could be studied — and has been
studied — mechanistically; but who studies him? Those other men,
the scientists, who conduct the enquiry do not themselves operate on
mechanistic principles (ENCEEL, et al., 1975s PP«35-36).
Thus, scientists who study human behaviour mechanistically; or
planners who seek to predict, say, what locations individuals, households
and firms will select, based on mechanistic principles, cannot escape
from applying the same principles to themselves. They cannot maintain
that the two pounds' (£2) worth of chemicals which make up their
bodies and their minds is not all that there is to account for
observable behaviour of both subjects and investigators. But how
can they account for their own behaviour if they do not introduce
134-
notions such as purpose, interaction, motive, conflict, etc. into
their inquiries? Although such notions may be alien in the context
of mechanicism they are conceptually indispensable in any scientific
investigation of human conduct and exercise in prediction of social/
spatial phenomena. The difficulty here is that considerations of
purpose and purposive conduct cannot be accommodated within
a mechanistic framework which stresses prediction from past
occurrences. For purpose refers to the future and hence predictions
which account for purposive action have to be made from the
future rather than the past. This important issue of mechanism
versus teleology still remains unresolved, if there can be a solution
to it, both in philosophy (EESCHER, 1970) and the social sciences,
though in the latter realm the work of the so-called "new teleologists"
has produced some valid results (LOUCH, 1966), (TAILOR, 1964)•
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3.2 "Incommensurability" of paradigms and interdisciplinary research:
multidisciplines and some "interdisciplines".
The above brief review of some perspectives or research traditions in
studies of social/spatial organisation has indicated, firstly, that
theoretical developments and model building in the realm of urban
spatial structure has been actively pursued by several social science
disciplines, either individually or collectively, which shared a common
interest in urban affairs. Secondly, it has suggested that these
traditions focus on their particular range of interests in accounting
for, more or less, the same set of phenomena. In so doing they tend to
view what they take as their subject matter from a particular
perspective which is characteristic of their approach.
These perspectives cannot be said to be mutually exclusive, in the sense
of pertaining to different universes of discourse which are incommensurable
between one another. (153) What makes sense in one approach is not totally
out of context in another. This is because these traditions of research
tend to share a number of orga.ni.sing principles.
For instance,"social physics" places emphasis on distance considerations
in spatial interaction and implies that people will tend to behave so
as to minimise their costs of travel, say, to work. Hence it is not
dissimilar to location theory which also presupposes xhe '■ ideal type"
of a1rational economic man". Further, ecological theories of the
city lean heavily on the notion of competition which may be seen as
an analogue of the market mechanism that underlies most location
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models. Moreover, they share a set of ontological, epistemological and
methodological presuppositions and are thus able to establish
conceptual links with one another. This is not to deny that
disciplinary perspectives have associated with them some way of looking
at the world which is peculiar to them. This tends to give rise
to problems of language, communication and commensurability of
perspectives in investigations of some subject matter, which require
contributions from more than one discipline. The nature of the subject
matter of urban planning is such that involves many disciplines in its
research and policy formulation activities.
The planner who would be an expert in all relevant areas of knowledge
contributing to a planning study must be a very rare species indeed.
It is said that Max Weber was the last social scientist to "know
everything". Since his time knowledge has been accumulating at such
a pace that it is inconceivable that a single individual would be
capable to absorb it even in relation to a relatively restricted field
of application such as planning. Recognition of the need for several
disciplinary contributions to planning studies came early enough in
(15M
the history of the profession. ' Apart from any other considerations,
the orientation of planners towards all-encompassing, comprehensive,
holistic approaches to their plans called for extensive knowledge which
was unlikely to be found in planning itself and would have to originate
from disciplines whose subject matter was akin to the city and its
various aspects.
Multidisciplinary research emerged as the first response to the need
for a new structuring of scientific and technological effort in the
inter-war period, which became apparent as the problems to which the
sciences addressed themselves seemed increasingly complex and
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multi-faceted (ACKOFF, 1973s p.669). The investigation of problem
complexes by multidisciplinary teams involved decomposition into
unidisciplinary and uniprofessional aspects that were considered to be
amenable to solution independently of each other. Disciplinary
solutions were subsequently aggregated to provide total answers.
This method of approach was the natural derivative of an analytical
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way of thinking about the worldv ' which was predominant until
the 19U0s and was founded on the assumption that the solution to
the whole was the sum of the solutions to its independent parts.
But this assumption is warranted only if the parts are genuinely
independent.
The intellectual framework that began emerging by the early 19l+0s,
what has come to be known as"systems thinking"} ^56) intensified the
search for holistic approaches to the solution of general classes of
complex problems. Based on the -understanding that all objects and
events, and all experiences of these, are parts of larger wholes the
doctrine of so-called "expansionism" was adopted and pursued to
supplement the reductionist approach. This principle implied
concentration on the study of wholes rather than their constituent parts,
though without denying the existence of the latter. "Expansionism"
represented a "synthetic" mode of thought focusing attention upon a
(1 £7*1
whole with interrelated parts: a system.^ ' In synthetic thinking
the expla-nflndum — or what is to be explained — is viewed as part of
a larger whole and is investigated in terms of its function in that
larger system. Conventionally called the "systems approach", synthetic
or holistic thinking is founded on the observation that optimum
performance of each element of a system does not necessarily imply
/ -j [^0 N
optimum performance of the whole. 5 '
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Under the influence of this way of looking at the world it was realised
that multidisciplinary approaches to the study of the whole were not
the best obtainable. Each of the disciplines involved in the
investigation of a phenomenon might make a significant contribution.
However, few of the problems that arose could be handled within any
one discipline. The systems that were being studied were not' simply
mechanical, chemical, social, economic, spatial, biological or political.
This classification represented only different prespectives of viewing
these entities. Understanding of the systems was taken to involve
the integration of the different disciplinary viewpoints; their
synthesis during the process of investigation rather than the
aggregation of the results from independently conducted unidisciplinary
studies after the end of the investigation (ACKOEF, 1969: p.3k2).
Interdisciplinary studies undertook to perform exactly that: that is,
to treat the subject system as a whole by fusion of disciplinary efforts.
Interdisciplinary relations were not only a common exploration of the
boundaries of knowledge nor only a tool for facilitating work touching
upon the interest of many fields. Their true object was "to reshape
or reorganise the fields of knowledge by means of exchanges which
are in fact constructive recombinations" (PIAGET, 1973s p.66). One of
the most striking features of the scientific movements of recent years
is the impetus generated by interdisciplinary studies towards the
formation of new branches of knowledge born from the union of neighbouring
fields. Such "interdisciplines" — operations research, policy sciences,
management sciences, organisational sciences, "planning sciences",
general systems research — adopted new goals that had an impact upon
their parent disciplines and which may be said to have enriched
the latter.
139.
Several disciplines have been instrumental in transforming urban planning
from its emergence as an area of professional practice into a field
of knowledge which is evolving towards acquiring the status of an
"interdiscipline". Apart from the founding professional groups, such
as architects and engineers, the trend to multidisciplinary work
attracted to planning those disciplines whose interest lay with the
problems of social and spatial organisation, in general. Sociology
was one of the first disciplines whose members expressed concern
(159)
over the difficulties that were being faced by the planning profession
as well as over the problems for society created by the planners in
their attempts to reshape the urban environment according to their
ideals.
Negative criticisms of the concept of comprehensive social planning
at national and local levels were strongly expressed by many
sociologists. Planning in a democratic political/administrative
context was attacked as pseudo-scientific or as "scientistic" delusion
stemming from Comtean positivism; which in turn was seen as originating
from the Ecole Polytechnique of Paris. The desire to apply purely
engineering techniques to the solution of social problems wa3 regarded
as a dangerous aberration and as being alien to the fundamental
principles of liberal democratic regimes (von HAYEK, et al., 1935s
p.210); (von HAYEK, 1914+); (von HAYEK, 1952:pp-94,105); (LIPPMANN, 1937:
p.365); (ZWEIG, 1942).
Description by Mannheim of liberalism as a transitional phase between
two forms of "planned order" — medieval Christendom, on the one side,
and the new phase that was emerging from "the growth of a coherent and
coordinated system of social techniques" within the modern state (MANNHEIM,
1935: pp.160; 362), on the other side — attracted a host of criticisms.
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They were especially expressed against Mannheim's tendency for
"historicism" (i.e. the inevitable laws of historical development) and
"holism" (i.e. that social reconstruction should be all-embracing);
and started a controversy which lasted until the 1950s and, in
retrospect, made the whole debate appear increasingly unrealistic.
Emphatically opposing Manheim's views of planning, Popper advocated
"piecemeal .social engineering".in which social arrangements are changed
by "small adjustments and readjustments" rather than by trying to
redesign the whole society (POPPER, 1957/1961: pp.66; 68).
Economics had no formal involvement in urban planning -until the late
19l+0s.^0) This was due to the fact that the concept of space
was introduced relatively late in the process of evolution of modern
economic theory (FRIEDMANN and AL0NS0, 1961+: p. 17)♦ Moreover, the main
interest of theoretical economics did not lie with issues that were
directly relevant in the urban planning context. For example, emphasis
on economic rather than social objectives; concentration of attention
on the private as opposed to the public sector of economic activities
(although the latter permeates planning in the forms of social overhead
and infrastructure investment); inability to reach conclusions on
objective measurements of interpersonal comparisons of utility (that is,
to establish with some degree of certainty the extent to which social
groups would be better or worse off as a result of changes proposed in
a plan); all these represented gaps in economic theory on matters
which were of great importance in urban planning (FAMELIS, 1970: p.8).
However, problems created by the need to finance the implementation
of planning programmes generated the requirements for sound economic
advice and the active implication of economists in town planning
operations. Further, realisation that the way in which economic activity
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is distributed spatially has a significant bearing on the development
issues of urban and regional economies; and the fact that town planners'
proposals of extensive reorganisation of the existing patterns of urban
land uses were made on the basis of criteria other than economic, gave
rise to increased concern among economists over the repercussions that
indiscriminate action on urban economies might have for their survival.
Thus, a number of prominent economists were attracted to the study of the
economic aspects of urban planning, in particular, and to the research
of the basic theoretical principles governing the functioning of urban
economies (LICHFIELD, 19^6); (PFOTJTS, i960); (PERLOFF and WINGO, 1968);
(LEAN, 1969); (RICHARDSON, 1971) 5 (LEAN and GOODALL, 1970); (McKEAN, 1973).
The emphasis placed in recent decades upon the social science aspects
of geography produced a strong interest among the professionals of that
discipline in connection with the philosophy and methods of investigation
of man and society in geographical space (HAHVEY, 1969) • Geographers
have been increasingly concerned with the patterns of localisation of
man, his structures, societies and cultures; with the interrelations
between these and the physical environment: in short, with spatial
patterns. Variations in the social environment between and within
cities and urban areas — being viewed as a subset of the set of all
such variations in physical space — and the process of adaptation
to and modification of these environments to suit specific human needs —
being the process of spatial planning — have been of direct concern
to the geographer. Both the study of the roles of planning and
professional participation in it are claimed to be within his scope
of activities.
Political and administrative issues abound in urban planning. This is
manifested in the need for coordination of community choices, for
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adapting means to ends for bridging the gap between the formulation of
policy and its implementation: the passage from the empirical "is" to
the normative "ought". Further, the problems that are generated by
different elements of urban administration at various hierarchical
scales; and the requirements for integration of policy making at all
relevant administrative levels provide ample opportunity for active
involvement of political scientists and public administration specialists
in the interdisciplinary planning team (GALLOWAY, 192+1); (MILLET, 19^7);
(DALLAM), 1967).
The model interdisciplinary planning team comprising a number of
specialists in relevant fields, presumably ready to cooperate and
integrate their disciplinary points of view, seems to represent an
ideal which has seldom been attained in actual planning practice.
Although the rationale for interdisciplinary approaches to the tasks
of urban planning is basically sound, many issues regarding the functioning
of interdisciplinary planning teams still remain problematic. Some
of the problems that arise in such undertakings are well reviewed in
(ALONSO, 1971s PP-169-173)* More specifically, there seems to be
an inability to arrive at integrated interdisciplinary approaches
because of emphasis placed on individual disciplinary perspectives.
Moreover, semantic problems of communication between professionals of
different disciplinary backgrounds often prove overwhelming. Increasing
intra-disciplinary specialisation renders exceedingly difficult the-
selection of professionals from various disciplines, whose skills are
best suited to the particular set of circumstances facing the
interdisciplinary team. The techniques employed by various professionals
belonging to different disciplines may be refined and"appropriately"
scientific but their use may prove problematic within the broader
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framework of a methodology specifically formulated with the social
context of planned action in mind.
To advocate, as Alonso does (ibid.: p. 17*0, " that urban and regional
problems and plans be attacked by one or more professionals who are
first and foremost scholars in urban and regional problems and
secondarily members of traditional disciplines", is indeed a plausible
alternative to what has so far been the case. But it will not be
a viable one, too unless a range of fundamental problems of planning
begin to receive attention. Such problems would involve the question
of the disciplinary status of the field — art, science, ideology,
something else ? — its epistemological and methodological foundations;
its approach to issues of "practice" — in the sense of the Aristotelian
r
"TTpQKTlKT) «f viz. practical reason, pertaining to the realm of ideology
and politics; in short, they would be problems of paradigm formation
rather than paradigm change a la Euhn. They would be questions of
problem generation and definition rather than "degenerated
problemshifts" a la Lakatos.
However suspicious one is of such questions regarding the cognitive
foundations of a field which is well-known for its emphasis on the
pragmatic and the feasible rather than the contemplative and the
scientific, there is no way of avoiding the conclusion that it is
preferable to seek to know before acting, that informed action stands
a higher chance of yielding "pragmatic" results than a mere guess.
If this is accepted, then the ways in which knowledge is acquired and
legitimated in urban planning — rather than made use of — should
be subject to investigation and discussion and not taken for granted.
This also means that models and the model building activity,
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appropriately viewed as elements of man's cognitive apparatus rather
than as merely special techniques performing restricted functions of
prediction and testing of action hypotheses; as vehicles of thought
rather than simply instruments or tools which somehow miraculously
accomplish their forecasting tasks; should be investigated with
regard to their epistemological foundations. But this need not
imply a state of extreme integration of different viewpoints resulting
in a solidified and fixed view of the world, a closed system of
thought which is to govern inquiry forever.
There should exist areas of constructive argument which would initiate
changes in perception and conceptualisation should the critique of
existing modes be accepted. There are many similarities between
political conflict and theoretical disagreement and many gradations
to the latter. Calls for interdisciplinarity should be heeded to,
but cautiously; for the demands for interdisciplinary integration
in planning should not overwhelm the need for critical discussion
and assessment of different theoretical perspectives. There is
a sense of unconstrained optimism associated with interdisciplinary
research which tends to overlook important realities in inquiry.
Although interdisciplinary approaches are successful in softening
entrenched disciplinary viewpoints, they should not be aimed at
eliminating them completely. Convergence more or less partial
of insights should be regarded as a satisfactory outcome of
interdisciplinary exercises. Development of enlarged perspectives
without sacrificing what has been accomplished at a more limited
disciplinary basis, should be a prescription for such exercises.
It is by convergence and fusion of theoretical viewpoints that
new perspectives axe to be created from which to approach already
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familiar material and seek richer formulations. Fragmentary
insights cannot he expected to inevitably add up to some integrated
whole. Methods and procedures of other disciplines cannot he
taken for granted. The epistemological problems that alternative
disciplinary perspectives raise and their range of assumptions
concerning the nature of reality will first have to he investigated
and reconciled.
3.3 The movement towards comprehensiveness in conventional
physical planning approaches.
Recognition that planning could not sensibly restrict its concerns to
the purely physical aspects of the urban environment — such as
aesthetics, health and sanitation, orderly movement of persons, goods
and vehicles — and neglect influences arising from a combination of
environmental, socio-cultural, economic, and political factors in
interaction came early enough. Thus, in (MUMFOED, 1937s pp.vii-viii)
it is stated that:
"Planning involves the job of coordinating specialisms, focusing them
in common fields of knowledge, and canalizing them in appropriate
channels of common action ... We must learn to deal not with specialised
interests and atomic elements, but with elements in association and
generalised interests; we must deal with organism, function, and
environment, with place, work and people, with political, economic,
cultural and aesthetic life ... "
Further, one of the important members of the founding generation of
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urban planners in the USA expressed the view that "...city planning
is not and probably will never be the field of a single profession .."
(LEWIS, 1939: P.7).
The evolutionary trajectory of urban planning in terms of the degree
of comprehensiveness in its approach can be traced in steps from
(i) an early stress on aesthetics to (ii) the goal of efficient
functioning of the city — in both engineering and economic sense;
then to (iii) assuming the role of a set of means for controlling
the use of land; subsequently, to (iv) being a key element in
efficient governmental procedures; later to (v) involving welfare
considerations and stressing the human element; and more recently
to (vi) encompassing many socio-economic and political as well as
physical elements that help to guide the functioning and development
of the urban community (GOODMAN and FREUND, 1968).
However, early comprehensive land use planning attracted a host of
criticisms which tended to reject its conception of some holistic
end-state, a master or general plan, as a static normative model holding
together the principal planning norms and activities. The critique
of the comprehensive mode of planning resulted in two important
modifications: (i) the notion of an end-state plan was abandoned in
favour of the plan as a continuing -process: (ii) the planning
process was viewed as independent of the object of planning, and this
orientation resulted in conceiving of planning as a process of rational
decision making.^^ ^ The expanding subject matter of planning
imposed requirements of knowledge and methods and procedures for its
acquisition and application to practical issues, which were taken to
be best met by exploring the methodological apparatus of neighbouring
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fields. Thus planners reached outwards beyond their own restricted
boundaries imposed by such antecedents as architecture and basic
civil engineering.
In its search for a concomitant methodology to replace and/or
supplement traditional approaches, urban planning has been turning to
both other planning milieus (e.g. transportation, industry, business
management, even defense); and to fields and disciplines which,
although they had developed an interest in spatial analysis, had been
previously ignored (e.g. economics, systems engineering, operations
research). The interaction that emerged from this search for concepts,
formal methods, and approaches to solutions of problems that might be
applicable to urban studies further enhanced the trends towards
a re-orientation of urban planning. This was mainly due to the
recognition that (ROBINSON, 1972):
"... planing is basically a methodology, a set of procedures applicable
to a variety of activities aimed at achieving selected goals by the
systematic application of resources in programmed quantities and
time sequences designed to alter the projected trends and redirect
them toward established objectives. In short it has become
increasingly recognised that urban planning is but one branch of a
family of disciplines and activities which plan and use planning
methods, e.g. administration, management, budgeting, engineering, and
systems analysis".
This view takes planning to be independent of the object, or subject
matter, that is being planned and places emphasis on the knowledge
end of the "knowledge/action" continuum which constitutes the context
of urban planning ( FBTKDMANNand HUDSON, 197U) • In this manner,planning
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is seen as a process of rational programming or rational decision making;
and this view has been offered as an alternative to the earlier
normative conception of •urban planning as "comprehensive land use
planning". The separation of the planning process from that which
forms the object of the process, or — to put it in another way —
the conception of planning as a generic activity rather than one which
differs fundamentally in relation to context of application, has been
instrumental in intensifying the process of borrowing by urban
planners of methods and techniques from other areas where planning
of some sort or another is carried out (such as management or operations
planning). Moreover, it has attracted into the field of spatial
analysis and urban planning many individuals who were originally
skilled in planning studies in contexts other than the city.
However selective and partial such borrowing and adaptation may have
been, it has drastically affected traditional planning methods
and has resulted in the introduction into the urban planners' toolkit
of a number of often "exotic" and esoteric techniques that had been
developed with other fields of application in mind. It has been
observed, in retrospect, that such extensive enrichment and
restructuring of the methodological and conceptual material of urban
planning has been advancing at a pace that appears to be much faster
than the ability of the professionals of the field to assimilate the
new information and put it to advantageous use. However, the ongoing
modification of academic curricula in schools of planning which is
specifically introduced to take account of the inflow of recent
developments and to transmit this knowledge to new generations of
urban planners is bound to result in an ever widening dissemination
of the new approaches and in their gradual absorption into the body
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of theoretical and procedural material of urban planning. Whether or
not this is the appropriate direction for planning is open to debate
which must involve considerations of the extent to which the subject
matter of inquiry is allowed to determine the methods that are
employed in its study. This issue will be discussed later.
chapter three
The normative dimension of planning.
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CHAPTER THREE
The normative dimension of planning.
1. Introduction: The changing social and technological context
of urban planning.
2. Social criticisms of the early planning "models".
3. The shifting realities of society and technology.
1+. The ideological elements of urban planning.
5. Technicism, humanism and problem-solving: is a fusion of
perspectives possible ?
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152.
1. Introduction : The changing social and technological context
of urban planning.
The early conceptions of planning and its process represented genuine
attempts at eradicating the problems of the cities and making the
urban environment as attractive a place to live and work as was
possible given limitations in resources and constraints imposed by
existing physical and social structures. This commitment to
improvement and reforms that would further the interests of the community
as a whole was singled out for criticism from two sides: (i) For not
being sufficiently "objective", i.e. for being the result of normative
choice, based on some vision of the future, which was not founded on
solid empirical bases of scientific and value-free analyses of existing
states of affairs and exploration of the consequences of alternative
proposals for the city as a whole. (ii) For being too "subjective"
in its conception of some end-state of the city regarded as the "best"
possible and consistently pursued. This approach was seen as
paternalistic and ineffective in creating the kind of urban environment
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that would be acceptable to those who would inhabit it rather than those
who designed it. Thus, according to the former critics, it was not
clearly shown how the passage from the empirical "is" to the normative
"ought" was to be made in a way which effectively met stated social
goals, and objectives. This led to the conception of planning as
rational programming. According to the latter criticisms, it was
the goals themselves, their derivation and explicit formulation usually
outside of the segments of society concerned, that was at the root
of the difficulties. This led to calls for increased public
participation and the viewing of planning as a social process.
But apart from "inside" criticisms planning was faced with pervasive
changes in its subject matter to the extent that where simple design
exercises might earlier prove appropriate in well-defined problems,
they were proving wholly inadequate- in the rapidly shifting social
and technological realities of post-war urban societies. The problems
that gave rise to the recognition that some form of control and
planning of the urban environment was required if cities were to
continue to provide a livable milieu for human productive and social
activities, were problems that could be circumscribed with relative
clarity and precision and involved simple commonsense to identify.
Congested urban centres; poor housing; a network of roads which could
not cope with rapidly increasing vehicular traffic; the explosion
of the motor car and the resulting enhanced mobility of the urban
population; these were some of the problems that were taken to be
solvable by applying sensible standards of environmental design and
by arriving at concrete and detailed schemes of action in terms of
control and renovation by means of intuitive consideration of the
possible, the ideal, and acceptable compromises.
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No direct "tampering" with societal processes was anticipated; only-
physical, environmental measures were taken to be necessary and
sufficient in producing the requisite social harmony and improved
environment. That environment determines behaviour was a view
implicit in such physical determinist solutions to the problems of
the city. However, recognition that physical manifestations of urban
problems were actual products of societal processes, structures, and
mechanisms which were not fixed physical "things" but changing over
time in a way which rendered the- formulation of "natural" laws of
society a futile exercise in the long run,necessitated a change in
emphasis placed by early planning on the purely physical dimension so
as to incorporate and account for social aspects of its subject matter.
This state of affairs also contributed greatly in the reconsideration
of early planning approaches and the search for new methods and
procedures.
2. Social criticisms of the early planning "models".
The critics of early planning approaches focused on the two sets of
points that were referred to above. These were not "global assessments"
of what planning had so far achieved but rather critiques from some
particular points of view. For instance, to claim that planning was
not carried out based on sufficiently "objective " analyses of existing
states of affairs and predictions of the consequences of alternative
action schemes on these, presupposes that "objective" planning modelled
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on some conception of a "policy science" would be far superior to
more intuitive or subjective approaches. But this is a view which
can not be scientifically (empirically) established for it is based
on prior assumptions of the nature and potential contributions of
(1)science^ ' which cannot be tested in experience. Moreover, there
are many plausible arguments which cast doubts on the possibility
to directly apply methods and procedures of natural science to the
study of social problems.
Similarly, to argue that early planning approaches were not
sufficiently concerned with interpreting the wishes of human
individuals in the formulation of goals and objectives implies that
had they done so they would have proved successful. Again this is
a claim which is difficult to test in experience for it expresses
some particular normative viewpoint- viz. that the individual is
more important than the collectivity in questions of social policy.
The experience of several abortive exercises of public participation
and goal formulation by consensus has shown that the otherwise
honourable objective of "asking the people" is very difficult to attain
in a way which produces concrete and usable results for planning.
Of course, this may be due to the approach adopted in communicating
with the public and arriving at definitions of so-called "public
interest". But the difficulties in clearly delimiting such concepts
should not be underestimated, as is shown below.
Apart from the particular interests guiding the critics of early
planning, it has to be conceded that there are many plausible arguments
in these critiques. Further, the ideological content of urban planning
clearly differentiates it from other social science disciplines.
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In the theoretical formulations of the latter it is comparatively easy
to exclude "extraneous" influences and suppress contradictions
by employing simplifying assumptions such as 'ceteris paribus' — i.e.
other things being equal — or employ some form of the "conventionalist
(2)
stratagem" to save some empirical hypothesis from refutation.
In. contrast, in the field of concrete and real problems that planning
is required to solve the flaws in the conception of the urban
environment implied by the proposed solutions cannot be evaded.
The pragmatic justification of the results of planning is its
hardest test against experience.
Starting from the physical dimension, the cities that have been
subjected to active planning and control of development were affected
physically in various degrees ranging from localised changes to total
metamorphoses — depending on the effectiveness of the supporting
planning legislation and the radicality of the planners' approaches.
Extensive urban renewal, land use controls, and new transportation
systems are only few of the powerful instruments of change in the
hands of urban planners, which were used with great consequences
for the existing fabric of urban areas. Further, a whole constellation
of new towns were developed following the ideologies of the early
"utopians" of planning as these were subsequently supplemented by
( 3 )
contemporary locational economic thinking.
Therefore, judging from the magnitude of purely physical change which
took place during the period under examination it may be argued that
planning (in certain parts of the world) has been largely effective
in influencing physical conditions and bringing about structural
changes in the city. Cities, however, are essentially socio-spatial
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entities : any change that affects their physical space will
ultimately have repercussions for their social content. It is in
this latter area that early urban planning "models" are claimed to
have had certain monumental failures. Thus, it is argued that it
has proved extremely difficult to maintain either of the two
fundamental assumptions of those approaches. On the one hand,
"collective interest" proved impossible to identify objectively —
apart from cases where strategic or economic factors were exceedingly
predominant. Most frequently, conceptions of public interest
involved either approximations based on the planners* ingenuity
to devise arguments founded on the concept of "amenity", the "sense
of community", the "requirements of good planning", etc. (HARRISON,
1972: pp.267-269); or included suggestions that present planning
policies are justified on the grounds of the future "common good" of
posterity (DENNIS, 1970: pp.337-31+2). a notable example is one of
planning*s proudest and most dramatic in its effect achievements:
slum clearance; with the well documented side-effects on the social
structure and cohesiveness of the pre-existing communities and the
alienation of the latter from the new, standardised, idealised
environments that were provided them as substitutes. It is claimed
that this treatment of individual requirements in total abstraction
from social context may be regarded as an empirical refutation of
the assumption concerning an objectively identifiable communal interest
(ABRAMS, 1965); (ANDERSON, 1961+); (PRIED, 1963); (GANS, 1962); (GREER,
1965); (hartman, 196I+).
On the other hand, the pragmatic rebuttal of the hypothesis that
planners were privileged in having the means to identify the "public
interest" — in •whose name they were acting — manifested itself
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through the refusal of the affected parties to recognise the experts'
definition of social imperatives transcending whatever the local
residents or businessmen considered to be their interests (DENNIS,
1970). In Britain, general opposition tothe implementation of urban
planning proposals has augmented considerably since 19^4-7•
The profession was not prepared for the masses of planning appeals
of the 1950s (LITTEEWOOD, 1957).
The impending crisis in the urban planning scene of the early 1960s
initiated some fresh thinking among the professionals and the theorists
of the field. Placing faith in the treasury of the social sciences,
new methodological approaches were propounded to overcome existing
problems of planning. The first attack on the eminent weaknesses .
was concentrated upon the ways of identifying the concept of "communal
interest". Objectivity and rationality in this operation were sought
through the adoption of a methodology already developed within those
disciplines which specialised in the study of the optimisation of
the performance of functional systems, such as military or industrial
operations. Physical deterministic approaches were thus being
succeeded by a broader systems view of the cities which replaced the
early planning "models". This indicates that the attempts to modify
and improve the comprehensive land use planning "model" were not
thought either to go far enough in changing that "model" or to produce
a really improved version of it/^
Taking society as a cohesive collective the systems approach met
requirements of interdependence of factors influencing urban growth,
and of comprehensiveness in dealing with urban problems. It abandoned
causal analysis in favour of understanding interdependencies in
\
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the functioning of the urban system as a whole. It further provided
a sufficiently explicit and readily available theoretical background
on which to speculate about the behaviour of such systems and derive
( 5)
fruitful hypotheses. v ' Finally, it rendered accessible to planners
a set of procedures and methods under the general heading of "systems
( 6)
analysis" s which were being developed and used in the study of
operations and in the solution of clearly defined problems of systems
(HITCH, 1955s P.1)> (QUADE, 1966: p.28). These methods were applied
to fields such as operations research (BRANCH, 1957)> (WHEATON, 19&3),
decision theory (DYCKMAN, 1961), input-output studies (ISARD et al.,
i960), information theory (MEIER, 1962), as well as sociological and
manpower analyses for understanding the behaviour, attitudes and
ends of the people that were affected by planning (WIIMOTT and COOHEY,
1963), (REINER, et al., 19^3)-
The systems framework was an added incentive for urban planners to
adopt a conception of planning as "rational programming". The other
strong influence was, of course, the emergence of the so-called policy
sciences which employed a technological approach to the solution of
social problems (NAGEL, 1975)» (hERNER and LASSWELL, 195*1) and operated
on the assumption that explanation, i.e. knowledge (preferably
(7)
scientifically acquired), ought to precede prescription,i.e„ action.
Planning modelled on "rational programming" was taken to deal with
the objective choice of social ends and the scientific/analytical
determination of the most effective means to achieve those ends.
Selection of means-arrangements would be effected also objectively
by employing rational criteria of optimising the use of scarce
resources— criteria of efficiency, mostly — so as to eliminate
undesirable consequences that might ensue from implementation of
the means.
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As regards the ends of planning, these were either taken as supplied
from outside of the rational programming exercise, say, by the
administrators, politicians, etc., or arrived at objectively by
avoiding ideological influences and 'a priori' determinations of the
"public interest". Objectivity in defining community goals was
taken to be attainable by recourse to and dispassionate, detached study
of market and political processes and the feedback from those
affected by proposed planned action. Moreover, the means and their
consequences were determined through mainly empirical analyses and
a variety of studies testing the fit of means to ends and predicting
the consequences of these means (MEYERSON and BAMFIELD, 1955);
(MEYERSON, 1956); (DAVIDOFF and REINER, 1962); (FEELOFF and WINGO, 1962).
The influence of the "rational programming" framework brought urban
planning increasingly closer to concepts and methods of rational
decision making that were being developed in other disciplines and
so reduced the differences between planning for a variety of clients
and ends, on the one side, and planning for urban settlements, on the
other side. In terms of theoretical orientation, research findings
within the "rational programming" framework indicated that the aspects
of the physical environment which urban planners have traditionally
dealt with do not have a significant impact on people's behaviour
(R0S0W, 1961); (WILNER et al., 1962). Further, studies of social
organistion and social structure succeeded in amply demonstrating
that economic and social patterns were much more important elements
/ 8 \
of the urban system than spatial ones, ' although their
examination and study in abstraction from their spatial context would
be counter-productive. The insights gained through such studies
contradicted earlier physical deterministic approaches in urban
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planning and suggested that attention should be placed on urban
institutions and institutional change rather than on environmental
change alone (WEBBER, 1963); (WEBBER, 1961+) •
In conjunction, comprehensive or holistic planning and the ideal of
rationality constitute the so-called rational-comprehensive mode
of planning. This stresses the view of the city as a complex system
of interrelated components or sub-systems; seeks to explore system-
wide repercussions of proposed courses of action; takes a global
view of the subject matter of planning; adopts rational/systemic
methods in the study and control of urban affairs; requires central
coordination and integration of action programmes of different public
agencies; pursues overall or system goals (WEBBER, 1963)• Evidently,
the idea of comprehensiveness, if taken too far, is self-defeating for
it is never possible to command the kind and amount of knowledge
that is necessary to deal with the city seen as a whole. As Popper
has so convincingly argued, a holistic approach (implying an extreme
holistic view) faces the limitations of human knowledge.
If by a whole is meant "the totality of all the properties or aspects
of a thing, especially of all the relations holding between its parts"
(POPPER, 1957/1961: p.76), then wholes in this sense "can never be
the object of any activity, scientific or not" (ibid.: p.77)-
A holistic approach is impossible for the study of society as a whole
and so must be the holistic method of planning and controlling and
reconstructing society as a whole (ibid.: p.79)» Wholes in the above
sense cannot be studied as wholes for study of anything always involves
selection of some aspect of it: "all description is necessarily
selective" (ibid.: p.77)- However, comprehensive planning need not
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take such an extreme view of wholes or systems that cities are said
to be. All it needs maintain is that "certain special properties
or aspects of a thing, namely those which make it appear as an
organised structure rather than a 'mere heap' could be regarded as
a whole" (POPPER, 1957/1961: p.76).
This view would imply that such things would be both more than the
mere sum of their parts and amenable to selective study (ibid.: p.76).
Moreover, adopting an atomistic or individualistic approach, in no
way precludes recognition that every individual interacts with all
others (ibid.: p.82). Hence what happens in practice is that the
extreme holist is faced wixh the problem of knowing a whole and
being unable to solve it he settles for a partial or abstractive
approach (ibid.: pp.68-69). Analogous criticisms of comprehensive-
rational approaches have been made by (BA1JFIELD, 1959) and
(ALTSHULER, 1965)- Comprehensive or holistic approaches may be said
to be associated with organismic views of society while approaches
based on incremental!sm and "muddling/through" that are critical
of comprehensive planning would be linked with atomistic or
T-
individualistic views of society (FALUDI, 1973 '• P«113)«
Thus arises one of the most widely discussed issues in planning — but
also in social philosophy though here the emphases are on epistemological
issues — regarding the mode of planning that is most appropriate
given the nature of its subject matter, but also the methodological
perspective to be adopted in developing models and theories of
social/spatial phenomena. Thus, it is possible to distinguish two
interconnected levels of discussion: (i) at the epistemological
level, the issue arises from consideration of the methodological
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approach to studying social/spatial phenomena, viz. whether it
should be focused on individuals or on collectivities or wholes
(e.g. systems); (ii) at the level of planning process (the level
of action), the dispute involves comprehensive or holistic planning
approaches, which emphasise interrelationships and collective goals,
versus incrementalist or individualistic approaches of planning which
stress partial, piecemeal, incremental measures and muddling through
and exclude overriding global goals.
The well-known debate concerning individualism and holism as
methodological doctrines in the study of social life extends, though
not invariably, into many realms of human organisation — e.g. politics,
administration, sociology, economics, planning, operational research,
and management science. At a general level of social philosophy,
but often also in discussions of substantive issues within particular
disciplines, the debate frequently carries over into ontological
arguments about whether wholes such as societies and cultures can be
said to really exist as entities in themselves even though they are
constituted by individual human beings. The issues concerning the
nature of society — or collectivities such as social groups,
organisations, and institutions — and the relations between such
social "wholes" and the human individual have occuppied the minds
of many gifted scholars and thinkers since the time of Plato
and Aristotle; and there exists as yet no definitive answer to
those questions. Very roughly, three main sets of views have been




Firstly, there are the holists who generally take collectivity as
coming prior to the individual, or as having ontological status in
itself,and as being the distinguishing characteristic of human beings:
for in Plato's famous view, a man as a lone individual is not a man;
he is either god or beast. Hence it is society and socialisation
that turns an individual into a human being — though not all holists
share all of those views. Indeed, some appear to restrict their
holism to merely objecting against the doctrinal rejection by
individualists of the possibility of identifying properties that
pertain solely to wholes (DRAY, 1967). Secondly, there are the
individualists, who currently predominate, asserting that the
individual and aggregations of individuals is all that is involved
in the study of social life. Collectivities are simply made up
of individuals and their properties can be investigated either by
aggregating the properties of the individuals who constitute them
or by reducing collective behaviour to that of individual agents —
though in this camp, too, there are wide variations in the precise
content of the views that are held.
Finally, there are those who regard both collectivist and individualist
considerations as indispensable in investigations of society and the
social relations among its members (STARE, 1958). However,
collectivist approaches to social phenomena may be conceived
independently of the ontological issue concerning the real existence
of collective entities. Human affairs are often investigated in terms
of both individual questions relating to motives, intentions,
reasons for action, as well as collective or "institutional" questions
regarding concepts, forms of organisation, and patterns of behaviour
seen in relation to each other (HANSON, 1975* Ch.1).
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Especially as regards questions of social policy and planning at
various levels of the administrative hierarchy, these generally pertain
to the communal environment and address themselves to the provision
and maintenance of "goods and services" to which the individual cannot
have access in the market as a single individual. One might list,
for instance: urban transportation in terms of both systems of rapid
mass transport and the roads network of a city; the provision of
shopping and leisure facilities in areas which the market regards as
"unprofitable"; urban redevelopment schemes in city areas where
housing conditions are assessed as below some acceptable lowest
level; the control of environmental pollution (air, water, noise);
etc. as examples of such goods and services that are not available
to the single individual through the market mechanisms. Provision
of these is said to instigate the need for government; and the need
to coordinate decisions regarding the substantive, spatial, temporal,
and magnitudinal characteristics of their provision indicates that
"some form of planning" is appropriate.
Thus, due to the nature of its subject matter planning has to take
into account predominantly collectivist aspects of the social affairs
it deals with. Planning discourse has usually been articulated in
terms of aggregates rather than individuals; in terms of relations
between wholes and parts (e.g. between cities as social/spatial wholes
or "systems" and the activity "subsystems" that may be said to
constitute "urban systems"). This is not to deny that part to part
or whole to whole relationships do not enter into planning
deliberations. Questions concerning the ontological status of wholes
or systems rarely arise in urban planning. Such questions might
revolve around: (i) whether wholes or systems may be said to have
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an existence of their own by virtue of their collective properties,
such as "urban structure", "culture", or "collective interests",
which cannot be derived from properties of individuals or reduced
to these; or (ii) whether it is sufficient to establish appropriate
rules of aggregation of individual characteristics in terms of which
discourse about aggregates may proceed, thus rejecting the ascription
of ontological status to wholes. Setting aside such ontological
issues might be seen as enhancing rather than hindering progress in
the field, particularly since it stresses pragmatic rather than
contemplative criteria of knowledge and action.
As a result of the emphasis placed on collectivities and aggregates
rather than individuals, planning is often said to be anti-humanistic and
anti-individualist. This may be seen also in the tensions that are
claimed to exist between the collective concept of "srtucture" —
whether it be "social structure" or "social/spatial structure" as in
the notion of "urban structure" — and the concept of the individual
in society (CAWS, 1968/1970: pp. 197-21 i|) • However, this is an
evaluative statement expressing the view of some humanists that
collective analyses fail to give primary importance to the dignity
and interests of the individual. Since it has not been demonstrated
that alternative approaches, to the extent that they are conceivable
and applicable, possess distinct advantages and improved explanatory
power the humanists' criticism may be either accepted or rejected as
an act of faith or expression of preferences.
Further, to claim that planning is conceptually or inherently anti-
individualist is to fail to recognise that it is invoked as a social
process which, as part of social life, aims at furthering the interests
167.
of the individual in society and attempts to make accessible to the
individual certain goods and services which would otherwise be
unavailable. Hence the charge of conceptual anti-individualism
levelled against planning may not be very well founded. However,
there is a distinct methodological emphasis on collective concepts
and aspects of society in planning; and this may be said to provide
reasons for arguing in favour of approaches which employ methods
that ascribe to the individual a much more important role in the
forming of policies and decisions concerning his way of life,
privacy, independence, and freedom.
If an individual must engage in, say, regular physical exercise in
the present in order to minimise the risk of coronary disease in
the more distant future, it is unreasonable to deny that social groups
would not be better off if they adopted now some form of systematic
and thoughtful regulation of the affairs affecting their individual
members in order to improve collective conditions in the future.
Employing rational foresight to guide action now in view of potential
future occurrences is the underlying rationale of the ctivity of
planning. This is not to deny that adopting some form of planned
regulation of collective affairs may be taken as a matter of choice
rather than a condition that is necessarily imposed on society by
the order of the things social.
The instigation of planning is not an empirical but rather a normative
question. "Things as they are" are things as they are: they only
become subject to regulation and control if they are not judged as
satisfactory. However, leaving them as they are may not be
characteristic of human beings as morally responsible agents, and
such an argument may be taken to support the claim that planning
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and regulation of social affairs can be empirically justified ( on a
descriptivist view of ethics). The main point here is , of course,
that planning activity is itself a normative view of society; and
not that society possesses intrincic mechanisms to ensure its "survival"
or "progress" or "evolution" without requiring external intervention —
which is a view that is best rejected.
If it is agreed that there is scope for some form of planning and
regulation of change in societal affairs which does not conflict.in
-principle, with basic individualist values, then the problem becomes
one of specifying that form of planning in a way that it does not
antagonise the individual in practice. Creating a set of arrangements
in relevant areas of social life in order to assure that the interests
of all individuals are appropriately served is a critical task for any
form of planning of societal affairs. It does, however, share the
predicament of all democratic processes in that it cannot satisfy the
interests of all the individuals that are affected by planned action —
as attempts at defining the elusive notion of the "public interest"
( 10)
have shown.v
Efforts aimed at minimi sing the extent of dissatisfaction among
individuals that is caused by implementation of proposed social
policies are indeed laudable. However, they must be constrained in
their effectiveness by the need to balance collective and individual
interests without rendering excessively weak and inadequate the
coordinative and controlling aspects of planning, and hence nullifying
planning as a whole. The main difficulty here seems to lie in
clearly delimiting the requisite centralism of coordination in
planning policies so as to enhance their beneficial effects, while
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at the same time avoiding conditions leading to excessive coneentration
of power and responsibilities for producing the planned results by-
explicit coercion exercised upon individuals.
Some degree of central coordination of various action policies
proposed with respect to different aspects of social/spatial
organisation seems to be appropriate, despite objections from
individualists. The scale at which intervention takes place, the
scope of the resources that are involved in implementing policy-
measures, and the speed at which technology advances and changes are
some of the reasons given to support centralised coordination.
A further argument for a centralised form of planned intervention
is one which points to the inevitably unequal distribution of benefits
accruing to, and costs (not necessarily pecuniary) incurred by, those
affected by planned action. Alternative allocations of resources
at various administrative levels — e.g. what resources will be
allocated to education, health, social security, housing, protection
of environmental amenity, recreation — have significant effects in
terms of redistribution of resources among individuals and social
groups.
Even space, in terms of land or some use made of land, is not simply
a container of things and activities but also a factor of production
of urban goods and services; and decisions affecting its use have
strong redistributive effects within urban society with potential
ramifications reaching outside of the conventional limits of the city.
Allocative problems, together with questions of communal goals,
objectives, and steps that are outlined as necessary to meet such ends,
bring to the fore the political aspects of planning and indicate
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that the planning activity conceived of independently of politics
is not a viable concern. Attempts to agree on social choices by
considering the whole range of individual personal preferences reveals
and crystallises group and value conflicts which, on some accounts,
are inherent in society.
Such issues may not be possible to settle by applying strictly
technical criteria but inevitably involve political and evaluative
choices. The above considerations indicate that there is scope for
a more centralised planning organisation, aimed at coordinating
policies pursuing different objectives and at resolving conflicts of
interest. However, the criticism regarding the lack of knowledge
about interdependencies among different areas of policy-making
is well aimed (FALHDI, 1973^s p.122). A centralised form of planning
for the attainment of social objectives, involving coordination and
mutual adjustment of different policies, must be distinguished from
centralised public control and concentration of power for realising
community goals by comprehensive and explicit control and direction.
A minimal core of regulative measures combined with the provision
of a wide scope for incentives rather than with strict operational
control of societal processes is not necessarily incompatible with
individualist ideals and appears to meet the requirements for
centralisation of coordination in planning policies. Mechanisms
operating according to the dynamics of individual motives, such as
profit, voluntary association for furthering common goals, etc.
underlie processes in pluralistic societies and may be investigated
and taken into account in the planning of societal affairs together
with the mechanisms that are expressly constructed for the purpose
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of regulation. The terrible image of a society that is "over-managed"
by impersonal "social engineers" need not be the inevitable consequences
of planning which is sophisticated enough to avoid "management" and
the tampering with the freedom of the individuals. As regards the
latter, planning need not restrict such freedom more than the political
processes in pluralist democracies appear to do.
In the field of planning the various doctrines of individualism have
had a strong and manifold influence on both epistemological and
methodological issues. Regarding epistemological questions,individualism
is identified as one of the main problems of planning (OZEEKHAN, 1970:p.
239) for it is taken to foster an attitude of ethical neutrality — an
unattainable ideal in the social sciences and in the planning of societal
affairs. This is said to result from the view taken of normative
( 11 )
propositions containing the operator "ought"v 'which are so common in
planning since most policy statements involve prescriptions of one sort
or another. Methodological individualism is seen as stipulating that
"sense data cannot be directly communicated from one person to another,
and that consequently every experience is singular. With such an
assumption, truth becomes an individual matter,and values an individual,
uncommunicable set of preferences about which no valid generalisations
can be made. This purely "atomistic" viewpoint inevitably leads us
right back to ethical neutrality" (ibid.).
It is doubtful whether Ozbekhan's view of "methodological individualism"
is a very precise one given the contexts of ethics and epistemology
within which his discussion is developed. What he probably means
by "methodological individualism" in those contexts is "ethical
individualism", viz. the view that the nature of morality is essentially
individual (LUKES,1973:P-99)» associated or even conflated with
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"epistemological individualism" which is a doctrine concerning the
nature of knowledge and taking the source of knowledge to lie
within the individual (ibid.: p. 107). However, there are no
conceptual or logical relations between "ethical" and "epistemological
individualism" though there are identifiable structural similarities
between the latter doctrine — particularly in its empiricist version —
and "methodological individualism" (ibid.: p.12+3) which is basically
a doctrine concerning the explanation of social phenomena.
It stipulates that social or individual phenomena may be said to
have been explained only if their explanations are couched wholly
in terms of facts about individuals (ibid.: p.10). In this sense
it is said to assert that only by analyzing social phenomena into
their simplest elements, i.e. the individual agents, is their
explanation attainable. This atomistic or reductionist (or even
mechanistic ) approach is shared by empiricist versions of
epistemological individualism which pursue the reconstruction of
knowledge by means of its simplest elements (ibid.: p.1 i+3)•
The conception of "methodological individualism" criticised by
Ozbekhan is claimed to be associated with the philosophical
position referred to as Logical Positivism, in particular with one
of the doctrines that have been expounded within that school
regarding values, moral and evaluative judgments, and ethics:
the so-called "emotive theory of values". In this view, ethical,
moral, or value-judgments express the emotions of the speaker
about some action, person, or situation to which they refer, and are
not statements of fact which can be assessed as to their truth or
falsity.
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Hence, statements expressing value-judgments, being neither analytic
nor synthetic, have non-cognitive meaning and are not admissible in
scientific discourse (AYER, 1936/1975); (STEVENSON, 19U+); (UEMSON,
1968); (HARE, 1952/1972). There results a sharp distinction between
straightforward descriptions which purport to state "facts" and
impart knowledge, and utterances containing expressions of emotions,
attitudes, preferences, prescriptions, or recommendations — not all
of which have the same meaning but are grouped together in order to be
contrasted with factual statements. This is usually referred to as
the fact/value distinction and has been the subject of much controversy
in the field of ethics and moral philosophy (ATKINSON, 1958);
(NEWELL, 1968); (HUDSON, 1970); and with respect to its tenability in
the disciplines which study man and social life, having important
implications for urban planning.
Now,"ethical individualism" is indeed closely associated with views
asserting that facts and values are logically distinct; that any
inference that purports to derive a normative conclusion from purely
factual premises, viz. any straightforward passage in reasoning from
the experiential "is" to the normative "ought", is a form of discourse
that is not propositional (i.e. cannot be known to be true or false)
(LUKES, 1973s p.101). Thus, empirical description of some existing
sate of affairs — say, the existing situation in a city — is claimed
to be incapable of providing compelling grounds for acceptance of
specific conclusions of a moral, evaluative, or prescriptive nature —
say, some concrete proposal for planned action in the city, which
would be uniquely derived from the evidence of the survey of the
existing conditions and would be testable against such evidence.
Moreover, description of the empirical "is" is taken to be unable
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to dictate even limits to the range of possible value preferences —
say, the planning survey may not uniquely determine what is to be done
or even logically limit the range of prescriptive statements expressing
preferred courses of action in the city. Limi tations may be imposed
by choice but not derived from the empirical premises.
However, "ethical individualism" has received different formulations
and does not comprise only the "emotivist" account (STEVENSON, 19UU)
which was referred to above — viz. the view which analyses ethical
utterances by stressing their emotive meaning as distinct from their
prescriptive meaning (prescription of actions or attitudes).
A different account is the so-called "prescriptivist" view (HABE, 1952/
1972), (HARE, 1963/1972), which stresses the prescriptive meaning
of evaluative terms or statements containing such terms. These
formulations, as well as various existentialist and humanist versions,
such as Sartre's, are opposed by so-called naturalist and objectivist
views of ethics and of moral and evaluative judgments. These latter
views generally take the realm of ethics and other realms of knowledge
and belief, say, science, to be equally accessible to systematic inquiry.
They do not take those realms to be divided by some unbridgeable gap.
Naturalist and objectivist accounts of the fact/value relationship may
be distinguished into two main forms. The first asserts that terms
of ethics can be analysed into non-ethical ones; the second accepts
the possibility of logically deriving ethical conclusions,
recommendations, evaluative judgments, etc., from non-ethical, e.g.
factual, premises. They take "the content of moral values and
principles and the criteria governing moral judgments (as) not open
to change but ... given — whether through revelation or reason
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or intuition or a proper understanding of the requirements of society
or the direction of history or the principles of human nature"
(LUKES, 1973: p.106).
The main issue in the dispute involving the fact/value distinction
seems to "be whether it is possible to discover or agree upon a way
of establishing conclusions concerning ethical, moral, or evaluative
questions. Given that such evaluative issues are central in urban
planning, the view taken of the relationship between facts and values
has important implications for the process of inquiry in planning
and for the characterisation of the results from such inquiry.
To the extent that a way of establishing evaluative conclusions can
be found, terms such as "true" and "fact" may be unobjectionably
employed to refer to those conclusions.
Ozbekhan seems to favour some version of a descriptivist ethic (akin
to naturalistic ethic) as opposed to an emotivist or even
prescriptivist account. He argues for a different conception of
"truth" in planning, one that is far removed from the scientific ideal
of orthodox empiricism: "truth" not as an individual, atomistic
experience but rather as a "social fact", subject to change in the
light of prevailing "Weltanschauungen" or world views, the shifting
boundaries of knowledge, socio-historical influences emerging in
various contexts of action (OZEEKHAH, 1970: p.239). Such a conception
of truth does not appear to be at variance with so-called relativist
accounts of scientific knowledge that will be discussed below.
Apart from any identifiable relations between the epistemological issues
discussed above and the methods of inquiry that are to be employed in
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the field of planning, there are other direct influences of individualist
doctrines upon methodological aspects. Individualism associated with
the realms of politics and economics is said to foster certain core
human values such as "democratic equality", "equal respect for persons",
autonomy in consenting and pursuing interests, equality before the
impersonal laws of the market which favour the skillful and the
lucky indiscriminately and maximise autonomy and choice. In this
context, various forms of planning and intervention in societal
affairs are seen as restrictive of such individualist values and hence
viewed with suspicion. Those who are motivated by individualism
are inimical to any form of planning whose scope goes beyond a bear
minimum; for planning as an institutionalised process is said to be
restrictive of individuals' freedom and self expression.
The kind of planning that they are prepared to accept is a
technologically oriented one which is addressed to the solution of
clearly delimited practical problems (POPPER, 1957/1962: pp.6l4.-7O);
(HAYEK, 1952). This so-called "piecemeal social engineering"
envisages cautious, step-by-step, disjointed, pragmatic experimentation,
effecting solution of problems by evolutionary rather than revolutionary
steps. Thus, it opposes other forms of planning which might be seen
as deriving from holistic conceptions of society. The latter postulate
that over and above its individual members society may possess
properties pertaining solely to it as a whole — social, historical,
cultural characteristics — which cannot be inferred from mere
aggregation of the characteristics of its individual members.
Views taking society to be really an organic entity, a system of
functionally interdependent elements, may be characterised as holistic
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to the extent that they ascribe ontological status to the whole and
do not simply take society to behave as if it were a system.
The latter position, taking an instrumentalist view of systems, may be
compatible with individualist approaches to planning for it regards
"systems" as useful fictions providing fruitful insights into the
way that society is organised, and so providing the source of
( 12 )
predictively fertile hypotheses about it. '
Now, holistic approaches to the planning of societal arrangements,
often referred to as centralised, comprehensive, or Utopian planning —
though the meaning of these terms need not be identical — generally
tend to propose the introduction of bold, revolutionary, or system-
wide measures derived from large-scale social doctrines and based
on elaborate social theories, or visions of some ideal society, or
global analyses. Thus they are seen to involve centralised public
control for the realisation of collective goals, the inevitable
concentration of power needed to attain such goals through explicit
direction and coercion, and the consequent severe restriction of the
freedom of choice of the individual and of his autonomy — the
latter being principal values of the individualist which are allegedly
sacrificed in favour of the collectivity.
The strategy of "disjointed incrementalism (BRAYBROOKE and LINDBLOM,
1963) is advanced both as a model of how planning and decision making
operates in Western liberal and pluralist democracies, characterised
by entrenched bureaucracies and loose interdepartmental ties, as well
as a prescriptive account of how planning ought to be carried out
anyway in political/administrative contexts sharing the same liberal
and pluralist ideals. This strategy is wholly compatible with Popper's
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"piecemeal social engineering" and reflects most of the core values
of individualist doctrines. However, "disjointed incrementalism"
does not share Popper's suspicion towards planning of social affairs
as such but takes it as a necessary social function. It is becoming
increasingly influential in the field of urban planning — though
originally conceived in the context of politics and public
administration — where earlier so-called comprehensive approaches,
attempting to cover the planning and control of all aspects of the
city, are relinquishing their position as the current "paradigm" of
the urban planning process of inquiry.
The rational-comprehensive mode of planning attempted to provide more
"objective" definitions of the concept of "communal interest". It did
not, however , succeed in demonstrating that such "public interest" can
be identified in the first place; and if so, that it will be
sufficiently representative of the wishes of the people. In short,
the very validity of the concept of "communal interest" was left
unquestioned. Thus, an ideological problem of urban planning was
circumambulated by means of improvements in methodology rather than
through a more direct study and evaluation of its ideological
foundations. The fundamental question has remained unanswered.
Instead, the notion of an objective function — that is, a definable
package of performance criteria for the socio-spatial system — is
taken to be valid in the transformed approaches.
Social conflicts generated by "communal" goals and the interdependence
of the latter with the means available are generally ignored on the
simplifying assumption that the social system can be studied in such
a way that empirical facts are separated from issues of human values^
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Further, conflicts between values and between social groups are
neutralised by the utilisation of some form of weighting procedure
which hopefully provides functional definitions of the "public
interest". These developments were part of a more general scheme
aimed at integrating the planning activity (as a social decision
making activity) with the context of scientific, hypothetico-deductive
discourse (WILSON, 1968: pp.9-11)•^ ^
Thus, the basic criticisms of the rational-comprehensive mode of
planning have concerned the limitations inherent in completely knowing
anything; the lack of knowledge of urban structures and processes of
change and interdependencies, which effectively constrains
comprehensiveness of approach and coordination of different programmes;
the definition of the notion, and derivation, of overall goals or
"collective interest". Problems regarding the nature and degree of
rationality that is attainable in urban planning — given the
involvement of political issues at all stages of the planning process —
have not been settled convincingly, especially as regards the extent
to which the rationality which is characteristic of scientific inquiry
is an ideal which ought to be pursued in planning both at the
substantive and the procedural level.
These issues are discussed in a later chapter in the context of
reconciling a humanistic outlook with some degree of rationality
which is indispensable in planning, for the latter by definition
implies rational and purposive action (HABERMAS, 1973/1976: p. 139f.)«
The notion of "bounded rationality" was introduced by H.A.Simon
in the study of organisations (MARCH and SIMON, 1958: pp.203-210),
(SIMON, 1959)> to suggest the limitations of knowing and choosing
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wisely and its contingency on "environmental conditions — the social
context of planning — which represent the medium in and through
( 15' ^
which planning decisions are made" (FRIEDMAM, 19671 pp.226; 23I+).
Comprehensiveness in planning need not be conceived in the mode of
(ALTSHUTiER, 1965) as requiring an omniscient planner who has complete
knowledge of all conceivable aspects of some "urban system" and who
seeks to rationally establish communal goals and scientifically
deduce consequences for appropriate policies that satisfy those goals.
All it needs maintain is the requirement for investigation of
interdependencies in the city; exploration of the ways in which
action programmes might affect aspects of the urban structure and
the mechanisms of change; assessment of the redistributive effects
that such programmes might have for individuals and groups in the
city; and determination to seek to study all relevant relations for
the purpose at hand. This is to ask a lot in terms of the demands
placed on available knowledge and technique, but it is not an
unreasonable normative conception of planning and is not one that
can be established as inferior to other alternative modes. Some
awareness of the "whole", however that may be defined and excluding
ontological implications, is necessary if planning is not to be a
self-defeating exercise.
The suggestion could be ventured that looking into the notion of
"historical totality", rather than a spatial/technical conception of
"whole", might provide fruitful links between present programmes
or action in the future and the historical dimension of change in
a social/spatial complex. But there still remain the issues
concerning risks of overmanagement and technicism in society, and
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the derivation of community goals. The incrementalist critique of
comprehensive planning does raise valid objections regarding such
issues, but cannot avoid being charged with conservatism and lack
( 16 1
of overall direction in its mode of planning (ETZIONI, 1967/1973)*
Regarding one of the basic assumptions of the early planning "models"—
that is, that the planners possessed "privileged" access to information
concerning the concept of the "collective good" — this also received
the attention of the reformists of the 1960s. Extensive statistical
coverage and computerised data handling, however far from ideal they
may still be, confirmed this "privilege" in the eyes of the decision
makers. Increased use of quantitative descriptions and techniques,
and the expression of basic policy issues in terms of unnecessarily
technical jargon is often said to have established the technocratic
supremacy of the expert/planner over the laymen/planned.
The categories within which the "collective good" was to be pursued
were decided 'ex cathedra'(DIMITRIOU, 1973) and indices expressing
quantities of "good", e.g. "landscape value", were defined so as to
support expert opinion. Thus, the separation of the technical
( 17(or theoretical) from the practical (or politics) was almost complete;
The criticisms which were waged by social scientists and other
academics against the results obtained from applications of the
early planning approaches stemmed from concrete experiences of alleged
inadequacies of urban planning "in action". Case-histories were
examined, discussed and critically assessed, rather than the underlying
social theory and ideological framework of urban planning nor the
epistemological foundations of its conception of man in geographical
space. It is indeed surprising of the practices of academic social
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scientists that such criticisms did not precede planned action by
questioning the conceptual schemata, assumptions and values of urban
planners and social policy-makers, but were initiated by the outcome
of planning operations. Nonetheless, the fact that criticisms have
been founded in actual results should make these the more credible
to professionals of planning.
However, it appears that the planners' conception of the inadequacies
of the early approaches was misdirected. The reasons that were
frequently evoked to account for the notable difficulties facing
urban planning reflected two main concerns (i) the insufficiently
developed planning framework in terms of comprehensiveness of
approach or otherwise and in terms of rationality involved in the
goal-formulating and decision making stages of policy making; and
(ii) the inherent complexity of the "urban system", and the consequent
lack of understanding of the underlying spatial and social structures
and mechanisms generating change in the city. It may well be that
the difficulties of planning must be sought deeper, in the planners'
assumptions about the nature of society and its amenability to
normative change; in the relationships between the experts/planners
and those affected by their policies; in the planners' conception
of man and its compatibility with the mode of knowing that is
presupposed by the methodological apparatus of urban planning.
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3- The shifting realities of society and technology.
The decades that have seen the methodological and ideological
development of planning have also witnessed rapid societal changes
reaching almost revolutionary proportions. Taking an overall view,
some of the major elements of the changing ■ social context of
planning might be identified as follows.
(a) The changing institutional frameworks.
With the emergence of post-industrial societies and the emphasis on
services "the existing trend towards big organisations was intensified.
Large organisations evolved into vast clusters: business, government,
labour, religion, etc. and the industrial labour force is being
transformed into an increasingly professionalised salariat" (GROSS,
1971s p.276). In a number of highly developed countries (particularly
in North America and Western Europe) the traditional "industrial
metropolis" is being absorbed not only into the larger urban region,
but in a nation-wide "urbanism". In terms of international politics,
nation-states operate far beyond national boundaries in accelerating
the emergence of a world-wide society which appears increasingly
locked in conflict/cooperation relationships (GROSS, 1971s p.277).
(b) The changing technologies.
The remarkable acceleration of technological change and advancement
in industrialised countries (DRUCKER, 1969s pp.3-10) has born
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the additional feature that as the number of new technologies
increases arithmetically the number of possible combinations(including
entirely new syntheses) rises exponentially (RZBEIRO, 1968: p.130).
The marked unevenness in technological expansion has been evidenced
by concentration of efforts on those fields that are associated with
military applications, together with the vast computational,
communications, transportation, personnel and supporting systems that
are essential for the development and operational use of these.
( 19 )
However, progress in "technologies" v ' which concentrate on the
direct improvement of society, such as education, housing, nutrition,
waste recycling, urban mass transit systems, has been comparatively
very slow. The closer links that have been established between
technology and science ( HOLLIDAY, 1966) have resulted in a
transformation of science from sin abstract expression of human efforts
to understand experience into the most effective agent ever known
for manipulating nature, reorganising societies, and shaping human
personality (EZBEIRO, 1968: p.128). Involvement of many specialised
fields in any one technological development has given present day
technologies their image of complexity.
(c) Crises in contemporary society.
The accumulation of social problems and the delay or failure to
formulate viable solutions that would originate both in the
advancing technology and in an emerging dominant ideology and inspired
leadership has brought about a series of social crises. There is
a sense of a crisis of survival manifested in an ever present vision
of a nuclear world war (LTFTON, 1970). There is also a sense of
a crisis of survival involving risks of world starvation due to
extremely high rates of growth in world population and the strong
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possibility of failure in providing an adequate supply of food and
energy to sustain such growth — not to mention the pressures on
the environment which are generated by growth.
Moreover, the emerging trends of change in the organisation of society
are manifested in a number of crises ( 20 ) and reveal a significant
contradiction. The directions towards which the social context
alters convey an increasing sense of drift, disorder, and breakdown
of the guidance and regulatory processes of society at the same
time that planning has become a generally established activity at
all levels of the spatio-administrative hierarchy, having attained
a high degree of sophistication, backed by vast resources, and
dealing with all the settings of the temporal scale. As the
circumstances surrounding the development of society approach
the proportions of a crisis there emerge signs of new intellectual
activity.
Strong movements become noticeable within which collective efforts
are permeated by distinctive technocracy and the spirit of "elite
domination" (GORDON, 1971s P«323)« Significant examples are the
contemporary movements towards "futures research", social indicators
and the policy sciences. Other writers advocate the elimination
of "technocratic planning" and the invention of more humanistic,
far-sighted and democratic planning which guides the process of
societal evolution itself (TOFFEER, 1970s pp.396 ff.) — whatever
the latter may imply. One of the limitations of these approaches,
however, is their detached position in relation to emerging
unprecedented changes in technologies and in institutions, and also
regarding the nature of the crisis facing society.
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( 21 )Others suggest that planning v ' should abandon its ambition of
comprehensiveness, or system rationality since collectivities cannot
have clearly identifiable, non-conflicting goals (CYERT and MARCH, 1963)•
In this context, the only feasible outcome of a planned action is
"sub-optimisation". Researchers in the organisational sciences
put forward the argument that planning approaches which work from
upper towards lower levels in the organisational hierarchy are likely
to fail. They also add that plans developed in a "top-down" manner
will be inevitably altered or subverted during their passage
through the various hierarchical scales (HAIRE, 1959); (CIERT and
MARCH, 1963s pp.15-16). The reverse process, that is, planning from
lower to higher levels tends to suffer from continuous tension
because of conflicting goals (CHURCHMAN, 1968). Still other workers
contend that the resolution of goal conflicts can be effected by
means of an "advocacy" process (DAVTBOFF, 1965)•
This extra-rational criticism points to a -pluralistic style of planning.
In this, the desire to circumvent bureaucratic establishments and
procedures or to find alternative structures to these; the determination
of those that are affected by planned action to escape from the
custodianship of the planners; the acceptance of the pluralistic
dimension in social value systems; and the admission of the
inevitability of considerable uncertainty in public choice will be
key elements of its conception of planned social action.
Nevertheless, this emerging pluralism will be confronted by the
difficulty that no mechanism or ideology exists to adequately
rationalise conflicts between groups generated by differences in
community interests (DYCEMAN, 1971s P»331)» The absence of a sound
ideological framework from contemporary models of planning, or the
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existence of a misguided one, or one that has been superseded by rapid
societal change may be said to have resulted mainly from the analysts'
emphasis on "positive" social analyses and the rejection of ideological
influences on rational, scientific reasoning on the assumption that
ideologies, belief systems, norms and values have no place in
scientific discourse.
i+. The ideological elements of urban planning.
Conventional use of "ideology" as a banner rather than as an operational
concept has spread confusion about its meaning and has discredited
its importance as a legitimate term in discources concerning rational/
purposive action. Moreover, most political theories seem to have
become anti-ideological and tend to place emphasis on "technique"
rather than ideology (PARTRIDGE, 19^1/1977s pp. 1+0—J4I ) . The concept
( 22 ) , .
of ideology ' appears to be fundamental in both: (i; the analysis
of planning as a field of professional activity: no action at all
is possible without some ideological basis; and (ii) in planning
studies, where the selection of a preferred alternative implies
an understanding of the nature of the beliefs that transform the
alternatives into possible courses of action. In this context,
ideology encompasses an important dimension of "praxis" (BAILEY,
1973: P.5).
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Examples of issues in urban and environmental planning that involve
ideological considerations are given in (GREGORY, 1971) where it is
argued that problems that may be present in cases of planning
dilemmas on environmental issues are evaluative and distributive.
The evaluative problem arises when planners are faced with the need
to evaluate and assess aspects of economic efficiency of some set of
measures or proposed scheme against considerations of benefits or
costs with no market value — so-called intangibles — loosely
characterised as "amenity" of the environment. The distributive
problem emerges as a result of a set of proposals which involve
conservation of physical entities such as historical buildings,
playing and recreation grounds, etc. which planners normally take
to be "amenity-enhancing" measures entailing justified and quantifiable
economic costs.
Now, the main issue is one of agreeing on a just distribution of
the economic costs of enhanced "amenity" among those directly concerned
and the community at large. The judgments that such evaluative and
distributive questions necessitate involve aesthetic valuations and
ideological positions. In both of these areas planners may not be
the best qualified or specially experienced or privileged individuals
( 23)
to contribute —given the present system of planning education. '
The ideological dimensions of evaluative and distributive issues of
urban planning could most fruitfully be explored within the context
of politics involving "practical" reason and the logic of the argument.
In current usage , the meaning of ideology is rather loose and variable.
The term may be applied to describe : (i) ideals, political beliefs
and programmes, moral positions; as well as (ii) reality. Beliefs
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about reality are said to be founded on ideology or determined by it
if they are generated or maintained in virtue of their connection
with certain social interests (BARNES, 1977s ch.2 ; p.33)* "knowledge
or culture is ideologically determined in so far as it is created,
accepted or sustained by concealed, unacknowledged, illegitimate
interests". Ideology may be taken as a system of beliefs which is
created to support the interests of individuals or social classes.
It might be imposed on others by authority, persuasion, or indoctrination,
though it appears as consensus until it is challenged and revealed as
ideology through social criticism. In the neo-Marxist view of the
Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School, notably Jurgen Habermas,
ideology could be described as a rationalision of consensus when it is
challenged: ideologies are being brought into existence at the same
time as the emergence of the critique of ideologies (HABEEMAS, 1968/
1971: P-99); (BURNS and BUBNS, 1973: pp.1l+-l5).
Ideology in the field of planning and policy studies is usually interpeted
as the value component in development programmes. One tradition of
social theorising — which is not unrelated to the views of the Critical
Theorists — takes problems such as urban poverty, environmental
deprivation, social injustice as the focus and the guiding interests
of urban analyses. Within this tradition what is known as "normative
theory" is replacing the part played by social philosophy.
A "normative theory" could be advanced on the basis of some ideological
conception of what ought to be the case and then proceed to clearly
state the necessary conditions for changing some existing state of
affairs into a more desirable one according to that ideal.
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It would specify the underlying structures and mechanisms that generate
the undesirable situation, say, urban poverty, that is to be changed.
Hence its emphasis would be not on accounting for "what is" but on
what could be or what ought to be the case. Normative theories are
contrasted with non-normative or "positive theories"(DTJHKHEIM, 1962 :
pp. 51-52): "Social theories separate themselves at once into two
large categories. One seeks only to express what is or what has been;
it is purely speculative and scientific. Others, on the contrary,
aim to modify what exists; they propose, not laws, but reforms. They
are practical doctrines".
Normative theory is identified with values and ideologies, with the
"subjective" categories of thinking about society and the social
problems that are to be solved through planning and policy making
(H0R.T0N, 1966: p.713)« Most normative theories regarding the way
to go about achieving certain ends reflect distinctive constructions
and interpretations of social reality. Being part of the knowledge
of intellectuals and specialists, their approach need not coincide
with the subjective interpretations of those who are affected by the
prescriptions of the theories. In some accounts this is remedied
through the instigation of a dialectical process of communication
between the "normative" planners and the "planned" which ideally
produces a melting of individual horizons and mutual adjustments and
readjustments.
A general and widely accepted meaning of an ideological framework for
intervention in the historical development of social/spatial systems
is that which contrasts it with the scientific approach on two grounds.
Firstly,while scientific reasoning involves the testing of a concept
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against empirical evidence, the ideological approach reflects an
intellectual interest in seeing the social system that is being planned
conform to a set of ideas held about it which have been conceived
independently of empirical falsification tests. Secondly, action
based on ideology implies motives and interests of particular people
and groups of people, that is, it implies subjective orientation (FOLEY,
i960). It therefore emerges as the opposite of the approach of the
scientist who is presumed to be a dispassionate observer of theory-
neutral facts, exploring the real-world phenomena independently of
his subjective judgment, personal preferences, beliefs, and prejudices.
It follows that while urban planning based on scientific reasoning
represents a guidance system that is adjusted to the real world,
the same planning framework founded on ideology would imply action in
a world that existed by conviction.
However, this claim must be rejected on several grounds. Firstly, in
the field of urban planning and policy making the evidence that is
selected to indicate the consequences of pursuing or failing to pursue
some set of ideals, goals, objectives cannot be free from some prior
theory of how these facts are going to be used and what is expected
of them. The evidence itself is capable of being interpreted in
a number of different, often conflicting ways. This seems to be
unavoidable given the nature of the field where the "facts" so often
only acquire meaning in the light of value (DONNISON and CHAPMAN,
196^: p.28). Hence there can be no value- and theory-neutral scientific
approach in planning and policy analyses.
Secondly, the idea that science and scientific reasoning ought to be
employed in planning studies is itself ideological for it cannot be
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properly justified by applying scientific method. It is adopted
by conviction rather than even pragmatic justification . Thirdly,
the belief that the natural sciences themselves acquire and legitimate
knowledge of the world which is free from subjective interests and
value influences is giving way to the views advanced by the "newer"
philosophy of science which take science as a social activity and
identify in scientific knowledge many culturally given elements which
do not derive from the objective interpretation of facts. Moreover,
the idea that there are theory-neutral facts seems to have been
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abandoned, * 'In short, all knowledge is seen as interest-loaded
(HABEBMAS, 1968/1971), (BAENES, 1977) — though there are different
conceptions of what those interests are: prediction and control,
maintainance of existing order, etc.; or whether they are overt or
concealed.
All social knowledge is taken to be characterised by a normative
structure determined by certain guiding interests of cognition with
their corresponding vocabularies of social explanation (STRASSER, 1976:
ch.1). For instance, system theories of society may be said to be
guided by a social-technological and conservative interest; their
vocabulary of social explanation is that of order, equilibrium and
incremental planned change. The same could be maintained in connection
with the positivistic organicism of Comte and Spencer (cf. Chapter one)
as well as the positivistic mechanicism of Vilfredo Pareto's contributions
to social theory based on the notion of (mechanical) equilibrium and
seeking to apply the laws of mechanics to sociology (DIXON,1973:PP*30ff«)•
Because the Pareto model can be shown to have close affinities with the
"gravity" models of spatial interaction both can be said to be guided
by the interests of order and conservatism and to perpetuate
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the 'status quo' — however unsatisfactory or socially unjust the
existing state of affairs might be. This points to one of the risks
in using such models in urban planning for predictions upon which to
base prescriptive action programmes (OLSSON, 197U)- For these models
hypostatise a social condition — accounted for by means of abstract
conceptual categories and research methods — as the inherent reason
for seeking explanations of it; they take it for granted instead of
making it the object of study and questioning whether what is to
be described and explained ought to be as it is or whether it could
be improved and how.
In contrast, critical theories (e.g. those advanced by the Frankfurt;
School) or radical theories of society could be taken as guided by
social-emancipatory and progressive interests; their explanations
are to be couched in the vocabulary of conflict, disequilibrium and
radical and dractic planned change which removes constraints of various
kinds upon individuals and groups by altering the processes and
mechanisms, ususally concealed, which generate them (FEET, 1978).
They stress the historical dimension of social reality, which is ignored
by social technologists, and seek to anticipate new historical
potentialities thus recognising not only purposive but also directed
action. The notion of socially just conditions of life is the
normative perspective of such theories as well as their organising
principle (HARVEY", 1973).
If it is accepted that social knowledge has a normative structure, and
if the knowledge that is acquired and used in urban planning is regarded
as social knowledge — as it ought to be — then planning theory must
presuppose some particular set of social interests (ROBSON, 1972:pp.2l).-25).
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Moreover, in terms of procedural context, the administrative role of the
planner — in connection with other social administrators — is
essentially founded upon a set of administrative norms and styles
which directly influence the formulation of a policy to be
implemented. Therefore, there is a strong element of ideology,
a normative level of beliefs and social values, in planned social
action and policy making (CHRISTAKIS, 1973s P-55l)« Claims to the
contrary, usually based upon professional or methodological traditions
of empirical,value-free, culture-free study of social phenomena
(ESCRITT, 19l|6: pp. 111-112) are to be rejected for they are based
both on a misconstrual of the nature of planning theory and an
outdated and superseded view of objectivity attainable by science.
Regarding the nature of objectivity that is attainable in the social
sciences (HARRIS, 1968: p.225): "Objectivity in social questions
can mean no more than a certain open-mindedness; a willingness to
acknowledge that one is oneself a party; a willingness to examine
all the information available, all the arguments, and a willingness
to answer them. It cannot mean presenting an answer over and above
the answers of the existing parties to a dispute, adopting the posture
of God who sees things as they 'really are' ".
A more instrumental construal of the concept of ideology in connection
with planned action is that it represents an organised series of
convictions, more or less explicit, which are linked in a hierarchy
ranging from abstract and self-evident assumptions to practical
day-to-day beliefs (HARRIS, 1968: p.i|3)« Further, it enforces
inevitable value judgments. It is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for action and its divorce from pragmatic context is bound
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to result in sterile and counter-productive effects of planned
actions. Ideology ought to reflect the objects (i.e. the physical
world) as well as the subjects which it is concerned with.
The significance of ideological analysis in planning is at least
as substantial as any other type of analysis which it necessarily
precedes. Although knowledge revealed thereby cannot lay claims
to being "the truth" — both in a linguistic sense (not being
falsified by empirical evidence) and in an ontological sense (being
true to the real world) — ideological analysis' is acceptable as
an explorative method attempting to make explicit the links between
knowledge and complexes of subjective interests; and thus to bring
these forward for comment and critical assessment.
From the preceding discussion it becomes clear that ideology is
inextricably interrelated with urban planning. It need not
antagonise methodological approaches that are based on scientific
reasoning, though it would be incompatible with views postulating a
sharp separation between values and facts. It could supplement such
analyses with relevant information about social values and cultures.
As was seen above, the pre-rationalistic planning "model" was founded
on a certain ideological framework, however crudely this may have
emerged from the discussion. Reconsideration of that "model" which
ensued from its notable lack of success, resulted in methodological
rather than ideological changes. The planners' theoretical and
methodological background was improved; the field of observables
was extended; the decision making and administrative procedures were
rationalised. However, the ideological foundations of the "model"
either remained unaltered or were eradicated in the name of rational
reasoning and scientific discourse.
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The methodological transformation which urban planning has undergone
has taken place without due consideration to its ideological
implications. Critics of this situation argue that contemporary
"failures" of urban planning — that is, of post-rationalistic planning
— cannot be accounted for simply by evoking the "complexity of urban
(27 )
systems" or the "lack of comprehensiveness" of planning approaches; '
It is argued that the reasons for such "failures" should be sought in
the assumptions of the planner about social processes and their
mechanisms of change and adaptation to new circumstances; and in the
pattern and nature of his relation to those affected by planning.
Thus, the shortcomings of planning are said to originate from the
realms of substantive theory, communicative competence, and systems
of beliefs. The planner's conception of these realms does not seem
to be compatible with the requirements of planned action.
The main issue appears to be the need to develop a positive(in the
sense of non-negative) approach in relation to the contribution of
ideology in urban planning. This would involve reversal of the
tendency to eliminate ideology from the developing social/spatial
theory for planning. The emergence of this tendency was due to the
alleged incompatibility between ideological and scientific approaches
(HARRIS, 1969: pp.55-58) ^ ^ but this claim should be rejected.
Accepting the need for an ideological framework to guide planned
social action, and attempting to evaluate that framework in its own
merits but inseparably from its context seems to be the most promising
direction in a field in which the normative dimension of action is
at least as important as the positive (in the sense of non-normative)
for successful results.
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5. Technicism, humanism and problem-solving in planning.
There are at least two distinctive and mutually exclusive ideological
frameworks that appear prominently in contemporary planning discussions.
On the one side, there is the pragmatic/ameliorative tradition of
planning which stresses orderly rather than revolutionary change when
it is required to improve unsatisfactory conditions or create new
situations. Many if not most current conceptions of planning would
fall into this category — for instance, the disjointed incrementalist
"model", the policy science "model" of planning based on a technological
approach, and even the moderately holistic or comprehensive "model"
could be so placed, for it merely requires study and exploration of
the "whole" rather than the drastic and normative change that an
extreme holist might advocate.
On the other side, there is an emerging normative tradition of planning
which emphasises and pursues more or less revolutionary change in the
existing social/spatial order in so far as the latter is affected by
forms of domination and suppression, either apparent or underlying,
that are generated by the system of material production and the
structure of power and authority in societal processes. Critical
and radical approaches would be firmly placed in this tradition of
normative change — though normative theories need not originate from
Marxist social theory. However, they are only recently emerging as
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plausible alternatives in planning. Now, this division between non-
normative and normative approaches tends to give rise to two
antithetical interpretations of the relationship between knowledge
and action, between substantive research including model building and
planning and policy making.
Arguing from one point of view, it is possible to claim that planning
research is making a significant contribution to urban planning in
terms of more informed decision making and action. Taking the
normative view, it could be maintained that due to the absence of
(29 )
normative social theories of the city x ' there is what may be
referred to as lack of moral direction in the field of planning as
a whole : some distinctive kind of normative orientation. It would
be obvious that if knowledge is conceived of as value- and interest-
free, according to some views of science, then the knowledge that is
acquired and used in urban planning following the "logic of science"
that is associated with such views of science would leave no room for
normative theory.
Thus a view which sharply separates facts from values and takes the
latter as a matter of individual preference would render excessively
precarious the connections between knowledge and action that are
indispensable in planning. For that view would lead to the dinstinction
between a realm of rational scientific discourse in which questions of
means would be settled in a strictly technical manner free from
ethical and value commitments, and a realm of moral debate in which
issues of ends would be discussed and settled (much like the way in
which political opinions are expressed) being relative to individual
preferences, tastes, and subjective states of mind or consciousness.
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Hence the settling of ethical questions of ends would he conditioned
either by the belief that more detailed improved factual evidence
ought to lead to more informed choices of means (say, through rational
evaluation of alternatives after quantification of costs and benefits)
or by reliance on the directive of'muddling through" and the pragmatic
politics of negotiation and bargaining (DAVIDOFF, 1965)> (PEATTIE,
1970). The recent attempts by moral philosophers to effect a
rationalisation of moral discourse in terms of proposing sets of
rationally defensible criteria for justifying or rejecting ethical
decisions or statements (BAWLS, 1971) have been variously received
by philosophers, social thinkers , and individuals actively involved
in moral decisions of social policy. But such efforts have initiated
debate on these issues from which useful results are likely to
emerge which will be of great applicability to urban planning in its
search for a rational ethic of action.
The fact/value dichotomy in questions of planning and policy making
is also responsible for another wide-ranging discussion between
the proponents of a technological approach to problems of planning
and those who see in such an approach the risks of neglecting human
values and ideals. Following conventional terminology, it is
possible to distinguish "technocratic" or "technicist" and "humanistic"
modes of planning as ideological alternatives (GROSS, 1971s PP-238 ff.).
Planning on the basis of purely technocratic criteria would involve
the pursuance of ultimate "rationality " without directly relating to
advice from humanists regarding the ethical validity of "rational"
choices. Creative technocrats would furnish intelligence on matters
of societal management. This type of planning would involve rational
decision making based on value-free scientific reasoning, methods,and
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procedures. Technocratic professionalism presumes that it is possible
for the planners to attain a level of "disinterestedness" or neutrality
of "observation" in exactly the same manner as it is believed that
scientists do (BAILEY, 1973s P«1U)» However, the development of
knowledge of social/spatial "systems" over the past twenty years or
so — but also the realisation that there are many extra-scientific
social and cultural influences in science itself — suggests that the
ideal of objective knowledge may not be attainable in research for
planning and policy making (BATTY, 1973? P-38)- In the place of
a defunct value-free analysis of social/spatial phenomena a range
of objectivity/subjectivity to which social scientists could relate
is becoming increasingly acceptable.
"Technocratic" planning does not appear to differ substantially from
the collective (social) engineering approaches of the 1950s, and would
certainly encounter at least the same difficulties in discerning
the immorality of the secondary consequences of "rational" decisions.
Problems that might result from such an ideological stand would tend
to be analogous to those that followed suburban expansion, and urban
renewal and rehabilitation programmes in the past; with the familiar
implications for modern urban slums, segregation, and alienation.
But the most significant accusation that could be made against such a form
of pi arming is that it cultivates and promotes an attitude of "technicism"
reflected in supremacy of "technique" over essentially human values.
The other ideological alternative for planning emerges only tentatively
and rather sketchily for the technicist image of the field is still
well entrenched so as to exclude its rivals. It involves the
establishment of a set of new premises for planning by individuals
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for individuals, families, organisations and larger entities. The
orientation of the new premises appears to be essentially "humanistic",
as opposed to "technocratic". Such an orientation is said to entail
different attitudes towards existing structures of power, value systems,
and traditional rationality. Its conception of power and authority
would be guided by human values and would relate to increased social
participation in the control of resources, the priorities of development,
and in decision making, thus enhancing pluralism. However, the
restructuring of existing value systems which is part of the "programme"
of a humanistic approach to planning would seem an extremely difficult
operation both in terms of its conceptualisation — e.g. which are
really the more "humanistic" values? how are they to be specified? —
and in terms of its eventuation — e.g. how is the change to be
effected? Further, the traditional conception of rationality would be
abandoned in favour of a new view which would involve the radical
reconstruction of the doctrine that scientific, value-free analysis
is the essence of rationality.^ ^ ^ Moral commitment should
supplement conventional value-free decision xnaVing which has been
aiming so far at feasibility and consistency alone rather than
desirability and ethical validity. In the new conception of
rationality decision making should emerge as "value-creating"
and action oriented.
It should provide the basis for evaluation of the rationality or
irrationality of a planned action in terms of its substantive and
moral merits rather than in terms of the explicit reasoning and
calculations which are promoted in the technological model. In this
context human rationality is seen as a "process of learning" which
involves not only the acquisition of new knowledge and experience,
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but also the development of new values and interests. Thus, the
alternative to "technocratic" planning appears to consist in developing
a "humanistic" mode of "learning through planning" and a theory of
planning as a social learning activity (GROSS, 1971). This view
lies well within the tradition of the "new humanism" in planning
theory which was referred to earlier.^1)
The ideological framework that is referred to as "humanistic planning"
(GROSS, 1971) Is advanced as the viable alternative to existing
"technocratic"/rational planning. It shares with the latter the
mistrust towards the "grand social alternatives" of which (DAHL and
LINDBLOM, 1953) are so critical. In so doing, it raises the question
of its own status. If it is put forward as "the" alternative ideology
for planning then it contradicts itself for it ought to be suspicious
of its role as a "grand scheme". If it is advanced as only one of
many possible ideologies then there is no inherently compelling reason
why it should be more credible than its rivals. The difficulties
involved in making this ideological schema both acceptable and workable
in the realm of social action are, no doubt, legion. Creating new
power structures and new value systems; restructuring institutions;
overhauling the established conception of scientific rationality are
indeed laudable ends but no mean tasks.
Nonetheless, the difficulties involved in rendering operative this
conception of "humanistic planning" should not be taken to constitute
its pragmatic refutation for it is always possible that they will be
eventually overcome. This schema is interesting for its ascription
to the human individual and community of cultural and value elements
that are said to be imperfectly captured by technological approaches
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to planning which tend to neglect the moral foundations of their
analyses. It seems to share the cultural tradition of pragmatist
social thought and is therefore exposed to the criticisms against that
tradition regarding multiplicity of goals and the keeping of options
open at all times which results in rather ineffective and vague
planning — if the ensuing activity could still be called so.
It does, however, possess many advantages over the "technocratic" or
"technological" model, at least as regards planning, in that it is
more human-centred, allows considerations of context and "wholes",
stresses the historical dimension of social action and social
organisation, and accounts explicitly for values in searching for
arrangements of means to attain specific goals. Indeed it takes ends
and means as closely interdependent in their formulation. If the
"humanistic" model of planning (and here the term explicitly refers
to the so-called "new humanism" school in planning) shares the
pragmatists' epistemology as well as aspects of their social theories,
then this would have important implications for questions of truth and
testability (pragmatic theory of truth, pragmatic justification), the
view taken of theories and models (instruments to do something with
rather than copies of the world), but also for issues of ethics
(pragmatic theory of values) such as the relation of values and facts.
But it is doubtful whether the "new humanists" would espouse all these
implications.
As regards the ethical perspective of humanistic planning, its attitude
would be inimical towards fixed norms and values. Rather, intrinsic
and eternal values would be seen as relative to varying psychological,
social, historical, or logical contexts. Evaluative judgments would be
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taken as essentially hypotheses or tentative claims to knowledge of
what is good or had, either for the individual or for society.
To the extent that such judgments would he implicit hypotheses ahout
what is valued as desirable or enjoyable they would he regarded as
capable of being validated in virtue of their consequences. Value
judgments would be hypothetical taking the form: "if men desire to
attain certain goals in any harmonious way, they will probably achieve
these ends by acting in accordance with such and such empirical
conditions". Only by conducting themselves according to such
hypothetical rules will men discover after trial and error experience
whether they really find the attained goals desirable.
This principle constitutes the element of learning which is central
in the conception of humanistic planning. Programmes of social and
political action would be seen as possible hypotheses since they would
be cast in the form of value judgments, but would be testable against
experience in terms of their consequences. By regarding all value
judgments as tentative while they are being tested it would be possible
to modify and adjust or even reject claims to approval or disapproval
implicit in them. Reappraisal of evaluative judgments would be
possible at all times if further experience so requires. Each specific
situation would have to be faced in terms of its peculiar
characteristics and complexities and related to its more general context.
This view seems to transcend the classical antinomy between a scientific/
( 32)
technological, value-free approach to problem-solving and a humanisticw '
approach which captures and reflects the richness of peculiarly human
values and assumes moral responsibility for action. But it is self-
evident that its conception of science needs to be one which allows
20$.
for legitimate discourse in terms of values, rather than one which
postulates a sharp dichotomy between facts and values and reduces the
latter to mere statements of preference. In the context of planning,
the view taken of the relationship between a scientific and a humanistic
perspective on problems of social/spatial arrangements is likely to
have pervasive consequences for the ideological foundations of some
preferred mode of planning as well as for its epistemological stand.
The relations between scientific and humanistic perspectives of planning
are well explored in (HARRIS, 1967J PP« 3214.-335)> and (HARRIS, 19^9
pp.1$-20).
What emerges from these papers is that science and humanism are not
( 33)irreconcilable and can be fruitfully integrated to form a continuum
in the context of the overriding problem-solving interests of urban
planning. Thus, it is argued that humanism focuses on man and society
and on their attempts to master themselves; while science has been
traditionally concerned with nature and man/nature interactions in terms
of man's interests in predicting and controlling natural occurrences.
Now, these dinstinct but interrelated emphases are said to be
inherently embraced by planning which is seen as reflecting both human
interests in controlling, regulating and predicting the environment—
viz. the purely spatial or "naturalistic" element — and in purposeful
action addressed to dealing with problematic aspects of social life —
viz. the socio-economic and cultural element.
There does not seem to be much to object with in this conception of
planning for in the course ofpurposeful design of social/spatial
systems both science and humanism have essential contributions to make.
Their relationship is said to be one of dialectical interaction
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(CHURCHMAN, 1968). If such a view is accepted, the problem becomes
one of specifying the precise nature of the dialectical processes.
However, if science and humanism are regarded as mutually exclusive
universes of discourse — such that effective translation between them
is precluded — that is, if they are taken as dinstinct, closed and
self-contained frames of meaning within which and only their
corresponding terms become meaningful—then there is no way of attaining
a fusion of perspectives and the dialectic is doomed to failure.
Hence the view of science that is compatible with a reconciling
conception of science and humanism is one which both allows mediation
between frames of meaning or research programmes or paradigms and
can accomodate notions of values, beliefs, and cultural elements of
social life. Such a view of science is emerging in contemporary
discussionsof the "newer" philosophy of science (LAKATOS, 1978);
(FEYERABEMD, 1975); (KDHN, 1962/1970); it is developed in later
chapters of the thesis.
In this context, the "planning paradigm" that is advanced by (HARRIS,
1969) deserves special attention for it is a conceptual scheme which
postulates the interdependence of scientific, humanistic and problem-
solving aspects of urban planning. Viewing the conflicting interests
and attitudes between the scientific and humanistic elements of today's
culture from a perspective relevant to urban planning, it becomes
apparent that the latter cannot afford to be either purely scientific
or exclusively humanistic.
Humanism in planning reflects the pursuit of the appreciation of people;
of their behaviour and their values; of enhanced communication between
the planners and the planned. It is an essential component of
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an activity developed specifically to improve the conditions of
human existence. Science and its method of reasoning in planning
implies the pursuit of theory and knowledge of society, of its
environment, and of their interactions, in the manner of rational
discourse. Nonetheless, there exists a third component in the activity
of planning and this relates to the process of searching,
systematically or intuitively, for solutions to "practical" problems:
the problem-solving dimension Qf planning (HARRIS, 1969: p0l5)«
It involves finding suitable arrangements of sets of means such that
sets of goals are attained; it is an activity that pertains to any
operation of formulating policy for future action. This could be
taken as "technology", in general, but it would not reflect what
Harris is trying to say. For he employs "problem-solving" to refer
to the heuristic search -process for solving "practical" problems which
need not be identified with some conception of the "method of science".
Clearly, science and "practical" problems implies technology in which
science employs its methods and procedures to investigate and solve
such problems. Moreover,"pure" science also seeks to solve
(intellectual) problems and hence involves problem-solving. For there
to be three strands in Harris' "paradigm", it is essential to make
explicit that the scientific strand does not already include problem-
solving as a key element — which is the widely held view of science
as a form of problem-solving.
Recognition of the problem-solving element of planning as distinctly
different from the field's humanistic and scientific dimensions is
taken by Harris to suggest a conceptual scheme — a "paradigm" — that
encompasses all three strands (rather than only the two, that is,
humanism and science, as is conventionally accepted). Interactive
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pairwise combinations of these strands provide useful insights into
the nature of planning, but their discussion independently of the .
"three-way paradigm" is meaningful only for illustration purposes and
does not reflect the nature of the planning activity. Association
of humanism with problem-solving produces an activity of decision
making which, in the absence of scientific reasoning, appears pragmatic,
practical, giving full recognition to human values, and suffering
probably from the effect of entrenched institutionalised bureaucracy.
Roughly referred to as "the politics of everyday life", the field
extending between these two elements of planning deals with both
political decisions regulating societal action and the everyday
adjustments of individuals and organisations to each other and to
their environment.
The combination of problem-solving and science would describe the field
of technology. The opposition which obtains between these two strands
when they are considered individually ascribes to problem-solving the
( 35)
attribute of a unique activity.Excessive emphasis placed on
technology in urban planning ususally contributes to a strong
"technological" perspective on problems whose solutions are fundamentally
non-technological in the sense that they involve considerations of
values and attitudes of those that are affected by decisions concerning
policy. Finally, the allied activities of humanism and science
delimit a realm which encompasses philosophy and social science —
obviously, naturalistic social science. This field addresses itself
to the exploration not only of nature and society but also of man's
relations to these. At the one extreme of the field this is achieved
by studying the individual and his sensations and sentiments: the art
dimension. At the other end of the spectrum the subject matter is
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explored by employing abstraction, developing theories, experimenting
with these, all in a value-free context: the science dimension.
Harris argues that despite the apparent contrast between science and
humanism which emerges from this discussion, these two strands are
strongly associated and specimens of their positive interaction abound
in philosophy, the social sciences, and the arts (e.g.literature).
The above "paradigm" of planning clearly illustrates the concept of an
integrated rational/humanistic style of planned action which allows
for the contribution of the heuristic ingenuity of the planner.
The presence and fruitful interaction of the scientific and humanistic
elements is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the planning
activity to take place. It would need to be supplemented by the
professionals' intuitive search processes. Moreover, the "paradigm"
ascertains that planning provides the scope for both humanistic and
scientific dimensions. Although these may appear contradictory when
they are contrasted as individual entities detached from the milieu
of planning, they are characterised by rich synergistic effects when
they are perceived in interaction within the context of the activity
of planned societal development.
As a very abstract and general shcema Harris' "paradigm" may be regarded
acceptable, in principle, if its underlying ideology of order is
accepted. It does bring together, though it does not make any
specific suggestions about ways of integrating, the strands of practical
politics of everyday life, technological problem-solving, and the
humanism/science continuum which could be plausibly regarded as
characterising most planning activities. According to the "paradigm",
planning without science becomes a process of bargaining and negotiation
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on proposals that have been intuitively arrived at. Though this could
be a haphazard affair it obviously need not be. Much, often brilliant
planning has taken place in the history of mankind when science was
still in its infancy or even when it was proving highly successful.
Planning is inconceivable without its humanistic and problem-solving
components though it is conceivable, and often successful, without
science. The scientific perspective is introduced in planning in
the belief that science will be equally successful in tackling human
problems as it has been with problems of nature and technology.
The justification of such a belief is predicated as much on the uses
to which science is put in planning as on the conception of science
that is employed in the field.
Without its humanistic interests, planning reduces to technology taking
essentially human problems as disguised technological problems and
seeking solutions which presuppose as given a set of goals. The break
between the realms of ethics, culture and values, and beliefs, and the
realm of science and technology diminishes the moral and social
credibility of technologically derived solutions and so renders planning
sterile in terms of results, alien in its social context, and an
ethically questionable exercise. It is this reduced form ofplanning
that is usually attacked in humanistic critiques and which should be
rejected as a viable alternative.
However, it is the third combination of perspectives that seems to
present the most serious difficulties. Firstly, what would planning
be without its problem-solving activity? Probably an academic
discipline: collecting knowledge about the world of man and society—
and its interaction with nature—in its "subjective" dimension;and also
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proceeding scientifically to study its "objective" aspects — the
latter being subject to the usual constraintof value-neutrality.
Although there is nothing pejorative about a field, like planning
being an academic discipline, it would not be planning any longer for
it would lack the dimension of purposive action upon its subject
matter aimed at effecting changes by way of plans and policy proposals.
Knowledge and action are interdependent in planning, and knowledge
cannot be applied to guide action unless there is an activity of
problem-solving.
Secondly, how could a fusion of two domains — with their own ways
of looking at the world and their associated ontologies and
epistemological theses — be successfully implemented in a way which
is intelligible and credible to both, when it can be shown that workers
in these realms often do not speak the same language? Given
insuperable difficulties of commensurability, there is the risk of
examining only those aspects of humanism that may be meaningful to
a scientific study and neglect those that are not amenable to such analysis
or are incompatible with the view of science that is accepted.
Many humanists criticise naturalistic social science for precisely
this result. Some of the difficulties of employing methods and
procedures developed in the natural sciences to investigate and
theorise about human beings and their social life are explored in
later chapters. It is especially pointed out that methods and
procedures of inquiry should not be regarded as neutral instruments
of research which could be applied to many different milieux
irrespective of substantive content of the latter. The view taken
of the relation between form and content of inquiry has important
implications for theory and practice in urban planning. The methods
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and procedures of knowing will be seen to determine a perspective on
the world and to be grounded in practical human activities or "forms
of life"
Pervasive methodological changes in the domain of the social sciences;
the emergence of a body of theory of living organisms(General System
Theory) and its extension to many realms of social science; the
increasing magnitude and complexity of problems associated with urban
societies; significant new needs and technological advancements in
the area of analysis and regulation of the development of human
settlements; all these have contributed in generating dramatic changes
in methodological orientations in urban planning and have put into
question the latter's ideological foundations. Some workers take
the thoughtful application of more rigorous scientific principles
of reasoning and methods in both the theoretical and the procedural
fields of urban planning as the outstanding characteristic of the
reorientation of planning and place on this development their hopes
for fruitful results.
Others have contested the unreserved belief in the powers of science
to reach solutions of the irreducibly human problems of urban planning,
mainly because a "value-free" scientific approach is taken to be unable
to provide an understanding of societal value systems and the process
of their formation. But it could be argued that these would simply
be treated as part of the "object" of investigation. To say that
science is "value-free" is not to say that science cannot ask "positive"
(factual?) questions about values — and their social roles, processes
of formation, etc. However, even if this is conceded, the mode of
apprehension of such "things" as values, motives, feelings, purposes,
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reasons for acting is essentially different between scientific
inquiries and humanistic studies. The former proceed on the basis
of observation and testability to secure correspondence of their
statements and propositions with empirical reality. The latter
operate on intuition and interpretative understanding to ascertain
the coherence of their material within some broader (historical or
social) totality.
A validated conceptual framework, a general social and spatial theory
of planning, has not yet been propounded in a way that encompasses
both the processes of acquiring and formalising relevant knowledge
and the processes relating to control and regulation of social/spatial
"systems". Unlike the natural sciences where exacting research procedures
and evaluation standards exist, in planning the problems of choice
of research methods, the selection of evaluation criteria, the
difficulties involved in assessing the importance of various
characteristics of alternative solutions, and the questions concerning
the availability and suitability of means for implementing the
selected solutions are still unresolved. However, it is doubtful
whether these problems can be solved in general, or in the abstract,
at all. Rather, they would have to be approached and solved on
a project-by-project basis.
CHAPTER FOUR
Philosophical versus methodological considerations in discussing methods
and procedures of inquiry: implications for theory and practice in
urban planning.
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C H A P T E R FOUR
Philosophical versus methodological considerations in discussing
methods and procedures of inquiry: implications for theory and
practice of urban planning.
1. Methods of inquiry and their relation to substantive content:
two alternative views and some of their implications.
2. Some related aspects of the "methodological debate" in the
social sciences.
3. The distinction between substantive and procedural aspects of
urban planning seen in the context of interdependent content
and method of inquiry.
1;. Methodology, research strategy, method, and technique:
some distinctions.
5. Philosophical versus methodological approaches to studying methods
of inquiry: can these be reconciled?
(Chapter four, coiitd.)
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6. Some arguments from the "newer" philosophy of science :
paradigms, research programmes, theoretical and methodological
pluralism, proliferation, and anarchism.
217.
1. Methods of inquiry and their relation to substantive content: two
alternative views and some of their implications.
There seems to be little doubt that the concept of method is to be
found on the rational (mind) side of the classical dualisms alleging
separate functions of : the rational and the empirical, reason and
sense experience, ideas and objects, form and content, thought
(knowledge) and action, theory and practice; and of subject matters
such as mind and body, ideal and real, value and fact, nature and man,
society and individual, environment and organism, abstract whole and
(1)
concrete part. Method of inquiryx ' may be contrasted to substantive
content or subject matter of inquiry.. Although it is reasonable to
suggest that a method is a logical construction — a kind of form that
the operations of thought have produced — there is no unanimous
agreement on whether or not it relates to anything which is not purely
mental in the world; whether or not there is any interdependence
between form and content, method and subject-matter of inquiry.
The kind of answer given to this problem concerning the relation
between logical form and substantive (or empirical, or material)
content of scientific inquiry provides one of the various, more or less
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artificial, ways of classifying philosophical views. There are, in
general, two contrasting views on this issue (NOVACK, 1975 : ch.8);
(THAYER, 1968: p.2+5U).
On the one side, there are those who maintain that forms of thought
and, by extention, methods of inquiry are wholly independent of
substantive content and socio-historical conditioning. For them
methods may exist apart from any objective reference; for they claim
that form is absolutely counterposed to substance. This so-called
"formalist" view contrasts with the thesis of those who argue that
logical forms possess real content — some being richer in connotation
than others — and that methods of inquiry are essentially
interrelated with the empirical materials to the study of which they
are invoked to apply. In between these two extreme positions there
is a wide variety of intermediate stands. The implications of the
two main antithetical theses for the nature of the methods employed
in scientific inquiry have been traced by various writers in ways
(2)
that do not seem independent of their philosophical points of view.v J
Thus, on one account of the 'interdependence' thesis — associated
with the philosophical outlook known as pragmatism — "a method of
analysis and critical evaluation of ideas does entail metaphysical
and moral commitments as well" (THAYER,1968: p.l|5^-). In this view,
adoption of some particular method of analysis entails acceptance of
certain theoretical consequences concerning "the kind of world in
which that method is successful (or the only appropriate one for the
purposes it accomplishes), and the kind of creatures and conditions
of behaviour for which that method is of use and importance" (ibid.).
This argument suggests that to detach a method of inquiry from the
subject-matter to which it applies — viz. its objective content —
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in order to assess its validity may be an -unacceptable distortion
of reality.
This view will be accepted in this thesis; though not necessarily
accompanied by the specific philosophical outlook of pragmatism —
the latter being one of several contexts in which this view has been
advanced and with which it is compatible (such as Marxian social
_ (3)
theoiy, Hegelian idealism, etc.).VJ' Thus an assumption of this
thesis is that any particular methodological approach is founded
on presuppositions, more or less well conceived, regarding the nature
and grounds of knowledge and the kind of world knowledge of which
is sought. These epistemological and metaphysical foundations are
not in themselves a set of methods but direct and inform any such
set. A given set of methods may explicitly represent only one facet
of an epistemology but may be influenced by other concerns.
Consequently, a taken-for-granted, unexamined, and mis-specified
epistemology may lead to methodological confusion, just as the
bluntness of methodological analysis substantially reduces the
usefulness of even the most sophisticated techniques. A further,
related assumption accepted in this thesis is that methodological
prescriptions cannot intelligibly be separated from their theoretical
and practical consequences, but rather condition the direction which
research may take. Hence it is important to investigate, in order
to reveal, often implicitly made presuppositions underlying the
development and use of models and theories with special reference
to the role played by these cognitive devices in the field of urban
planning. Such presuppositions often owe their origin not so much
to any empirical predicates, but to axiological predicates derived
from assumptions about the world and everything in it.
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It is essential to state this at the outset because it is a
consideration which one expects to guide the ensuing discussion of the
"methods of science" (meaning "natural science"), but also the
examination of the question of the appropriateness of employing
"scientific methods" in other contexts such as the social sciences
and urban planning. However, it does not seem possible — within
the narrow confines of this thesis — to pursue such a consideration
with unfailing consistency. Especially as regards the so-called
"method of science", it is impossible to investigate fully all the
philosophical (metaphysical, ontological, epistemological)
presuppositions that may be claimed to be entailed by employing various
versions of "the method of scientific inquiry". Some attempt at a
compromise is made below* where it is examined whether or not a
discussion of "methods" can be strictly methodological and to what
extent it will have to involve philosophical considerations.
Further, it can be argued that since the interests of this thesis
are firmly rooted in the social sciences and, in particular, in urban
planning, such an orientation must introduce some form of "bias" in
the selection of material for discussion and the nature of the
conclusions that are likely to be drawn from it. Now, this may be
taken to imply that "the method of science" — however that "method"
may be construed — is not directly applicable to the subject-matter
of the social sciences and urban planning.This implication is
accepted in this thesis as a plausible contention, though one for
which it is not possible to provide any reasons that can remain
unchallenged, and any "ultimate" justification. Some of the reasons
for preferring some version of a "peculiarly humanistic" method of
approach are discussed below.
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However, it should be stressed that such a view has not been dictated
by experimental findings but has been the result of intuitive, but
non-arbitrary, choice based on the acceptance of a 'prior' system of
'basic beliefs' which stresses the human as opposed to the physical
element in man. It is thought that, given the present state of
knowledge regarding man's neuro-physiological constitution, the
opposing thesis of "naturalism" has no 'objectively' sounder foundation
than the humanistic view, and may thus be taken as an equally
acceptable thesis to inform the various methodological programmes that
are compatible with it — e.g. programmes advanced by Popper, Quine,
and marxist historicists. Thus, the stated preference for some
peculiarly humanistic approach to the study of "theoretical" and
"practical" aspects of urban planning does not entail agreement with
more or less extreme views of humanists like Dilthey, Heidegger, and
Gadamer who seem to advocate wholesale rejection of all methodological
programmes inspired by naturalist views (often wrongly referred to as
"positivist"). In short, it is not thought that the alleged
■uniqueness of human phenomena is an argument which is sufficient to
justify total rejection of any form of scientific study of social life.
Now, if it is argued that a statement of preference for a humanistic
as opposed to a scientific approach ought to have been justified by
some suitable application of the "empirical method of science", then
the following objections may be offered : (i) there are several
apparently incompatible accounts of the "method of science" advanced
(<
by different schools in epistemology and in the philosophy of science^
(ii) it is not obvious which of these accounts is to be preferred and
how such a preference is to be justified; (iii) if the choice is to
be made by employing the "method of science", then it is not clear
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which account of "the method of science" to use in order to decide
which account of the "method of science" to accept. This involves
one in circularity. If it is decided not to rely on any account of
the "method of science", hut rather to seek to study the scientists
in the process of their activities and identify their method-in-use,
then the question might he raised ahout where to focus attention in
such a study: for scientists like Mach or Einstein, zoologists,
astronomers; or social scientists such as sociologists, economists,
geographers, urban planners, seem to employ their own versions of
"scientific method" or of "method of inquiry". One might also ask
why the method of astrologers or scientologists is unacceptable in
discussions of the "method of science"; or why the version of the
"method of science" advanced hy logical empiricists is taken hy many
to he unacceptable. Now it seems that answers to such questions
have to be viewed as founded on some "prior philosophies" or system
of basic beliefs which cannot be avoided (LAKATOS, 1972:pp.91—136) .
2. Some related aspects of the "methodological debate" in the social
sciences.
Certain issues involved in the so-called "methodological debate"
in the social sciences are discussed below, both in this and in a
later chapter. Actually, the anti-naturalist arguments are far more
sophisticated than is suggested in this text, and their critique is
often well aimed, especially when it is addressed to the positivist
and logical empiricist conception of natural science and scientific
method. As described elsewhere (cf.Appendix to Part II, entry :
"Positivism") this conception of natural science makes a number of
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claims such as: (i) the possibility to formulate high level
generalisations (general laws) accounting for human phenomena; (ii)
a predictivist account of explanation; (iii) the use of experimental
procedures to directly confirm or falsify theories. The anti-
naturalist's comments on these positions are, respectively: (i) that
individuals and social events are unique and this characteristic
precludes the possibility of formulating general laws relating to
them; (ii) that phenomena which depend on human activity cannot be
subject to accurate prediction; (iii) that it is impossible (or, at
least, unethical) to conduct scientific, controlled experiments on
human individuals. Other important issues raised in the
"methodological debate" concern: (A) the nature of human action; (B)
whether or not it is possible to construct objective social theories
('objective' in the sense that the term is employed in natural science).
Yery roughly, the following points may be made with regard to these
two central issues.
(A) Consideration of the nature of human action involves answers to
at least two distinct questions, viz. : (A1) on the kind of
explanation that is most appropriate for human actions — whether it
should be causal or non-causal explanation; (A2) on the nature of
knowledge of social phenomena. Consider what is involved in (A2).
Given that human beings are unlike rocks; that the "forces" moving
them as beings rather than bodies are (unlike gravity) "meaningful
stuff" such as internal ideas, feelings, motives, values; that human
beings are purposeful, goal-seeking, meaning-attributing, meaning-
responding creatures; can it be sensibly claimed that the nature of
knowledge obtained from the study of such a subject-matter is the
same as that of knowledge of natural science phenomena? Further, if
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with (SCHUTZ, 1963: pp.231-21+9) it is recognised that the social world
possesses an intrinsic meaning system an equivalent of which cannot he
found in nature (i.e. relevance is not inherent in nature hut is the
result of selective and interpretative activity of man within nature),
then there follows that facts, data, events in natural science exist
within the observational field and do not mean anything to the
molecules, atoms, electrons therein. ,If this is the case, then it
may plausibly he suggested that there is an irreducible something
which is not captured by way of social inquiry which employs the
positivist version of the "method of natural science" (or the "logic
of science"). In one set of views, the method known as interpretative
(or interpretive) understanding ("verstehen") is capable of capturing
the "irreducible" meaning aspects of social phenomena and is peculiar
to knowledge of social reality. From Max Weber and Alfred Schutz it
follows that it is possible to develop a "verstehen" approach and
subject its results to empirical testing for acceptance or rejection.
From a number of views in the philosophy of science claiming that an
adequate philosophical account of the natural sciences must also include
some conception of "understanding", there follows that it may be
possible to relate the peculiarly humanistic concept of "verstehen"
with a non-positivist account of scientific method. One attempt to
develop such an integrated schema is made in (KEAT and IJRRY, 1975);
it is founded on the philosophical outlook referred to as Realism
(in the specific sense that this outlook has been formulated in the
writings of Rom Harre — cf. Appendix to Part II, entry: "Realism").
(B) On the issue of objectivity in social theories, it is often said
that there is, on the one side, "objective" social theorising and,
on the other side, "ideological" social theorising. Two conceptions
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of ideology are currently in use in social science : the one is akin
to the main sociological tradition, the other derives from Marxian
tradition in social theory. Though both take it as a "distortion"
i
of reality, they interpret "distortion" differently. In the
traditional non-Marxian view, ideology involves distortion because of
the intrusion of values that permeate it (values such as political,
religious, and moral beliefs). "Objective" social theories are
said to be value-free and are contrasted with value-charged "ideological"
(r)
theories which are "contaminated" with "subjective" elements.voy
Many writers express doubts that it is possible, or even appropriate,
to divorce considerations of values from "objective", "value-neutral"
social theories. They argue that all knowledge about the social
(7)world is ideological. ' Assuming that this is correct, one
suggestion might be to clearly state some preferred value outlook
(some set of "interests") and formulate social theory directly in
relation to that outlook. Acceptance or rejection of such a value
configuration would influence answers to the question of truth or
falsity of the value-impregnated theory. This approach would raise
considerations regarding the relations between "subject" and "object"
of knowledge, between the knower and the known, between cognition and
practical interests, between thought and action, between theory and
practice. Such relations have been examined in the context of the
philosophical outlook known as pragmatism by writers such as John
Dewey; and are currently being explored by the social thinkers of
the so-called Frankfurt School. Reference to the work of Habermas
and its focus on Marxian social theory is made below.
To carry this approach over to the field of urban planning, the
relations between knowledge and action, cognition and practical
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interests, theory and practice would suggest relations between theories
and models of urban social-spatial organisation and the programmes and
policies for planned action that are informed by them — relations
between procedure and substance. Certain implications of such a
view for the method of planning to be adopted have been traced in
(DAVTDOFF, 1965) where a conception of "advocacy planning" is expounded.
This approach argues against ideals such as value-neutrality and
suggests that it is not possible to separate the ideological beliefs
of the individual planner from the carrying out of his professional
activities,and that the definition itself of social problems which
are taken to necessitate solutions through planning is not independent
of particular interests and value judgments. Thus, programmes for
planned action should be developed and constructed so as to explicitly
sustain and reinforce the evaluations and aspirations of particular
social groupings. The pluralism of interests and the recognition
that "the public interest" may not be possible to be served in toto —
if possible to define at all — should result in corresponding
pluralism of planned solutions to various problems.
One line of argument against this view might be that the advocates of
"advocacy planning" find it desirable that, future societal arrangements
should be dependent to such great extent upon current, fallible
assessments of value, of interest, and of the means of furthering
interest. Surely it would be a preferable, if perhaps less realistic,
ideal to seek to know before one judges, to seek to minimise the need
for rationalisation of particular interests as a component in the
construction of societal arrangements, and to seek to express the
intention of a "good life" and an "improved environment" in well-
informed and well-constructed activity. However, even though wishing
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to know before passing a judgment is an honourable objective its
realisation seems to be constrained by interest-charged modes of
obtaining and legitimating knowledge relating to problems of urban
planning. If this is accepted, then solutions to interest- and
value-loaded definitions of planning problems should take into account
such interests and values and state them explicitly so that they are
accessible to social criticism and exposed to analysis through, say,
the method of logical argument.
Further, this approach may be open to the charge of self-defeating
relativism. Thus, if it is proposed as the 'best' account in an
objective sense how can it be justified by its own tenets? Why should
one particular method of planning — viz. "advocacy planning" — be
'best' given that it is proposed in the light of the pluralism in the
ways of defining urban problems as well as the pluralism of interests
and values involved in those definitions and in the solutions to such
problems? Conversely, if it does not claim to be the 'best' account
of a planning method in an objective sense, then why should it be
accorded credibility or be preferred over other potentially equally
valid methods? This is, of course, the classic argument against
relativism and will be referred to later in this thesis — especially
in the context of the Kuhn-Popper debate on the "growth of knowledge".
For the purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient to state that the
justification of the method concerned is taken to lie within itself
and the particular conventions pertaining to the context within which
it is employed; though it is conceded that such justification may be
at variance with justification in an unqualified sense.
Moving now to the Marxian notion of ideology, this has been employed
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to criticise the view that ideas are autonomous or that they have the
power to shape or determine reality; or to advance the claim that all
theory is socially determined. Ideology may also be seen as some
kind of justification which marks some particular set of interests.
This conception of ideology derives from the contention of Marxian
social theory thatthe distinction itself between facts and values,
empirical knowledge and human ideals, cannot be maintained. This
appears to be a much stronger claim than the one in which it is
suggested that values intrude into the acquisition of factual
knowledge of the world. On this Marxian account, facts and values
are not logically heterogeneous : the methods by which knowledge is
produced in a society, and the substantive content of such knowledge,
are inextricably connected with the social relations of material
production — practice or practical activity. ' Ideology is said
to involve forms of distortion which depend upon the relations of
"material production. The main defect of ideological belief is taken
(91
to be "reification". ' Acceptance of ideologically distorted beliefs
serves the interests of particular social classes : but it is the
underlying structure of social relasionships, rather than the dominant
social class itself, which systematically generates ideological
distortions that serve the interests of that social class. On this
view, an adequate social theory would have to: (i) represent the
beliefs held by the members of some society; and (ii) show how
some of these beliefs are false, having been distorted by the
ideological beliefs of that society, and why they develop and are
sustained.
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3. The distinction between substantive and procedural aspects of urban
planning seen in the context of interdependent content and method of
inquiry.
Apart from issues of methodological significance for the ensuing
discussion of "scientific method", the questions explored in this
chapter are of importance for the field of urban planning as a whole.
This may not be immediately obvious; and although these issues will
be investigated later in this thesis, it may be useful at this stage
to provide some indication of how the connections between the discussion
in this chapter and the field of urban planning are to be established.
Very roughly, one of the more or less artificial ways of subdividing
the field of urban planning is that which takes it to consist of
substantive and procedural aspects. The former pertain to questions
of subject-matter proper, that is, laying down the range of subjects
that should and could be meaningfully dealt with within the boundaries
of the field. "Theories", and models of urban social-spatial
organisation which are employed to inform planning decisions are
developed within this so-called knowledge component of urban planning;
and are commonly referred to as "theories in planning".
Substantive aspects of urban planning are contrasted with its
procedural aspects. The latter comprise considerations of method or
process involving formulation of and agreement on operational rules,
rational procedures, and techniques of research aimed at attaining
the objectives of the field — e.g. procedures for relating means to
ends, techniques for reducing the number of alternative proposals to
be evaluated for inclusion into some finalised policy statement,
rules regarding linkages of planning and policy-making activities
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at the urban level with higher and/or lower levels of the
administrative hierarchy, normative accounts of the structure,
purposes, and activities of the process or method of planning.
These may be referred to as the action component or practice aspects
of urban planning; and the "theories" or "models" of planning process
developed to account for such aspects are conventionally characterised
as "theories of planning"^1(PAIEDI, 1973a); (FALUDI, 1973b);
(FBIRT1MAM, and HUDSON, 197*0; (GALLOWAY and MAHAYNI, 1977);
(HIGHTOWER, 1969)-
It may be argued that the "substantive component" of urban planning
refers to the subject-matter or content of inquiry in that field: that
it denotes its area of specialised knowledge. Farther, the "procedural
component" corresponds to the reasoning processes whereby knowledge
about the subject-matter is made use of (is applied) to the solution
of relevant problems: this might be seen as the realm of social
activity, as part of the social structure, which urban planning
represents. Now, this way of bifurcating the field of planning would
seem to entail acceptance of the well-known dualisms claimed to exist
between : content and form of inquiry, subject-matter and method of
study, knowledge and action, "objective" facts as the "positive is"
and "subjective" values as the "normative ought" — though, to be
precise, these categories do not correspond exactly with one another.
Acceptance of the substantive-procedural dichotomy in urban planning
would involve taking "objective" theories and models of the city and
its social-spatial organisation to be independent of the process of
planning which would be seen as being founded on ideologies, interests,
rational and/or ethical principles of evaluation, and the like.
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The latter would lie in the realm of the "subjective" — in the sense
that they would be products of the human mind rather than hypotheses
founded on experiential evidence — and it would not be possible to
"objectively", experimentally adjudge them as true or false, but only
decide on their acceptance or rejection through logical arguments,
social agreement, and convention. Acceptance of a clear distinction
between substantive and procedural components of urban planning implies
that "the (planning) method is largely independent of the phenomena
planned" (WEBBER, 19^3 : p«320). This view is also expressed by
Davidoff and Reiner who advance their version of the "planning method"—
so-called "choice theoiy of planning" — as applicable "...equally
well to such diverse endeavours as urban land use planning, national
economic planning, business planning and others, for the same steps
are followed no matter what the substantive or geographic focus"
(DAVIDOEF and REINER, 1962).
Alternatively, the substantive-procedural distinction may be claimed to
be untenable if urban planning is viewed "as an activity centrally
concerned with the linkage between knowledge and organised action.
As a professional activity and as a social processes, planning is
therefore located precisely at the interface between knowledge and
action" (FRIEDMANR and HUDSON, 197^+= P-2). On this account, the way
that the nature of planning problems is defined, that is, the way that
the object of planning is looked at and theorised about, will have a
bearing on the selection of method to be employed in the search for
appropriate solutions as well as on the content of such solutions
(CARTWRIGHT, 1973)* This suggests that a (procedural) theory of urban
planning may not be conceived wholly independently of a (substantive)
theory of the city (HARRIS, i960 : p.272).
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The "substantive-procedural" dichotomy which might be taken to reflect
the distinction between a field of specialised knowledge and a social
(institutionalised) activity which is an element of the social structure
is not as straighforward or warranted as it appears prima, faciae.
It is possible to discern a general and a particular level of discussion
in exploring the relationships between the two allegedly distinct
aspects of urban planning.
(A) At a general level, the field may be seen to involve policy making,
implementation and control which are activities informed by knowledge
of the existing state of affairs and by socially held or acceptable
goals and objectives which would provide directions for a desirable
future. In this sense, planning exists as a field of specialised
knowledge as well as a social activity: it is part of the cultural
history of ideas and a component part of the social structure.
The drawing of a distinction between the substantive (theoretical)
and the procedural (institutional, methodological) components of urban
planning involves separating cultural and historical from social
structural aspects of human communities. But it would be absurd
to divorce institutional arrangements from the social, cultural, and
historical context within which they gain their expression and
articulation, developing in accordance with the salience of political,
economic, social, and cultural issues at historically important times.
It is, moreover, exceedingly difficult to clearly demarcate the areas
concerned for practitioners of planning are often engaged in theoretical
inquiry and formally contribute both to the academic study of policy
making and the procedural aspects of urban planning. Further, the
latter are being increasingly influenced by substantive (theoretical)
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schemes and doctrines originating from a variety of other disciplines
whose areas of concern overlap those traditionally falling within
the scope of urban planning. The resulting interaction between
the articulation of substantive and procedural modes of planning
provides an intriguing context in which to observe and study the
enormous complexity and profuse subtlety of the relationships between
thought and action.
(b) At the more particular level, questions arise as to whether
substantive theories and models of social/spatial phenomena are to
be related to or distinct from procedural concerns of planning.
The notion of interdependence between -procedure and substance in
urban planning has its advocates, though it is not certain whether
there is exact correspondence among the meanings attached to either
by various writers. Thus, in an early paper Britton Harris argues
that (HARRIS, 1960: p.272): " ... at least for the moment there
can be no theory of city planning wholly divorced from a theory of
cities, and hence no general theory of planning as such".
In a later work he asserts that (HARRIS, 197^-J pp.65-66) a theory of
social change and societal development — such as the one advanced
in (MICHAEL, 197^4-) and. (SCHON and NTJTT, 197^4-) — might be taken as
a "paradigm" of the object (or substantive content) of planning,
but not as one which comprises a "paradigm" of "planning itself",
that is, a "paradigm" of planning action and professional practice.
He attempts to formulate an account of such a "paradigm" of the
principal elements in the planning process by rationally reconstructing
what planners "actually do", and sees no obstacle in relating that
account to the paradigm of mathematical programming which organises
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the whole process around a systems view of the substantive issues involved.
In this sense, a systems view of cities justifies a systems-analytical
programming approach to their planning.
Harris' rational reconstruction of the planning process and its relation
to mathematical programming involves: (i) defining the "problem" so
as to reconcile variances between ends and means available for their
attainment (defining objective functions); (ii) delimiting areas of
possible action (defining constrains); (iii) generating a series of
alternatives which offer "solutions" to the "problem" (initiating
search process); (iv) testing these "solutions" by predicting their
consequences and assessing these (modelling the response of the
system); (v) selecting some alternative course of action or proceeding
to improve some preferred "solution". However, there are difficulties
involved in such rational reconstructions of the method employed by
a group of professionals in the course of their activities.
The difficulties have been subject to extensive debate in the context
of scientific research and "scientific method"; and the various accounts
of "scientific method" have been shown not to be independent of particular
views of science and ways of looking at the world.
This debate is taken here to be relevant in the discussion of the
relations between substance and method of planning, and to justify
raising the question: if a systems view of the city is not agreed
upon or is rejected, would the logical reconstruction of the method of
planning outlined above still be valid? Could it plausibly be
maintained that "the method" of planning may be universally established
for all contexts? It seems that if one accepts a poly-theoretic view
of the subject-matter of planning, in which there are several plausible
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ways of looking at the fluid "realities" of urban social-spatial
organisation, one is bound to a view allowing for pluralism of methods
as well.
Another view acknowledging interrelations of substantive and procedural
aspects of urban planning has been advanced by Bolan who contends that
"communities possess attibuteswhich are a function of place, historical
development, economic rationale,and social compositions" (BOLAN, 1967s
p.235). The possible variations in the social and political
environments of different cities suggest that the same version of the
planning process may be successfully employed in certain urban
environments but unsuccessfully in others. Hence planning method
ought to be adjusted and adapted to the particular social-spatial
contexts it endeavours to apply. If planning content is taken to
denote the kinds of "issues and problems to be concerned about" in
planning, i.e.the "scope of planning"/'choice of content is not totally
independent of choice of method although there are no impediments
to discussing them separately" (ibid.: p.2i;2).
In a later work the same author comments on the directions in the
development of planning theory since 1968 and identifies two
interrelated concerns (BOLAU, 197Us pp.1i+-l5)s (i) the question
of how facts and values affect one another. The position favoured
by some philosophers and accepted by many planners is one which
recognises value-ladenness of facts. This suggests that the
separation of the empirical, supposedly value-free part of planning
analysis from the evaluative, prescriptive, or normative part of
planning proposals may not be justified on logical and epistemological
grounds. The view taken of the relation between empirical facts and
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value judgments will have a bearing on the position to be adopted
concerning relations between substantive and procedural aspects of
urban planning, between theory and method; theory and practice;
knowledge and action, (ii) Indeed, it is by stressing the importance
of focusing on the interrelations between human thought and human
action that planning theory has made its development felt since 1968,
taking into consideration philosophical, epistemological and social
scientific arguments.
There seems to be some vagueness in Bolan's writings as to the precise
meaning he attaches to "planning theory". Thus, in (BOLAN,. 1967)
he concerns himself with the "planning process" or "planning style"
and takes it to have four principal components: strategy (e.g.
disjoined incrementalist or rational comprehensive); method (e.g.
the "key-levers" approach, or systems analyses and system simulations);
organisational or institutional framework; and planning content
( the"scope" of planning) (ibid.: p.237)- To the extent that it
recognises interdependence between content (substance) and procedural
aspects of planning — and it clearly does so — this view is consistent
with the position accepted in this thesis.
Thus, though not explicitly stated in that paper, the meaning of
"planning theory" may be interpreted as encompassing both substantive
issues of content, viz. theories of the city or theories and models
about the subject-matter (content) of planning, and issues of process
such as "strategy", "method", institutional arrangements, social practices,
and the like. However, in (BOLAN, 197U) there is explicit reference
to the familiar distinction between "theories in planning"(substantive
aspects) and "theories of planning (planning process aspects).
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Moreover, Bolan declares his concern with the latter type of planning
theory which he contrasts with the former. Then he goes on to
proclaim his support for the view acknowledging interdependence of
values and facts, and relationships between thought and action.
But if such relationships are accepted, how is it possible to discuss
"theory of planning" independent of "theories in planning"? How could
one justify the distinction between : (i) "theorising" about the
city as a thinking process and as a social activity ( as suggested
by both the nragmatist and Marxian accounts); and (ii) "planning"
the city as a thinking process as well as a social process (BOLAN,
1974s p.15), given that it is the pragmatist philosophical outlook,
usually unacknowledged, which informs the kind of planning theory
that Bolan is referring and subscribing to, viz. the so-called
tradition of the "new-humanism". Could it be seriously maintained
that the "thinking" (or "cognitive") aspects of the urban planning
process are independent of some theoretical conception of urban
social-spatial organisation? If the pragmatist outlook provides
the philosophical underpinnings for the set of views known as the
"new humanism" — as it evidently does (WILSON, 1975s pp.76-78) —
then the reply to the last question, above, should be clearly negative.
Further, Bolan's notion of a "theory of planning" as one which "centres
around what is going on when men plan whether they are planning cities,'
wars, or industrial empires" (BOLAN, 197^+s p.1^+), that is, a context-
independent "theory of planning", may not be intelligibly reconciled
with his view of independent knowledge and social context, thought
and action. Yet his conception of a "theory of the planning process"
does comprise both substantive and procedural aspects of urban planning
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in an integrated framework. One probable reason for this apparent,
but not real, contradiction may be that Bolan along with other writers,
such as (MICHAEL, 1973), (PEIE3MAN1T, 1973), and (OZBEEHAN, 1969), not
all of whom may be said to belong to the tradition of the "new
humanism", takes a "process" view of urban planning — as opposed to
the "fixed plan" counterpart of the well-known "plan versus process"
antinomy. This presumably compels him to stress the procedural
aspects of planning as against its substantive aspects though he
acknowledges their interrelation in the planning process.
The position advanced in this thesis takes "theory in planning" and
"theory of planning" as inextricably interrelated and impossible
to formulate separately without severe loss of meaning and usefulness —
"theory for planning" seems to be an appropriate term for such a
conception of theory (BAILEY, 1975s p.vii). However, there does not
seem to be any dispute between this conception of'theory for planning"
and the process view of planning advocated by the above writers if by
"theory of planning" they mean a theory of the -planning -process which:
(i) views knowledge and planning action as intimately related;
(ii) postulates that knowledge increases the possibilities for
deliberate planned action and social change and control, but also
increases moral responsibility for actions taken in determining the
conditions of social life;
(iii) takes the elements of the process of planning social action
to be dependent on some interpretation of a given situation including
both empirical and value aspects of it. For it accepts that action
is guided by knowledge, i.e. it regards planned social action as
founded on a set of rational but fallible and corrigible beliefs about
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social-spatial reality, and influenced by some normative conception of
how such action would be both most appropriate for the purpose at
hand and ethically acceptable.
(iv) accepts that a so-called "substantive" theory of social/spatial
organisation ( a term which becomes redundant if used by itself
divorced from procedural planning theory) is one possible interpretation
of a given situation as means to deliberate future consequences under
hypothetical or anticipated conditions. It is not a "copy", viz.
a geometrical or pictorial representation, or a correspondence, within
an agent and of a subject-matter. A theory so conceived would still
need to provide some reflection of the world though one which could be
the result of an interaction between the world and man's perceptual
equipment as well as his needs and interests. For if it did not in
some way reflect the similarities and differences to be found in the
world it would be descriptively useless and prescriptively unsound.
The crucial point in this discussion appears to be the specification
of the meaning of "theory in planning" or "substantive" theory of
planning.Nearly all attempts at theory- and/or model-building of
aspects of the urban structure and social/spatial organisation have
taken for granted some version of the empiricist theory of knowledge
based on a correspondence theory of truth. The pragmatist outlook
which informs the position of the "new humanist" writers referred
to above, is of course strongly opposed to the conception of truth
as strict correspondence with value-free facts. Thus, for those
writers there is no place in their theories of the planning process
for "substantive" theory so conceived. However, there is no reason
why "theory" as has been loosely specified above, should not be
compatible with the humanists' notion of "theory of the planning process".
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Taking planning as a thinking process and planning as a social process
to be "the two main axes of a matrix for mapping the planning theory-
terrain" (BOLAU, 1971+s p.15), it is easy to see the contribution of the
knower to the known in their interaction: the planner (subject)
theorises about various ways of influencing or affecting the object
of his inquiries. The mind of the knower can be admitted to be
conceptually creative without denying that the conceptual outfit it
creates does reflect the reality of the known, viz. the object of
knowledge and action, in some way. But the process of acquiring
knowledge or rational belief to guide social action is not simply
the opposite of the one-way process which the empiricist epistemology
postulates and prescribes.
This so-called "spectator theory of knowledge" asserts that rational
beliefs about the world are the result of sensory experiences, passively
received and then privately elaborated and systematised within the
mind. Unlike this one-way movement towards knowledge, inquiry for
planning involves interaction between the "object" and its investigators,
between the planned and the planners. Thus, at some stage in the
process of inquiry (or process of planning) the inquirer/planner must
be a "spectator" in order to leave room to the object to do its part.
For if it is questioned by inquiring minds, the object of planning
still has to provide answers. Failure to appreciate the interaction
of knower and known, subject and object, the planner and the planned,
will result in inefficient inquiry for it will not be possible to
disclose any important, actual traits of the object but only what the
inquirer would expect to find or wish to believe. Hence there is
some form of a dialectical process involved in theorising for planning.
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Methodology, research strategy, method, and techniques: some
distinctions.
There seems to be some confusion as to the precise meaning attached
to the terms "method" and "methodology". Restricting observation
to usage in social science disciplines, one discovers that these
terms are either used interchangeably, or are distinguished, or are
divided into further sub-categories. Thus, Rapoport argues that
"no sharp line need be drawn between the meanings of ' method' and
'methodology' "(RAPOPORT, 1969s P«179)« This view must be based on
a conception of methodology as a body (an aggregate) of methods,
research techniques, and sets of procedures developed and applied by
a discipline. If this usage is intended, then there may be grounds
for employing the terms interchangeably. Kaplan seems to concur to
this view. He notes that, although it may be ambiguous to use
"methodology" both "for a certain discipline and for its subject-matter','
such usage does not "lend itself to any serious equivocations"
(KAPLAH, 1961+ : pp.18-19). However, the term "methodology" is also
employed to denote the process of study and analysis of principles
and procedures of inquiry in some cognitive field. It is in this
second sense that the term is used in (WEBER, 19l+9)» and by Parsons
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(as "the consideration of the general grounds for the validity of
scientific propositions and systems of them") (PARSONS, 1937s p.2lj.);
while for Merton it is "the logic of scientific procedure" (MERTON,
1957 : p.86).
According to Kaplan, the ambiguity of the meaning of the term
"methodology" can be traced in its four different usages (KAPLAN, 1961*:
pp.18-21+) :
(i) "methodology" is often taken to mean inquiry into the potential
and limitations of particular techniques (e.g. techniques of
multivariate statistics such as factor analysis or multi-dimensional
scaling; techniques of interviewing or questionnaire design; and the
like), where a technique is a particular procedure employed in
cognitive inquiries;
(ii) "methodology" used to refer to "the method of science" rather
than to study of specific techniques is often associated with a
conscious attempt to convey the image of pursuing scientific rigour
in cognitive inquiry in a way which secures the scientific status of
the results of that inquiry (Kaplan calls this the "honorific" usage
of the term);
(iii) "methodology" employed to refer to a concern with very general
philosophical principles is sometimes similar to epistemology or
philosophy of science (as used by philosophers), and deals with
questions such as the problem of induction, the issue of determinism
or free will in human behaviour, and the like, which are approached in
a primarily philosophical manner and may have a rather indirect
influence on the practice of scientific inquiry;
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(iv) "methodology" is taken to refer to the study of methods (and
this usage is adopted by Kaplan).
The distinction between usages (i) and (iii) above is claimed to be
one of degree. On the one side, philosophical issues differ as to
the extent of their significance : while, say, the problem of
induction may be important for the whole of human knowledge, other
problems, such as the issue of determinism or free will in individual
behaviour, tend to relate to particular disciplines. On the other
side, techniques differ in scope of application (KAPLAN, 1961+: p.23).
The term "method" is usually reserved for a systematic procedure or
mode of inquiry applied in order to attain some cognitive end
(LIESING, 1971: P-1) : it may be seen as "a pragmatic means of
attaining some form of knowledge about the world" (CICOUKEL, I96I+ :
p. 28). For Kaplan, "method" refers to "mid-range" techniques or
principles "sufficiently general to be common to all sciences"
(KAPLAN, 1961+ : p.23). Thus "method" refers to "the technology
of research, the actual tools by which data are gathered and analysed;
while 'methodology' refers to the logic or philosophy underlying
particular mathods" (HUGHES, 1976 : p.6). This distinction seems
appropriate and will be adhered to henceforth; and use of "methodology"
to denote the body of methods and research procedures of a discipline
will be avoided as much as possible.
Some writers distinguish methods of research into "research strategy"
(or "research procedure") and "research techniques" (BULMER, 1977 :p«5)«
The former refers to the research programme or method of approach
concerning the carrying out of a particular study and includes
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considerations of appropriateness of available research techniques
in attaining the objectives of the strategy, and of the synergistic
effects of such techniques. The latter refer to the actual
instruments of research. However, research strategy and techniques
are interdependent : strategy is necessarily limited by availability
and appropriateness of techniques, while techniques are selected on
the basis of some research strategy. Further, Bulmer differentiates
research strategy and techniques from "general methodology" (employed
in the sense of a study of logical and philosophical issues of methods).
He also notes the interdependence between methodology and methods of
research : "Choice of research strategy and research techniques is
rarely independent of a general methodological standpoint; conversely,
the use of a particular strategy or technique may have important
implications for the general grounds for the validity of scientific
propositions" (ibid.).
(11)
Viewing planning as a process or programme of inquiry,v 'it. may be
possible to draw distinctions between 'strategy', 'method', and
'technique' in a way which establishes interesting connections with the
work of the above writers. One such set of distinctions has been
drawn by (BOLAN, 1967). He discerns four components of what he refers
to as "planning style", i.e. the type of programme or pattern of inquiry
in urban planning. These components are :
(1) Strategy, which is characterised as the means whereby planners
endeavour to convince those concerned (e.g. the government, the public
affected by planning) that their policy and planning contributions
ought to be influenced by information, criteria, and values which
they (viz. the planners) are capable of wielding. Thus, the extremes
of compulsion and voluntarism as 'strategic' principles delimit .
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a spectrum of options, and it is likely that a strategy-mix leaning
towards the voluntarist principle would be more appropriate for
Western liberal democracies. Within a voluntaristic framework based
on incentives there are several ways of articulating strategy of
planning; for instance, disjointed incrementalist, advocacy and
pluralist, or adaptive and contingency approaches.
(2) Method (or "scheme of logic") stands for the mode of reasoning
involved in studying the subject-matter of the field. It might range
from forms of individualising studies focusing on partial and limited
analyses, to forms of holistic or comprehensive explorations taking
in all conceivable interdependencies and striving for their integration
into a meaningful whole. Thus, a method of planning might place
emphasis on quantification and mathematical expression of concepts or
it might stress qualitative aspects of the object of planning — such
as natural beauty, social harmony, and the like — according to some
Utopian vision of these. It might favour daring and long-term
thinking or present reserved and experimental programmes subject tc
revision after careful monitoring of their implementation. It might
focus on the political process for guiding decisions and on the design
and management of institutions or opt for the use of future end-state
plans in terms of physical arrangements in urban space as the key
instruments for effecting decisions. Some methods that have been
used more or less successfully in urban planning are : (i) systems
simulation by way of models of the urban system as a whole or of
particular subsystems — these are actually seen as "techniques" of
comprehensive or holistic planning disguised in technical terminology;
(ii) the "key-levers" approach which derives from Keynesian principles
of economic management : key areas of the object of planning are
identified and managed leaving the remaining aspects to social choice;
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(iii) so-called "ad hoc opportunism" involves proceeding not on the
basis of some plan but by seizing individual opportunities for action
as they emerge, without concern for effects outside of the action areas.
(3) Organisation refers to the political and institutional framework
within which decision making for urban planning purposes takes place —
the position of the planning function within the administrative
structure.
(1+) Content of planning denotes the "scope of its subject-matter",
that is, the kinds of issues and problems to be taken into consideration
in the planning exercise and for which solution and/or regulation is
sought. Isssues pertinent to content are said to revolve around the
kind of time-scale of the planning undertaking, the nature of the
relations between the means available and the ends set, the attitude
towards information (selectivity versus comprehensiveness), etc.
Now, the following kinds of relations are postulated to hold between
components of the process of inquiry of urban planning : (i) choice
of method is independent of, but yet affected by strategy of planning.
Thus, some strategies might be compatible with any method; others
would be appropriate only in conjunction with some particular method.
For instance, the strategy of disjointed incrementalism would be
logically opposed to the holistic, comprehensive methods of the systems
approach for it favours partial, atomistic, individualising approaches
and reasoning. (ii) interdependence is acknowledged in the choice
of method and choice of content of planning, although these
components may be discussed separately.
Some remarks on these views on strategy, method, organisation, and
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content of urban planning are in order at this stage. Components,
1,2, and 3, above, refer to so-called procedural aspects of urban
planning representing what may be termed the "method of planning";
while the content component refers to the substantive aspects of the
field. Strategy concerns some broad methodological principles
involved in approaching the object of planning. It is based on a
set of assumptions concerning the nature of the object of planning,
which derive from some way of looking at urban social-spatial
organisation. Thus, from considerations about the kinds of moral,
political, etc. values that some particular society finds — or ought
to find — acceptable or desirable it would be possible to argue that
a planning strategy based on the principle of voluntarism and the
instrument of incentives should be more appropriate than a strategy
which employs compulsion by means of strict state control.
This entails a way of looking at society which distinguishes it from
the state (the government, the executive or administrative branch of
the state) as opposed to the view which seeks to obliterate the
differences between them. A society could be seen to differ from
the state in a number of important ways :it is a collection of
individuals who interact cooperating and communicating with one
another and their social activities are persistent and characteristically
human; it will persist only if there are generally accepted rules
of conduct but these do not have to be enforced by any centralised
agency. Compatible with such an account would be the emphasis
placed on individuals and their freedom of choice and action which
would, in principle, be the overriding consideration in a planning
exercise against approaches which take the city as an indivisible
whole, with properties which go beyond the properties of its component
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parts, and set out to study and plan changes for it in a comprehensive,
holistic manner * guided by some normative view of the "ideal city".
Moreover, strategy is constrained by the nature and availability of
methods for carrying it out as well as by considerations of compatibility
of such methods with the strategy. Methods themselves are based on
presupositions, more or less explicit, regarding the nature and
constitution of the object to which they intend to apply. For
instance, a method which stresses quantification and mathematically
expressible relations presupposes that the nature of the subject-matter
of planning is such as to permit the necessary quantification —
including those aspects which many writers take to be irreducibly
humanistic, exclusively qualitative, and hence unquantifiable.
Such a quantitative method may foster a scientific, as against a
particularly humanistic, way of looking at urban social-spatial
organisation and thus directs the perception, interpretation, and
ultimately the organisation of its subject-matter. It may possess
both problem-solving and cognitive characteristics and, in this sense,
it may be differentiated from technique which might be employed with
a narrower meaning to denote the systematic, instrumental means for
attaining specific objectives (TEITZ, 197J+ : pp.87-88).
General methodological viewpoints may not be independent of the
subject-matter of planning, that is, of ways of looking at urban
social-spatial organisation. Thus, there is clearly a level of
discussion regarding strategy, methods, and techniques of urban
planning which may be referred to as "general methodology" and which
deals with the issues concerning the logical and philosophical
presuppositions involved in various methods in relation to
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subject-matter. Choice of strategy and methods of inquiry in urban
planning is rarely independent of some general methodological stand
which often is taken for granted and remains unacknowledged. Such
methodological position is closely dependent upon the nature of the
political and administrative framework which is prevalent in particular
situations and which tends to reflect cultural, historical, and
structural (political, socio-economic) characteristics of the society
within which it is articulated and legitimated.
Methods include such procedures as observation and measurement, concept
and hypothesis formation, theory accretion, model building, prediction,
etc. The purpose of methodology is to describe and analyse such
methods, to discover their effectiveness and limitations, to expose
their implicit presuppositions and their consequences; in general to
aid in the understanding of the processes of scientific inquiry and
not its products (KAPLAN, 1962+ : p.23). Although pursuance of .
methodology is neither necessary nor sufficient for successful results
in scientific research, it can enhance inquiry by removing ambiguities
and making practising scientists more aware of the scope and
limitations of their methods. In this sense, methodology is seen
to offer recommendations rather than strict prescriptive rules for
practising the game of science: adherence to these is not mandatory at the
penalty of expulsion from the scientific community.
This view of methodology as an instrument of advice rather than a
normative framework for practising science certainly affords greater
flexibility in scientific inquiry and helps to shift its focus from
form (method) towards content (substance); thus emerging as an
improvement on the Logical Empiricist (^)thesis on methodology as
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the "logic of science" or "scientific method". In this latter view,
the logic of science, based on methods and principles of formal logic,
is both an adequate description of the process of scientific inquiry
and a prescriptive account of how science ought to be practised.
Although this account of "scientific method" has infused more clarity
and precision of thinking, it has also contributed to the cultivation
of a "myth of methodology", especially among practising social
scientists : "that it does not much matter what we do if only we do
it right" (KAPLAN, 1968 : p.39l|). This comment seems to be applicable
to many situations in urban planning where emphasis on method and
technique tends to overshadow substantive considerations and the
attempts to intuitively, and if possible, sympathetically interpret
the problems facing the city, but also its human inhabitants.
5. Philosophical versus methodological approaches to studying methods
of inquiry : can these be reconciled?
The general problem of the relation between philosophical and
methodological approaches to the study of methods of scientific inquiry
is discussed in (HAEVEY, 1969 s Ch.1) whith reference to the context
of geography— The discussion seems to be germane to analogous, though
not similarly defined problems in the field of urban planning, notably
the issues revolving around the distinction between procedural and
substantive aspects of the field. A discipline is seen to be
characterised by both a set of objectives of study, laying down the
range of subjects that should and could be dealt with within the
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disciplinary boundaries, and a method of study which consists of
rules, rational principles, and techniques of research for the
attainment of the cognitive objectives of the discipline and the
legitimation of the knowldge so acquired. The objectives of study
within the discipline are founded on some system of beliefs which
might be called the "philosophical" foundation of the discipline.
To the extent that different such systems of beliefs are conceivable
and may be subscribed to, a number of corresponding philosophical
outlooks are also possible which would have a bearing on the cognitive
objectives of the discipline or field and would provide differing,
often conflicting accounts of the field. Choice of one system of
"basic beliefs" in preference over all others would seem to be founded
on considerations pertaining to esthetics and axiology rather than be
the "objectively" justified outcome of the application of one of many
possible versions of the "method of science". Thus, it is accepted
that social and cultural factors tend to influence to a greater or
(13)
lesser extent, and often determine, beliefs and ways of thinking. '
Philosophers appear to defend the truth of particular sets of beliefs
about the world and to reject alternative sets as false. They may
"either stress the role of the mind in the generation of knowledge, or
minimise it and emphasise instead the external constraint of the world
itself, or the sensuous given, or the data of experience" (BARNES,
197U : P-8)» They may also view the production of knowledge as an
interchange between the external world and the structures that are
inherent in the human mind, or the social and cultural (underlying)
structures which influence and often determine beliefs and ways of
thinking and looking at the world.
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As concerns the method of study of the subject matter of the discipline,
it is the task of the methodologist to establish sets of criteria for
assessing what is to count as legitimate knowledge in the field.
Such a task is claimed to be related more to the "logic of justification"
rather than to philosophical considerations with regard to some
underlying system of beliefs which suggests a particular way of
looking at the subject matter of the discipline. Consequently, this
is a different task from that ofthe philosopher. Writers such as (BEAITHWAITE,
i960 s p.21) and (HOMER1966) have drawn attention to important
differences between a methodological and a philosophical approach to
the study of scientific methods; while Kaplan argues that a
philosophical study of methodology usually affects the practice of
scientific inquiry only indirectly (KAPLAN, 1961+ : p.20-23).
It may be argued that a methodological position inevitably entails a
corresponding philosophical position : that, for example, employing
a method of cause-effect analysis could only imply a deterministic
view of the world. There can be no doubt about the interrelationships
between philosophy and methodology although the influence of the former
upon the latter need not always materialise as pervasive as it is
anticipated tprima faciae'. The methodologically oriented practicing
scientist may adopt a view on methods irrespective of his view of
science (his philosophy), simply because the mode of analysis it
represents is more effective or more convenient (or both) in achieving
specific research targets. His criteria are often more pragmatic or
instrumental . in comparison to those of the philosopher.
Use of, say, a stochastic model to investigate the interaction between
certain classes of phenomena need not suggest that this is the only
appropriate method of studying a specific type of relations; nor does
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it suggest that the scientist has eliminated the alternative of using
some deterministic mode of analysis, should the latter prove more
appropriate for his purposes.
In contrast to such "methodological pluralism", the philosopher would tend
to recommend some method of analysis that corresponded to his
philosophical outlook with respect to the domain of phenomena that
interested him. Adoption of a language that takes account of
indeterminacy in human behaviour would tend to be the choice of
approach for the philosopher whose position emerges in favour of, say,
free will. Thus he would discard deterministic modes of analysis
for reasons of consistency with the philosophical view he espouses.
However the preceding statement is an idealised reconstruction, and
in practice the philosophical approach seems to be less rigid to that
presented above. Philosophers may well accept some analytical
approach as a better approximation to explanation in comparison with
the one that corresponds directly to their views of science.
A notable example of this is illustrated by the case of Laplace who,
though holding a deterministic view of the world, developed the
calculus of probability to account for human ignorance about certain
types of phenomena and to provide some means of analysing them in a
way which approximated reality more closely than any deterministic
method (HARVEY, 1969 : p.7).
However the independence of a methodological approach from the
philosophical implications of the methods of inquiry should not be
overemphasised. The decision to place an emphasis on methodological
issues rather than on philosophical ones in the ensuing discussion
of the "method of science" is based on mostly pragmatic considerations.
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This approach has the advantage of convenience of analysis "but may
entail dangers in its separation of procedure from content of inquiry,
and its assumption of neutrality of methods towards broad philosophic
matrices or ways of looking at reality, which may underlie scientific
research and influence the development and choice of methods employed
to master that reality. To deal with the anticipated advantages
first, this is a convenient approach because it seeks to limit
discussion to issues directly relevant to method and avoid expansion
to considerations pertaining to the universe of philosophical discourse
which would lie outside the scope of the present work. But this may
be a trivial and easily refutable argument. The main benefit of such
an approach would be the high degree of flexibility which it affords
in the study of investigative procedures and strategies of inquiry.
Commitment to one of the currently held philosophical conceptions of
science and scientific practice would tend to restrict the flexibility
of methodological analysis by imposing some specific framework which
prescribes methods and principles of inquiry and the roles to be
played by these. In contrast, the study of methods from a
philosophically neutral point of view would make it possible to examine
the circumstances in which methods are used, to investigate and
establish the assumptions that are involved in the application of
methods, and to formulate the analytical structure that must be
adhered to in such applications.
It could be argued that such advantages accrue only if methods are
viewed as mere instruments or computational devices which are employed
because they usually give satisfactory results in the pursuit of some
cognitive objective, independently of substantive content of the subject
matter to which they are applied and irrespective of philosophical
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presuppositions concerning, say, the nature of experience and
perception, the nature of language, etc. Further, that such a view
of methods of inquiry is itself based on some philosophical outlook;
and that the claim of a philosophically neutral (and theory-neutral)
methodology is, therefore, self-contradictory. This argument seems,
at best, to reduce the validity or, at worst, to provide strong
reasons for rejection of the proposed approach. But this need not
be so. The methodological approach emphasised herein need not
endorse the sweeping claim of independence of form from content of
inquiry; in fact it is not meant to do so. All it needs to accept
is that at least some procedures of scientific inquiry may be common
to a number of disciplines. Moreover,this approach gives full
recognition to the interdependence of philosophy and methodology and
is intended to consider their interrelationships wherever they become
relevant.
6. Some arguments from the "newer" philosophy of science: paradigms,
research programmes, theoretical and methodological pluralism,
proliferation, and anarchism.
The view that science owes its success to using a special method, and
that scientific research can be characterised and demarcated from
non-scientific activities by the fact that it involves the use of this
method explicitly and consciously, - reflects a scientific world
outlook which recently appears to be losing the support it previously
commanded among both philosophers and scientists. Discussions
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in contemporary philosophy of science, but also the actual practice of
scientific research, seem to be moving further and further away from
the long established view that the sciences keep increasing and
accumulating knowledge of the structure and constitution of the world
by employing "the method of science"; and that if such methodical,
systematic search for knowledge continues over sufficiently long time
it should be possible to discover everything that there is to be found
out in the world.
Furthermore, the account of science which takes it to provide
objectively true descriptions of the way things really are has been
challenged by many contemporary thinkers. The belief that there is
a realm of absolute, theory-neutral facts which simply dictate the
content of scientific theories about the world, and that the notion
of truth.is simply correspondence to reality is being contested by
the view — which in its original version was put forward by Kant —
that theories are not just copies or pictures of the real world.
Bather they include the contribution of the human mind without being
wholly fictitious, that is, they do fit the world in some very basic
way. Thus, what is called truth is seen to depend partly on what
there is in the world (the external facts) and partly on the
contribution of the intellect (the categories and ways of looking at
things which come from the observer). In this sense, there may be
alternative ways of describing the same set of empirical facts which
yield both true and adequate descriptions of them, so-called eqtrna lent
descriptions. Moreover, not only is reality viewed as partly mind-
dependent, but also the concepts applied on it by the scientist may
prove to be wrong ones and may have to be altered in the process of
interaction between human contribution and experiential evidence.
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The intrusion of many "subjective" elements in scientific inquiry need
not result in a characterisation of science as a wholly subjective
enterprise. It is recognised that there is good and bad reasoning
but there is no mechanical rule for deciding about it. Many of the
terms employed in scientific inquiry and in everyday life are interest-
loaded in the sense that they presuppose particular ways of looking
at the world and theories about it. For instance, applying the term
"town planner" to an individual makes no sense unless one is fa.miliar
with a whole framework of social institutions that provide for the
activity known as "town planning", i.e. it is seen as useful or even
necessary to employ the services of "town planners" — rather than
do without — as individuals who perform roles that are consistent
with the purposes of that activity. This in turn, presupposes a
way of looking at the city and the people who live in it which takes
it to present social and environmental problems that are identifiable,
corrigible, and essentially avoidable through anticipating and
consciously planned social action. Now, an observer who is not
acquainted with such an institutional framework and the social and
spatial theories it presupposes might characterise the town planner,
after observing him in his activities, as say, "the man who caused
my house to be demolished", or "the man who says I ought to drive
around rather than through the city centre", and like. However,
even if the notion of "town planner" is so affected by interests,
values, and theories, there does not follow that it is impossible
to state objectively that that individual is, in fact, a "town planner".
Strong arguments have been advanced suggesting that "normal" scientific
practice is governed by some paradigm which "stands for the entire
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the
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members of a given community" of scientists (KUHN, 1962/1970 s p.175).
In this view, research is a puzzle-solving activity : scientific
problems are solved within the framework of assumptions implicitly
or explicitly embodied in the paradigm. The latter guides the search
for answers to questions such as : "What are the fundamental entities
of which the universe is composed? How do these interact with each
other and with the senses? What questions may legitimately be asked
about such entities and what techniques employed in seeking solutions?"
(ibid.: pp.l+-5). Thus, it appears that the paradigm which is
accepted by some community of scientists performs the dual role of
prescribing a set of appropriate rules of method for pursuing the
cognitive tasks of a scientific discipline, and of prescribing the
nature of the subject matter of that discipline, in the sense that it
suggests a way of looking at the world, to which these rules of method
may be legitimately applied. By arguing that scientific standards
and methods are relative to paradigms this view denies the claim that
the sciences embody a single set of procedural and methodological
conventions in their pursuit of "true" (as opposed to "relative")
knowledge of the world. The latter claim is put forward by writers
such as (POPPER, 1959/1972).
Kuhn's concept of "paradigm" bears close relation to Imre Lakatos'
notion of "scientific research programmes", as explicitly recognised
by the former author (BUCK and COHEN, 1972: p.138). The notion of
a "scientific research programme" is not a very precise one — though
it is not certain that it was originally intended to be a precise one.
A scientific research programme is seen as a sequence of theories.
These occur within the 'context' of the research programme and must
possess a certain continuity for them to constitute a single such
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programme. Lakatos' arguments draw on the history of science.
Scientists are viewed, as tending to maintain support for a theory
even if they are unable to explain away anomalies in it. On Popper's
account (POPPER, 1959/1972) scientific knowledge advances through
continuous attempts to refute scientific theories; and theories so
refuted are eliminated while those that pass falsification tests are
accepted as presently sound but corrigible in the light of subsequent
tests.
Now, Lakatos argues that such discarding of single theories which
failed to pass falsification tests does not occur in actual scientific
practice. Rather, scientists tend to appraise sequences of theories
and not individual ones. Decision on whether or not to abandon a
refuted theory will depend upon the extent of the increased
explanatory power of a new, slightly different theory which is derived
by modifying auxiliary assumptions in the original theory in order to:
save it. Thus, a scientific research programme is adjudged as good
if later theories in the sequence contain excess corroborated
empirical content over earlier ones. Anomalies deriving from false
empirical consequences of earlier theories have to be tolerated until
eventually settled and explained, lest science be rendered totally
sterile. For if Popper's account was adopted, it is argued, most
research programmes would have been abandoned before giving any
concrete results (LAKATOS, 1969); (LAKATOS, 1970). Lakatos'
methodology implies theoretical pluralism and proliferation : the
so-called polytheoretic model of science which is contrasted with the
"mono-theoretical" model of criticism or "naive falsification"
advanced by Popper (DIXON, 1973 : pp.16 ff). This view seems to go
beyond Popper's account in which plurality of theories is also
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advocated tut only for heuristic purposes in the sense that "we need
a new theory in order to find out where the old theory was deficient"
(POPPER, 1963 : p. 22*6).
If Rutin's work seems to reject much of the received view of "scientific
method", the writings of Peyerabend make much stronger claims in which
all methodological doctrines and principles are taken to be false
(PEYERABEHI), 1970); (PEYERABEUD, 1975)* Since the real advances in
knowledge contradict all methods available to the scientists "there is
only one principle that can be defended under all circumstances, and
in all stages of human development. It is the principle : anything
goes" (PEYERABEHD, 1970 : p.26), which reflects an anarchistic attitude
towards scientific research. On this account, the scientist should
proceed by relying not on universal rules, standards, and methods, but
upon "esthetic judgments, judgments of taste, and (his) own subjective
wishes" (ibid., p.90). However, the availability of the option of
conducting scientific inquiry in a rational and objective manner is
not denied; only the selection of that option is claimed to be an
inappropriate one for the scientist who values human freedom and
individuality (ibid., p.21). Obviously, adherence to this view
would render the ensiling discussion of "scientific method" redundant.
That the discussion is developed, however, should not be taken to
imply rejection of Peyerabend's thesis.
The main arguments in Peyerabend's thesis derive from his drawing
on examples from the history of science — a practice to which Kuhn
and Lakatos also resort — but in a way which does not expose him to
the charge of historicism. His general conclusion from the study
of historical cases of scientific discovery is that all available
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theories of scientific method cannot account for the real advances of
knowledge which always contradict logical reconstructions of method;
and that there can be no rules which describe good scientific
practice. Although he does not offer any explicit argument for the
latter claim, he makes a number of criticisms of common methodological
principles (KOEE.TGE, 1972 : pp.281-282). He contends that these
show that all methodological doctrines or principles are false, not
because existing accounts of scientific method are not satisfactory
but because any principles of method could never be good enough.
The difficulties involved in discriminating between general
methodological principles and criteria of truth indicate that
distinction between good and bad methods is not possible and that it
is also impossible to distinguish between good and bad substantive
theories. There follows that proliferation of theories ought to
(15)
result in the emergence of certain good theories. '
Theoretical pluralism is recommended not only because it is seen as
essential for the growth of knowledge, but also because it might
oppose psychological dogmatism and institutional rigidity which, as
potential consequences of a mono-theoretic view of science, would be
inappropriate for a free individual to use. In this sense,Peyerabend
raises questions about the direct human consequences of adopting a
certain scientific method. He asserts that "the happiness and the
full development of an individual human being is ... the highest
possible value" (PEIEEABENI), 1970) and seeks to so characterise
scientific practice as to facilitate this aim. Moreover, he argues
that being concerned with truth and the uniqueness of truth should
not be the principal goal of scientific inquiry; for in man's
intellectual and cultural activities there are many aims more
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important than truth. That pursuance of the single ideal of "truth."
is not the only aim of human activity is a plausible contention which
other writers have arrived at through different chains of reasoning
(GELLNER, 1975 : p.335)- Feyerabend offers two additional arguments
in support of this contention.
Firstly, unlike the pretensions of different theories of knowledge,
the vision of a coherent, clear, and stable intellectual world is
said to be only a facade: ideological stands tend to influence beliefs
which take that world to be coherent and rationally preferable to any
other way of looking at it. Given that the world is complex and
difficult, almost anything might contain some truth (ibid.).
Secondly, the multiplicity of existing, incommensurate cultures and
values in the world makes it exceedingly difficult to choose between
rival views. For instance, the claim that one such culture, viz.
science, is superior to others is not to be taken for granted.
For each culture comprises, and internally legitimates, its own world
view and cognitive norms and conventions. Further, it is very
difficult or even impossible to justify basic beliefs upon which
world views or ways of looking at the world are founded. However,
adopting a liberal attitude toward different cultures entails
cognitive relativism. Apparently, Feyerabend does not worry about
the usual arguments against the rather extreme relativism that his
position entails. All these considerations lead to Feyerabend's
suggestion that a position of epistemological anarchism (which is
different from scepticism) should be seriously considered as a
foundation for scientific inquiry which "opposes positively and
absolutely ... universal standards, universal laws, universal ideas
such as 'truth', 'reason', 'justice', 'love'..." (FEYERABEHD, 1975 '•
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p.189). Thus, the scientist ought to lend support to or put
forward even the most trivial or outrageous statements.
The arguments involved in this position are put forcibly by
Feyerabend though perhaps not flawlessly as his critics comment
(GELLNER,' 1975); (KOERTGE, 1972). 'While one may not subscribe to the
brand of methodological and epistemological anarchism advanced in that
account, one inevitably comes to recognise the risks of artificially
imposed restrictions and premature closure in scientific inquiry which
may result from dogmatic application of some formal and rigid account
of scientific method. Maintaining a sceptical outlook regarding
such accounts of method and theories of knowledge seems to be the
most intelligent approach. In this respect, Gellner presents an
eminently tenable view in asserting (GELLNER, 1975 : P-33b) :
".... doubt whether any methodology can fully capture the complexity
of the transition from one theory to another, or from one style or
paradigm to another. The transition will always hinge on the
content of the theory or paradigm, which of course must be
ignored by an abstract and general theory of method, meant to be
applicable impartially to all such advances (of knowledge). On the
other hand, theories of scientific method can do the important
job of singling out worlds amenable to science from those which are
not. This is important because not all worlds or thought-styles
are amenable to science". Moreover, theories of knowledge
(epistemologies) are seen as (ibid. : p.336) J "....irrelevant to
the manner in which specific cognitive advances are reached.
Their real use lies in helping us make inter-cultural comparisons.
A culture which subjects its cognitive capital to testing by arbiters
who are not under its own control, seems
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to me- superior to one which does not do so. Epistemological theories
thus give, us some insight in how to choose between whole styles of
thought. But I do not expect them to apply mechanically to individual
discoveries or advances, even within the culture which as a
whole, satisfies this or that epistemology".
The preceding comparatively long reference to recent work by
Feyerabend was introduced not only because his is seen as a radical,
almost heretic, and widely debated position in the context of the
philosophy of science, but also because his views appear to be
(16}
connected with aspects of social and political theory. ' The
connections are only obliquely indicated but may be identifiable in
the context of "Against Method". The main issue seems to be whether
or not one ought to adhere to rules of rational scientific practice
given that there may be certain direct human consequences of adopting
a particular scientific method. The approach of theoretical pluralism
is proposed because it is taken to enhance "the happiness and the full
development of the individual" and thus to be most appropriate for a
free individual who rejects the dogmatism and rigidity that sole
pursuance of the elusive ideal of "truth" might impose on him.
The potential icompatibility between the quest for scientific "truth"
and the pursuit of individual happiness would suggest that it is worth
exploring the possibility to replace a world in which science, in its
present form, is the dominant outlook with one in which science so
conceived plays no role whatever. Feyerabend "ventures to suggest"
that the latter choice would afford a world "more pleasant than the
world we live in today, both materially and intellectually"
(FE3YEEABEMD, 1970 p.90). His account of the reasons why
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contemporary technological society causes concern about the quality
of life, in general, indicates that the present scientific world
outlook is the main problem-generating agent. The view of science
which he attacks tends to cultivate the attitude of rationality,
especially in terms of constructing rational arguments and formal
methodological principles of scientific inquiry.
Rationality in the formulation of social policies may simply follow
some given distorted view, legitimated by government, to its 'rational'
conclusions and suggest, say, embarking on a programme of weapons
development whose consequence might be human extermination. Rational
arguments could also be seen as largely ineffective for it is
frequently the case that one has to adopt a radically different
approach, belief, or way of looking at things that lies outside of
the context within which such arguments are advanced. Moreover,
inducing agreement among individuals regarding social policies through
rational arguments is a potentially harmful process for such arguments
are effective only with rational individuals. Now, an individual
who can be said to be rational is "specially prepared"; has been
"conditioned in certain ways"; his "freedom of action and of thought
has been considerably restricted" (M3YERABEND, 1970 : P.101). Thus,
the ideology of science may be seen to promote an attitude of
rationality which itself conditions individuals into ways of thinking
and reasoning that are compatible with that attitude, without their
seeking to discover whether there are other more appropriate ways
of pursuing answers to the same questions.
The sketches of the two possible, mutually exclusive worlds drafted
by Feyerabend and claimed to reflect the options open to man indicate
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close connections between epistemological and methodological stands,
on the one hand, and social and political theories, on the other.
Either way of conceiving of the world features its own epistemology
and cognitive strategy. The prevailing view of the world, which
the conventional conception of science presupposes, is one which takes
the uniqueness of truth as an ideal to be pursued by science, and
falsity and error to make a strong presence in the stock of existing
claims to knowledge of the nature of the world. Pursuit of truth
is seen to be reinforced and directed by method. Epistemological
and methodological conventions constrain the range of statements and
propositions which are eligible for testing and criticism as making
serious claims to knowledge of the world. In this world view, not
"everything can go". In contrast, the "alternative" view of the
world, which is advocated by Peyerabend, appears as providing greater
opportunity and variety for the fulfilment; of essentially free human
beings. This allegedly superior, radically different view
challenges the rigidity and dogmatism of epistemological and
methodological conventions which are seen as restrictive of human
freedom, personal expression, and pursuit of human ideals other than
"truth", and offers an alternative epistemology culminating in the
tenet "anything goes" which presumably brings about emancipation from
the intellectual oppression of the conventional conception of science.
It is not possible, within the confines of this thesis, to evaluate
these "sketches" and the claims about either of them put forward by
Peyerabend. As stated earlier, the reason why they are discussed
here is that the way in which the principal issues are handled
indicates certain linkages between an epistemological and
methodological stand and social and political theory. This issue
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is seen as highly relevant to the context of acquiring and validating
knowledge of the world to be employed in the development of social
policies and programmes of planned action addressed to regulating and
reshaping the urban environment as well as the organisation of human
activities in it. It is thought that there are resonable grounds
to suggest that the contention about connections between ways of
acquiring knowledge and ways of looking at and planning society should
be explored. The question regarding whether of not an epistemological
and methodological outlook impinges upon the way in which society
and its political arrangements are viewed as well as upon the style
of planning that is seen as most appropriate in relation to such a
view of society is taken to require careful consideration. For
instance, it may be argued that there are connections between, say,
the positivist epistemology advanced by Auguste Comte and social
theories reflecting a conservative attitude in terms of political
arrangements (BENTON, 1977 '• Ch.2). Linkages may also be said to
exist between Popper's epistemological doctrines of falsificationism
and critical rationalism and his theory of the "open society" (POPPER,
1915/1966).
It is perhaps, significant that Popper's social and political
philosophy is actually criticised (by Peyerabend) for its deriving
from extension of his views on a range of epistemological and
methodological problems (PEYERABEND, 1972). The latter author does
not sketch a general social and political theory in his own writings
although there are suggestions in his work for a starting point in
such a theory, consisting in J.S. Mill's general approach combined
with so-called "practical anarchism" (ibid. : p.108). However,
Popper's social and political views occasionally appear at variance
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with his epistemological and methodological stand. Thus, in his
discussion — and rejection — of Utopian, holistic
(i.e. comprehensive) planning or social engineering Popper comments
that the required comprehensive descriptions of what would make
individuals as a whole happy cannot be agreed upon by all.
Thus, on this account, adjudging different accounts of what goals are
to be pursued in particular social planning undertakings ought not to
be effected by applying the methods that are employed to assess claims
to knowledge advanced in the context of the sciences. Moreover, the
transition from Popper's discussion of method in natural science to
method in the social sciences is characterised by certain shifts in
emphasis. Thus, the principle of testability is combined with
relative flexibility as to the kind of theoretical entities to be
accepted in the theories of natural science; while in social
science, reliance on piecemeal social engineering and methodological
individualism are directed by concern with practical social problems
(POPPER, 191+5/1966); (POPPER, 1957/1961).
Notwithstanding such differences in emphasis, Popper's social and
political theory may be said to be intelligibly connected with both
humanistic and epistemological and methodological considerations,
but cannot be correctly claimed to derive from his philosophy of
science — though it does appear to be consistent with it. For
instance, in his philosophy of science Popper asserts that the aim
of scientific research is to eliminate the false rather than
establish the true which lies at an infinite distance.
Correspondingly, in his political and social philosophy he views
planning, in the form of "piecemeal social engineering", as the
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means to eliminate the bad and the problematic from social .
arrangements rather than establish the good or ideal state, and by-
extension the ideal environment.
It is thought that the nature of the connections between a particular
epistemological and methodological viewpoint and some system of beliefs
about and way of looking at society and theorising about its social,
political, planning, etc. arrangements may not be said to be
impermeable and logically necessary. The latter claim is made by
writers of the Frankfurt school who maintain that they have discovered
such connections between what they refer to as the positivist
epistemology and the specific political and ideological character of
the social theories — allegedly conservative — that are developed
under the influence of such an epistemology (MARCUSE, 1955).
However, it may be possible to establish such connections subject
to postulation and acceptance of certain hypotheses regarding'social
theorising. For instance, it may be contended that the social
theorist as well as the planner is a member of a scientific or
professional community and a member of a social class or stratum.
Like other such members, he understands his position in that
community and in society in terms of common-sense thought and beliefs.
Such common-sense thought may be seen to have embedded in it
categories which both disguise and justify certain aspects of the
existing social and scientific order and thus affect the way society
is looked at.
Regarding the urban planner, in particular, it could be argued that
he is taught and learns to perceive urban problems and to seek
solutions to these within some generally accepted way of looking
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at the city. His perceptions are related to his sub-culture and the
training it has offered him, as well as to the society's common-sense
thought and beliefs. Moreover, he is amenable to further
differentiation within his sub-culture for he is normally trained
in some other discipline prior to becoming involved in the field of
urban planning: an architect/plannerwould tend to have a different view
of the problem than, .say,a geographer/-, economist/-, or sociologist/
planner. Each of these sub-cultures, is characterised by certain
special traits, emphases, and interests that are exclusively cultivated
within it. The modification of perception — of, say, urban problems,
or of perception in general — by disciplinary training does not seem
to be entirely, or even mainly, a matter of learning verbal categories
in order to "impose" upon experience. More importantly, there are
certain accepted models of "right" perception within the discipline,
and exposure of the planner to these affects his way of looking at the
world. He learns to see the city and its social/spatial organisation,
both synchronic and diachronic, in the way indicated by his training
and the illustrations, diagrams, and learned papers in the relevant
disciplinary literature. There follows that whatever he perceives in
the world of his interests is never a matter of passively monitoring
and becoming aware of the world.
The urban planner as : (i) a perceiver of problems, of interactions
and interdependencies, of environmental features such as outstanding
natural beauty, amenity, etc. ; (ii) a member of a sub-culture
with its own orientation towards the city, but also with further
differentiations within it; finally (iii) the planner as one of
the members of a society with its culture and commonsense thoughts
and beliefs which have filtered through and shaped the planner 's
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own culture; that Is,the planner and his culture are actively
involved in the process of his becoming aware of aspects of the world
even before perception generates belief. The natural tendency to
accept sense impressions and experiences as objective givens and
indubitable facts unaffected by social, cultural, historical values
and norms can be said to be overriden by an equally natural
requirement for an uncluttered and methodical system of beliefs which
provides the basis for plausible, well-structured and easy to handle
narratives about aspects of the world. Hence cultural norms come
into operation to define what is to count as experience and sense
impression in the world, and thus affect the definition of problems
and the way solutions to them are sought.
This is essentially an epistemological issue which is often dealt with
in contemporary discussions of what is to count as knowledge and how
claims to knowledge are to be assessed. There seems to be an
increasing acceptance of the view that sense impressions (the data of
experience) are capable of great variation between individuals and
sub-cultures as are the ways problems are looked at and defined
(HANSON, 1958); (KOHN, 1962/1970).Seen in the context of urban
planning, such views — so-called relativist — merely assert the role
of the culturally given in a field of endeavour which is concerned
with acquisition of knowledge of aspects of the world and with the
putting it to practical use. These views further indicate the
absence of any clearly delimited boundary separating fact from theory
and thus make it important to try and develop ways of understanding
the wide variation in beliefs about the world of man and society and
their way of life in the city, and the wide variation in the
perception and definition of problems to be solved and in the policy
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recommendations that are advanced as "solutions" to those problems.
If such views are accepted, then the "orthodox" view of objectivity
and uniqueness in the definition of problems has to be adjusted to
allow for variations in perspective stemming from cultural elements
of the perceiver and a host of other interests. The notion of
alternative solutions to one and the same problem must yield to
alternative interpretations of problems for which alternative
solutions are to be sought. The emerging picture of interdependence
between questions of belief and questions of knowledge should be
more acceptable in the context of urban planning than in the realm
of natural science where it is being originally conceived. For the
orientation of •urban planning is much more interpretative regarding
its subject matter and the problems inherent in it, and normative
in its conception of prescriptive policies as answers to those
problems, than the natural sciences may be claimed to be in their
endeavours to interpret the world of nature.
Variations in belief systems and the ways in which beliefs are
maintained and changed may be discussed without taking some specific
view of what is to be regarded as "true" — viz.whether it is that
which corresponds to "reality", or that which works in attaining the
goals of the inquiry,or even that which coheres with some broader
"frame of meaning" or cognitive context — or on the most appropriate
method of assessing claims to knowledge. It is possible to maintain
views which postulate a sharp distinction between issues of belief
and issues of knowledge, and equally possible to claim that questions
of belief and knowledge are intimately interlinked. Although the
decision to separate these questions cannot be conclusively argued
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against and rejected, the contention that issues of belief are
distinct from issues of knowledge does seem to render epistemological
positions dogmatic and more or less arbitrary. Further, it tends to
weaken their importance in relation to pervasive theories of beliefs.
Thus, despite the impossibility of claiming that systems of belief
logically entail corresponding epistemologies, it seems reasonable to
argue that they may suggest theories of knowledge. Hence, such
connections as there may exist between systems of beliefs and of
knowledge ought to be given attention and properly investigated^ ?)
A system of beliefs might mean different things to different people.
It might include the most basic ideas about the nature or "essence"
of things in the world, often referred to as "basic ontological
assumptions", which guide the way things are looked at and the
cognitive activities that take place within some paradigm. In this
sense, it would provide generally accepted directives on what to
regard "real" or "ideal" and on whether these could be related; it
might exclude religious, metaphysical, mystical, cultural elements
from what could be taken as knowledge of the world; it might express
an unquestioning faith in the powers and capabilities of a scientific
attitude in settling all conceivable problems, both in the world of
nature and in social life; it could even proclaim that beliefs as
such should be eliminated from scientific thought and that claims
to knowledge should be limited only to those that can be tested
against empirical facts.
Systems of beliefs so conceived are fundamental in the formation
of paradigms of thought or ways of looking at the world
(FOED, 1975s Ch.2). Sometimes they are not distinguished
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from the commonsense "beliefs involved in man's everyday
life, such as social conventions and norms, cultural traits, moral
and ethical principles and values. In this sense, systems of
beliefs would include the individual's ideas about himself and
others and about natural objects as well. These beliefs would
guide his actions and support his social role as ways of coping with
the social and natural conditions of his life. They would be
invoked to justify both to himself and to others his particular way
of life and conduct, and would thus enable him to continue his life
as he wills in view of the situations which he encounters.
An individual's system of beliefs is thus essentially interlinked with
his way of life and practical activities. Until this relationship
is understood it may not be possible to appreciate how influential
such beliefs are in his conduct. His beliefs are moulded through
his learning activities; through the acquisition of language, and
socialisation. His membership of some social or professional group
presupposes his acceptance of the prevailing world outlook of that
group and its associated assumptions and beliefs, and exclusion of
alternative ways of looking at the world. His system of beliefs
stands for his "practical philosophy" which helps him take his
bearings in society. Unless he understands the way in which society
appears and is changing; possesses a coherent system of values
which would be knowingly applied to assess what is taking place in
the social world; and forms: and adopts a practical philosophy which
would be adequate only if it-was also a social and political
philosophy (PLAMENATZ, 19^7/1977 s P»25)> he will not be able to find
his way through modern life and develop his aspirations.
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Commitment to some coherent and realistic system of beliefs does not mean
that facts would be ignored. Even if values may not be logically derived
from beliefs about self and social life, they do seem to be affected
by changing beliefs towards the facts. The influence of social and
political theories upon the formation of belief systems increases
with the recognition that thoughtful, planned action might successfully
modify the social and physical environment in ways that approach
certain cherished ideals. It is through social and political thought
that the set of self-consistent principles constituting belief
systems as practical philosophies would be related to planned action
that is legitimated by government, and suggest kinds of action to be
taken to implement those principles and the structure that such
action should have.
Belief systems as practical philosophies guiding thought and action
may not be acceptable to all individuals and may vary widely:
ethical, political, cultural rules, norms, and principles may not
be shared by all. But together with the diversity of beliefs and
the tolerance to such diversity which springs from a pluralist
democracy, there is also a certain community of interests and
principles among the individual members of a society. These could
be identified and put forward, though not taken for granted
uncritically, in order to serve as guides for action aimed at
realising those principles and values. Viewing an individual's
system of beliefs or world outlook as a product of his society —
its language, institutions, values, conventions — is an attempt to
reconcile the perspective of the existential reality of the social
individual and the social structural aspects of his consciousness.
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An approach which limits emphasis to only structural characteristics
of social life for instance, one that stresses only systemic
features of urban social/spatial organisation — might be evaluated
as anti-humanistic for neglecting the existential reality and dignity
of the individual social agent (CAWS, 1968/1970: pp.197-211+), and
hence its conception of knowledge may be assessed as inadequate on
epistemological and conceptual grounds. In contrast, a perspective
which focuses on systematic investigation of the constitution of
knowledge in the individual consciousness tends to overlook the
structural features that may be identified in social life. The
attempt to establish logical connections between those perspectives
and particular political, social, and ethical viewpoints has resulted
in claims to the effect that, say, structural approaches to the
study of social phenomena — e.g. systems approaches — are inherently
conservative in political orientation for they take for granted
the "status quo" of the political administrative, economic, etc.
structures (such criticisms usually originate in the camp of
"conflict theorists").
Moreover, humanistic perspectives — for instance, phenomenological
approaches — by seeking to understand an individual actor's
conduct in terms of its meaning for the actor as well as in terms
of his motives for acting the way he did in the context of the world
of his experience (his social position, his view of the world), may
be said to be politically liberal, pluralist, or even radical.
However, such connections may not be claimed to be logically necessary,
and the research results from such approaches are not necessarily
value-laden in this sense. This is not to deny that these perspectives
tend to be more compatible with certain kinds of political arrangements
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and may be employed politically. It is possible that both perspectives
would result in accurate, objective analyses of social life (though
the notion of objectivity may be differently conceived in each of these).
Their contribution to knowledge of the world of man and society would
be valid when assessed by the standards, rules, and procedures that
are accepted within each perspective and its corresponding view of
the world.
Feyerabend's view of science as a "comprehensive ideology", and his
belief that there are ideological ingredients in any comprehensive
theory or paradigm which makes "the choice between theories which
are empirically disconnected .... a matter of taste" (FEYERAEEUD,
1970a: p.228), indicates the need to always examine potential
connections between theory and politics. In the context of these
arguments, it could be maintained that a technological view of policy
making and planning of societal arrangements which would presuppose
objective, true knowledge used instrumentally to rationalise human
affairs might be viewed with suspicion by Feyerabend, or by Kuhn
for that matter. The technological/instrumental relation between
knowledge and action may thus be associated, admittedly indirectly,
with a view of science as provider of objective, value-free knowledge
of the world.
A technological view of planning would involve the creation of a
body of empirically testable knowledge of the workings of the city
in terms of the mam* fold interrelations obtaining within urban
settlements and those that exist between cities and their larger
environment. Such knowledge would derive from descriptions and
explanations of urban phenomena and the regularities that are
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discovered to hold in social/spatial organisation. It goes without
saying that such knowledge would have to he obtained scientifically,
viz. by applying "the methods and procedures of the scientists"
(meaning "natural scientists"). For only scientific investigations
are said to enable acquisition of objective knowledge of the ways
in which phenomena and properties of systems are related regularly
Positivist accounts of science take it as totally independent of
social experiences and cultural influences, and as constituting all
knowledge. Although science is in fact a human activity, it is
seen as unrelated to social life processes and the practical interests
of individuals. Theory and practice are thus seen as wholly distinct,
as are substantive and procedural aspects of planning based on the
technological model of positivist science. In this view, social and
spatial change in the city cannot be effectively controlled and
directed other than by means of intelligently applied measures whose
conception and design must be founded on such objective knowledge
of urban social life and environment. This presupposes looking at
"things as they are" in the city: from a viewpoint which is free
from personal prejudices and biases, free from interpretation in
terms of one's own needs, values, world view, free from cultural
or social noims, and especially free from the influences of politics,
power relations, and conflicts among individuals and between socialgroups.
Thus neutrality towards the social world enables its study "as it is"
and not "as it could be" or "ought to be". The latter pertain to
the realm of social action or"practice" and are to be strictly
separated from scientific knowledge proper. The relationship
between a neutral and objective scientific approach and the practical
application of scientific knowledge to the task of selecting a morally
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"right" course of action must depend on the view taken of the connection
between facts and values. Such a scientific approach would ideally
eschew disagreements on empirical questions that may be expressed in
terms of persona] values, or become influential due to the position
held by some interlocutor in the power hierarchy, or appear persuasive
because of the rhetorical ability of those who advance them. The
absurdity of this requirement imposed on the urban planner is such
that no further arguments would be needed in order to dismiss it.
However, the technological paradigm of planning is so deeply entrenched
in contemporary planning theory — though not so widely practised;
would not this be significant? — that certain logical arguments
will be invoked (later in this thesis) to criticise it and reject it
at least in its strong version.
CHAPTER FIVE
Perspectives of humanistic social thought:
planning possible?
is a purely humanistic
In reply to the Emperor's inquiry
"Among the hills what have you?"
"Among the hills what have I?"
On the ridges there are many white clouds,
But these are only for my own enjoyment,
They cannot he caught and sent on to your Majesty.
T'AO HONG-CHHTG (1+52-536 A.D.)
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CHAPTER FIVE
Perspectives of humanistic social thought : is a purely
humanistic planning possible?
1. Theories, research methods, and language in which they are couched.
2. Social studies influenced by linguistic philosophy.
3. Phenomenological approaches in social studies.
1+. The hermeneutic tradition in social enquiry.
5. Aspects of Critical Theory : Integrating considerations of
language, phenomenological intuition, and hermeneutic "verstehen"
with structural aspects of social life; what would a "Critical
Theory of Planning" be like?
6. Summary and Conclusions : Implications for theory and practice.
7» Epilogue to humanism and introduction to the perspective of science.
Footnotes to Chapters four and five.
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1. Theories, research methods, and language in which they are couched.
There is further strong opposition to the claim of theory-neutrality
of methods of scientific inquiry. It is argued that methods of
analysis employed by some discipline are themselves part of the
subject matter of that discipline : that it is, in fact, inappropriate
to draw any strong distinction between substantive theory and
procedural method. That the subject matter of a discipline should
determine its methods of study is argued in (HUSSERL, 1965 : p. 102) :
"The true method follows the nature of things to be investigated and
not our prejudices and preconceptions". The rationale- of methods
of inquiry is derived from the nature of the phenomena being studied
(NORTHROP, 19^4-7 * P«2l*7) s "A subject becomes scientific not by
beginning with facts, with hypotheses, or with some pet theory
brought in 'a priori', but by beginning with the peculiar character
of its particular problems ".
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This suggests that it might "be wrong to try and articulate a set of
norms or rules of scientific practice which are sufficiently abstract
and general so as to be independent of the subject matter of any
particular discipline. Further, it could be misleading to claim
that if the scientist adheres to such and such norms and principles
he meets the necessary and sufficient conditions for scientificity
of methods (EMMET and MACINTYRE, 1970 : p.xi) : "Rules which
constitute necessary conditions for this, certainly ; but there are
always in each specific well-developed science methods, procedures,
and concepts the justification for the use of which is only to be
found in the prior decisions of that science. The very subject
matter appropriate to a given science comes to be identifiable only
via the theories of that science".
Notwithstanding the preceding views, the separation of theory from
methods of research seems to be still accepted in contemporary science—
though strongly disputed in the social sciences. It may be argued
that this dichotomy has been based on the distinction between the
"context of discovery" (development and formulation of hypotheses)
and the "context of justification" (testing the validity of the
hypotheses) that has been made with regard to the process of
scientific inquiry (or "scientific method", as is usually called in
(19}
the framework of the methodological debate).v 1 In the social
sciences this distinction is epitomised in, say, (MERTON, 1957 '
pp.86-87) s "At the outset we should distinguish clearly between
sociological theory .... and methodology... Sociologists, in company
with all others who essay scientific work, must be methodologically
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wise; they must be aware of the design of investigation, the nature
of inference, the requirement of a theoretic system. But such
knowledge does not contain or imply the particular content of
sociological theory. There is, in short, a clear and decisive
difference between knowing how to test a battery of hypotheses and
knowing the theory from which to derive hypotheses to be tested".
Although Merton favours the relation of theory and research methods
(and vice versa) he does so strictly in the context of justification.
In contrast, Blumer recognises that "methodology embraces the entire
scientific quest and not merely some selected positions or aspects of
that quest" (BLOMER, 1970 : p.21). Methods of inquiry must be
evaluated uin terms of their significance or implications for the
nature of the world to which they are applied" (ibid., p.22+).
The claimed interdependence of theory and methods of research is
nowhere more strongly pronounced than in the writings of
phenomenologically oriented social scientists (especially sociologists)
and in that context it is taken to be a basic premise of
phenomenological sociology. On this view, methodology is treated
as "the processes by which a sociologist generates an abstract view
of a situation" and, consequently, it encompasses "all the processes
by which a theory is constructed" (PHILLIPSON, 1972 : p.79)« It is
argued that "methodological decisions always have their theoretical
and substantive counterparts" (CICOUEEL, 1962+ : p.1) since the
"methods themselves contain implicit theories and assumptions about
the phenomena being studied which should be problematic for the
observer and not taken for granted by him" (PHILLIPSON, 1972 :p.96).
The adoption of certain methods of inquiry tends to influence the
kinds of subject matter that is chosen for study, since a position
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is assumed as to the nature of the reality to be studied ; the ways
of studying it; and the nature of explanations advanced to account
for the phenomena of interest (ibid. : p.86).
Such arguments appear to leave little doubt about the close
interrelations between theory and method, and to render a theory-neutral
method a rather elusive concept. Further, it may be said that both
theories and methods of inquiry are developed and applied within a
universe with certain assumed characteristics : a way of looking at
the world, or "Weltanschauung", is implicitly reflected also in the
language (the terminology) in which theories and methods are couched
(HA.TANSON, 1963 5 P.1U) and consequently, theoretical presuppositions
of method cannot be viewed apart from the language employed in
theorising and research : "linguistic structure and use affects the
way people interpret and describe the world" (CICOUEEL, 19 62+ : p.1).
The dual function of language as an instrument for reporting experience
or as a technique of communication, as well as a way of defining
experience for and directing the perception of its speakers is the
central point of the "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis".^^ An implication
of this hypothesis is that "science and scientific method as means
of viewing and obtaining knowledge about the world around us provide
those who accept its tenets with a grammar that is not merely a
reproducing instrument for describing what the world is all about,
but also shapes our ideas of what the world is like, often to the
exclusion of other ways of looking at the world" (CICOTJEEL, 1961+ :
p.35). Consequently language, to the extent that it influences both
theory and methods of inquiry, should not be treated as a mere
resource but should be seen as a topic for investigation in its
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own right.
A few very general remarks concerning the nature of the relationship
between theory and method, on the one hand, and language, on the
other hand, are in order at this stage. Interest in questions about
language and linguistic phenomena has been growing considerably since
the beginning of the twentieth century. Two distinct but related
disciplines are dealing with such problems (COOPER, 1973 '» pp.3-7) :
(i) the philosophy of language sets out to investigate important
general concepts of language, such as'meaning', 'truth', and 'facts'
and does so within the framework of the philosophy of science (with
special connections with logic, epistemology, metaphysics, and the
philosophy of mind); (ii) linguistic -philosophy is founded on the
belief that philosophical problems in any field can only be solved,
or even properly formulated, after due concern with aspects of
language : either natural languages (e.g. French or English) or
artificial languages. It differs from (i), above, in that it is
(22 )
an outlook rather than a subject (LACEY, 1976 : p.160).
With reference to the problems of language in the context of the social
sciences, recent development in social theorising (especially in the
field of sociology), though showing great diversity, tend to indicate
concern with questions of language and meaning in relation to
interpretative understanding of human action. These developments
seem to have been informed by at least three schools of thought, all
more or less philosophical (BEX, 197U s PP*25-26), (GIDDENS, 1976 :
Ch.1) : the analysis of ordinary language, phenomenology, and
hermeneutics. The framework within which these outlooks have been
developed and some of their main points are briefly discussed below.
287.
The phenomenal growth of knowledge in one particular area, that of
natural science,cannot he said to have been matched by similar
successes in other fields, especially in the area of the sciences
of man and society. The apparent instability which has succeeded
the hitherto stable order of science - - an instability which is
today reflected in the diversity of systems of beliefs,of scientific
world outlooks, of theories of knowledge, etc. — does not seem
to have hindered its growth. Admittedly, natural scientific
knowledge advances and is effective in its applications. However,
its growth and achievements have resulted in increased specialisation
of the cognitive apparatus employed therein, which tends to restrict
its applicability to what may be seen as the less developed areas
of the social sciences — assuming, of course, that such applicability
is, in principle, possible. In this sense, natural science as a
body of knowledge and methods of inquiry does not seem able to
sustain and promote social scientific knowledge despite the concerted
efforts of social scientists. For it appears as an idiom which is
irreconcilably different from that in which statements about human
beings are couched. It thus tends to become unavailable as a
premise for one's vision of one's social life. Science as an area
in which a lot is known does not seem to be able to provide very good
premises for deciding, for instance, the kind of social and political
order or the kind of urban environment that ought to be aimed at.
The remarkable advances of natural scientific knowledge have
stimulated increased emphasis placed on epistemological and
methodological questions regarding the laying down of universal
and inviolate criteria for assessing claims to knowledge, and the method
whereby such knowledge is acquired. In relation to the latter kind
288.
of question, it seems that the recognition of a state of instability
in the scientists' and philosophers' beliefs and ways of looking at
the world has been accompanied by parallel efforts to discover and
standardise at least the way in which knowledge is obtained and
legitimised through the method of science. One account of the way
knowledge explains, which still commands the support of many, is that
which takes scientific explanation to be the subsumption of events,
phenomena, behaviour — including human conduct — under
generalisations stated in some value-neutral scientific language.
Now such an account of explanation of human behaviour may well be
criticised as effecting the dehumanisation of the essentially human
episodes of social life. For it may be contended that to view
immensely variable human behaviour and attitudes as being explained
in terms of the interplay of fixed entities, following the pattern
of the natural sciences, results in destruction of human individuality
and loss of irreducibly human qualities. Claims such as these appear
to characterise many contemporaxy philosophical outlooks which may be
referred to as humanistic. They tend to stress the need to preserve
fundamentally human qualities in the study of social phenomena, and
to retain a human image of man as against one which is explained by natural
science ; in short, they advocate the creation of a human-centred
science of society.
One might refer to the analysis of ordinary language (linguistic
philosophy), phenomenological philosophy, and hermeneutic philosophy
as providing the foundations for the latest human-centred approaches
to the study of social life. The possible addition of pragmatism
may be justified for it is a related philosophy of knowledge and
action which chronologically precedes contemporary versions of
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the former outlooks focusing on the world of man. and society.
To call these outlooks "humanistic" may he objectionable to some since
the term has in the past been associated with a variety of doctrines
and approaches and is thus not unambiguous. Moreover, the outlooks
themselves do not express exactly the same ideas. However, it may
be said that their similarities are more important than their
differences, at least for the purposes of this discussion. The
common core of such humanistic outlooks — if the term "humanistic"
is accepted as their designation — is the emphasis they place upon
the individual human being as a person, viz. as a potentially
conscious"and intentional actor who is able to choose how he acts and
accept responsibility for the consequences of his actions.
In this sense, human beings are conceived as distinctively "free
subjects", as the agents of "meaningful" acts, and as the "creators"
of their social world which is not "out there" with its attributes
and appearing independently of individuals who experience it and
theorise about it, but is continuously produced and reproduced by
human individuals in their interaction. Combined with this
emphasis is an increasing scepticism regarding the generally accepted
belief that human progress and improvement of conditions of life is
to be effected by means of positive science ; an acceptance of
the relativity of perspectives concerning ways of looking at the
social world — a view which commands substantial support in the
philosophy of the natural sciences; an awareness that it is possible
for each individual being to formulate his own view of the world in
which he lives and to conduct himself in accordance with it.
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2. Social studies influenced by linguistic philosophy.
The movements in the social sciences which originated from the work
of the later Wittgenstein (WITTGENSTEIN, 1953/1968) and the Oxford
( 21}
ordinary language philosophersv JJ have tended to place credibility
to commonsense ~ notions and beliefs about the world, and to relate
language usage and meaning to some particular social context and
culture with its own rules for intentional human action.
Such directions are exemplified in, say, Wittgenstein's notion of
language as a "form of life" and his reference to "language games"
featuring their own rules. The commonsense understanding of
everyday life experience is seen as the framework within which
all inquiry must begin and to which it must return. Social action
is viewed as human activity which takes place within a social context;
and is. regarded as human action since it involves conceptual thinking
and thus- language which is a social product. . The various social
studies that have been informed by linguistic philosophy appear to
stress-the human agents' own definition of the situation in which they
act, their power to exercise choice (rational or otherwise), and their
ability to negotiate interaction or to manipulate expected role
performances.
Social relations are thought of as expressions of ideas about reality,
and hence the sociological understanding of social relations must be.
couched in terms of notions that are available to the social agents
involved in such relations; methods of inquiry are thus interdependent
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with substantive content. This is a direct derivation from the
Wittgensteinian conception of language as a "form of life" which
suggests that the meaning of a concept or a belief is to be found
in its use in a particular context which is culture-bound; and
this is all that is required for its justification. It is not
possible to assess its validity by employing criteria of truth and
rationality and methodological rules and procedures which transcend
cultural and social contexts. The social and cultural world is said
to be understandable only through some technique of "getting inside"
the meaning systems of everyday life and language. In this sense,
a conflict is claimed to exist between the scientific conception
or image of individual human beings and their image as it is
manifested in everyday life. The latter is said to be most directly
expressed in accounts of human action stated in ordinary language
where it appears as the image of a feeling, conscious, intentional
agent.
However, accounts of human behaviour couched in ordinary language
are not granted the status of knowledge by those who advocate
a science of society modelled on some view of the natural sciences
(usually on a logical empiricist account of science). Such ordinary
language accounts refer to notions such as "wanting", "trying", etc.,
which are taken to be mentalistic, i.e. to pertain to the private
realm of feelings, and hence to be impossible to express in
empirically grounded and intersubjectively verifiable scientific
propositions. By reducing mind to body (on some version of
physicalism), or asserting that both mind and body can be viewed
in terms of the same underlying reality or "neutral stuff" (as in
neutral monism),a confusion is claimed to result between bodily
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movement and intentional action, between reflex and conduct (URMSON,
19^6) in the study of social action; and there seems to be no way
to distinguish these essentially different concepts.
The tradition of social studies which are influenced by ordinary
language philosophy rejects causal analyses as inadequate in
themselves in affording full understanding of human conduct.
Moreover, behaviourist approaches to studying social phenomena are
severely criticised for their endeavour to base social theories
on a bedrock of neutral,theory- and value-free empirical data which
are publiclyaccessible and amenable to unambiguous measurement.
Such studies take intentional human action to be distinct from
motion and impossible to explain in terms of causes. They tend
to approach the study of human behaviour outside the scientific
world view of cause and effect and maintain that such an outlook
cannot provide knowledge of the meaning of human actions seen
properly in its social context. The vocabulary of physical science
is claimed to be inadequate in accounting for human conduct which
is essentially normative, bounded by rules whose validity holds only
in specific social contexts.
For instance, by restricting inquiry into human action to mere
physiology it would be possible to deduce that an extended open
palm facing some observer means "five" in some places but is
understood as a "swear" expression in Greece. Hence the need
to understand the language in which various social phenomena are
discussed is only one of the requirements for attaining an
understanding of those phenomena. in addition to that,
familiarity with the phenomena that are being inquired into is
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necessary, in the sense of understanding what can "be taken as
a social phenomenon. For if an observer is not familiar with, say,
the Greek culture then he is likely to view the "extended palm" sign
not as a social phenomenon indicating anger or disgust of an actor,
but rather as a physical movement or even something else.
The point is made that (WINCH, 1958/19&3: pp. 13i+-135) • "Whereas
in natural science it is your theoretical knowledge which enables
you to explain occurrences you have not previously met, a knowledge
of logical theory on the other hand will not enable you to understand
a piece of reasoning in an unknown language; you will have to learn
that language, and that in itself may suffice to enable you to grasp
the connections between the various parts of arguments in that
language".
By arguing that human and social action must be understood in terms
of reasons, rules, personal projects, and socio-cultural context
the very possibility of a science of man and society modelled on
the natural sciences comes to be disputed on grounds of fundamental
differences in the objects of study of the natural sciences and
social studies. The distinctive characteristics that are attributed
to human beings and their social relationships, viz. that they are
free subjects, the agents of meaningful acts, and the creators of
their social world, are said to necessitate a totally different
approach to investigating such aspects of human and social behaviour
to what is seen as the scientific method of the natural sciences.
The attempt to develop formalised "scientific" languages to describe
and explain social phenomena is abandoned in favour of an in depth
investigation and analysis of the structure and presuppositions
of "ordinary language". Human action is explained in "evexyday"
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terms of intentions, purposes, motives, etc., i.e. in teleological
terms, rather than by means of explanations that are cast purely
in terms of efficient causes. The works of the so-called
"new-teleologists" — e.g. (TAYLOR, 1961+); (LOUCH, 1966); (PETERS,
i960) — share in the tradition of modem analytic philosophy by
criticising Logical Positivism and the doctrine of the "unity of
method" in natural and social sciences.
Phenomenological approaches in social studies.
Phenomenological philosophy (or method) ^ ' has informed many
studies of social life, both in its Continental tradition and in
its American version as applied to analyses of everyday social
activities — the latter being commonly referred to as etbnomethodology.
Phenomenological approaches to social science stress the distinction
between society and nature, between the socio—cultural and physical
worlds: the latter is not man-made, produced by; man (although
human beings do interact with and change it), while society is
the outcome of the consciously applied skills of human subjects.
This is not a world which exists "out there" possessing attributes
and appearing independently of the individuals who experience it,
but 'is constituted through intersubjective corn-muni cation and action.
It is produced by the skilled performance of human beings as
participant in every social, encounter.
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This crucial difference is said to entail a different methodological
approach to the study of society and the rejection of "conventional"
approaches which adopt the paradigm of the natural sciences in their
search for order and scientifically testable theories in the socio-
( 21)
cultural world. Phenomenological sociologyv "is advanced as an
alternative position to existing approaches which have been developed
within an empiricist, so-called neo-positivist, epistemological and
philosophical outlook. The phenomenological critique of the methodsv'
and their associated presuppositons employed by these latter
"conventional" approaches appears to be rather well-aimed, especially
to the extent that it points out certain difficulties involved in
a physicalist or behaviourist account of social life, which tends
to minimise the alleged differences between the physical and
socio-cultural worlds. However, acceptance of the existence of
such differences need not entail either adoption of phenomenological
sociology as the "correct" alternative to empiricist or scientific
sociology or of its account of the process whereby "social reality"
is constructed as the best account available.
A phenomenological approach to social science would claim that
(HATAHSON, 1963a: p.273)t "what is needed above all is a way of
looking at social phenomena which takes into primary account
( 29)
the intentional structure of human consciousnessv and which
accordingly places major emphasis on the meaning social acts have
for the actors who perform them and who live in a reality built out
of their subjective interpretation". The contribution of Alfred
Schutz towards the phenomenological reformulation of scientific
method and the "humanisation" of the social sciences has been
highly influential in recent attempts to develop a phenomenology
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of the social world. His writings on methodological issues in social
studies are particularly interesting. Schutz argues that both
the objectivist/naturalist and subjectivist/intuitionist schools
of thought in social theorising are inadequate in the approaches
that they adopt in inquiries concerning human conduct. He views
the former school as being founded on the presupposition that by
accepting and systematically applying the methods and procedures
of natural science it is possible to obtain reliable knowledge of
the social world. However, stressing publicly • accessible
observational data as the rock bottom foundations of social theories
leads one to neglect understanding of human individuals in their
everyday life activities, and the empirically unobservable thoughts,
feelings, reasons, motives that may initiate their overt behaviour.
Regarding the latter school, he claims that it emphasises the
existence of pervasive differences in the constitution of the world
of nature, on the one side, and the world of man and society, on
the other side. Writers belonging to the subjectivist/intuitionist
tradition maintain that such differences in the nature of the subject
matter of the natural and the social sciences essentially affect
the kinds of methods of inquiry that may be intelligibly applied
to obtain knowledge in either realm. Thus the study of social
life necessitates methods that are peculiar to it. However, through
its wholesale rejection of naturalist methods and procedures this
school seems to overlook the possibility that certain procedural
rules and methodological conventions applied in acquiring knowledge
may be common to all fields of empirical inquiry (SMART, 1976: pp.
99-100). Schutz's methodological contributions are aimed at
preserving the integrity of unique human individuals but not
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at the cost of sacrificing the exactness, clarity, and systematic
procedures of empirical science.
His goal is to achieve the fusion of objectivist and subjectivist
approaches into an integrated methodological framework. He rejects
the implications of a subjectivist epistemology and subscribes to
Max Weber's requirements that social scientific knowledge be
empirically validated prior to its acceptance, and that it must attempt
to interpretatively understand the subjective attitudes of social
agents. Schutz's phenomenological approach encompasses much of
the theoretical basis of Weberian social science and introduces
into it a number of concepts from the phenomenological philosophy
of Edmund Husserl. He accepts, in a broad sense, the three key
elements of Weber's methodological approach, viz. the notions of
"value-relevance", "verstehen", and "ideal type". (^0) However,
he argues that Weber fails to provide an explicit theory of
subjectivity which would enable unambiguous understanding of
the meanings of his three principal methodological concepts as
well as establish the connotation of notions such as "meaning"
and "action" in a social context. In his attempt to formulate
such a theory of subjectivity Schultz draws on Husserlian
phenomenology. He elaborates a scientific method which takes
into account the peculiar characteristics of the world of social
life and culture;— so-called "life-world" or "Lebenswelt",
He stipulates that to develop descriptions of human conduct social
( Q-l )
scientists must depend upon the typifications^J ' employed by
members of society themselves in describing or accounting for
their actions. Reflexivity or self-awareness in human conduct
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is ah important aspect of such members' accounts. Self-understanding
is connected integrally to the understanding of others.
Understanding one's actions is only made possible by understanding,
in the sense of being able to describe, what others do, and vice
versa. It is a matter of semantics and essentially depends upon
the social character of language as a medium of practical social
activity. It is a question of being informed by the communicative
categories of language, which in turn presuppose definite "forms
of life". Thus, the multifold character of language, in which such
members' accounts are couched, is recognised : the way language
is embedded in social practice constitutes a subject for investigation
and is not taken for granted.
In his critique of phenomenological sociology Smart argues that
(SMAE.T, 1976: p.75) * "Perception of externalisation and objectification
as taking place primarily through language has produced a
preoccupation in phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology
with accounts, descriptions, conversations and talk. The social
world is treated as a linguistic and cognitive world and the task
of sociology becomes one of describing the processes by which
the social world is constructed through accounts, readings,
understandings and interpretative procedures". When it is put
forward as a theory of society, a pure phenomenology of the social
world is said to neglect several important elements of social life.
By starting from the individual actor it fails to provide a way of
grasping the supra-individual whole of a societal outlook or a
cultural system (WOLPF, 1975J P«6!j.). Moreover, it seems to ignore
the historical perspective of social action — dialectical or
otherwise depending on the cognitive tradition from which
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the criticisms originate — which necessitates a diachronic model.
In addition, it is argued that a phenomenological framework fails
to accommodate the structural context of meaningful action in
the sense that it inherently excludes the practical involvements
of human life in material activity requiring work (system of production)
and affected by relations of power and domination. To adequately
account for such a structural context of meaningful action requires
a structural model. But structural approaches by themselves,
i.e. without being supplemented by considerations at the level of
meaning which is occupied by phenomennology, afford no way of
identifying either the pertinent social groups to which some ideology
or world view may be attributed, or the nature of the content of
such world views. Bather, these groups are identified either
by prior commitment or through arbitrary decision (WOLFF, 1975:pp.
130-131). These shortcomings are said to be remedied by
hermeneutic approaches to the study of social life, which: (i)
appear capable of retaining the phenomenological intuition while
(ii) seeking to comprehend the wider perspectives of society and
history (ibid.: p.103). Phenomenologically oriented social
studies could make important contributions in cases where it is
pertinent to reveal the underlying presuppositions of concepts
employed to define some situation, that is, when such concepts
are not neutral between the participating actors but rather serve
the interests of one side. Studies in the so-called "sociology
of deviance" have developed phenomenological approaches in
providing alternative definitions of the situation, viz. from
the viewpoint of the deviant, the offender, the delinquent, etc.,
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who are faced by the implicit ideologies and view of order of
complex and integrated legal and medical systems (MATZA, 19^9)•
4. Social studies influenced by the hermeneutic tradition.
( 32
Hermeneutic philosophy is a long-established philosophical tradition;^
It incorporates diverse views which are characterised by the
emphasis they place on the concept of "verstehen" (or interpretative
understanding) in studying social life and the products of human
culture and thought (such as works of art, literary texts, etc.).
The notion of "verstehen" may be said to originate in theological
hermeneutics — i.e. the art of interpretation attempting to disclose
an understanding,coherence or sense in biblical, historical, or other
esoteric texts — and in problems of understanding alien cultures
in the context of historical or anthropological studies. This
concept is applied to interpretations of contemporary society and
culture on the assumption that there is an analogy between the context
of interpreting and clarifying the meaning of texts and alien
cultures and the context of human conduct and social intercourse
(the object of interpretation being taken as a text-analogue)
(TAYLOR, 1971: p.1).
Writers adhering to this philosophical tradition contend that
"the empiricist account of science as objective, cumulative,
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success-oriented, and value-free, is no longer adequate either as
an ideal or as a methodological model for the social sciences"
(HESSE, 1976: p.3).^33^ It is claimed that any attempt at
understanding which involves other understanding beings, persons,
and therefore self-understanding must face problems of "verstehen"
(PELZ, 1974: P-2). On one of the earlier views of hermeneutics,
associated with the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-19*11 )>
the task of "verstehen" would inevitably involve elements of
(35)
sympathy, empathy,the attempt to re-experience, re-live, and
reconstitute the social life that is being investigated. This view
presupposes methodological dualism: the methods that are appropriate
to the study of the natural sciences do not coincide with the
(interpretative) methods to be employed in the study of the world
of man and culture. Later versions of the concept of "verstehen",
especially Max Weber's application of it as a main component of
his " scientific method " of studying the social world, ^3^have
tended to move away from Dilthey's view.
The writings of Hans-Georg Gadamer, especially (GADAMER, 1965/1975)>
and of Martin Heidegger, in particular his (HEIDEGGER, 1962), might
be said to state the case of modern hermeneutics (WOLFF, 1975: Ch.7).
The Dilthean presupposition that hermeneutics be understood as
one kind of "epistemology" and that the "methodological debate"
in its Neo-Eantian form may continue to provide the context for
discussing scientific explanation as against interpretative
understanding of social phenomena is seriously questioned by both
Heidegger and subsequently Gadamer (RICOEHR, 1978: p.150-151):
"Their contributions cannot therefore be taken as the simple
prolongation of Dilthey's enterprise. Rather they must be seen
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as an attempt to dig beneath the epistemological enterprise in
order to disclose its ontological conditions ... There is a new
question. Instead of asking, 'How do we know?', the question
will be, 'What is the mode of being of that being who only exists
through understanding?' ". Moving towards the direction of ontology
these writers elaborate the notion of "hermeneutic verstehen"
which differs from the Dilthean concept of understanding. (37)
For Gadamer, hermeneutics is the point where three streams of thought
in the cultural sciences (or "Geisteswissenschaften") tend to merge;
these being Husserlian phenomenology, Dilthey's historicism, and
Heidegger's hermeneutic-existential philosophy (GADAMER, 1965/1975?
p.xxix). Thus "hermeneutics consists ... in the individual,
socially-situated, sociologist or historian understanding the
existential meanings, symbols, expressions and values of another
culture and its inhabitants, and (being) simultaneously aware of
his own historical consciousness and its role in this process"
(WOLFF, 1975? p.132).
As Ricoeur puts it, "it is the function of hermeneutics to make
the comprehension of the other — and of his signs in multiple
cultures — coincide with the comprehension of oneself and of being"
(RICOETJR, 1963: p.617). Gadamer extends the "hermeneutic method"
to all the "cultural sciences", although he stresses that hermeneutics
is not so much a method as "a discipline which guarantees truth"
(GADAMER, 1965/1975s p.i+65). However, he claims that in hermeneutic
theory subject-matter and method are intrinsically connected.
The object of study does suggest a method of approach in the
hermeneutic tradition: "• . the problem of method is completely
determined by its object" (ibid.: p.297)» But hermeneutics as
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a discipline is not only taken by Gadamer to imply a method of
approach to the study of sociology and the humanities but also
to lead beyond method into its own ontology (theory of existence)
and a corresponding epistemology (theory of knowledge).
Because the hermeneutic process (or process of interpretative
understanding) moves in a circular manner, it has come to be known
as the "hermeneutic circle". The object of the hermeneutic process
has to meet certain conditions (TAYLOR, 1976: pp.153-155). It must
be possible: (i) to make sense of (interpret) the object in terms
of coherence (or its absence); (ii) to distinguish the meaning
of this object (its coherence) from the expression of the object,
that is, its embodiment in some text or text-analogue (its social
context); (iii) to take the meaning of this object as being
expressed for or by a subject (or subjects). T he interpretation
of the meaning of situations, actions, etc. moves in a hermeneutic
circle. The subject matter of the hermeneutic act is approached
by its interpreter with certain prejudices or anticipations originating
in the researcher's own historicity but also with an "openness"
towards its meaning (or "the facts").
The balance or dialectic between prejudices and "openness" enables
the interpreter to discover and revise distorting prejudices as
he increasingly penetrates into the meaning of the subject matter
he is attempting to comprehend (GADAMER, 1960/1965: PP«2!?0 ff).
There are two aspects of the "hermeneutic circle" which may be said
to determine its circular nature. On the one side, there is
a controlled oscillation between present and past horizons in terms
of the movement from one horizon to the other and back again to
301;.
the starting point. On the other side, there is a simultaneous
movement between specific part and anticipated whole, between
a situation whose meaning it is attempted to grasp and its social/
cultural context; and this is a process of a conversational nature
(ibid.: pp.275; 3^9)• To understand particular aspects of a society
the interpreter/social scientist must have prior knowledge of the
total, socio-cultural context of that society, which in turn can
only be grasped through the particular manifestations of that
totality in specific social acts.
The claim that an interpretative account of some subject matter
makes sense is founded on the interpreter's reading of it which
cannot be justified other than by reference to other such readings
and their relation to the whole. The activity of interpretative
understanding is not aimed at establishing the correct reading of
some social action framework. Different interpretations may be
plausible and there is no process of verification, analogous to
that employed in the physical sciences, with which to assess
the validity of alternative interpretations. Bather, hermeneutic
understanding involves a creative process of interpretation through
which the investigator offers his account, in the present time-
horizon, of historical or alien, hitherto obscured aspects of society
and culture (OTJTHVAITE, 1975* P«103). In case a discussant
misunderstands, rejects, or does not grasp that reading there is no
way of persuading him other than by appeal to other readings, and this
presupposes that he must follow these latter; if not, the
hermeneutic process continues, it seems, for ever. The ultimate
appeal to common understanding of the language involved seems to be
inescapable. In this sense, the inherent uncertainty in meaning
305.
in "hermeneutic knowledge" is taken to be a characteristic of
the knowledge of the sciences of man and society. There is no
"objective" knowledge to be derived from the hermeneutic process,
which is comparable in objectivity to scientific knowledge in
the natural sciences. The "truth" of the subject matter of
hermeneutics is claimed to be historical, relative, and socially
determined. The best the social scientist can do in his attempt
to interpretatively understand social acts is, it seems, to work with
full consciousness of his own historicity and relativity and its
implications for the "true" meanings of social acts: each age will
comprehend in a different way a past age.
Hermeneutic theory is said to be able to remedy the inadequacy of
phenomenological social studies in grasping the historical perspective
of social action while retaining the valid elements of phenomenological- '
intuition. Stressing the "essentially historical character of
being" (BAEBETT and AIKEN, 1962: p.287) Heidegger qua historicist
argues that the past must be grasped in its historical context which
includes the contemporary interpreter: there is a need to pass
from simple psychological understanding to historical understanding
(RICOEUR, 1978s p.150). Thus, "verstehen" must seek to comprehend
the totality of world-experience: understanding is also self-
understanding. By definition the past may only be interpreted from
some present point of view. Dilthey takes the central task of
hermeneutics to be understanding some action context under the law
of understanding another person who expresses himself in that action
context. This enterprise remains psychological for it focuses
on the individual agent who expresses himself in some action frame,
rather than on the nature of that frame (ibid.: p. 11+9).
306.
Dilthey's subjectivist theory of empathetic transposition of the
interpreter into the past is not condoned by Gadamer or Heidegger.
They contend that a hermeneutic approach to social life does not
require a mysterious communion of souls a la Dilthey, but rather
involves participating in a common meaning (GADAMER, 1965/1975 s
pp.27l+-276). There follows that what may be referred to as the
"truth" about the past is dependent upon and relative to every
"present". Taking all knowledge of social life to depend on
social and historical position, this view is said to lead to
epistemological relativism. The difficulties facing relativist
views of knowledge, the most serious and unanswerable of which seems
to be the self-negating character of such views, are not regarded as
problematic by Gadamer. Seeing relativity as an advantageous
feature of cultural studies, he argues that historicity guarantees
the "truth" of an interpretation. Presumably his notion of
"truth" is far removed from empiricist accounts of "truth as
correspondence" with facts, that are prevalent in natural science.
The "truth" discovered by hermeneutic methods is, therefore, not
attainable by science. Gadamer opposes the empiricist account of
objective, value-free observation and inquiry which is -unaffected
by personal prejudices, presuppositions, or preferences. He takes
this methodological ideal of natural science to be unattainable
in the social and cultural studies. He argues instead that
preferences and prejudices are necessary conditions for understanding.
The historical consciousness, seeing its own present, brings
prejudices into play in interpretative understanding which thus
becomes a fusion of horizons of past and present (WOLFF, 1975s
pp.10l+-105).
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The appropriateness of hermeneutic approaches in the study of social
life is said to be decided by the requirements of understanding
the "meaning" aspects of human conduct. The notion of "meaning"
is taken to be central in the study and characterisation of social
action (TAYLOR, 1976: pp.161-163). A situation, action, episode;
a prospect,a plan has "a certain meaning for an individual, different
from linguistic meaning: (i) it is the meaning for an individual;
(ii) it is the meaning of something (an action, a plan); and
the description of that action, project, plan, etc., is to be
differentiated from its description in terms of its meaning for
a human agent; (iii) situations, actions, plans, etc., have
meaning in some field, viz. in relation to the meanings of other
things; and changes in the meanings of the latter may have
implications for the meaning of the former. Thus, the meaning
which it is sought to grasp through hermeneutics, so-called
"experiential meaning" (ibid.-: p.162), is to be distinguished from
linguistic meaning and refers to the meaning of a situation, action,
plan, etc., for a human agent. It is integral to his consciousness
and his language employed to account for his actions.
Human action may be characterised by the purpose of the actor and
accounted for by reference to his desires, feelings, emotions.
The actor employs language to provide accounts of these latter,
which is also a redefinition of the meaning things have for him.
The understanding of, say, emotional concepts can only be realised
by relating them to certain kinds of situations in which they are
generated and to certain kinds of response these situations evoke.
Such concepts cannot be explained unless they are related to other
concepts, but these latter cannot be understood unless they are
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referred to the former. Thus, the grasping of such concepts moves
in a "hemneneutic circle": it is essential to be in possession
of a certain language both of words and . mutual action and
communication, of shared meanings. Cultures that are alien to an
interpreter will therefore present problems of understanding which
involve the grasping of the "way of life" of these cultures.
Human conduct is seen as action performed in a context, and this
reality must be characterised in terms of meaning.
Gadamer emphasises the centrality of language in any endeavour
to understand the totality of a culture or society as well as
the context of meaning of its particular aspects, social situations,
episodes, etc. He views language-in-use, rather than its abstract
grammar and vocabulary, as basic to and determining the world view
or fundamental ideology of a culture. But language is seen as
one significant form among other forms of life: its role is crucial
in the creation of the world of meaning. In this way, Gadamer
seems to avoid the rather extreme thesis advanced in (WINCH, 1958)
deriving from an interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of language
as a form of life, which reduces social science to linguistic
analysis. However, Gadamer's hermeneutics as a method and a
philosophical system for the social sciences has been criticised
( ^9)
on methodological, epistemological, and conceptual grounds.
His views are, of course, expressed within an. idealist philosophical
tradition and when these are put forward as a theory of society,
they are immediately subject to criticism by, at least, those who
espouse a materialist ontology. Thus, Gadamer's theses that :
(a) all perception is perspectival i.e. from some point of view;
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(t>) experience is inevitably determined historically and socially;
and (c) language contributes in the creation of the world; are
taken to entail neglect of the material foundations of existence
and the social structures of production and work, and of power which
underlie it. These criticisms are reflected in the work of the
contemporary German social philosopher, Jurgen Habermas, who develops
his ideas in the tradition of the Critical Theorists of the so-called
Frankfurt School. Habermas attempts tobring together, in
the unifying framework of a critical theory of society, the idealist
insights of Gadamer's hermeneutics with aspects of the material
world regarding the structuring systems of production (work) and
authority (power).
5. Aspects of Critical Theory : Attempts at integrating considerations
of language, phenomenological intuition, and hermeneutics with
structural aspects of social life.
The programme of the group of German scholars and social thinkers
who established the so-called Frankfurt School has come to be
known as "Critical Theory" and exhibits strong connections with
the hermeneutic tradition. Writers such as Horkheimer, Marcuse,
Fromm, Adorno, Albert, Apel, and Habermas are said to belong to
the common ideological and theoretical tradition of that School.
Although their programme comprises several diverse theses, not
always in agreement with one another, it does also have certain common
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elements that are shared between the above scholars. Such
common elements may be said to be their close Marxian affinities,
but also their marked divergences from Marx's "Critique of Political
Economy"; and the belief that aspects of social life cannot be
understood independently of "the historical whole, of the social
structure conceived as a global entity" (COMERTON, 1976: p.12).
The rediscovery, in the late i960 s, of "Critical Theory" — itself
a creation of the early 1930 s — may be attributed to the contemporary
social philosopher Jurgen Habermas. The remainder of this note will
therefore deal with the latter's principal theses^^
However, it is appropriate to explicate the notion of "critique" —
which is a key concept in "Critical Theory" — prior to discussing
Habermas' work. "Critical Theory" makes use of the concept of
"critique" both in its traditional sense and also in two other
senses (COHNERTON, 1976: pp.15-16). The traditional sense of
"critique" was developed from an early usage as the art of informed
judgment in connection with hermeneutics, viz. the study and
interpretation of ancient texts. Having derived from that early
usage, the contemporary notion of "critique" has come to be
associated with the activity of rational thinking which subjects
to judgment and interpretation all spheres of social life that are
accessible to reason, taking these as "text-analogues" (TAYLOR,
1971). It is in this sense that "critique" is employed by the
critical theorists of the Frankfurt School; that is, as "oppositional
thinking", as an activity of revealing hitherto hidden meanings
in aspects of social life. But critical theorists also use
"critique" to denote two other meanings originating in the
philosophical tradition of German Idealism.
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One meaning derives from Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" and may "be
taken to denote "the rational reconstruction of the conditions ..
which make language, cognition, and action possible" (COKttBRTON,
1976: p.18). In this sense, "critique" as "reconstruction" is
concerned with the understanding of systems of rules adhered to by
any competent subject. As an activity of reflecting on the
conditions of possible knowledge, "reconstruction" makes use of
objective information (in the form of. actions, sentences, and other
conscious human operations) in its endeavour to explicate rules
that are implicitly followed by any human being ( and not by some
particular individual), and establish the sort of knowledge that is
/i 1 \
needed in order to competently apply such rules. ' In this way,
"critique" as "reconstruction" tends to expand theoretical
knowledge without necessarily altering the practical conduct of
individuals.
The other meaning ascribed to "critique" by critical theorists
denotes "the analysis of constraints to which classes of individuals
are subject" (C0MNERT01I, 1976: p.20). This meaning of "critique"
as "criticism" seems to originate in Hegelian idealism (in Hegel's
"Phenomenology of Mind"). It pertains to the activity of
deliberating on a system of man-made constraints (or pressures)
which impose restrictions upon human conduct and action
(of individuals, groups, or whole societies). This view of
"criticism" is founded on the assumption that objects of experience
are subject to inbuilt distortions which pass as objective reality.
This seems to justify attempts to identify and subsequently change
or eliminate such distortions by way of critical reflection to
arrive at a liberated consciousness. In this sense "criticism"
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entails "emancipation" from constraints imposed on the individual by-
authority and power. Emancipation is attained by means of critical
insight into the system of domination or power which reveals to
consciousness hitherto covered restrictions. "Criticism", therefore,
focuses into the forming of the identity of a particular subject
(an individual or group thereof). It initiates a process of self-
reflection which is aimed at illuminating hitherto obscured aspects
of the subject's consciousness. This will ultimately bring about
the subject's liberation from socially unnecessary constraints of
his freedom and, consequently, will affect the practical aspects of the
subject's conduct(practical referring to the realm of ethics or politics).
Tbe /ineanings of "critique" referred to above, namely (i) "critique"
as "reconstruction "reflecting on the conditions of knowledge of
social life, and (ii) "critique" as "criticism?1 dealing with
practical aspects of individual conduct, seem to be sufficiently
different to merit distinction. However, such differentation is
not always evident in the writings of the members of the Frankfurt
School. In the context of a critical theory of society, the sense
of "critique" as reflection on conditions of knowledge of the social
world has important methodological implications for the whole field
of the social sciences (in particular, sociology). Thus, it is
argued by critical theorists that the methods of the sciences are,
in principle, not applicable to the study of social life. There
are, it is claimed, fundamental differences between the subject
matter of sciences such as physics and astronomy which are concerned
with inquiries into the movement of inanimate bodies and into
observable events, and the subject matter of the social sciences
which is societies and social life. Societies are seen as systems
313.
of communicative action: as objects of possible knowledge they are
constituted in a different way to that of physical reality.
Such views are also informed by phenomenologically oriented approaches
to the study of social life, in which the investigator of a social
episode is himself taken to constitute part of the process of cognition
as a social act (in opposition to the logical empiricist thesis
that he be a neutral observer of social phenomena) i^^ Further,
concern with language as an aspect of communicative action establishes
connections between critical theory and philosophical analyses of
language.
Both Habermas and his contemporary, Apel (APEL, 1968), are influenced
by the hermeneutic tradition although they have moved towards a
different direction from that of Dilthey's "early hermeneutics".
In this they have been informed by another more recent German social
thinker, Gadamer, whose seminal work"Wahrheitund Methode" may be
said to state the case of modern hermeneutics (GIEDENS, 1976: pp.
/ I
54-55). Gadamer views language as central to the method of
"verstehen"; the process of"verstehen"is linguistic since speech
is the medium in which the understanding is accomplished.
The dialogue between the interpreter and his subjects can only take
place through language (GADAMER, 1960/1965: p.361). Habermas' work
acknowledges its debt to Gadamer, but also diverges from the latter's
thesis in important respects. Thus, Habermas agrees that the recent
developments in linguistic philosophy (and in particular the work
of the later Wittgenstein and its contribution to the study of social
life attempted by Winch) and in the field of linguistics (marked by
the, work of Chomsky, for example) are v*?ry significant for the
understanding of human conduct. In fact, he takes such developments
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to show that the problems of language have replaced the traditional
problems of consciousness in the process of -understanding meaningful
human action (HABEEMAS, 1970).
He appreciates both the nature of language and its significance in
social life, and also the importance of interpretation to all forms
of inquiry. He concedes that understanding is attained through
discourse: "verstehen"is related to language as the medium of
intersubjectivity and as the concrete expression of "forms of life".
However, in opposition to Gadamer ( and to Winch, for that matter),
both Habermas and Apel stress that the study of human activity cannot
be purely hermeneutic (HABEEMAS, 1970: p.289):^^^ "A verstehende
sociology which bypostatises language so as to make it the subject
of the form of life and the tradition ties itself to the idealist
premise that linguistically articulated consciousness determines
the material meaning of life-activity. But the objective system
of social action is not confined to the dimension of intersubjectively
intended and symbolically transmitted meaning. The linguistic
infrastructure of society is a moment of a system which, however
they are mediated symbolically, is also constituted by the
constraints of reality; the constraint of external nature which goes
into the process of technical control and the constraint of inner
nature reflected in the repressions of social power relations ...
Sociology cannot allow itself to be reduced to being merely
interpretative".
Habermas criticises the contemporary approaches to social inquiry
(HABEEMAS, 1970) which draw on linguistic analysis, philosophical
idealism, and phenomenology (represented in the works of, say, Winch,
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Schutz, Garfinkel, Cicourel, and others); as well as the "verstehen"-
sociology of Max Weber. He claims that these approaches are
inadequate for a proper sociological understanding of human conduct
and social life, and that they have misconceived the unique structure
of communication in ordinary language (WELLMER, 1971s PP«30 ff.).
He views the phenomenological penetration of the social actor's
life-world (the "Lebenswelt") as wanting. The undefined empathic grasp
of the actor's situation, with its meanings and significances for
him, to be arrived at by generalisation based on the sociologist's
experience is seen as unsatisfactory. Because phenomenology starts
from the individual, it is criticised for failing to provide a way
of grasping the supra-individual whole of a societal outlook or
a cultural system. Hermeneutics claims to be able to remedy
this inadequacy by: (i) retaining the phenomenological intuition
through which it gains insight in the existential meanings of
historical individuals, and (ii) grasping structural wholes ,
thus resolving the tension between structure and the existential
individual(WOLFE, 1975: pp.130-131).
The rules of interpretation of social situations, actions, etc.,
as invariant essences of the social life-world cannot by themselves
provide the requisite understanding of the phenomena. Habermas
contends that such rules are themselves subject to the influence
of other social processes: for example, power relations, class
structures, socialisation processes, and material production (work).
The "transcendental contemplation" in the study of social life
(a la Husserl) can be no substitute for systematic participation
(HABERMAS, 1970s p.215): "We only grasp the construction of
individual life-worlds by way of socially accustomed communications;
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but one learns their specified rules by systematic participation and
not, as Schutz assumes, by phenomenological intuition, or as Cicourel
and Garfinkel assume, by phenomenologically guided experiments".
Habermas attempts to draw together relevant insights from linguistic
analysis, the phenomenological intuition of social life, and
hermeneutics and combine these with analyses of the structural elements
of societies reflected in relations of power, authority, domination,
and material production (work). His position on the "methodological
debate" in the social sciences is developed in the Neo-Kantian
spirit. The natural sciences have as their subject matter the
inanimate world of objects and observable phenomena which are
amenable to manipulation and control. Their interests focus on
instrumental action. In contrast, the sciences of man and culture
study speaking and acting subjects in societies which are thus
differently constituted as objects of possible knowledge.
The network of intentional actions formed by a society cannot be
accounted for by statements that are reducible to observational
reports, but involves the inquirer into an understanding of meanings
in order to acquire his data. While the natural scientist/observer
is asked to eliminate the strictly subjective elements in his
controlled observation and in this way secure intersubjectivity and
reproducibility of experimental data, in the social sciences there
is a relation between inquirer and those that are being inquired into.
This relation involves both parties in communication and dialogue:
dialectical relation replaces observation in social science.
This introduces the perspective of communicative action — as opposed
to the instrumental action of the natural sciences directed toward
317.
domination of nature — which requires understanding of others1
intentions, motives, feelings that lie behind their actions, but
does not involve considerations of domination, but only
enhanced communicaTion. The -practical implications of this
differentiation between objectives, methods and procedures of inquiry
in the natural and the social world are traced in an outline of a
political theory. This stipulates that the contemporary scientific/
technological establishment must be subject to the control of the
public in order to be rational and not left to dominate upon the lives
of individuals; their autonomy is to be safeguarded by instituting
dialectical processes between men regarding the goals to be pursued
in societal arrangements and public planning. By enhancing
communication among them through public discussion and critique
it would be possible to remove distortions in understanding and
obstacles in communicating.
There are also certain theoretical implications of the natural/social
divide in methods; these are formulated by Habeno&s into a "theory
of communicative competence". This envisages the elimination of
constraints on discourse imposed intentionally by communicating
actors: not the kind of obscurities that enter accidentally but
rather systematically distorted messages (much like those studied
by Freudian psychoanalysis). The communication process is taken to be
unconstrained when all participants have equal opportunities to
participate in the dialogue. In this way, enhanced communication
is associated with an ideal form of life, thus linking politics and
communicative dialogue: viz. the -practical and theoretical implications
of the separation of instrumental and communicative action.
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Habermas* views come into opposition with Popper*s critical
rationalism in epistemology and "piecemeal social engineering" and
problem-oriented technological planning of societal affairs (practice)
— the latter often taken as one of the specific moral and political
consequences of the former. Popper's falsificationism or critical
testing is predicated on an "open society" which tolerates pluralism
of views and criticism of accounts, solutions, policies put forward
by others, leading if required to their modification or rejection and
replacement by new ones. His quest for objective, ethically neutral
scientific knowledge which is to be rationally and systematically
applied to the solution of social problems — with the ends already
identified outwith the knowledge-procuring processes — is countered
by Habermas* claim that knowledge of both natural and social phenomena
is interest-charged and not value-free as the objectivist ideal would
have it. Scientific knowledge of nature is not the result of pure
intellectual curiosity and disinterested contemplative activity but
rather involves a variety of interests, and most importantly those of
technical control and exploitation of the physical world and its
natural resources.
However, there is a difference between the "interests" of the
scientific community referred to by Eabermas and the well-known
interest of industry in the application of scientific knowledge to
production processes — the latter becoming manifest after the
emergence of industry in its present form. Rather the interests
of the community of scientists themselves constitute "the condition
of the possibility of natural science" and are not simply directed
towards securing the existence and development of scientific activity
(COHKERTON, 1976: p.35). The ways in which the methods and procedures
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of the sciences are constituted introduce the perspective of
cognitive interest in technical control over objectified processes
(HABEHMAS, 1968/1971: p.309): "...the logical structure of
admissible systems of propositions and the type of conditions for
corroboration suggest that theories of the empirical sciences
disclose reality subject to the constitutive interest in the possible
securing and expansion, through information, of feedback-monitored
action". The fact that one important criterion for the acceptance
of theories is often taken to be their ability to predict future
occurrences indicates the knowledge-constitutive interest in
instrumental action. Thus (ibid.: p.313): "knowledge equally
serves a3 an instrument and transcends mere self-preservation".
Contemplative activity owes its existence to the human interest in
autonomy and responsibility (ibid.: p.31i|) : "Reason also means
the will to reason".
Habermas' account of "critical theory" has both epistemological and
methodological, and practical and political implications. The former
involve considerations of methods of investigation of social life
that are distinct from those employed in the sciences of nature.
They assimilate the phenomenological contribution regarding the
interdependence of the knower and the known in the process of
cognition as a social act: the subject/social scientist engaging
in perception of his object/social reality is included within
the process of cognition which itself is a social act. Further,they
incorporate the insights provided by linguistic analyses and
hermeneutics, in the context of the theory of communicative
competence (HABERMAS, 1968/1971* P«310)* "the understanding of
meaning is directed in its very structure toward the attainment
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of possible consensus among actors in the framework of self-understanding
derived from tradition. This we shall call the practical cognitive
interest, in contrast to the technical" of the empirical-analytic
sciences. In this view,there are three categories of possible
knowledge (ibid.: p.313)* (i) scientific knowledge consisting of
"information that expands our power of technical control", governed
by technical interests; (ii) hermeneutic knowledge affording
"interpretations that make possible the orientation of action within
common traditions", involving practical interests; and (iii)
critical analyses that remove constraints imposed on the
consciousness by hypostatised powers, guided by emancipation
interests.
The practical and political consequences of "critical theory" are
significant in that they are founded on a perspective of normative
change rather than one of equilibrium and order in social affairs.
The notion of critique in the form of social criticism is a central
part of these approaches. It entails revealing hitherto obscured
constraints imposed by structural elements of social life which
vary in history. The search for the discovery of underlying
structures and mechanisms that are generative of constraints imposed
on social life would reveal, say, that society is made increasingly
dependent on science and technology. The latter's constitution
as a primary productive force renders it part of society while
at the same time scientific criteria of rationality are employed
in deciding on the rationality of order and characteristics of
societal processes. This is a self-reinforcing circle which
produces mechanisms for justifying and legitimating societal
organisation and a particular distribution of political power
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(COMERTON, 1976: pp.37-38)« Having placed itself beyond social
control, the scientific/technological system gives rise to mechanisms
which render the relation of man and technology one of human
adaptation to a self-legitimating technological system rather than v
one of human direction of such a system.
Thus, it is said to restrain the capacity of the individual and the
social group to intentionally participate in the direction of their
destinies. There results a kind of society which exhibits a social
order dominated by "techniques": society is becoming an ensemble
of social organisation whose sole reason for existing is to further
the interests of some "technique" and its human functionaries who
expect to gain from it. However, the original ends of those
"techniques" appear to be lost in the process of their operation.
This leads to the self-perpetuation of organisations, institutions,
and methods (and of those who operate them) which were originally
invoked to solve some specific problems or to provide some service.
It is said to be characteristic of bureaucracies that they typically
end up existing only for their maintenance rather than for
the performance of the particular service for which they were
initially instituted. Thus, the scientific/technological world
of "techniques" and its maintenance becomes an end in itself.
To the extent that it constrains the free expression of social life
it introduces a form of domination which may be said to be rooted
in the structural elements of the mode of production in society.
The task of critical theory then becomes one of elaborating a
critique of socially unnecessary constraints of human freedom in
the context of advanced Western societies (SCHROYER, 1975).
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Social criticism would be historical, resorting to history in order
to assert traditions and events; it would be sociological in seeking
to discover hitherto hidden, underlying structures and mechanisms,
and processes generative of social phenomena; it would be
self-critical in action in the sense that it would expose itself —
its findings — to criticism from alternative points of view
(FLETCHER, "\S7hi Ch.10). It would not restrict itself merely to
describing and explaining how things came to be: criticism is
concerned with how things could be and is aiming at making firm
proposals about how things ought to be, subject to dialectical processes
involving the social groups concerned. A critical social theory
would be ultimately validated in actual social practice and so
becomes a social construction.
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What would a "Critical Theory of Planning" look like?
Habermas expounds a cogent critique of public planning in the context
of his critical theory of society (HABEEMA.S, 1971s chapters and 6).
Examining the role of science, technology, and the rational attitude
in the practical politics of decision making and planned social action
he regards the type of planning based on a Weberian conception of
"rationality" (WILSON, 1977s pp. xiii-xiv) as "purposive-rational action"
which is concerned either with organisation of means or choice between
alternatives and is aimed at"establishing improvement, or expansion
of systems of purposive-rational action themselves" (HABEEMAS,1971 sp.^1) •
He refers to the views of his fellow critical theorist, Herbert Marcuse,
regarding the way in which a conception of rationality based,on
scientific and technological criteria has specific political
implications in the sense that it fosters "a specific form of
unacknowledged political domination" (ibid.: p.82). Rationality
in selecting one from a set of alternative policies, in application
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of technologies, and in use of efficiency criteria in the formulation
and assessment of systems of means which are conceived so as to
satisfy given ends is said to lead to planning in a vacuum, divorced
from considerations of the social context of interests: it is a
planning which separates the theoretical and the practical.
Because rationality so conceived directs planning towards
preoccupation with technical control, it entails action which involves
domination either of society or of nature. There emerges a fusion
of technological planning with a form of institutionalised domination
(ibid.: p.105): "Thus arises a perspective in which the development
of the social system seems to be determined by the logic of
scientific-technical progress .... This technocracy thesis ... can
also become a background ideology that penetrates into the consciousness
of the depoliticised mass of the population, where it can take on
legitimating power. It is a singular achievement of this ideology
to detach society's self-understanding from the frame of reference
of communicative action and from the concepts of symbolic interaction
and replace it with a scientific model. Accordingly the culturally
defined self-understanding of a social life-world is replaced by
the self-reification of men under categories of purposive-rational
action and adaptive behaviour. The model according to which the
planned reconstruction of society is to proceed is taken from
systems analysis".
Although this "ideal" of"technocratic planning' has not been realised,
it does serve as an ideological background — a "negative utopia"—
for a politics and decision making which focuses on technical
problems, by taking social problems as disguised technological ones,
and removes questions of practice and interests relating to societal
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ends. Habermas introduces a distinction between: (i) The institutional
framework of a society. This consists of binding consensual norms
which guide communicative action or symbolic interaction (defining
reciprocal expectations about behaviour that must be -understood and
recognised by at least two acting subjects). It represents the
sociocultural life-world. (ii) The subsystems of purposive-rational
action which are embedded in the institutional framework. These
determine actions in accordance with patterns of instrumental or
strategic action, viz. governed by technical rules based on scientific
knowledge (ibid.: pp.91-9U)« Now, "rationalisation" of action at
the level of the "institutional framework" can only take place if
constraints on communication are eliminated. This presupposes
free dialogue, without any traces of domination, concerning
"suitability and desirability of action-orienting principles and
norms in the light of the sociocultural repercussions of developing
subsystems"of purposive-rational action" (ibid.: pp.118-119).
In this process of "generalised reflection" particular institutions
would be expected to modify their constitution in a way which goes
beyond mere changes in legitimation (ibid.).
Examining the relations between the planner qua expert technician and
the politician qua decision maker dealing with "practical" issues —
relations which bear on the question of interdependence between
theory and practice — Habermas distinguishes three "models".
On a "decisionistic model" the functions of the planner and the
decision maker are clearly separated. The planner attempts to secure
rationality in the choice of means by applying expert technical,
scientific knowledge; but the goals are given, and are established
outside of the context of means arrangements. The politician
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retains his decision making privileges (acts of the will) but
"practical decisions cannot be sufficiently legitimated through reason.
Rationality in the choice of means accompanies avowed irrationality
in orientation to values, goals, and needs" (ibid.: p.63). This is
said to result inevitably because of the postulated separation of
questions of fact (the "theoretical") from questions of values,
goals, norms, and practical politics (the "practical"). The related
argument from neo-classical economics is the so-called Arrow's
"impossibility theorem" (ARROW, 1951 )> (HABERMAS, 1973)
The so-called "technocratic model" appears to have superseded the
"decisionistic model". In this account, the politicians
become agents of the technical experts/planners. Developments
in systematic decision making techniques, such as systems analyses .
and decision theory, enable rationalisation of choice and so ascribe
to the specialist a much more important role in planning.
The planner objectively traces the implications in terms of costs
or other consequences of various policies and rationalises selection
from among alternatives by means of evaluation techniques which are
presupposed to be theory-neutral and value-free. In this way the
primary role falls on analysis and technical considerations and is
removed from the realm of practical politics. The interests of
society are accommodated in a decision theoretic context, rather
than in the context of a dialectical relationship between the
theoretical and the practical — which presupposes enhanced and
unconstrained communication between a technocratic intelligentsia
of experts/planners-qua-decision-makers and society.
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Habermas identifies certain weaknesses in this technological model
of decision making and planning. He argues that (HABEKMAS, 1971J p.6U):
(1) It presupposes in society the inherent need for technical
advancement; it takes this as a societal goal to "be attained rather
than as an independent, self-regulating process guided by societal
interests. (2) It assumes a "continuum of rationality" in the
planning of and deciding upon courses of action which is impossible.
For rational, value-indifferent methods applied to the solution of
practical problems may expand the possibility of technical control,
but fail to make statements accounting for the "value systems" of
society — viz. social needs, objective states of consciousness.
The task of integrating questionsof values and goals and considerations
of objective necessity and means has occupied pragmatists such as
/) pN
John Dewey.^ ' What Habermas refers to as the "pragmatistic model"
(HABEHMAS, 1971s pp.66 ff) postulates critical interaction between
the expert planner and the politician/decision maker dealing with
the practical aspects of resolving conflicts of interest among social
groups,and problematic situations. In this "model", ends are not
discussed and fixed independently of the means required for their
satisfaction — and hence independently of the techniques and methods
of deciding on means specifications.Pragmatists such as
Peirce, James, Dewey, and C.I.Lewis assert that value judgments are
verifiable in experience to the extent that they are implicit hypotheses '
about what is valued as desirable or enjoyable. They are tentative
claims to knowledge of what is good or bad either for the individual
or for society. Ends are tentative until they are tested experimentally
for their consequences.
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Scientifically informed, discussion on ends and means based on
reciprocal communication removes both the primacy of the expert on
questions of means and the primarily ideologically informed decisions
on ends. Habermas claims that there is an important difference
between: (i) the testing of action hypotheses experimentally ( in terms
of their consequences); and (ii) the "practical confirmation" of
the process of inquiry or method ("technique") in the context of
"concrete situations" interpretatively clarified (ibid. : p.66).
This is said to be ignored in the "pragmatistic model" — though
the criticism may be related to the different conception of "practice"
held by pragmatists and "critical theorists'! However, Dewey does
allow for interdependence of methods and techniques, and practical
decisions.
Commenting on these three models, Habermas argu.es that in the
"decisionistic" account the public that is being planned delegate
responsibility for decision making to the politicians through the
voting system. In this way, democratic choice emerges as "acclamation"
rather than public discussion. Public choice is thus restricted to
selecting the decision makers and does not concern directly the
actual decisions which remain beyond public discussion. Hence power
is legitimated but not rationalised. In the"technocratic model"
this rationalisation does occur but at the expense of the democratic
processes. Considerations of feasibility and objective necessity
derived by expert technicians would dictate decisions to decision
makers. As a consequence, the only contribution of the democratic
process would be to condone or reject the expert "administrative
(Ej1 )
personnel". ' Moreover, in case of equal qualifications it would be
indifferent to which"elite group" — planners or decision makers —
wielded power. A technocratic administration where the roles of
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planner and decision maker are both played by the experts would overrun
the democratic decision making process.
The"pragmatistic model" overcomes these problems of incompatibility
between democratic processes and planning as a form of rationalisation
of public choice which arise in the other two "models". It is
"necessarily related to democracy" (ibid. : p.67) though it cannot be
applied to political decision making in modern pluralistic democracies
in the form in which it is known(ibid.: p.70). It accomplishes this
by taking the public and its value-orientations as mediators between
action hypotheses and their experimental testing in practice.
Communication and reciprocal guidance between planning and the "value-
beliefs" (Dewey) of interest groups would be expected to take place
in a harmonious social context and would be couched in terms of common
sense.
However, Habermas affirms that this is a naive expectation. The kind
of public participation and dialogue anticipated by the "pragmatistic
model" would never be a realistic proposition. This is because of the
insurmountable problems in communication stemming from the differences
in the language in which technical statements of programmes of action
and goals are couched (plan presentation) and the ordinary language
spoken by the public in their everyday practical activities and
projects. To translate the former into the latter in order to inform ' -
the mass public entails the risk of ideological distortion.
Expression of technical/scientific results in terms of world view or
"Weltanschauung" raises criticisms of ideology and results in the
advocacy of separation of technical questions from issues of practical
politics, i.e. separation of theory from practice. Such a distinction
would be in agreement with the positivist account which stipulates
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an autonomous and value-indifferent realm for the expert/planner.
Thus, this model (HAEEHMAS, 197*1 s P«70): "neglects the specific
logical characteristics and the social preconditions for the reliable
translation of scientific information into the ordinary language of
practice and inversely for a translation from the context of practical
questions back into the specialised language of technical and
strategic recommendations". These essentially "hermeneutic tasks"
emerge in the communication process between the experts and the
politicians. More specifically, in the context of constructing
programmes of social development and. planning, the "hermeneutic tasks"
involve the transition from practical questions of politics and
decision making (goals, ends, objectives, value-orientations) into
questions that are appropriately formulated by the technical
experts (questions of means); and vice versa. During the dialectical
process questions of means specification help crystallise and refine
( ^2^
originally vaguely conceived and stated needs, values, and goals.w '
But there is also a movement in the other direction: needs, value-
orientations, ends, goals emerge clearly only in relation to the
technical possibility of their being realised. Recognising some
practical need involves considerations of availability of techniques
which make possible its satisfaction.
Having arrived at some programme of action which satisfies needs,
values, goals and objectives, and having brought this to the
consciousness of the public, it is necessary to relate it to the
totality of the historical situation in which it has practical
consequences. In this sense, this "critical theory" approach would
first, guide research toward the objective context of social events
and, second, explore possible directions of historical development.
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In this endeavour, it cannot remain merely dialectical hut has to
resort to hermeneutic understanding of the historical whole and of
the relation of concrete situations to it. In contrast, a purely
scientific/technological approach to societal guidance and development
allows no scope for historical transformation, hut only for
regularities and enduring relationships between things. These will
hopefully reveal what consequences will ensue if certain externally
(53)
determined^^' needs, values, interests, goals are to be satisfied by
specific means, measures, action programmes. There results an
ahistorical approach where (HABEBMAS, 1970: p.91)"history is
projected to the level of universal contemporaneity and thus robbed
of its real spirit".
Ultimately, the communication process between the theoretical/technical
realm and the realm of practice (political decision making) is related
to public opinion (HABEEMAS, 1971s P«7U)s "Technical knowledge and
capacity" is confronted with "tradition-bound self-understanding" which
is to be grasped hermeneutically. To this effect ideal conditions
of communication have to be established, free from constraints and
domination. But there are problems in this communication process:
the ability of the public to respond; the blocking of the free flow
of technical information for a variety of reasons (e.g. in planning
a new motorway, its proposed routing may not be disclosed to the
public until some appropriate time in order to avoid fluctuations in
land values or the emergence of speculative interests; or when
particular development controls are to be introduced into some
residential area which, if known well ahead, might adversely affect
the housing market); the situation of the expert who is trained to
address specialised audiences rather than the lay community; etc.
However, informing the public of the practical consequences of technical
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solution to their problems has to originate from the experts in their
role as citizens rather than as technicians. The choice then
lies between (HABEEMAS, 1971s PP«79-80) : "a productive body of
knowledge (which) is merely transmitted to men engaged in technical
manipulation for purposes of control or (one which) is simultaneously
appropriated as the linguistic possession of communicating individuals.
A scientised society could constitute itself as a rational one only
to the extent that science and technology are mediated with the
conduct of life through the minds of its citizens".
By integrating the theoretical and the practical aspects of
programming and planning societal arrangements it is possible to
transcend the divide between means and ends. If planning restricts
itself to technical interests of prediction and control in acquiring
knowledge to apply it to problem solving operations, such knowledge
would consist in predictive models and causal narratives of observable
phenomena. This would enable investigation into the means
appropriate to attain given ends but it would not contribute anything
to the ends themselves for the latter would be arrived at externally.
The result would be a clear separation of questions of means
(theoretical) from questions of ends (practical) one aspect of which
would be the distinction between facts and values. It takes the
rationality of value systems to be accessible only in a purely
instrumental sense by their efficacy as means towards ends, and
logically by their inner consistency. The "critical theorist"
would challenge this view of value-neutrality and would favour
critical judgment of value systems. His "critical theory" would
not restrict itself to merely observing the world in its empirical
spatial and temporal appearances but also — following the historicism
of the early Marx, e.g. his "Capital" — would endeavour to go
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beyond observation into a critical investigation of the rationality
of social institutions in terms of a conception of human needs,
interests, and freedom. He would forcibly reject the notion of a
fixed human nature and would emphatically maintain that values,
goals, and objectives of action in societal affairs must be created
from human practice through dialectical relations within objective
historical situations. His dialectical process based on unhindered
communication free from self- and socially-imposed constraints
would not envisage rational ends, norms, values, etc. which have any
intrinsic validity.
Thus, an adequate theory of societal organisation (and planning)
on the "critical model" would need to proceed in three dimensions:
(i) the economic sphere or realm of material production — where it
would attempt to account for the historical development and current
form of .the forces of production by revealing the structures and
mechanisms underlying it; (ii) the political sphere or realm
of institutional systems — where it would seek to develop appropriate
systems of organisation as well as specific techniques which enhance
and rationalise the planning of societal affairs; and (iii) the
socio-cultural sphere or realm of interpretative systems — where
it would attempt to understand hermeneutically, and develop and
critically dissolve legitimating socio-cultural norms, values, and
interests. Criticism would develop on all three dimensions and
would contribute in revealing hidden forms of domination, institutional
practices, and unrecognised constraints on communication, respectively.
Regarding the dimension of politics, the rational organisation and
planning of increasingly complex societal affairs creates the need
for the construction of systems of "purposive-rational action"
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which would match the complexity of the social world. However, the
augmenting complexity of systems of rational planning in turn raises
questions of compatibility between such planning systems and unimpeded
operation of democratic processes in terms of the role to be played
by the public in the planning of their affairs — an issue of public
(ciC)
participation and mode of planning which enhances or restricts it.w-v
Habermas approaches this problem in the context of a controversy
which is at the heart of contemporary planning theory and concerns
two opposing "paradigms" of planning: the pluralistic disjointed-
incrementalist mode and the rational-comprehensive mode (HAHEHMAS,
1973/1976: Pt.III, Ch.5).
The former involves mainly a form of planning which is predicated on
conditional forecasts of the consequences of intended courses of-action
and assessment of the desirability of such results given some goals.
The latter takes a global, holistic view of its subject matter and
involves mostly programme planning and systems approaches. Either
mode is compatible with weak or strong forms of public participation,
and hence four types of politics ensue: (a) incrementalist/non-
participatory; (b) incrementalist/participatory; (c) comprehensive/
non-participatory; and (d) comprehensive/participatory. In an
incrementalist/non-participatory mode of planning, the inevitable
conflicts that would result from the uni-directional relation between
the experts and the public would be dealt with through various
approaches to conflict resolution: concentration of negotiations on
non-controversial goals, subdivision of planning concerns, etc.
Such strategies are not necessary in an incrementalist/participatory
mode. Further, in a comprehensive/non-participatory type political
(56 )(practical) questions would be taken as disguised technical questions, '
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conflict situations would be sidestepped, and eventual dissent of those
who are affected by planned action would be either suppressed or
ignored or guarded against. Apparently, this type of planning is
characterised by elements which render it incompatible with a
comprehensive/participatory mode.
Now, the view that contemporary complex societies require a form of
comprehensive/non-participatory planning and political decision making
is criticised by Habermas. This view is taken to be founded on the
assumption that the administrative and institutional structure as a
control centre in a highly complex society has to be shielded from
both politicians and the lay public in order to enable the operation
of procedures of rational planning and societal guidance upon which
survival of the society would allegedly depend. But the capacity of
the planning machinery to perform under idealised conditions of
rationality would be -unavoidably constrained by its environment,
particularly by the dynamics of the economic system. Thus, it would
face a property order which it would be unlikely to be able to alter
significantly without revolutionary changes which might threaten the
very identify of the society which is to be maintained by such planning.
Further, in mobilising, motivating, inducing people towards collective,
expertly fixed goals it would come into collision with independently devel¬
oped normative structures which oppose the goals of the planning
system. Hence the contention that rationality breakdowns can only ■ ■
be eliminated by instituting a planning system which is independent
of society and assumes the leading role of steering its development
trajectory cannot be upheld.
Now, the adoption of some conception of "rationality" is necessary
in any theory of planning — for the latter as a mental preparation
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for action, presupposes some form of rational thinking. The view
taken of rationality cannot he independent of the substantive content
of such a theory of planning and the political/institutional context
in which planning is to take place. Four levels of increasing
rationalisation in the planning and control of societal affairs are
distinguished in (HABEHMAS, pp. 270 ff). It will be
attempted to relate these to the context of urban planning. The
conception of rationality that enters into the so-called "decisionistic
model" — referred to above — would correspond to a liberal democratic
administration. Externally decided goals — either with or without the
active participation of the public — would be satisfied by way of
rational arrangements of means aided by appropriate, impartial,
atheoretical methods and techniques. For instance* models of the
urban structure could be employed as "value-indifferent","theory-
neutral" instruments for experimental testing of various action
hypotheses and the tracing of their consequences upon the subject-
matter of the planning exercise. In this sense, the planner would
assume the advisory role of the dispassionate and objective expert:
he would employ his expertise and"objective knowledge", acquired by
using objectivist methods and procedures deriving from the sciences,
independently of interests and values both his and the community's.
Both comprehensive and incrementalist modes of planning would be
compatible with this account, though considerations of political
autonomy might favour the latter. An idealised reconstruction of
the "planning process" which employs such a conception of rationality
would be the one put forward in (HARRIS, 1967).
, Another level of rationality characterises a "weak programme" of policy
(57)science w ' which focuses on rational assessment and evaluation of
alternative courses of action which satisfy externally supplied
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goals equally appropriately in terms of technical considerations.
The instruments employed in such assessment fall within the range of
techniques of rational evaluation — for instance, cost/benefit or
cost/effectiveness analyses — founded on the assumptions and criteria
of neo-classical economics ("economic man" concept, utility maximisation,
etc.). By so rationalising choice, technical questions are further
separated from practical issues of societal values and interests whose
minimal integration was allowed for in the first level of rationality,
above.
These two levels of rationality of action remove values from the context
of planning and restrict them to hypotheses of goals: if x is desired,
then it may be rationally achieved by doing W,Y, or Z; but Z is the
more efficient of these alternatives and hence recommended. Due
to the acceptance of the principle of value-neutrality, a disjunction
is forced upon man's consciousness between his "subjective interests"
which — though decisive for his orientation to action — are
reduced to sentiments, feelings, private thoughts that are unobservable
and hence impossible to account for in "objective knowledge"; and
"objective considerations" regarding the predictable, utilitarian,
and calculable aspects of social life which, as observable, can be
taken into account in "objective knowledge" informing rational action.
The world is therefore seen as an "objective" reality, deprived of all
those elements that are said to be basic to the specifically human status
of individuals in society. As Habermas puts it (HABEHMAS, 1971/197Us
p.271): "all the other interests of the praxis of life are subordinated
for the benefit of the sole interest in efficiency and economy in the
utilisation of means".
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A still higher level of rationality would take .value systems and goals
to be subject to technical control on the basis of a technocratic
approach to planning. This sense of rationality is said to emerge in
cases of strategic planning which involve the development of a rational
programme of action under conditions of uncertainty in strictly
competitive situations where there are opposing interests also
articulated on a rational basis. Such situations introduce considerations
of "system survival" which overrun practical questions of values and
interests and result in a totally planned society. In the fictitious
state of affairs in which the survival of a "social system" is taken
to be the ulti.ma.te goal to which all value orientations are reduced,
the decision making problem resolves to one of specifying the
constitution of decision systems (institutions, social groups) so
as to enable them to satisfy that basic goal. In this sense,
all pre-existing and emergent value configurations recede in favour
of the overriding end of survival which would involve formalised
objectives such as stability and adaptability. The goal-seeking,
goal-forming processes in social life are thus wholly subsumed under
"quasi-biological" needs of the system. For society to reach this
state of a self-regulating system the highest level of rationalisation
would have to be aimed at. This would allow the automation and
mechanisation of decision making functions.
nationalisation at this level would affect norms and values and their
relation to interests and goals but would not alter the existing
basis of the economic system. Adaptation to crises in society would
be accommodated in terms of changes in the systems of values, needs,
and rules of conduct rather than by structural changes in the
mechanisms of production. Thus, a society with a capitalist mode
of production would still remain one even if it were faced by a series
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of serious crises, though its values, needs and behavioural rules would
adapt to crisis-resolving conditions. Even though this is an
idealised and imaginary model of total rationalisation, the possibility
to extend rational control to such extremes to cover all action realms
indicates that, under suitable political conditions, it might become
reality — one that ought to be guarded against, according to
"critical theorists". Rational, scientific, technological approaches
to planning criticise ideologically charged, normative approaches to
societal guidance and decision making. They advance the notion of
rational control as a substitute and improvement on the latters'
"dogmatism" and commitment. But rationality utlimately emerges
as an end in itself, a self-legitimating process that is detached
from social practice in that it focuses on objective considerations
and tends to neglect essentially and irreducibly humanistic values
in social life.
The preceding analysis of the function of rationality in systems of
public action and planning of societal affairs suggests that the
idea of rationality is itself based on an ideology which takes
objectivity, value-freedom, and reason as ideals to be pursued instead
of practical interests and commitment to normative change. However,
there seems to be no "scientific" justification for either of these
(58)
views which is independent of any prior philosophies. The"critical
theorist" would reject this claim and, being in favour of commitment —*
especially to his own point of view — would urge the planners to try
and integrate the technical with the political aspects of their concern;
their facts with their own and society's interests,values, and goals;
their theory with their practice. He would advocate their
active involvement, by way of dialectical processes, in re¬
awakening the critical consciousness of the people which
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would result in the latter's emancipation from internally and externally
imposed forms of domination: from alien structures of the system
of production and of the system of institutions of government, and
from definitions in the socio-cultural realm arising out of these.
The critical analyses that might he condoned by a "critical theory of
planning" would concentrate on the following concerns:
(1) They would subject to critique and interpretation all spheres
of social life that are accessible to reason and have a bearing on
planning. This would suggest a holistic but also historical perspective,
and the "oppositional" thinking involved would be aimed at revealing
hitherto obscured structures and meanings in relevant aspects of
social life. In this context, critical analysis would have as its
starting point the normative perspective of change — both structural
and socio-cultural. It would question the premise that "urban problems"
pertain to some distinctive "urban realm" with its own identity and
autonomous rules and logic. This view would preclude the taking of
"urban problems" as unrelated to the political economy of society, and
hence would reject attempts aimed at their solution through social
policy. Rather, its focus would be on social structure and the
conditions which necessitate its change. Community development
programmes, environmental protection areas, and other instrumentalities
of a "social policy" approach to urban problems introduce a positive
discrimination in favour of deprived social groups, and their
implementation involves redistribution of facilities in space.
A critical approach would discount this emphasis on apparent phenomena
and would seek to discover the underlying structures and mechanisms which
produce the appearances. It would search for them in the system of
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material production and the ongoing process of "capital accumulation"
in Western capitalist societies — thus keeping in line with Marxian
social theory. The "real" problems of the city would not be those
of physical environment and urban space in their purely physical
dimension but rather social structural problems of economy, politics,
and constrained communication among the people in the city. An
investigation of "urban problems"which is restricted to any one of
these three dimensions — viz. placing emphasis only on economy, or
on the institutional framework, or on interpretative aspects of human
action — would be totally inadequate. Structural aspects of the
city which might occupy the"critical theorist"in planning would
include: (i) a historical analysis of the development of capitalism
in society,and of the State and its political economy in relation to
the city (HARVEY, 1973), (CASTELLS, 1977); (ii)an analysis of the
control of the labour force through planning policies (e.g. restrictions
and inducements regarding location of industry; controls on the
location of offices; provision of housing) (LAMBERT, et al., 1975);
(iii) an investigation into the conditions of conflict between
institutionalised interests regarding development of capital, planning,
and social control, and the interests and needs of the urban population
being controlled; and of the ways in which such conflict might be
expressed in social life (e.g. protest movements ) (PICKVAMCE, 1976).^"^
Criticism would also be addressed to the current approaches to solving ' '
urban problems for concentrating on policy rather than changes in those
structures and mechanisms that are "really" causally responsible for
generating those problems. Such approaches would be characterised
by: (i) maintaining a liberal pragmatic attitude to urban problems
and seeking remedial solutions which are piecemeal and lack a general
sense of direction,some guiding normative view of urban life, which
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would aid in the fixing of priorities; (ii) concentrating on the
contributions of the professionals and "urban managers" and neglecting
the practical interests of the people being planned, thus reinforcing
elitism and legitimating the language of objective rationality in
decision making which separates technical questions from issues of
practice and interest; (iii) searching for solutions within the
prevailing institutional order without any critical assessment of
its. adequacy in coping with urban problems; (iv) focusing on
constraints upon social life and urban process in the socio-cultural,
economic, and spatial dimensions without linking them within a
historical perspective of continuous development of the system of
material production; and as a result limiting the search for data
to the strictly observable; (v) instigating procedures of public
participation in planning which do not address themselves to removing
constraints on thought imposed by forms of domination in social life
but rather seek to either record individuals' views and re-interpret
them in the technical language of rational goal-formulation or —
on the model of the "new humanists" (DUNN, 1971)> (FRIEDMANN, 1973) —
to establish a process of mutual . learning through social experimentation,
and so neglecting the practical aspects of the active political
involvement of the planner in his dialectical relation with the
planned; (vi) fostering an attitude of pluralism towards conflicting
pressure groups pursuing specific interests and so appearing
as interest-free.
(2) The critique would extend to the rational reconstruction of the
conditions which make knowledge and action possible in planning.
Regarding the conditions of understanding the people affected by
planned action — in a way which enhances communication — it would
be necessary to seek to understand the systems of rules which are
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implicitly followed by social actors ( in the form of actions,
utterances, and other conscious operations) and establish the kind of
knowledge that is required to competently apply such rules. In this
way, "theoretical" knowledge would be obtained without altering the
"practical" activities and conduct of individual social agents. This
orientation towards hermeneutic understanding has, for critical
theorists, important methodological implications for social inquiry.
A critical theorist would affirm that the differences in the nature of
the subject matter of the disciplines that study social life are such
that the "methods and procedures of the natural sciences" are not
applicable, in principle, to the -understanding of the social world.
As the subject of urban planning is people in their interaction with
physical and man-made environment, understanding social life in the
city would necessitate methods other than scientific, viz. methods
that would be appropriate in capturing irreducibly humanistic aspects
of the social lifeworld.
Given the nature of his subject matter , the planner could not be a
neutral observer: in his investigations he himself constitutes part
of the process of cognition as a social act. His methods and procedures
of knowing would inevitably determine his perspective on the world and
hence should be grounded in practical human activities or "forms of life"
if they are to provide knowledge which relates to his social subject
matter rather than to a morally indifferent nature. This view is
central to the concerns of both Wittgenstein and Heidegger (MAHDEL,
1978s p.260): "Steps and procedures determine our perspective on
the world. They become the "rules of synthesis" by means of which
a pespective is achieved. The foundations of knowledge become the
activities of men that make knowledge possible. The logical structure
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of knowledge becomes those steps and procedures which make knowledge
manifest. This is a shift in .direction shared by many phenomenologists,
ordinary language analysts, and pragmatists alike". If this argument
is accepted, then the direct tranference of methods and techniques
developed in the context of the natural sciences to the context of
urban planning cannot be taken for granted and has to be questioned
with regard to the perspectives it introduces on social/spatial
phenomena and the ways in which they account for the practical
activities of both the planners and the planned.
A pespective of'critical theory" in planning would demand the employment
of interpretative methods as indispensable in attaining an
understanding of human conduct, of the meanings attributed to space
by social agents, and of the ways in which such meanings might be
imputed to actions. However, a purely hermeneutic approach would
be taken as inadequate in providing the knowledge that is requisite
as a foundation for action in planning. The objective system of
social action would not be seen as restricted solely to the dimension
of intersubjectively intended and symbolically transmitted meaning.
There would also be aspects of physical reality which would be
relevant in planning and would require accounting for. Constraints
of external nature would entail considerations of instrumental control
where a scientific/technical approach has often proved the most
fruitful (e.g. the design and construction of public utilities;
technology for controlling environmental pollution). Constraints
of "inner nature" (consciousness) would necessitate illuminating the
complex relations between politics, power and autonomy, institutional
arrangements, and the system of productive activities — with their
corresponding underlying structures and mechanisms — and the
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historically situated existential individuals who pursue their
everyday practical activities often unaware of forms of domination
imposed upon their"form of life" by such structures and mechanisms.
Hence there are aspects of objective reality, not necessarily available
to empirical observation, which should be accounted for in planning.
The latter could not plausibly and intelligently restrict its pursuit
of knowledge for guiding action to purely interpretative concerns of
social life. Although planning could benefit from such insights
into the meaning aspects of the social lifeworld, e.g. by the resulting
enhanced communication between social agents — including planners
and decision makers — planning is not only communication, but rather
has to encompass the material foundations of social life as well.
As regards the scope of intepretative methods in planning, hermeneutics
appears to provide ways of resolving the tensions between the
existential individual historically situated in some meaningful
reality and structural wholes that may be identified in the socio-
cultural, institutional, and economic arrangements in the city —
through its mediation between parts and whole. The rules of
interpretation, however, would themselves be subject to the influences
of other social processes, such as socialisation, power, social
stratification, work. The rules of these structural elements of the
city would not become available by means of interpretation. They
would only reveal themselves through systematic participation and
socially accustomed communications. In this context, dialectical
processes assume particular relevance and replace empirical observation.
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Due to the nature of his subject matter the planner is required by
a critical theory to establish a relation with the planned such that
artificially imposed criteria of objectivity, value neutrality, and
disinterestedness are transcended. This relation would involve both
parties in dialogue: the planner would discard observation as the
sole determinant of his models and theories about his subject matter.
A dialectical model of study would stress - the perspective of
communicative action which should be clearly distinguished from
instrumental action aimed at direct manipulation and control without
public participation and dialogue in planning. This separation of
the instrumental from the communicative aspects of action is required
because the former involve purely scientific investigation of the most
appropriate, efficient, etc. combination of means that satisfies
certain given goals established outside of the context of study of
the means.
This introduces elements of authoritarianism and domination which are
incompatible with communicative action. The latter is based on dialogue
and involves understanding beliefs, intentions, motives, needs guiding
the actions of social agents. Thus, it enhances communication in
a manner which is said to be analogous with the processes involved
in psychoanalysis, in the sense that people are being led through
discourse to appreciate benefits and disadvantages involved in
proposed theories of reconstruction of aspects of society"that are
taken to be unsatisfactory. Adopting the dialogue model of inquiry
and communication in urban planning — viz. advancing theses based
on the needs and purposes that are felt by the planned, receiving
antitheses, and eventually attaining acceptable responses and
compromises which are put into operation — renders the whole of the
3hl.
planning edifice subject of the control of the public. Rationality
is to be attained in this way and not through forms of institutionalised
domination upon the lives of individuals which is accepted by them
either because it is not recognised as such or because it is concealed.
Enhancing communication and dialogue through public discussion and
critique enables removal of distortions in understanding.
The communication process would be unconstrained when all individuals
concerned have equal opportunities to participate in the dialogue.
But this presupposes that those individuals would be willing, prepared,
sufficiently interested to exercise their privilege to participate
in the dialogue. Short of mass scale political indoctrination, it
is difficult to see how critical theorists would induce involvement
of the public in dialogue. The problems of public participation
exercises in urban planning are so well-known as not to
require reminding: indifference and apathy; selfishness,
shortsightedness, lack of resources (time, funds, expertise) requisite
for participation; disproportionate influence of vociferous, fully
committed, or strongly placed groups in the negotiating context;
and the like.
To remove these "distortions", on the critical theory programme of
planning, would presumably require armies of psychoanalysts and
some very perceptive "planners" who are not availalbe on the current
curriculum of academic education in planning. Apart from such
difficulties, the enormous task of the critical theorist would also
include an investigation of the institutional and social structural
arrangements that are conducive to such distorted and impeded
communication. Thus, enhanced communication connects up with
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an ideal form of life and so links planned action and dialogue
which are respectively the theoretical and practical implications of
separating instrumental/technical and communicative action.
By recognising that the realm of meanings and their interpretation
in communicative action is not all that there is to he accounted for
in social life in the city, a critical approach to planning would
seek to come to terms with the interplay of "conceptual" and
"intelligible" factors with the brute blind forces which are
extraneous to the ideas and illusions of a culture (GELLNER, 1973s
p.87). One way to conceptualise this interplay is to recognise
both the context-dependency of any generalisations regarding such
aspects of social life and the instability of the postulated relations
over time: their time-dependency or "episodic" aspects. In this
sense it would be quasi-historicist avoiding long-term sequences of
historical transformation and concentrating on the historically
specific and delimited holistic configuration of industrial society.
It could allow properties such as irrevessibility, practical
inevitability, unidirectionality but would constrain these by
accepting the uniqueness and singularity of the episode it refers to.
It would take it as neither one member of a class of such episodes
nor one link in a series.
Given these qualifications, the relations that would be sought would
consist in discovering structural or institutional characteristics
of some current state of affairs which would be taken as responsible
for problematic situations experienced by social agents or groups
in the city. The modification, change, adjustment, or total removal
of such undesirable conditions would eliminate identified
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dissatisfactions in social life. Coherent accounts of these relations
that are taken to be generative of disturbing conditions — but not
causally generative as in the realist view of science and causation
(£2) (6l)
could be couched in terms of "partly causal"^ 'narratives ^ -''which
would also make use of functional analyses. The latter would seek
to investigate how particular forms of institutional arrangements
emerged and how they contribute in sustaining some social collectivity;
and explore systemic properties of action in terms of repercussions
of unintended but not accidental consequences of action upon some
whole.
Narratives inevitably contain — even if only implicitly; even if only
simple — laws. Moreover, to distinguish between some narrative
of action, and its context and consequences it is necessary to develop
an understanding of relevant recurrent interdependencies concerning
distinct aspects of events, their implications for conceptually or
functionally linked realms of activity and their unintended
consequences. Narratives would need to be plausible and coherent
within some broader frame of meaning. They would draw their validity
from that frame but they would at the same time constitute it.
If it is accepted to call such narratives "theories", the requirement
of critical approaches for links between theory and practice would be
satisfied if such "theories" are also related to practice.
The relation of knowledge to action upon which critical theory is
founded entails the demand that such "theories" include some account
of the way in which they are to be related to practical action.
But these narratives would not offer accounts which are restricted
to past occurrences — though they would draw extensively on these
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and regard the ensiling insights as their integral parts — hut describe
the way in which the future might unfold as a function of the role
played by the narratives themselves in social practice (i.e. activity
involving ethical and political considerations). Hence their validity
would depend to a great extent on the way in which they are related
to the satisfaction of human needs and goals. They would look to
history in order to reveal how these needs desires and aspirations
have emerged and understand the circumstances which preclude their
fulfilment, thus making explicit structural conflicts and consequent
dissatisfactions as contradictions within some prevailing social
order. The purpose of a narrative so conceived would be to persuade,
convince,and show that social discontent and thwarted aspirations and
desires are to be interpreted and understood only in terms of the
account of the social order that is put forward.
The terms in which such narratives would be couched would need to take
account of the full range of interpretative categories that a humanistic
social science specifies — for instance, taking social action and
human conduct as a result of individuals' intentions, motives,
reasons, feelings, etc., which require interpretation rather than
observation and are to be stated in terms that are intelligible to
those whose conduct is being accounted for. But interpretative
categories would not be the only ones to constitute a narrative for
social structural and institutional aspects of social life would also
be accounted for, in an integrated manner with interpretative categories.
Furthermore* the condition that such a narrative be linked to practice
can only be satisfied if the "theory" contains within itself
a programme and sequence of change in those aspects of reality which
the "theory" postulates as underlying the structural conflicts creating
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disatisfactions and deprivations. But it would not be a programme
of action along the lines of a policy. It would not require people
to accept or impose on them the kinds of changes that it regards
necessary.
Rather, and here seems to lie the crucial difference from a policy
approach, it would seek to enable those coming within its scope to
fully grasp their conditions and situation in the existing state
of affairs as the product of structures and mechanisms that are
inherent to and underlie that state of affairs. It would follow
this approach rather than a unidirectional interventionist, or even
a two-directional interventionist — on the "public participation"
model — since it is required by the critical perspective to reveal
to the individuals concerned the ways in which THEY can act if they
wish to remove identified constraints and conflicts, and so change
their ungratifying conditions as an aspect of changing the existing
state of affairs which gives rise to these. Thus the function of
a narrative in social practice would be a guiding and educational
one. This is one of the main reasons why enhanced, unhindered
communication is so important in a critical approach to planning.
In performing such roles a "theory" would also need to be couched
in terms which minimise or neutralise inevitable resistance to proposed
structural and ideological change.
A first requirement would be to eliminate semantic problems by stating
the "theory" in the ordinary language of everyday life. Moreover,
critique of prevailing ideological beliefs which hinder the success
of the "theory" would be aimed at revealing to the individuals
concerned how the beliefs they hold are contradictory with their own
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experiences, feelings, desires — that their empirical self in space
and time contradicts their "true" self in the ideal realm of the
"theory", as already described above both in the Hegelian tradition
(p .311) and in the tradition of normative organicism which is informed
by it ( chapter one). Finally, resistance to change could be overcome
by demonstrating -to social agents the ways in which structural changes
normatively anticipated by the "theory" would be incompatible with
currently held ideologies. Such social structural changes are to
take place in virtue of the existence of the "theory" which reveals
to social agents how they "ought to act". But the "theory" which
advances the critique would also need to be self-critical in the
sense of involving reflection on the planners own theoretical and
practical assumptions which may themselves be exposed to the
dominating influences of some prevailing social and political order.
Self-criticism would involve not only the planner's ideological beliefs
but also his epistemological and methodological presuppositions in
studying social life and the way in which he delimits the boundaries
of his subject matter — i.e. whether his postulation of a distinctively
urban subject matter is justified given his "theoretical" interpretation
of structural change. Self-criticism would also face the question of
which criticism is to count as relevant in the first place — since
it would be absurd to claim that any criticism is necessarily relevant.
The contemporary relativist movement in philosophy originates from
the state of affairs in which it appears impossible to obtain
agreed standards as to what is critical assessment. A crucial test
for acceptance of some theory for one inquirer may be taken as
relevant but not crucial by another, and irrelevant by a third.
Refusing to abandon a view in the light of strong criticism may be seen
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as irrational by other critics; but it may also be claimed that the
latter miss the main point of that view and that their criticism is
not "really" one.
Obviously anything can be criticised, but the question of the valid
criticism is a different matter. Is it possible to formulate objective
standards for criticism? However, attempting to turn criticism upon
itself and ask "why be critical?" entails acceptance that criticism
is in principle possible. Asking for "reasons" for criticism implies
being involved in criticism. Hence the attempt to stand outside of
criticism in order to assess it involves remaining inside it — and
this is a logically absurd situation. But it could be argued that
if it is not logically possible to "justify" criticism or a critical
approach there is no harm in failing to do so providing it is
recognised that acceptance of criticism is an element of some given
cultural tradition. On the other hand, the justification of some
particular critical theory would depend on the extent to which it enables
unhindered communication in social practice and is translated
into action; hence its "truths" would be socially determined, at
least partly. There is no requirement for correspondence with facts
in this version of "theory", only coherence within a frame of social
practice which is both informed by the "theory" but also constitutes it.
The fusion of interpretative categories of a shifting social reality
with the more enduring aspects of social structure that are accounted
for by means of "partly causal" law-like relations and functional
analyses precludes the linking of a critical theory with social
practice unless social agents themselves are actively engaging in
participation in the process of such linking. For a "theory" of this
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nature could be justified only in the consciousness and self--understanding
of the social actors. Consequently, it cannot be argued that such
a "theory" could also be employed instrumentally, as any positive theory
of social/spatial structure and organisation, to derive accurate
predictions which will inform decision making. The very nature of the
postulated law-like relations in a critical theory (see footnote(62 ),
above) precludes such application. Moreover, the role ascribed to
"theories" in the critical model takes these to become, if successful,
integral elements of social life itself.
This would be attained through the illumination and enlightenment
provided by the "theory" to social agents into the conditions which
they ought to come to realise as detrimental to the fulfilment of their
needs and purposes — viz. a process of augmenting self-consciousness
and adjusting ideological beliefs of social actors, and revealing
hitherto obscured structures and mechanisms which underlie their
problematic situations. This does not involve simply attempting to
persuade the individuals affected by planned action to modify their
views, as a policy scientist might seek to convince the population
of the rectitude of some proposed course of action. For in this
way people are simply persuaded to do something they did not approve
of originally. The critical approach involves instead a process
of self-understanding and developing consciousness in a way which
enhances their ability to make their own appropriate choices: it
assists the actors to help themselves and create their own destiny.
It is in this way that the theory is rendered into social practice:
by persuading those for whom the "theory" is to operate to adopt
a new image of themselves and interpret their experiences in a
different manner.
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In addition, there would also be some form of "instrumental" rendering
of a critical theory into social practice. This would involve
applying its knowledge couched in terms of "partly causal" law-like
relations and functional descriptions to instrumental action.
However, there is no relationship between such cognitive elements
and those of a "positivist'J/instrumental approach to planning on the
model of policy science. For the law-like relations are to be
conditioned by the interpretative categories of social agents — in
terms already stated — and hence do not determine the ways in which
social actors will respond to external structural influences.
The development of these law-like relations involves a normative
perspective on social life and its enduring social structural aspects,
rather than a detached and value-indifferent scientific approach.
Such relations would not be expressed in terms of models of segments
of reality which would be based on the principle that the truth . of
the 'status quo1 would determine morally relevant and politically
charged action for it excludes evaluation of that 'status quo' in
terms ofwhether existing states of affairs are ethically acceptable.
In the critical approach, applying particular law-like relations in
"instrumental" action involves moral and political evaluation and
ideology-critique: for structural aspects of social life that are
assessed as ethically unacceptable and in need of modification and
change enter in these relations.
The continuous dialectical processes involved in the realisation of
a critical theory by way of controls introduced to change existing
situations also differentiates this approach from the instrumental
activities of policy science. The requirement for effective dialogue
is not to be satisfied upon establishing agreement on a programme
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of action. Bather it is to involve continuous monitoring of the
views and interpretations of the people who are affected by planned
action for the effectiveness of the theory can only be assessed
against such views. In this dialogue there is mutual rather than
unindirectional education from the planner to the planned; for
the planner may come to realise that the responses which his efforts
are evoking point to the need for changes in his "theory". Dialogue
presupposes free unhindered communication and the opportunity to
participate in it shared by all concerned. In this sense, it may
make additional demands on social and political institutions which
are already developed without taking into account such requirements.
Conclusions
The above outline of a "critical approach" to urban planning is a
very rough and tentative sketch of the putative extension of the
work of critical theorists, such as Habermas, to the more limited
but no less important concerns of urban planning. The extension
may not be as appropriate or as successful as critical theorists
themselves would argue that it ought to be — this may of course be
due entirely to the shortcomings of this presentation. But there are
many aspects of this approach that could make a valuable contribution
to urban planning providing it is possible to meaningfully detach them
(64)
from their context rather than accept the whole "package".
For instance, the adoption of a normative perspective on the "genus"
"moral and political action", of which "planned action" in the city
is a "species", seems to be appropriate and if accepted will have
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implications for the ways in which goals and means are to be interlinked
in planning. The emphasis on continuous dialogue and enhanced
communication is also an aspect of the relationship between the planners
and the planned which has not gone unnoticed by the planners themselves.
However the particular way in which a critical theory conceives of
this dialogue may not prove ultimately feasible in planning for -
(65)
reasons already stated. Nonetheless, the attempt to understand and
interpret other people's intentions, motives and reasons for action
would involve the kind of interpretative categories that are absent
from contemporary planning.
The problem of interpretatively understanding other people is a
difficult and involved one and it is not adequately solved in the
accounts of critical theory. One is told that hermeneutic "verstehen"
involves part/whole relationships, a historical perspective on action,
the merging of contemporary with past viewpoints, the reconciliation
of the phenomenological intuition with structural and historical
aspects of some totality; and that the hermeneutic knowledge produced
explores the conditions of its own objectivity, it constitutes its
facts but is also constituted by them. These are very broad
characteristics and are unduly abstract for adequately demonstrating
the way in which one is to attain hermeneutic "verstehen" without
moving into overt irrationality.
The same inadequacy of precision in describing the dialectical processes
of reaching unconstrained consensus characterises most of the writings
of critical theorists — but these criticisms may be due to
misunderstandings in the assessment of a piece of philosophical work
which is informed by a philosophical tradition that is alien to the
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works of English-speaking philosophers. However, there is an urgent
need to inject a humanistic perspective into urban planning if the
field is not to degenerate into one of those institutionalised
activities that are most detested by the lay public. This cannot be
restricted to merely attempting to improve the public image of the
field through public relations exercises in participation. Rather
it would have to involve a conscious effort to explore the possibilities
of incorporating interpretative categories into the knowledge component
of the knowledge/action continuum that planning is. This is no
easy task and raises many subtle and technical epistemological
questions which will have to be eventually faced and answered.
Another issue that seems to raise problems for a critical theory
is the sharp separation postulated between the nature of the "social"
and the "physical". That there are differences between the two
which warrant adjustments in method of inquiry is not disputed by many
today. But the ontological and epistemological division that ensues
from, say, Habermas' writings is a view which would be contested by
many serious workers especially by those who argue that all
(66)
knowledge is guided by human interests. What could be highly
problematic in urban planning, as it would in other fields of endeavour,
is the combination of a normative perspective on the enduring
structural aspects of the city with the requirement for successful
dialogue and understanding through communication in order to reach
consensus. This could prove dangerous for it could easily slide
towards a situation in which history is interpreted so as to secure
consensus, viz. in the light of what people would like to hear rather
than what the historical sources determine as evidence.
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Another difficulty would be encountered in the process of procuring
knowledge that is guided by so-called "emancipatory" interests.
The view that the social critic would act in the manner of the
psychoanalyst to reveal to the individuals concerned hitherto obscured
aspects of their consciousness and thus raise their self-understanding
of their personal conditions and modes of thought and life and change
the latter through a critique of ideological beliefs (on the model of
"you are a slave to your passions") does not come through very clearly
and is not entirely convincing if not on ethical grounds, then on
(67)
grounds of feasibility alone. It is possible that the attempt to
convince individuals of their misconceptions in their practical
philosophies and beliefs would reach dimensions of propaganda and
would be founded on some distorted conception of reality. But
ideological critique is indispensable in planning and to the extent
that it leads to liberation of consciousness from unnecessary restrictions
it is to be systematically pursued.
The valid emphasis placed by critical theorists on the historical
perspective of societal organisation is an aspect which if adopted
in planning on a systematic basis — rather than the haphazard
historical review that often precedes planning studies and merely
states dates and figures and ignores underlying processes — would
greatly enrich the quality and perceptiveness of knowledge in the
field. But the distinction should be drawn between a clearly
historicist approach — as, say, in Marxian historical materialism —
and a quasi-historicist one. The former accepts inevitability of
historical laws determining human behaviour and has been rightly
criticised in (POPPER, 19U5/1966) and (POPPER, 1957/1961). The latter
does not accept such general laws, and takes an "episodic" view of
historical change in society.
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It regards each "episode" as a singular and unique event and thus
constrains any quasi-historical laws that may be identified in its
historical study. The implications from the adoption of a historical
perspective in planning is that emphasis is placed on idiographic
rather than nomothetic approaches to the study of its subject matter.
There results a change of methodological and epistemological orientation
in that the development of theories and models accounting for classes
of regular law-like relations betweeen observables ( a nomothetic
approach) recedes in favour of historical narratives of action (an
idiographic approach) whose time direction points toward the future
rather than the past and which draw on historical material to provide
plausible accounts of how the future might unfold given certain
states of affairs.
Not all critical theorists would accept this part of a critical
approach to planning. However, a critical approach is conceivable
independently of the substantive and political contributions of the
thinkers of the Frankfurt School as well as of Marxian social theory —
even though the latter provides the paradigm case for a critical
theory of society, and the former provide the most complete
articulation of critical approaches to social theorising to date.
The main elements of such critical approaches are possible to
abstract from the theoretical context in which they have emerged:
(a) the requirement for interpretative categories (taking man as
a social agent); (b) the need to reconcile action concepts with
considerations of enduring aspects of social structure which often
constrain the choices that are open to intentional social agents;
and (c) the close and intimate links between theory and practice,
facts and values, subject matter and method (method constitutes and
361.
is in turn constituted by subject matter); these basic characteristics
of critical theory may be adopted without a Marxian perspective on
social life.
These appear to be valid concepts in the context of urban planning
and it is thought pertinent to seek to explore more fully their
implications for the approaches that are currently held in the field.
The initial epistemological shock that might be felt by those who
are not familiar with the dialectical or dialogue model of inquiry
should not divert them from examining more carefully what may well
be one of the most plausible alternatives to the empiricist account
of scientific knowledge as applied in the social sciences.
The "truth" of a critical theory is to be determined by the reactions
towards it of the individuals who are actively involved in its
scheme of reconstruction and its claims to knowledge of social life
(its interpretative, structural and emancipatory aspects).
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6. Summary and Conclusions to Chapters four and five:
theory and practice.
implications for
The purpose of the preceding discussion was to examine the conditions
under which the investigation of "scientific method" can he carried
out. In particular, it concerned the problem of whether it is
possible to maintain a view of methodology without entering into an
analysis of the philosophical presuppositions that underlie particular
methodological viewpoints. Given that the interests of this discussion
lie with method rather than philosophical outlook, it would be natural
to pursue a methodological approach in the study of "scientific
method". However, a number of arguments have been advanced to the
effect that it is doubtful (i)whether methodological and philosophical
aspects of the process of scientific inquiry can be unequivocally
distinguished from one another; and (ii) whether it is possible to
pursue a methodological approach without due regard to matters
arising from the philosophical implications of particular methods.
Nonetheless, claims that such a clear distinction is possible can be
maintained within particular philosophical outlooks.
Throughout the discussion, the main concern was with views originating
in the social sciences; and this was prompted by the guiding interest
of this dissertation which lies in that particular area. Obviously,
talking about aspects of scientific inquiry entails considerations of
certain issues pertaining to the natural sciences. As a result there
is a certain superimposition of views originating in the one or the
other field. It must be made clear that the structure of the
argument should not be taken to imply agreement with widely accepted
claims about the unity of method in the sciences of nature, on the
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one hand, and of man and society, on the other hand. It merely
recognises that such a complex of views exists, and selectively
considers aspects of the methodological debate without offering any
detailed account or critique of any position whithin it at this
stage at least.
It is in this context of the social sciences, of sociology in
particular, that the issue of the interdependence of methods and
theory (of form and content of inquiry), and by extension, of theory
and practical application of theory to policy-making, is brought
forward. Moreover, the existence of the problem of language, and
the influence of the latter on both methods and theories used in the
study of social life is also noted within the framework of linguistic,
phenomenological and hermeneutic philosophies which have given rise
to a number of fresh approaches to acquiring knowledge of the social
world. These approaches are concerned with the understanding of
"subjectively meaningful" human action; and some of these attempt to
view such action in its social and /or historical context . As a
result of their philosophical orientation they come into marked
contrast with "objective" social inquiries which are based on
observation of overt human behaviour and explanation of such empirical
phenomena by subsumption under general laws.^ The emphasis placed
on "subjectivity" or "objectivity" by each of these two main
orientations respectively might be taken to suggest that they are
advanced as clearly distinct "frames of meaning" within which methods,
research procedures, and substantive hypotheses acquire meaning and are
legitimated. The social theories that are developed within these
"frames of meaning" could be said to presuppose some metaphysical
basis associated with a "conception of man" (a "model of man") and
361;.
a method of inquiry which is complementary to such a "model".
Mediation between these "frames of meaning" may ultimately prove
abortive — though attempts to this effect have been undertaken, e.g.
by Max Weber, and Alfred Schutz.
A first step in the discussion was to attempt to clarify the meaning
of "method" and "methodology". If "methodology" is taken to be a
"body of methods", then there seems to be little difference between
it and "method". But "methodology" as a process of study of methods
and the conditions of their application is quite different from
"method". Thus, it is appropriate to distinguish between "methods
as systematic procedures of research",and "methodology" as a
discipline dealing with logical and /or philosophical presuppositions
underlying particular methods. In one view, methodology aids in the
understanding of the process of research without necessarily
prescribing strict rules for scientific practice. It acts as an
instrument of advice on scope and limitations of methods of scientific
inquiry. In another view, often associated with the philosophical
outlook of Logical Empiricism, methodology is the "logic of science"
or "scientific method"; it provides both a descriptive account of
how scientific inquiry is universally practised and a prescriptive
statement of how it ought to be practised.
The position that is defended here is one which recognises relations
of interdependence between philosophical and methodological approaches
to the study of the methods of scientific inquiry. Although the
strong interaction between philosophical outlook and methodological
approach is acknowledged, emphasis is placed on methodological
issues in the ensuing discussion of "scientific method". But this
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need not imply that methodology is taken to be philosophically-neutral
and theory-neutral. It is an approach which is selected for the
sake of discussion alone, and which will pay its philosophical and
theoretical debts wherever: necessary. The spectrum of views advanced
by some contemporary philosophers of science, such as Kuhn, Feyerabend,
and Hanson, has emerged as a reaction against received opinion that
the aim of science is the systematisation of experience that exists
independently of any scientific theories (HEMEEL, 1965 s P« 178).
Although this philosophical movement, reflected in the writings of
the above philosophers, is not as united as it might be suggested
'prima faciae', a certain common ground can be identified and
established. The following claims appear to fall well within such
common ground : (i) that pervasive presuppositions are fundamental
to scientific investigations; (ii) that theories, as ways of
looking at the world rather than true representations or "pictures"
of it, affect "our general beliefs and expectations, and thereby
also our experiences and our conception of reality" (FEYERABEMD,
1965s p.29); (iii) that theories influence observation statements
(HANSON, 1958); (iv) that the traditional distinction between
the "context of discovery" and the "context of justification" is
problematic and needs to be rethought if it is to be informative
(KOHN, 1962/1970 : pp. 8-9).
These views, if accepted, may have profound implications for the
position to be taken with respect to the issue of the interdependence
of philosophical outlook and methodology, of theory and methods of
inquiry, but also potentially on the connections between an
epistemology and approaches to politics and planning of societal
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arrangements. In particular, these views question the possibility
of formulating a set of norms or canons of scientific inquiry that
are valid and applicable throughout the universe of scientific
discourse, irrespective of the subject matter that is being inquired
into; indeed, they suggest that it might be wrong to strive toward
such a methodological ideal. This claim assumes particular relevance
in the context of the social sciences (especially sociology), where
it is acknowledged that it is important to relate methods of research
to subject matter and to take methods themselves as a subject for
investigation rather than view them as neutral, atheoretical
instruments (DENZIN, 1970 : p.298). Although it cannot be denied
that there is a pragmatic aspect of methods which justifies their
being seen as mere instruments for performing specific tasks in
scientific inquiries, it is impossible to fail to recognise that,
in the context of the social sciences, particular methods tend to
entail some theory or theories of instrumentation which may themselves
be theories about society. That methods of social inquiry, and
methodology must be viewed within a framework of the sociology of
knowledge is argued convincingly in (SJOBERG and NETT, 1968) and
(CICOUREL, 1962+) -
In this sense, methods of inquiry and the theories they presuppose can
not be thought of independently of the subject matter to which they
apply. They are embedded in some paradigm or way of looking at the
world which renders their application meaningful. Such a meaning
system would comprise views regarding : philosophical outlook
(ontology, that is, assumptions about the kinds of things that exist
in the world; and epistemology, that is, theory or theories of the
nature and grounds of knowledge concerning its limits and validity) ;
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substantive hypotheses advanced to account for aspects of the world;
methodological conventions regarding inquiry and evidence ; and
specific research procedures. Although certain theories, methods,
and concepts may be consistent with more than one philosophical system
there will inevitably emerge a level above which inconsistency must
ensue.
A number of relatively recent works of social thinkers and philosophers
show concern with the interrelationships between theory and practice,
and with the role played by language in cognitive processes and
in social life as a whole. The language used to express theories
and methods is seen as a reflection of the "Weltanschauung", or way
of looking at the world, within which theories and methods are
developed. Because of its dual function as a means of communication
and as a way of defining experience for its speakers language, it
is argued, should be studied as a subject in its own right and not
taken for granted ("we do not describe what we know ; we know what
we are able to describe" is a rough account of one of Wittgenstein's
points). This interest in the problems of language has filtered
through from philosophy to the social sciences, in particular to
sociology. An extensive and highly diverse literature has sprung
during the last two decades as a result of such influences. It
shows concern with action, meaning, and convention in the context
of human social life, and recognises the intricate ways in which
language is embedded in social practices.
It is in this context that the process of communication between
social agents (the way people actually understand each other) has
come to be recognised as a basic phenomenon of everyday life.
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Numerous contemporary social studies show a tendency to disregard the
"objective" facts of socio-economic development in favour of
investigations of the "subjective" world views of individuals. In
their search for the fundamentals or "essences" of social life, such
studies move away from considerations at the macro-sociological level
and concentrate instead on the understanding of basic rules of
everyday communication and interaction; and this is taken to be a
necessary approach for any type of social inquiry. The problem of
comprehending subjectively meaningful actions of social agents is
approached by the researcher by means of studying how individuals find
a meaning in their mutual actions; how they interpret the others' as
well as their own actions.
This approach is based on the understanding of social reality from
the point of view of the actor, hence it is often referred to as the
"subjective" approach. It is contrasted with the "objective"
(so-called "conventional") approach where the supposedly detached
observer/researcher investigating some social phenomenon considers
the evidence (the factual data) and advances testable hypotheses
purporting to explain it by subsuming it under some general laws.
"Subjective" approaches are also called "humanistic" because they
grant the human individual a special status in the world and take the
self as an object of study (CAWS, 1970 : p.20i|). They focus on
meaning in terms of subjective meaning to a person (or persons)
rather than in terms of non-personal meaning , i.e. "significance"
or "relationship", of a fact in its social structure. They attempt
to perceive the relations between the various spheres of social life,
and between these and the totality of social experience.
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Thus, the notion of "meaning" is of central importance to these so-
called "subjective" approaches to the study of human conduct. It
does not denote linguistic meaning but is the result of a process of
interpretation of the meaning which a situation, an episode, an action,
a plan has for a social agent (or group of agents). It is integral
to his consciousness and his language used to account for his actions.
Being arrived at by means of interpretation, this meaning may be
called "experiential meaning". Moreover, the description of such
situations, actions, etc. in terms of their meaning is to be
differentiated from their expression. Overt human conduct as a
carrier of meaning is to be distinguished from its meaning for the
agent : what one says or writes may be expressed in speech or text
in a way which does not establish equivalence between the expression
and the meaning originally•intended.
Finally, situations, actions, plans, etc. have meaning in some context
in relation to the meaning of other things; changes in the meaning
of the latter may have implications for the meaning of the former, and
this should be taken into account in the process of inquiry. As one
writer puts it (TAYLOR, 1976 : p.169) : "Experiential meanings are
defined in fields of contrast, as words are in semantic fields ...
The range of human desires, feelings, emotions, and hence meanings
is bound up with the level and type of culture, which in turn is
inseparable from the distinctions and categories marked by the
language people speak. The field of meanings in which a given
situation can find its place is bound up with the semantic field of
the terms characterising these meanings and the related feelings,
desires, predicaments".
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The epistemological relativism that such a position entails, that is,
the dependence of all knowledge of social life on social, cultural,
and historical context is taken to be a major inadequacy of this
approach by its critics, while it is not regarded as problematic
by its proponents. The latter take it instead to be a positive
factor of the cultural sciences and argue that relativity does not
render the notion of "truth" irrelevant. But their conception of
truth bears no relationship to the "truth" of knowledge acquired by
adhering to the principles of scientific inquiry ("scientific method")
— i.e. truth as correspondence to empirical reality. The hermeneutic
method of "verstehen" has as its task the discovery of a "truth"
(69)
which is not attainable by science. ' The problem of "objective"
knowledge of social life, which this approach is faced with, is
resolved by redefining the notion of objectivity for the social sciences
in a way which recognises that it is impossible to eliminate the
"ego", i.e. the personal perspective, from social inquiry.
This has epistemological implications for the process of perception
which is taken to be perspectival. It is socially and situationally
conditioned; and prejudices are inevitable accompaniments of all
ersqperience. How such views are not totally alien in the context
of the philosophy of science. Indeed, views that reality, though
non-mental or outside the mind — i.e. the reverse of what an idealist
might claim — can only be described from some point of view ; that
there are different ways of looking at reality, none of which is more
correct than the others, are common in the "newer" philosophy of
science. In particular, the philosophical outlooks known as
conventionalism^ instrumentalism,^ ^ and pragmatismmay be
associated with such views (LACEY, 1976 : p.86) — though they might
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differ among themselves in terms of the specific claims they make.
Hermeneutics as expounded in, say, Gadamer's work, does not provide
for reliable criteria for assessing the rightness of the inquirer's
understanding of the social situation, although it may be said to
guarantee the coherence of its historical material. But it is
difficult to see how this approach will provide reliable knowledge
of human social life without due regard to the structural aspects
of the lawfulness of the subject matter of the interpretative process.
The presence of a tradition of philosophical idealism is very strong
in the insights gained by social science's association with linguistic,
phenomenological, and hermeneutic philosophies. These insights
come into opposition with empiricist philosophies the methodological
embodiment of which, so-called "scientific method", has been
traditionally emulated by the social sciences in their attempts to
produce knowledge of the social world comparable in validity to
knowledge obtained in the sciences of nature. The ongoing
methodological debate in the social sciences is one outcome of the
recent movement towards idealist theses in the study of social life;
with the resulting strong criticism against established empiricist
(so-called "conventional") scientific approaches as being "objective"
at the expense of neglecting important "subjective", "meaning"
(73)
aspects of human conduct. '
The Cartesian dualism between mind and body, between the spiritual
and the material, is at the centre of one of the perennial
problems in philosophy with ramifications into the social sciences
/ rj \ \
regarding the so-called "methodological debate". ' The philosophical
discussions extend into considerations of the most appropriate
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methods to he employed in the study of spiritual or mental phenomena —
to the extent that their existence apart from matter is accepted —
such as phenomena of culture, of consciousness, of social interaction
and human conduct. In some views, these phenomena are taken to he
sufficiently distinct from physical phenomena of nature as to require
methods of study peculiar to them. The methods and procedures of
the natural sciences are claimed to he inadequate in capturing the
irreducihly mental qualities of human phenomena.
Those who reject the dualism of mind and hody in favour of one category
consisting of the latter — materialists, naturalists, physicalists,
behaviourists, not all of these terms meaning the same thing — have
no reservations towards applying scientific methods, rules and
(7$)
procedures in the study of social life. However, they differ as to
their conceptions of "the methods and procedures of natural science"
which are not independent of their views of science. Nonetheless,
they do seem to share the rejection of idealist views on the nature
of cultural, social and human phenomena. The latter take these
phenomena to be expressions of ideas about reality — and hence
spiritual in nature — which cannot be independently observed in an
empirical sense, but can only be understood interpretatively.
They are to be grasped in their historical and/or cultural context,
according to the rules of language and form of life obtaining in
that context, much like a hermeneutic problem of grasping the meaning
of esoteric, mystical, or religious texts.
Those who oppose the above view reject materialism. This
results in taking the intentions,purposes, motives, desires, etc. that
underlie the observable behaviour of social agents as mental acts in
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the minds of human actors. They are not "things" available to
observation hence their investigation is said to require non-
empiricist methods, say, procedures of "empathetic understanding"
in which the social inquirer would attempt to re-experience and
re-live the private worlds of the actors, and so reveal the mental
causes of their actions. This conception of "verstehen" was
developed by Dilthey and has been extensively criticised. It is
usually charged for ignoring the potential important influences that
the world of the inquirer, from which he is required to somehow
abstract himself, has upon the whole exercise of "verstehen"; and
for the assumption that the encounter itself with the subject of
interpretation does not change the inquirer's own world (HESSE,
1972: p.286). It is argued that intentions, meanings, motives,
do not pertain to hidden and private worlds of individuals' minds but
are ways of characterising observed actions.
Thus, human action may be accounted for by placing it into a purposeful
schema which would render intelligible the way in which the action
was performed in the light of the actor's physical and mental conditions:
his social and physical situation; his beliefs, values, norms;
his needs. In this sense,interpretation of an individual's actions
would involve demonstrating the reasons why some act took place: an
approach that would require a teleological rather than causal model
of explanation (WRIGHT, 1971s Ch.3). But placing the individual act
within a broader context(i.e. some "whole") of the actor's beliefs,
goals, circumstances, etc., does not complete its interpretation.
In addition, the context itself would have to be inquired into — in
the light of the particular act which has occurred within it — as
part of the oscillation process between part and whole that
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characterises hermeneutic approaches. Investigation of the social
context of some action would revolve around the specific rules and
conventions obtaining in it.
For instance, actions involving urban renewal and redevelopment can
only have intended meaning in a social context in which there are
constitutive rules for urban planning; rules which enable intelligent
distinctions to be drawn between the act of demolishing buildings,
say, as part of an exhibition of vandalism, or madness, or sadistic fain,
from the same act as part of a planned programme of improvement of
urban housing conditions. Rules of this kind in effect constitute
the possibility of claiming that a particular act takes place.
Take "social practices" such as the StockExchange, the housing
market, the justice system of juvenile delinquents, etc. It is not
possible to refer to some act as "stock transaction", "purchase of
a house", "decision of panel members in Children's Hearings" if there
are no rules which constitute what is to be "Stock Exchange", "housing
market", "panel members of Children's Hearings".
These rules of "practice" are implicitly and unquestioningly accepted
when referring to the above acts. Hence understanding an action
presupposes: (a) grasping the"form of life" or "practice" in which
it takes place; (b) clarifying the rules that constitute that
practice; and (c) relating these to other rules in society.
In addition, the existence of "social practices" presupposes a set
of shared meanings, conceptions, definitions, without, which they
would be inconceivable. For instance, the practice of commissioning
an architect to design some building presupposes a frame of shared
meanings, etc., regarding, say, conceptions of property rights and
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building regulations and standards; acting so as to meet the client's
brief without jeopardising professional integrity and the principles
of design; reconciling aesthetic requirements and budgetary constraints;
the need to meet deadlines; and the like. Such shared meanings may
be said to constitute a social practice. It is in terms of these
that social agents act and communicate.
There are many difficulties involved in attempting to discover what
these constitutive, shared meanings are for some particular"social
practice". A widely practised approach is to carry out "social
surveys" among relevant samples of population — which presupposes an
empiricist epistemology. This approach is criticised for failing
to accomplish its objectives of revealing what the shared meanings
are. Since it is in terms of the meanings sought — viz. in terms
of the questions that they are being asked — that individuals will
provide accounts of themselves and of their actions, social survey's
take for granted the constructed categories of the inquirer and
impose these on their subject matter. Thus they presuppose precisely
that which they seek to discover, that is, the framework of
constitutive meanings of ordinary language and experiences.
The conclusion of this critique suggests that inquiry into meanings
and beliefs may be carried out intelligibly only if the inquirer
places, himself outside the frame of ordinary language and attempts
to construct alternative conceptualisations which do not take for
granted the meaning categories whose discovery is sought.
Regarding, say, the "social practice" of the housing market, the
inquirer should seek to reveal the meanings that affect that "practice"—
e.g.conceptions of ownership, of acting so as to obtain the highest fair
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price for the property bought or sold,and the like. In this way, he
would be able to discover how the apparent behaviour that he observes
makes sense in terms of the constitutive meanings of that "practice".
Thus, he would make available the particular conceptual scheme which
directs and informs actions in ways in which these make sense.
This conceptual scheme, system of beliefs, or world outlook reflects
the notion of a "whole" in which particular sets of constitutive
meanings are interlinked. There results a systemic perspective
on social action — in its abstract characteristics rather than in
detail, for the proponents of this view would not associate
themselves with system Concepts ^^Grasping such a "whole" involves
associating the constitutive meanings of some "practice" in a society
— e.g. the housing market — with other sets of such meanings
pertaining to that society — e.g. the land market, the travel to
work, leisure and recreation activities — and thus discovering the
grouping and structuring of meanings in forming a "Weltanschauung"
or world view.
To achieve this movement from "part" (the specific "social practice")
to "whole" (the system of basic beliefs in society) necessitates
understanding of shared views of the world, society, culture, man.
More specifically to the context of urban planning, it would involve
understanding of views such as: (i) what it means to live in a house
with garden as opposed to a flat in a high-rise block; (ii) what is
the importance of being able to drive to work instead of having to
wait for public transport; (iii) what it feels to be the owner
of your house rather than a council tenant; and more general views
regarding: (iv) what is recreation rather than boredom and depression;
(v) what is the meaning of environmental amenity, privacy, the
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"good urban life" as opposed to land, air and noise pollution,
overcrowded living conditions, the stress of urban living; (vi)
shared views on community, public services, care and welfare,
conditions at work; (vii) conceptions of the authority that planners
should have over individuals' lives; etc.
In order to make transparent the obscured, taken for granted, shared '
meanings and assumptions about the world in general, and ■urban life
in particular, it is necessary to reveal the implicit frame of
meanings which defines social and natural realities in the particular
ways in which the actions that are to be interpreted make sense.
This is an approach which would require adoption of a philosophical
perspective on social life in attempting to sketch frames of meaning
and seeking to disclose the underlying conditions that render social
action meaningful in some frame of meaning or social context.
To remove such a philosophical perspective from social theorising is
said to lead to the separation of questions of knowledge from
questions of social action, practice, and values.
Interpreting meaningful human conduct in its social context brings to
light implicit and taken for granted assumptions of actors involved
regarding, say, the way in which they construe symbolic relations, or
the kinds of criteria of "rationality" that they employ in making
decisions in everyday life; and relates the importance of particular
acts to some totality so as to enable understanding which was hitherto
unavailable both to the observer/interpreter and to participating
members of social acts. As stated above ( p.369)> "this is an
exercise not unlike learning a language for meanings of acts are
defined as words in semantic fields. Faced with the sounds and
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symbols of a foreign language — or the rituals and social practices
of some alien culture — the inquirer has to make sense of particular
signs, words, expressions, sentences, texts (in ascending order of
complexity) by becoming familiar with the language as a whole.
This is not to simply arrive at lexical definitions of unknown words,
etc. but also to understand the underlying rules of grammar and sentence
construction peculiar to that language which constitute what is to
(77)
count as a meaningful utterance. The Wittgensteinian notion of
language as a "form of life" carries particular weight in this analogy.
There is thus a dimension of communication between the inquirer and
those whose actions are being inquired into. Since interpretation
ought to result in understanding of the latter's actions in the context
of some culture or society, the possibility of communication ensues
because the investigator has learned his way in that culture and
can engage in intelligent dialogue with its members. Dialogue
involves interlocutors understanding each other's language — or
form of life. But dialogue is a two-way process and therefore the
inquirer both influences and is being influenced by the subjects he
studies. In one set of views, the only true account of how social
action comes into being, and what its real nature is, is to be
provided by the social agents themselves. This seems to be true
in the sense that what social actors believe must be the motivational
"force" underlying their actions — assuming that beliefs and actions
are not independent of one another. It also cannot be true to the
extent that it is not certain that what the social agents believe
to be true is in fact so. False beliefs in actors' minds may also
give rise to actions.
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A methodological approach that denies the inquirer the prerogative
to probe the validity of beliefs of social agents in studying their
actions would result in impoverished, often erroneous results.
Thus, interpretation is to involve dialogue: it is to be a two-way
process. Uni-directional processes of investigation, viz. in terms
either only of agents' accounts of their actions or only of the
inquirer's construals of such actions, would not provide a complete
account of the situation. The interpretative process is further
complicated by the fact that the accounts given by agents of their
own actions are already interpreted by them in the sense of being
"glossed over" in the light of their views of themselves and others.
The task of the investigator then becomes one of interpreting
already interpreted material hence he is involved in a "double
hermeneutic" process (GIDDENS, 1976).
By being able to communicate with those whom he studies the inquirer
opens up new directions and perspectives on the world. Both he
and the social agents are enlightened as a result of dialogue and
are able to grasp the implicit frames of meaning, presuppositions,
and hitherto obscured rules directing their actions. As a result
they may decide to modify their beliefs, value assumptions, practical
philosophies. Dialogue is entered into in order to reach consensus.
The knowledge that ensues is assessed by its relevance in attaining
consensus, i.e. enhanced communication and understanding. Thus there
is a -practical aspect in the character of interpretative or hermeneutic
knowledge to the extent that "it is capable of sustaining a moral
community" (BAHNES, 1977s P»17) — what Habermas refers to as the
"practical" guiding interests of hermeneutic/historical knowledge
(HABERMAS, 1968/1971).
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The knowledge that is procured "by interpretation and understanding
of social action through dialogue is useful in "social practices" such
as urban planning for it can be applied to social life. Its
contribution consists in enhancing communication among individuals
within some social context and between different contexts, and removing
obstacles to and distortions and false beliefs from understanding and
acting. It enables those involved in successful dialogue to see
themselves in new ways and act accordingly. There follows that it
is conceivable to adopt an interactionist perspective on urban
planning which would be founded on the main principles of an
interpretative/hermeneutic approach. It would not be a perspective
that stresses direct action upon some subject matter, with a view to
effecting desired changes, independently of that subject matter.
Rather it would involve engaging in dialogue and communication to
reach consensus and understanding; to illuminate concealed distortions
of everyday life which underlie problematic situations; to come to
know the rules, norms, and principles directing action — so that
proposed planned action is not outside the frame of meaning within
which social action makes sense; and in the light of knowledge so
created to come to look upon the world from a modified and improved
viewpoint which will inform future action. Hence planned direct
action by a centralised authority in a social vacuum is replaced
by a process of decentralised pluralistic learning through dialogue.
In this way, it becomes possible to come to recognise problems which
give rise to differences of views, divergence of opinion and
arguments, and distortions, and attempt to collectively and
harmoniously remove or improve upon them thus fulfilling expectations
and "fixing beliefs".
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Individuals are assisted through communication and discourse to see
themselves in different ways and so take themselves the requisite steps
to change disturbing and problematic conditions in their lives:
conditions that gave rise to the dialectical process in the first
place. Successful dialogue, viz. reaching consensus and harmonious
communication is the test of the "truth" of interpretative accounts
for only then do they cohere and make sense within some social context.
Interpreting actions which are obstructing communicative interaction
appears to be the main task of this approach. A plan as an action
hypothesis which is put forward as an interpretation of what the
individuals concerned really need in order to change problematic
conditions is only regarded successful if it is accepted by those
individuals as a potentially true account of themselves and their
needs, wants, desires. Thus, a proposal for planned action is
appropriate only if both the planners and the planned come to speak
the same language, and hold convergent views on the actions, beliefs,
purposes, and needs of the planned. This requires convergence and
reciprocity of perspectives between plannersand the planned. Plans
are to have meaning and consequences for the planned and the extent
to which this is the case can only be revealed by the understanding
of those concerned.
Aspects of the interpretative approach to social studies may be
identified in the work of the so-called "new humanists" regarding
the planning of societal affairs (DUNN, 1971), (FEIEDMANN, 1973).
They draw on Mannheim's historicism and evolutionary perspective
on society and employ a learning process analogy to characterise
evolution as a process of social learning. As a stage in social
evolution planning makes use of knowledge of society to guide its
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development. Their approach transcends the fact/value dichotomy
and requires planners to explore the ethical content of their goals
for action (knowledge, or theory, originating from the expert of
planner is to be related to ethics, or "practice"); but also politicians
to seek to relate their "practical" concerns with scientifically valid
knowledge. On Friedmann's account, the conception of a learning
society necessitates a compatible view of societal guidance and action.
Planning on the technological model of a policy science is criticised
and its replacement is advocated.
The proposed alternative consists in a decentralised structure composed
of several units — a pluralistic arrangement — in which project-
orientated groups attempt to establish and enhance uncoerced communication
and dialogue with the planned and promote mutual learning.
By proposing a dialectical relation between knowledge and action,
between theory and practice, social experimentation becomes possible in
which action hypotheses are tested in relevant social contexts and so
are subjected to the possibility of being proved misconstrued accounts
of goals, purposes, desires, values, of the individuals concerned.
The latter's critical view of society and self-reflection and criticism
guides the process of reaching consensus on arrangements of means to
sw
satisfy certain ends, but also on the ends of action for they are both
to be assessed concurrently and continuously, in the dialectical process
involving communicating planners and planned.
The planner who is in communication with the planned puts forward his
point of view as an account of problematic conditions, and makes
transparent to the individuals concerned hitherto obscured aspects
of their situation. His role is educative for as a result of
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consensus reached in dialogue social agents may come to see those
aspects from the planner's point of view and so render this a "true"
account of their needs. Thus, there is psycho-social development
of the planned in the course of their participation in dialogue and
socialised learning. But learning is to he mutual and hence the
planner may acquire information from his subjects which will modify
his point of view since his account will have been shown invalid in
the absence of consensus in dialogue.
In terms not specific to the new humanism in planning, interpretative
approaches to the study of social life and their conception of
"practice" — or translation of knowledge into social and political
action involving normative considerations — may be said to suffer
from the failure of idealist approaches to allow for structural and
material aspects of society which create the conditions for social
action. They introduce a perspective on social life which eschews
considerations of the ways in which the physical environment impinges
upon man and moulds his beliefs, his practical philosophy and his
ways of coping with the problems of everyday life and accomplishing
his projects. Unless the conditions of such man-environment
interaction are taken into account, the social agent's beliefs about
himself and others cannot be fully grasped for they also arise outside
of the limits of the realm of symbolic interaction.
Consequently, speaking of enhancing communication and promoting
dialogue in order to reach consensus ought to be based on an analysis
of the structural conditions in which successful communication
processes could be instigated. In the absence of such considerations,
the formulation of some shceme or interpretative account (or action
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hypothesis) and its presentation to the individuals concerned in the
expectation that it will enlighten them and make them adopt new ways
of looking at the world seems to be constrained from the start.
The reasons why individuals insist on maintaining their beliefs and
practical philosophies are many and cannot be enumerated and analysed
here — though some brief mention of them was made above (pp.273-275)•
Social agents do tend to hold on to their views of their situation
and of how this could be improved and hence resist being "educated"
and "taught" what they ought to think — given uncoerced communication.
This is bound to block dialogue and the reaching of consensus for such
are the reasons why disagreements emerge between individuals in
everyday life. Thus, if there is no structural dimension in the
knowledge contained in interpretative accounts it will not be known
how some social structural characteristics impose certain constraints
on the unlimited action choices of individual agents and evoke some
particular response rather than any other. Moreover, the intentional
actions of individual agents do not always produce strictly intended
consequences but also result in many unforeseen repercussions for
some social totality which are not captured in interpretation of social
agents' accounts of their intentions, motives, reasons for action.
One kind of unintended consequence is that social actions tend to
reinforce and maintain community structure which is not something
as fluid as ideas in people's minds. By seeking to establish
coherence of interpretative accounts within some frame of meaning or
context and so reach consensus in dialogue an interpretative approach
appears to implicitly accept and pursue "order" and continuity
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in society which may not be warranted given the many structural
conflicts that can be recognised in any society. This effort to
establish consensus and continuity may be taken to suggest political
characterisations of conservatism in reconciling social agents
with the 'status quo' of the existing social order. However,
others impute to these interpretative approaches pluralistic and
even radical political orientations.
The charge of conservatism is said to be justified since there is
no critical perspective of existing states of affairs: the
orientation to the planning of societal arrangements is one of
order rather than change. Taking all problematic situations to
ensue from breakdowns in communication between interacting
individuals, interpretative approaches reduce all communication
difficulties to false beliefs and ideas that individuals have
regarding the meaning they ascribe to their actions and world
views as well as to those of their interlocutors. The interpretative
task of illuminating hitherto concealed distortions in beliefs
and understanding of meanings — and so modifying and/or removing the
erroneous views and action assumptions of the social agents concerned
which will enable consensus to be reached once more — may be regarded
seriously deficient to the extent that it regards conflicts in social
life as merely the outcome of false or distorted ideas which social
agents hold of aspects of their social reality (FAY,1975: PP«91-92).
Thus, such idealist views,whenever they are advanced as theories of
society,are themselves subject to criticism: that is, that they
tend to preoccupy themselves with the problems of subjectively
meaningful human conduct and neglect other, equally important aspects
of human life concerning man's practical involvements in activities
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based on material concerns. For it is not possible to ignore the
argument that "... the social world is not only structured by
language but also by the modes and forces of material production and
by the system of domination" (DEEITZEL, 1970 : p.xvii). This latter
view reflects the thesis of the contemporary social philosopher
Jurgen Habermas, who writes in the tradition of the critical theorists
of the so-called Frankfurt School.
In his Critical Theory of society Habermas endeavours to bring
together both material and meaning aspects of social life. Habermas'
work is extensively informed by hermeneutic philosophy, especially
by the writings of Gadamer. Hermeneutics attempts to comprehend—
unlike a pure phenomenology of the social world — the historical
perspective of social action as well as the structural context of
meaningful action. Because phenomenology starts from the individual,
it is criticised for failing to provide a way of grasping the supra-
individual whole of a societal outlook or a cultural system.
Hermeneutics claims to be able to remedy this inadequacy by : (i)
retaining the phenomenological intuition through which it gains
insights in the existential meanings of historical individuals, and
(ii) grasping structural wholes, thus resolving the tension between
structure and the existential individual (WOLFF, 1975 '• pp.130-13l)«
Now, Habermas recognises the importance of language in social life
and the significance of interpretation to all forms of social inquiry;
and concedes that understanding is attained through discourse.
However, he stresses that the study of human activity cannot be purely
hermeneutic (or, for that matter, purely phenomenological). For the
rules of interpretation of social situations, actions, meanings, etc.
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are not invariant essences of the social life-world but are
themselves subject to the influence of other social processes, such
as relations of power, authority, and material production (labour).
Although this is very much work still in progress rather than a
finally elaborated statement, it seems that this direction of
research is valid and worthy of further investigation. However,
there are certain basic objections to the substantive content of the
synthesis put forward by Habermas.
The difficulties that are often involved in fully grasping the
meaning of Habermas' work may be attributed — apart from imperfections
inherent in any translation from a foreign language — to the demands
it makes on the reader in terms of knowledge of the particular
tradition in German philosophy that informs it. His view of science
emerges as an instrumentalist one : knowledge is not seen as the
product of contemplative disinterested activity but as A social
product of scientific community whose members apprehend reality in
terms of instrumental interests of prediction and control (HESSE,
1972: p.285). These interests are taken to be integrally linked
within the process of generation and evaluation of knowledge.
Existing systems of instrumental activity are taken to impose
corresponding organisational patterns on experience, and thus to
determine what is to be regarded as "facts" or "data". "Knowledge
constitutive interests" in forecasting and control form the foundation
and justification of science — the latter being the most highly
developed kind of instrumentally oriented knowledge.
Human interests are seen as varied in Habermas® writings: they are
not restricted solely to those that are instrumental but include
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"practical"and "emancipatory" ones as well. These other interests
guide the search for knowledge which is said to be as valid as
scientific/instrumental knowledge. Thus "practical" interests inform
hermeneutic/historical knowledge. "Practical"(and practice) is taken
to refer to the ethical, moral, or political realm: what Aristotle
refers to as "praktike" (Nicomachean Ethics; bk.6, chs.2 and 5)
which also comprises rhetoric and poetics. Practical interests also
require collection and study of available data but such data are
different in kind and less stable from the data of natural science
for they arise out of human endeavour. In engaging in practical
inquiry, interest is not only focused on what things are 1— knowledge
of which is not sufficient in itself for "practice" — but also on
what could be done about them. Practical interests guide hermeneutic/
historical knowledge leading to improved communication and consensus
among social agents. Moreover, "emancipatory" interests also guide
their corresponding form of knowledge which involves critical activity
as self-reflection and liberation from both institutionalised and
self-imposed, hitherto unimagined or concealed forms of domination.
The differences between hermeneutic and scientific knowledge, both in
terms of guiding interests of cognition and of subject matter, are
pronounced in Habermas' account. Hermeneutic knowledge is to be
assessed not in terms of instrumental results, as is scientific
knowledge, but rather in terms of its success in enhancing communication
and mutual understanding among human individuals and in promoting
(81)
consensus. Such knowledge is produced by interpreting thought
and action as "meaningful stuff" which can only make sense if it is
related to and coheres within some broader whole, some postulated
frame of meaning. "Meaning" is not to be restricted to
meaning in the epistemology of natural science — viz. as
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presupposing "an account of the empirical reference of terms and
of their intensional connotations" (HESSE, 1972: p.278) — but is
to have "implications for the data that go beyond the external
semantics of language" (ibid.: p.279). Thus the data of hermeneutic
knowledge are said to be constituted by "meaning" for they are
produced in intentional human communication involving use of language.
To obtain hermeneutic or historical knowledge involves a continuous
movement between meaningful parts or "data" and a hypothetical "whole"
or frame of meaning. The movement is circular — the "hermeneutic
circle" — for the way in which the parts are looked at is determined
by the hypotheses regarding the "whole"; and these are in turn
intelligible only in the light of the parts. Hence there is no way
of carrying out independent tests of hypotheses about the parts for
the parts themselves are perceived in terms of those hypotheses and
are constituted by them. There is no independent reality to provide
a stable reference point. Such hypotheses can be adjudged in terms
of their coherence and plausibility within a general interpretation
of some frame of meaning or totality.
The nature of human thought and action with its peculiar features of
context-dependency, instability and elusiveness, and variability, is
well reflected in hermeneutic knowledge which endeavours to grasp it
in terms and language that is compatible with the shifting realities
of everyday life and the continuous production and reproduction of
meanings in communication. Reaching agreement on plausibility and
coherence of some interpretation is a problem which, for Habermas, is
to be solved in an analogous way to that of reaching consensus in
everyday life — viz. on a dialogue or dialectic model of knowledge.
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"Objective" assessment is guaranteed through the participation in
dialogue between the inquirer and those that are inquired into in
which reciprocal interaction is taking place. If communication is
impeded and consensus is disturbed, hermeneutic knowledge is said
to fail. Engaging in communication to reach consensus — not
enforced consensus but one to be attained by partners in dialogue —
produces knowledge which is assessed in terms of the extent to which
it is instrumental in arriving at such consensus.
This circle of interpretation (hermeneutic circle) is taken by many
to constitute the epistemological predicament of all knowledge,
including scientific knowledge (TAYLOR, 1971). However, Habermas
regards such a conception of hermeneutic knowledge as appropriate to
the human sciences and as coming into total contrast with what he
takes to be the scientific/instrumental account of knowledge. But his
conception of "positivist"science upon which he bases his assessment
and critique is one that is now generally accepted to have been
discredited in the light of advances in the "newer" philosophy of
science. Such developments have led away from the classical
empiricist model of science to several post-empiricist accounts of
scientific knowledge. They have tended to show that there are
essential similarities between scientific and hermeneutic knowledge.
To the extent that Habermas disregards these developments the
validity of his critique of science as "positivist"/instrumental is
seriously diminished.
The claim regarding continuity between the hermeneutic model of knowledge
and the views of science which are informed by history or "ordinary language"
analysis may be easily substantiated by considering the points of
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contrast that are raised in Eabermas' comparison between "positivist"/
instrumental natural science (P) and human science (H), and by viewing
these in the light of general features of the post-empiricist accounts
of science (C). The following five points may be said to summarise
the differences between (p) and (H), and reveal the similarities
between (H) and (C) (HESSE, 1972: pp.277-280).
I. Theory and observation:
(P): All knowledge is ultimately founded in experience and sensory
perception. Empirical facts are possible to describe objectively
in some theory-free observation or data language. Validity of
statements can be tested objectively and independently of theoretical
explanations.
(H): Pacts cannot be independent from some more general theoretical
interpretation (part/whole relations of hermeneutics) since they are
constituted in the light of that interpretation and are reconstructed
as a result of it.
(c): There is no independent language of observation detached from
the language of theory: all observables are theory-loaded. What is
to be taken as data is interpreted in terms of some general way of
looking at the world. Pates are themselves reconstructed in terms
of some theoretical interpretation.
II. Nature of theories:
(p): Theories follow the logic of hypothesis and deduction and their
validity depends on the extent to which they correspond to reality.
(H): Theories do not seek deductive explanations but rather attempt to
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accurately reconstruct facts; they are assessed in terms of the
coherence of their interpretation of the meanings and intentions of
social agents within some frame of meaning.
(C): Theories are not models (representations of the world) cast in
a hypothetico-deductive schema and assessed independently in terms
of correspondence with facts. Rather they are ways of looking at
facts and providing plausible and coherent accounts of them.
A "currently accepted" theory determines the categories of observation
and, in some views, is accepted on wholly non-empirical grounds —
thus being difficult to demarcate from myth or metaphysics.
III. Laws and theories;
(P): Empirical law-like relations are external both to the objects
that are related and to the inquirer.
(H): The internal relations that constitute the subject matter of
the human sciences involve a double hermeneutic: (a) human relations
are constituted in interaction which involves interpretation and
negotiated performances of thinking, intentional subjects; (b) such
relations are mental for they are the product of interpretation of
the investigator which involves human rather than natural categories
of understanding.
(C): Law-like relations that are asserted of experience are not
external but internal. For facts are constituted in terms of the way




(P): The language employed in science is exact and can he formalised:
meanings of terms are stable and unambiguous and independent of
context.
(H): Language in social studies is inevitably ambiguous, imprecise,
and context-dependent.
(C): The language of science is essentially metaphorical and inexact;
when it is formalised it suffers distortion and is unduly detached
from context.
V. Meanings:
(P): Meanings in natural science are distinct from facts.
(H): Pacts such as intentional action, social norms, roles, etc,
cannot be divorced from their meanings for social actors and are
constituted by such meanings.
(C): Scientific theory determines the meanings of facts. Meanings are
understood in terms of their coherence within the theory rather than
by correspondence with facts.
The above very rough outline indicates that if hermeneutic knowledge
is said to be "socially sustained" so is all knowledge (according
to post-empiricist accounts) as a"set of agreed conventions" (BARNES,
1977: pp.18-19): " knowledge is primarily instrumental, in the
sense that it is generated and evaluated in a way that is pre-organised
by an interest in prediction and control, and normative, in the
sense that it is sustained by a communal consensus which is decided .
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and not a rational necessity ..... All knowledge is actively produced "by
men with particular technical interests in particular contexts; its
significance and its scope can never be generalised to the extent
that no account is taken of those contexts and interests".
The nature of scientific knowledge may be viewed as a product of
historical development. Representations of reality in theories and
models are constructed from already existing "cultural resources"
and must be accounted for "as developments within an ongoing cultural
tradition" (ibid. : p.20).
The implications from this discussion are that scientific study of
social life following a post-empiricist account of science does not
appear to be at great variance with the humanistic ideal of hermeneutic
knowledge of human conduct in its social and historical context.
There are clearly general methodological characteristics of post-
empiricist science which correspond to characteristics of hermeneutic
methods in the human sciences. But this does not render natural
scientific method non-objective or even wholly subjective for
hermeneutics seeks "to make explicit the conditions of objectivity
of the method of dialogue" (HESSE, 1972: p.288). Moreover, complete
identification of the two methodological approaches is difficult to
conceive for it is not possible to take nature as a "partner in dialogue".
But to regard nature as known externally by the behaviour it exhibits,, .
and man as known internally through an understanding of his motives,
intentions, reasons, feelings, etc. for action would result in
complete separation of man from his environment as an ontological
belief,which is an absurd conclusion to reach. But it is as
unacceptable as the brand of naturalism which rejects any distinction
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between man and nature. However neither of these views can be
regarded as being sustained by the implications of natural science.
If a method for human studies is required to be informed by hermeneutics
on the dialogue model of knowledge^2^ the requisite understanding
of social life cannot be meaningfully divorced from an understanding
of the ways in which man's environment impinges upon his conduct,
and vice versa.
The categories of biological theories of evolution, genetics, or
ecology — such as functionality, survival, selection — are already
influenced by the views man holds of himself; and the theories
themselves involve human values (HESSE, 1972; p.292). Moreover, .
it is generally accepted that theories make extensive use of culturally
given elements in society, metaphorical and metaphysical; "society
interprets itself to itself partly by means of its view of nature".
To claim that this is not so is not independent of some view taken
of the relationship of man to his environment for it involves acceptance of
thepossibility to study them completely independently of one another.
In this sense nature may be said to participate in the dialectical
processes involving communication between human individuals. In its
involvement in such a dialogue nature is ascribed meanings which
may be regarded as amenable to hermeneutic understanding (ibid.).
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7. Epilogue to humanism and introduction to the perspective
of science.
The perspectives that were explored in chapters four and five share
the views that form and content of inquiry are intimately interlinked;
that the method employed in the study of some subject matter imposes
a definite pattern upon the way in which it is looked at and influences
the theories about it; that cognitive inquiry is not a one-way process
either from the environment towards man, as in classical empiricism,
or from man towards the environment; that there is an interaction
between the knower and the known; that the relationship between
theory and "practical" activity involving moral and political choices
is a strong and intelligible one unlike what is claimed in views
which postulate a sharp separation between facts and values*
Several implications for urban planning were taken to ensue from
accepting interdependence of theory and method. The field attempts
to relate thought and action upon an essentially social subject matter
and hence its methods and procedures of inquiry should be compatible
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with the substantive concerns of planning. This immediately raises
the question whether the"methods and procedures of natural science"
are appropriate in the study of those aspects of social life which
fall within the interests of planning; whether some naturalistic
programme is compatible with the type of"inquiry" in which planning
is engaging in seeking to relate knowledge of the world to action
upon it.
The view postulating interdependence between theory and method in
planning cannot be reconciled with nositivist/naturalist views of
knowledge and inquiry. In these views, what _is is strictly separated
from the realm of decisions,ethics and politics of what ought to be.
The result of the latter distinction between is_ and ought is taken
to be a conception of planning founded on the model of technology in
which specific goals are supplied externally to the process of inquiry.
The task is then one of carrying out disinterested and value-
indifferent analysis of facts, apply positive knowledge of the world
to predict consequences of combinations of means which satisfy stated
ends, assess the results on some measurement scale of utilities to
arrive at firm choices,provide these as input information to the
actual decision making process which is essentially political and
outside of planning proper involving ethical choices, negotiations,
and bargaining with diverse interest groups. In this view, the ends
of planning cannot legitimately enter into scientific discourse for
they are socially relative, matters of individual preference rather
than relating to universally acceptable norms.
The alternative conceptualisations of the relationship between knowledge
and action that are briefly sketched above tend to reject this view of
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technological planning and postulate a much closer relationship
between theory and method, facts and values, knowledge and political
and moral decision, the planners and the planned. Their humanistic
interests guide them to either accept science but confine it to
limited and specific functions in the whole edifice of knowledge/action
(as in critical theories of society) or to discount the possibility
of a scientific contribution in social theorising and acting (as in
interpretative approaches).
However, if these serious epistemological and methodological issues
are to be settled at all, then the scientific view must also be
examined and assessed as to its potential contribution in solving
problems of the social world. This is where discussion now turns
with certain limited goals of broadly describing the "classical account"
of science and "scientific method", reviewing the objections to it
that were advanced by writers in the "newer" philosophy of science,
and investigating the constraints between a scientific (objective)
and a non-scientific (subjective) study of social life. This will
lead towards the conception of planning which accepts strong links
between theories and models in the field and a scientific approach
to acquiring and systematising knowledge of the world of experience —
of society and nature.
In the course of the discussion, increasing attention will be given to
the constructs that are known as models for these are often said
to constitute an essential component of "scientific method", but also
because they are 'par excellence' the most widely employed vehicles
for theoretical formulation and conceptualisation in research for
urban planning. Planners tend to take a pragmatic view of models
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as more or less successful instruments for forecasting, control,
monitoring plan performance, and the like'and do not often concern
themselves with the substantive content of these constructs and the
range of implicit ontological and epistemological presuppositions that
underlie their formulation and use. However, as will hopefully be
shown below, much of human thought and knowledge is based on
metaphorical and analogical relations in which models play a prominent
role as part of man's cultural inheritance. As will become clear,
traditional views of science allow only "objectivist" methods in
acquiring and validating claims to knowledge, but this creates a
situation in which the ways in which theories are invented are not
accounted for ( context of discovery), and are often delegated to the
realm of psychology and divorced from the logic of justification.
Such views are criticised by two different groups:
(a) Those who accept "objectivist" methods but seek to incorporate
into "scientific method" an account of discovery as well as
justification — in one set of views which will be discussed in some
length, models and analogies provide the linking medium between invention
and justification.
(b) Those who take scientific knowledge as not independent of culturally
and historically given elements in society and regard science as an
essentially social activity with its own rules of community. For them
anything known is known as_ something and is construed from some point
of view which is guided by specific interests of inquiry, including
prediction and control, convenience and economy, elegance, originality,
form and other aesthetic criteria. They advance a view of models
which requires them to retain their "as if" quality in order to provide
an awareness of the metaphorical element in what is taken as literal.
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Models as elaborations of metaphors would regard, say, the Cartesian
"machine of nature" in an "as if" rather than literal sense, as a
notion useful for such purposes as conceptualisation, discovery,
or prediction.
The distinction between those two broad views is often referred to as
the dispute between "realism" and "instrumentalism". It relates to
a fundamental issue in the philosophy of science which concerns the
way in which knowledge is conceived: (i) as the product of
disinterested contemplation of individual scientists objectively and
passively observing nature and formulating descriptions which are to
correspond to it — much like a picture is to correspond to real
appearances; (ii) as a social product and part of the cultural
tradition of man, which is developed and redeveloped and adjusted to
serve particular interests such as prediction and control — knowledge
whose understanding must be related to the specific socio-cultural
context within which it arises. These distinctions are given
consideration below in the context of discussing what is referred to
as the "method of science.
C-HAPTER SIX
The perspective of science.
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Introduction: statement of intent.
This part of the thesis sets out to examine aspects of what is often
referred to as the "method of science", and hence it is essentially
philosophical in orientation and content. It undertakes to penetrate,
without venturing into great depths, certain areas of intellectual
endeavour which lie in the realm of the philosophy of science. The
epistemological and methodological issues that are touched upon in
the ensuing discussion have engaged the attention of many gifted
minds ever since man began to contemplate and philosophise about the
world around him and his own existence. The discourse does not
follow the spirit of critical philosophywhere attempts to define
complex concepts tend to exhaust the efforts of a lifetime. Instead,
words are used in a rough, intuitive, commonsensical way, usually in
a rather broad sense much as in the thinking of Ancient Greek
philosophy. If this approach is accepted — though potential
criticisms for a certain lack of precision and avoidance of technical
points may be well aimed — then it becomes possible to reflect on
the subject as a whole. This is an important objective of this part
of the dissertation for it is recognised that without such
generalisation there can be no schematisation.
The approach that has been adopted towards various pertinent issues
is not claimed to be either exhaustive or extensive or proceeding in
any great profundity. The fairly well delimited objectives of this
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part, as well as those of the thesis as & whole, are being constantly
monitored throughout the discussion so as to avoid tempting but
unnecessary excursions into associated fields of knowledge. The
purpose of this part is to relate what has come to be called
"the scientific method" — which is said to be employed in acquiring
knowledge in the natural sciences — with approaches to the study
of the world of man and society, in general, and urban planning, in
particular. This discussion precedes the examination of models as
devices used in the context of scientific inquiries, which is
arranged in Part Two of the dissertation.
More specifically, this part of the thesis is concerned with
the scientific enterprise. After introducing science as a system
for ordering human experiences of and reasoning about the world
of nature and — on some views — about the world of man and society,
consideration is given to the scope and goals of scientific inquiry
and to the way these issues are investigated by the branch of
philosophy known as "the philosophy of science". The distinction
between sciences dealing with processes of logic and reasoning
in general (formal sciences) and sciences whose task is the
systematisation of empirical knowledge of the world (empirical
sciences) leads to the issue of whether there are identifiable
connections between logical form and empirical content of scientific
investigations — or between methods and substantive content of
inquiry. Two alternative views of this problem are referred to
and their implications are traced for the so-called "methodological
debate" in the social sciences and the distinction between procedural
and substantive aspects of urban planning. The view of methods
ho5.
of inquiry that is accepted in this thesis is one which takes such
methods not as neutral, atheoretical instruments or techniques
of research, but rather as devices whose use entails the acceptance
of certain ontological and epistemological presuppositions and hence
is not independent of particular ways of looking at the world and
of conceptions of science. Some associated arguments from the
"newer philosophy of science" are also reviewed and are seen to
support this view of methods of inquiry; as are certain perspectives
of so-called "humanistic" social thought.
The aspects of "scientific method" that are examined from a more
or less neutral philosophical point of view — to the extent that
this is possible — concern: (i) the general question of whether
there is an identifiable "method of science" which is universally
accepted and adhered to in the practice of scientific research;
(ii) the issue of whether "scientific method", to the extent that
it exists, may be said to encompass either a "logic of discovery" or
a "logic of justification", or both. Two accounts of "scientific
method" are investigated and critically assessed, viz. the inductive-
deductive and the hypothetico-deductive schemes of scientific
reasoning. An attempt is made to roughly synthesise the various
strands of the discussion as it has developed up to this stage by
distinguishing between absolutist and relativist conceptions of
thr growth of scientific knowledge. Certain advantages —but
also difficulties — of relativist views are pointed out and it
becomes clear that the perspective adopted in this dissertation has
been informed by those views. Attention is next focused on certain
aspects of the "methodological debate" in the social sciences where
naturalist and antinaturalist arguments are reviewed and contrasted.
406.
Finally implications are drawn for the process of acquiring knowledge
and the content of such knowledge in the field of -urban planning,
with special reference to models of urban social-spatial organisation.
Planning is viewed as a field of endeavour where the theoretical and
the practical not only meet but rather ought to be integrally
connected. The "paradigm" of planning which is informed by the
technological approach of applied science is examined, and the
role of models of the urban social/spatial structure in it is
specified. The view of science which permeates technological
planning is the "orthodox" logical empiricist account which
postulates a sharp distinction between facts and values and parallels
this with the divide between means and ends. However, planning
on the "model of technology" need not be informed by that particular
view of science. Alternative conceptions of science do not suffer
from the limitations of the positivist view — though it is possible
that they would face different kinds of difficulties.
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1. Reality, its experience by man, and systems for ordering experiences.
Human thought is directed towards knowledge,or towards action, or
both. The existence of 'thought' proper entails the ability to
formulate questions about knowledge and action in words. By
definition, words are parts of a language. A language is a set of
signs used by intelligent beings to take cognizance of and to
distinguish recurrent elements in their experience and in reality,
for a variety of purposes. A language must provide the means for
differentiating and/or dividing reality into the parts and sections
which represent- constant subjects of reference. To identify
and discriminate between elements in reality as constant subjects of
(1)
reference is to distinguish persistent things. Reality x ' must
(2)
unavoidably be thought of as consisting of persisting thingsv /or
events (or processes) of different types and kinds.
It appears that no theoretical limit can be set to the number of
different ways in which reality could be divided into recurrent
elements for the purposes of thought and action. In their attempts
to state the relation of man's thought and knowledge to reality most
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philosophers have either attempted to set some limits to what can
be counted as 'reality* or to what can be counted as 'thought* or
'knowledge'. In the post-Kantian period of philosophy it has been
evident that the issue resolves into one question only. This question
concerns the conditions necessary for making statements and for
making any recognisable distinction between 'truth' and 'falsity'
while referring to reality (HAMPSHIRE, 1959: Ch.1). Harre views
reality (the world) as consisting of • "... numerous, fairly permanent
structures, some compact enough to be called things, which are
organised in various ways, that is, there are numerous fairly
permanent units, having internal structures and being parts of larger
structures which persist through certain kinds of change, but not
through other kinds" (HABEE, 1970: p.10).
'Event' is a convenient notion under which all possible occurences
may be considered. Distinction between classes of external and
internal events in relation to man has been suggested by many workers.
This rests on the consciousness that man develops as a discrete
entity, distinct from his surroundings. External events are taken
to be things that occur outside the human body, in the environment;
while internal events refer to occurrences within the body, such as
emotion, desire, physical pain, thought. An event is considered
external or internal according to human perception of its location.
The latter has been proved to be inaccurate on many instances (e.g.
optical illusions). This approach should not be confused with
empiricist theories of perception descending from Berkeley and
Hume, according to which human beings are passive observers receiving
impressions from 'outside' of the mind, where the 'outside* includes
their own bodies. The mistake in this position may be said to
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be the failure to acknowledge that the standpoint of the observer is
one physical fact among others, and that the observer is always a
self-moving body among the bodies which he observes and intentionally
manipulates. Human beings must be considered simultaneously as
(3)
observers, and agents, and as language-users. '
An event and its experience by man are not always identical (e.g.
mirages, optical illusions). Experience is the perception or
awareness of an event by man : it is taken to be more important in
structuring man's world than the event(s)that provoked it. Many
writers express doubts about the existence of a distinction between
internal and external experiences, that is, between experiences induced
by internal events, and experiences evoked by external events in the
environment of man. Events that are perceived to be located in the
external world are heavily overlaid by internal unexperienced events.
Immediate stimuli may be external but the experience they provoke
depends on internal event(s) (e.g. attitudes that an individual has
developed, which affect the perception external stimuli meet).
Ultimately, all experience is internal in that man experiences
within himself events which may occur either in the environment or
internally. One has to explain one's references to one's own
sensations and impressions by references to the physical things
or events with which they are in some way associated.
The debate surrounding the relations between things and ideas , that
is, between the so-called 'real' world of materials and events on
the one side, and the ideas about or experiences of the world which
exist in man's mind, on the other side, has a long and thorny
history dating back in clear form at least to Plato in the fifth
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century B.C. It is inevitable to assume some position, implicitly
or explicitly, with respect to this debate in the discussion of a
number of subjects that are touched upon in this dissertation.
On one set of views which might be referred to as empiricist, whatever
the nature of the 'real' world outside men's minds, we know nothing
about that world until we receive information about it. All such
information is derived initially through our senses, and we think
and behave about the 'real' world solely on the basis of this
information. Although non-sensory informational inputs (e.g. extra¬
sensory perception or divine revelation, if and to the extent that
they operate) cannot be considered«a priori1 impossible, they code
their informational content in the repertoire of concepts that are
already familiar to.the recipient. Therefore, on this account,
the basic premiss is that human behaviour (in terms of thought
and action) is based on our information about things and not on
the nature of things.We thus appear as "spectators" of our world:
the etymology of "theory"(0ewp6q= spectator in Greek)emphasises this point.
This view of knowing has informed the extreme (and rather dated)
logical positivist or logical empiricist theses which claim that
all knowledge and understanding can be developed exclusively through
sense experiences and their logical and mathematical treatment,
independently of philosophical presuppositions and introspective
and intuitional efforts (JOAD, 1950: pp.21-31). This positivist
school of thought of the late 1920s by invoking a principle of
verification declared all discourses about realms that lay beyond
experience, in short about all metaphysics, as meaningless since
they were composed of statements incapable of empirical verification.
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One of the main problems of this position was faced in establishing
the way in which such a principle could be formulated. Modifications
of the early positivist accounts by contemporary philosophers, such
as (HEMFEL, 1956: pp.lfl-63), (CARHAP, 1956: pp.38-76), (NAGEL, 1961),
and (BRAITHWAITE, 1953)» suggest that those early views were
(ct)
unproductive.
The positivist position is further challenged by several recent
views which question the meaningfulness of the concept of an
observation language (as opposed to that of a theoretical language)
in the absence of a theory. It is purported that the presuppositions
of all methods employed by philosophers in their dealing with
theoretical terms, that is, assumptions that the latter have to be
explained by means of observation terms, etc. are falsa.
Particularly, it is suggested that there does not exist , in any
important sense, "... a distinction between two languages", that is,
between the so-called theoretical and observation languages, but
rather "... different kinds of uses within the same language ....
The fact that we somehow understand, learn and use observation terms
does not in the least imply that the way in which we understand,learn and
use them is either different from or irrelevant to the way we
understand, learn and use theoretical terms" (HESSE, 197M PP-9-10).
Experiences are generally manipulated by intelligent beings into
meaningful patterns by combining and storing information received
in different spatio-temporal contexts so as to enable man to have
more information at any one moment in time than is being received
at that moment through his senses. Is has not been possible to identify
the precise reasons why the need should prevail to order experiences.
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However, the existence of comprehensive ordering systems explaining
experiences in a wide range of cultural milieux is ample evidence
(6)
of the universality of this need. ' The necessity to order man's
experience cor-tinua is recognised not only as a primarily psychological
need but also as a need which has deep physiological and biological
bases (KOHH, 1963/66 : pp.27-28), (ABLER, et al., 1971: p.8).
Ordered experiences (without regard to context) are those which
arouse no questions in the mind. The most important way of
establishing order is to attend to an event and answer the questions
which its experience evokes. Art, theology, the humanities, and
science are more or less systematic bodies of thought which attempt
to answer questions about human existence and its experimental
consequences. Such questions are applied to past, present, and
potential future experience. A set of satisfactory answers to the:
set of all possible questions about all possible events would
produce a state of complete order. That this state does not exist
in reality, and cannot exist given the nature of human thought, does
not negate its value as an ideal frame of reference.
Even simple,straightforward description of reality (without any attempt
at explaining) is essentially inexhaustible. It is, in principle,
impossible to ever come to the end of it and complete the description.
This is true not only because it is not possible to set limits to
reality or give a possible meaning to the words: "all things that
there are have been identified". More strongly, it is not possible
even to give sense to the words: "all things that there are in
this room have been identified". The inexhaustibility lies in the
nature of description and identification, however restricted they may be.
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Every object must exhibit different appearances from different points
of view; and every object, including persons who are language
users, agents, and observers, has a history of changing relations to
other things in its environment. To state what a particular object
is cannot be the same as to describe its appearance from various
points of view. Hence, a description of the appearance of an object
from a certain point of view only constitutes evidence as to what it is
when it is taken in conjunctionwith a statement of the actual
situation of the observer as an object among other objects
(HAMPSHIRE, 1959: Ch.l).^
The stages in which order is imposed by man on his experiences may
(Q\
be approximately represented in a conceptual scheme.^ ' Because
events become experiences when they attract the- attention of the
human senses, the latter are said to constitute the effective
limit of human penetration of the world both external and internal
(9)
to man. ' This sensory frontier separates the universe of
possible events from those events that are in fact experienced
by man. The frontier can be depicted by a plane, so-called "plane
of primary experience or perception" (or the P-Plane), which forms
the starting point of the scheme for ordering experience.
The P-Plane is peculiar to each and every observer.
Experiences accumulate but cannot become intelligible until they
(11)
are preliminarily ordered by means of "constructs".v ' "Reality
and experiences of it cannot be thought about unless there exist
rules that correlate particular groups of signs with particular
recurrent elements in reality and experience, in such a way that
any familiar use of a particular group of signs will be taken as
a reference to some particular element in experience(HAMPSHIRE,1959:p«1
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The process of forming constructs involves the use of rules of two
(12)
systematically interrelated types: (i) rules of classification v '
single out elements in reality as being of the same kind, and identify
recurrent kinds of -"thing"; (ii) rules of individuation v single
out one specimen of a certain kind from another, and identify the
same one as recurring or appearing again. Generalisations from
larger numbers of experiences assume the form of abstract ideas
without empirical content (e.g. location, volume, amount, pressure).
(15)These are called concepts v and provide the means of manipulating
"constructs". Most concepts can be reduced to two megaconcepts:
"number11 and "relationship". Any experience or "construct"
may have "number" and may be related to other experiences of
"constructs". Concepts are developed by means of combinations
of the two megaconcepts. Thus, "constructs" are interconnected
both with each other and with concepts through relationships.
The conceptual scheme of the human thought processes is one
illustration of the way man organises the world. Within this
schema, it is possible to move directly from events and immediate
experiences to classes of experiences and relationships among these.
The development of systems of thought emerges as the result of the
accumulation of increasingly complex relationships between classes
of experiences. Systems of thought incorporate, at the same time,
the most elementary experiences and the most abstract concepts.
A very wide variety of types of relationship networks can be
constructed according to the type of order that is being adhered to.
The same "constructs" may be connected through different structures
of relationships, depending on the system of intellectual order
that is employed. Thus, different order modes will tend to produce
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distinct networks of relationships. There are, generally speaking,
four major systems of ordering experience now in use: (a) theology
C16)
attempts to answer ultimate 'why' questions^ 1 and to develop the
implications of its answers in the realm of daily life; (t>) aesthetic
and emotional order relates to the realm of artistic experience
and interpersonal relationships; (c) the system of order based
on common sense is applied to secular social and economic activities;
and (d) scientific order attempts to explain a very wide array of
events in the external world and, increasingly, experiences which
arise within man.
Although separated for purposes of identification and discussion,
these four systems of order are not always separable due to their
extensive overlapping and interpenetration. There exists a
fundamental unity among all ordering modes because all are concerned
with providing answers to the questions that man raises about his
existence in the world and its implications. It is not possible
to assess the superiority'of any one system of order over the other
unless the realm of experience to be ordered and the purpose of the
order to be established are specified. None of these systems
possesses inherent preeminence over the others, but usually they
operate in a complementary manner as experiences are categorised
into classes each of which is best dealt with through a particular
system.
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2. The order of science: scope and goals of the scientific enterprise.
Ever since the concept of "science" was introduced into the realm of
human thought there has been a proliferation of attempts to
characterise or define it. The relevant literature abounds with
several, often conflicting points of view, and it is not difficult
to conclude that a definition of "science" is a complex matter.
Although the aims of this thesis do not include the provision of
a'tonce-and-for-all" definition of science, it is impossible to avoid
a discussion of the issue when the purpose of this section of the
thesis is to examine "scientific methodology" and the role of models
in it. The task of defining "science" is rendered more complicated
by the fact that the meaning of science is not fixed: the evolution
of science over the centuries suggests that "science'1 is a dynamic
concern and its meaning and significance changes with successive
ages (HANDY, 1961+: p.12). Therefore, a definition which appears
correct at one point in time may become defunct or erroneous at a
later time period.
The attainment of an ultimate definition of science seems to be an elusive
(17)if not unreasonable goal to pursue. ' However, it is necessary
to establish some common understanding on the concept and recognise
the inadequacies involved. In the past, the word "science" referred
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alternately to the study of certain specific subject matters or to
a body of knowledge. Thus, physics, geology, chemistry, etc. were
considered as science by virtue of their cognitive content.
However, the continuing expansion and specialisation of knowledge
has posed serious problems as to whether the emerging fields should
be classified as scientific or non-scientific by the earlier criterion.
An alternative definition of science in terms of a body of accurate,
and systematically organised knowledge tends to be true not only
for strictly scientific knowledge but also for other collections
of information, such as the flight schedule of an airline company,
the data contained in a telephone.directory, or even a set of
systematic observations on a real-world phenomenon that have not
yet been integrated into some conceptual framework (HEEMSTADTER,
1970: p.7).
Because science has evolved from ordinary, 'common sense* knowledge
associated with man's daily experiences in his environment and in
himself, its discriminating characteristics are best illuminated when
it is contrasted with what is generally acclaimed as 'common sense'.
Admittedly, the line separating beliefs labelled with the familiar
but vague term of 'common sense' from knowledge which is recognised
(18 ^
as 'scientific' is not very sharp. ' However, each of these
words possesses a nucleus of characteristic meaning. Thus, in
contrast to common sense (MAGEL, 1961: PP-3-11+):
(i) science emerges from the desire to provide explanations that are
both systematic and controllable by factual evidence; and is
distinctive in that it seeks to establish through a pattern
of inquiry some relation of dependence between propositions
superficially unrelated;
(ii) science introduces refinements into ordinary conceptions by the
process of exhibiting the systematic connections of propositions
about matters of common knowledge; and circumscribes the range
of valid applications of such knowledge;
(iii) science is not characterised by conflicts between judgments
to the extent that common beliefs are — though there often emerge
many disagreements regarding particular interpretations of one
and the same set of empirical observations in some field of
scientific endeavour;
(iv) modern science does not employ vague terms of ordinary speech
but introduces increased determinacy in scientific statements
and incorporates them into logically integrated systems of
explanations, and thus obtains greater discriminating power
in its testing procedures, and augments the sources of relevant
evidence, for.it3 conclusions;
(v) science directs its inquiry to the relations of dependence
between things irrespective of their bearing upon human values; and
(vi) science, as a matter of principle, exposes its cognitive claims
to repeated tests against critically probative observational data,
obtained under carefully controlled conditions, aiming at
eliminating known sources of error. Scientific conclusions
are the products of inquiries conducted in accordance with a
definite policy for obtaining and assessing evidence, that is,
what has come to be known as "scientific method".
M9.
Thus, to sum up, science claims that (a) scientific statements about
the real world are 'truer' than any non-scientific ones; (b) such
truth claims can be actually tested; (c) shortcomings in scientific
statements can be discovered; and (d) that these shortcomings can
be corrected (BTINGE, 1967s P«29). Extrascientific statements
(or speculations) do not appear to be as modest in their claims, and
to yield as much in terms of their content.
The preceding list of differences between scientific and ordinary,
common sense knowledge suggests that the 'substance' (object; specific
subject matter; body of knowledge) cannot by itself be a distinctive
feature of all science^^ without the 'form' (process of inquiry)
which, in some views, emerges as a universal and unique
characteristic of science. Thus, " the peculiarity of science
must reside in the way it operates to obtain a certain end .... "
(BIUTGE, 1967! p.5). Indeed, the opinions of most contemporary
authors on the subject of defining 'science' converge on the
conception of science as a process of inquiry (which represents a
cluster of reliable methods of research, observation, and manipulation);
as well as a body of knowledge which has been acquired through such
a process (SPRAGTJE, 1971+: p. 279), (CAMPBELL, 1952: p. 1) , (WABTOFSKY,
1968: pp.23-25).
Any particular science can be viewed as a collection of theories,
and each theory consists of a set of statements associated with
proper methods for their validation. In this context, "... science
can be conceived as the sum-total of all particular sciences, and
hence as an organised system of theories and their respective
validating methods. The methods are as indispensable a part of
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science as are its theories" (MEHLBERG, 1958: pp.64-65)• In general,
the scientific approach to acquiring knowledgeis said to "be
composed of a process of inquiry (for which the term 'scientific
method' has been used), and of'the goals' towards attainment of
which the method is being adhered to by the scientists (BUNGE,
1967: p.6).
The process of scientific inquiry is controlled to the extent that it
is efficiently directed toward the achievement of desired objectives
(ACKOFF, 1962: p.3). Unlike what has been suggested by many
writers, science may not be thought of as having a central,
(21)
definitive goal. ' "Science has a plurality of coordinated
objectives some basic and theoretical (explanation, prediction,
and retrodiction), and others consequent and practical (control)"
(RESCHER, 1970: p.131). This position is also supported by (BUNGE,
1967: pp.25-26) where it is contended that the aims of science are:
"Primarily, to increase our knowledge (intrinsic or cognitive goal);
derivatively, to increase our welfare and power (extrinsic or
ulitarian goal)". A similar view is put forward by (CAMPBELL,1952:
p.1) : "First, science is a body of useful and practical knowledge
and a method of obtaining it .... In its second form or aspect,
science has nothing to do with practical life, and cannot affect
it except in the most indirect manner, for good or for ill. Science
of this form is a pure intellectual study it appeals to
nothing but the disinterested curiosity of mankind".
This statement points to the much debated distinction between 'pure'
science, if a purely cognitive goal is pursued, and 'applied' science,
if a practical end is aimed at. This leads directly to the traditional
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conflict between the doctrines of scientific realism and
instrumentalism. Realists hold that science principally attempts
(or ought to attempt) to describe the world as it really is through
the formulation of scientific theories which are about independently
existing theoretical entities (e.g. electrons, protons); thus,they
stress the theoretical goals of science (description and explanation
of the real world). On the other side, instrumentalists tend to
stress the practical goals of science, that is the goals of prediction
and control, and argue that science is mainly a provider of tools for
predicting and controlling observed phenomena — without necessarily
affording any materials for describing the real world (EESCHER,1970:
p. 132+); (SMART, 1968: p.138); (RYEE, ^k9i pp.120-125); (TOUIMTN, 1953);
(NAGEL, 1961: Ch.6); (SPECTOR, 1965: pp.121-11+2); (POPPER, 1963: Ch.3);
(FEYERAREND, 1961+: pp.280-308); (HEMPEL, 1958: PP-37-98). Each of
those two contrasting accounts of science takes a coresponding view
of models and of their role in the scientific enterprise (cf.Part II).
Proceeding beyond the purely manipulative issue of control towards the
purely cognitive aspects of science, that is, those of prediction,
emanation, and retrodiction, it appears that the principal
consideration is not confined to any one of these aspects as being
predominant over others. The characteristic that is common to all
cognitive concerns of science is best described as essential knowledge
of laws in terms of which explanation, prediction, and rational
retrodiction become possible; what has been called 'systematisation'
(RESCHER, 1970: p.133). Laws can operate in the absence of all
prospects for explanation, prediction, etc.; while these latter
tasks of science essentially rely upon laws for their accomplishment.
The establishment of laws that rule the functioning of natural
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processes is basically a descriptive task and appears to be the basic
element in scientific understanding that enables scientists to
structure their perception of the past and to guide their expectations
for the future (RESCHER, 1970s p.135)• At the present time there
exists a considerable number of problems and questions (e.g. those
involving ethical considerations) which cannot be fruitfully
investigated by science because of their nature. Based on such
reflections many authors have attempted to discuss the •limitations
of science* or the 'reach of science', but the results of these
elaborations proved far from successful in adequately defining the
'limits of scientific inquiry'.
Indeed, numerous issues with which science concerns itself today
were, at one time or another in the past, claimed to be outside the
reach of scientific investigation. In his analysis of the limits
to scientific explanation, Rescher rejects the thesis that "science
can explain everything" and substitutes for it the view that
"science can explain everything explicable". This restructuring,
he claims, is not imposed by any reason of principle or any
(22)
theoretical boundary of ultimate fact,v ' but rather because modern
science itself reveals certain inexplicable facts, e.g. in the context
of irreducibly stochastic processes (RESCHER, 19^3; pp.325-3^-5) •
According to (MEHLBERG, 1958: p.3>P*65)» the tools that the scientists
possess or are likely to develop and the ways they handle these
(i.e. scientific method) rather than scientific information appear to
be the determining factor of the potential of science to answer
relevant questions. Thus, the class of all theoretical and practical
questions that are inherently impossible to answer satisfactorily by
recourse to any actual or merely discoverable scientific method
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should be considered to define the 'limits' of science. Further, the
class of all questions that are so accessible to scientific method
would suggest the 'range' of science.
3. The philosophical study of the sciences.
The issues involved in establishing the 'range* and the 'limits' of
science are perplexed not only because of the way in which the relevant
questions are formulated (e.g. the use of vague and ambiguous terms
such as 'scientific method', 'theoretical' and 'practical' questions,
'potential' of science to answer a question), but also because of
the bias that prevails in discussions of the social effects and
value of science. Admittedly, science emerges today as both a
universally decisive and universally unfamiliar element of human
culture. Unfamiliarity with the concepts, information, methods,
and equipment which scientists have accumulated over centuries of
intensive activity is apparent among both the lay public and, to
a lesser extent, among the scientists themselves; and it is due
mainly to the increasing specialisation of scientific endeavour
indispensable for the increased speed of the advancement of
science (MEHLBERG, 1962: p.275)* Anticipating this situation
over a century ago, Comte advocated for a philosophical and
broadminded "science of science" which would concern itself with
the study and clarification of the fundamental conceptual issues
about the sciences (COMPE, I830/I8I4.3) •
b2b.
There exist generally two types of questions which concern any field
of human knowledge: (a) questions in that field, which are first
order or factual questions relating to the disciplinary or
professional context of the field; and (b) questions about that
field, which are conceptual or second order questions referring to
issues about the cognitive status of the field (EMMET, I96J4).
In the case of the sciences, the substantive problems within specified
sciences constitute the subject matter of the professionals of the
sciences concerned, whereas the latter type of questions lies in
the realm of the philosophers (RYAN, 1970: p.i+)« These are
structural problems about science as a whole (SCRIVEN, 1966: p. 8I4.).
Philosophers have always been interested in the sciences for they
have been traditionally concerned with other major areas of man's
intellectual activity, such as the arts, ethics, and religion.
However, in the last half century, philosophical activity has been
characterised by a proliferation of substantial studies in an area
which has come to be called the "Philosophy of the sciences", and
which is probably the fastest growing branch of philosophy nowadays
(BUNGE, 1973s Both the method and subject matter of this
field of endeavour cannot be considered novel but fall within the
domain of philosophy which is generally concerned with the
organisation, nature, and modes of generation of the products of
intellectual effort.
Although the philosophy of science does not appear to possess a
well-defined area of analysis, it is not impossible to delimit its
boundaries empirically by content, that is, by listing the actual
problems that are being dealt with. Broadly speaking, the philosophy
b25.
of science bears upon three main groupings of questions about the
sciences (BENJAMIN, 1900/1965: pp. 51*2-51*7 ); (BEBUBG, 1968: p.2):




activity,v "" and those relating to the anal of basic
concepts and presuppositions of the sciences.
(ii) The miscellaneous issues associated with the general philosophical
implications which the scientific enterprise has, either in its
(27)
content or in its method, for the other aspects of human life.v ''
(iii) The questions related directly or indirectly to a consideration
of the method of science.
These groupings tend to overlap to a great extent and exclude some
problems that pertain to the general field. Based on this listing
of issues, it can be suggested that the philosophy of science may be
conceived as having two main components. The first relates to an
analytical and methodological discussion about science and
concentrates on the study of patterns of scientific arguments, of
ways of testing scientific theories, of the nature of laws and theories,
of ways in which scientific concepts are defined or otherwise
introduced, and of scientific method. The second component
involves the application of scientific knowledge to the solution
of problems generally recognised as philosophical^(SMART, 1968s
pp.l4.-f>) and thus presents philosophy of science as a synthesis of
• n • (30)special sciences. '
Despite the significant contributions that modern philosophy of
science is making to the clarification of scientific concepts, to
the analysis of the methods of the sciences, to the study of
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the logical structure and semantical organisation of science,
as well as to the general results of scientific efforts, there exists
some disagreement predominantly among practising scientists as
to the relevance of philosophy in the course of routine scientific
activity. It is often claimed that, by moving to abstract levels
of analysis, philosophical studies of science tend to look at what
scientists do in practice as mere technical detail, and concentrate
more on general questions which frequently emerge as philosophical
paradoxes that are of little direct interest to scientists (DIESING,
1971 '• P«2). Admittedly, modern philosophy of science has turned
out to be a Pandora's box which, once opened, released "puzzling
monsters"(COHEN, and WARTOFSKI, 197k'' p.vii). However, to object
to its important contributions to science implies a misunderstanding
of the primary purpose for which the philosophical study of the
logical structure of science is undertaken. Such study is not
intended, in the first place, as an aid to scientific research nor
does it form a descriptive manual of scientific approaches.
"The logic of science is a branch of philosophy, specifically of
epistemology or the theory of knowledge, and also of ontology or the
theory of what kinds of things there are. It is not surprising if
the practice of science largely passes these questions by.
They have, after all, been controversial for many centuries and
modern science in part developed as an enterprise that was neutral
with respect to them and could afford to ignore them. Science has
been remarkably successful in pursuing its own aim independently
of philosophical disputes. But that is not to say that the
philosophical critique of the foundations of science itself can
ultimately be ignored, for that critique is concerned both with
the understanding and justification of the aims of science itself,
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and with the existence and character of modes of knowledge other than
the scientific" (HESSE, 1974s P«7)«
The foregoing discussion indicates the existence of a substantial
body of intellectual acitivity focusing on the study of the methods
of science both from the point of view of the scientists and from
that of the philosopher. A range of such views will be examined in
following chapters, and an attempt will be made to explore the
accepted accounts of scientific method and to investigate the role
of models in these. That it is necesary to follow this trajectory
in the analysis of the role of models in spatial planning may not
be immediately obvious. However, to control the use of scientific
tools, as models are, in a field where intellectual endeavour has so
far been predominantly non-scientific, it is essential to understand
the philosophical and methodological assumptions upon which the use
of these rests. It appears that the most appropriate way to make
these assumptions explicit is to analyse the structure of what has
come to be called "the scientific method". It is purported that
such an analysis will ensure that assumptions accepted with respect
to certain scientific tools used in spatial planning do not conflict
with the broader assumptions employed in establishing standards
for rational discourse and inference.
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1+. Formal versus empirical sciences and their corresponding methods.
The various judgments that human beings make are said to be categorised
into three types (KEMENY, i960: p.292): logical,factual, and value (or
evaluative) judgments. The content of each of these forms of
judgment may be described as follows:
(i) Logical judgments are based on certain premises which may be
true or false; if they are internally consistent they specify
what other propositions or theorems follow of formal necessity.
The sciences which determine criteria and methods for correct
logical judgments are formal logic and pure mathematics (including
geometry).
(ii) Factual judgments are concerned with establishing the truth or falsity
of propositions with respect to the facts to which those
propositions purport to refer. The sciences whose aim is to
set forth criteria and methods for making correct factual
(or descriptive) judgments are the empirical natural sciences
and the social sciences in their purely descriptive role.
(iii) Evaluative or value judgments attempt to evaluate the facts after
they have been correctly or incorrectly described. Fields whose
task is to provide criteria and methods for making correct
evaluative judgments are personal ethics, the social sciences
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(including politics, sociology, economics, urban planning, etc.),
law, and even religion, in their evaluative — as distinct
from their descriptive — function (NORTHROP, 19^3s p.3)•
If the above distinctions are agreed upon, the commonly accepted
grouping of individual sciences into formal (or rational) and empirical
(or factual) sciences (CARNAP, 1953s pp.123-128) becomes justified.
Formal sciences are those which have no empirical content but which
are systems of thought. They sire, sometimes, viewed as branches
of philosophy (SALMON, 1973), or as non-empirical sciences (HEMPEL,
1966). Although they may be applied to empirical phenomena, and
they demonstrate their greater utility in such applications, they do
not concern themselves with any class of events or experiences.
Their application to the empirical sciences can be described
metaphorically as the provision of 'forms' to be filled with an
unlimited assortment of contents, both factual and empirical; and
this act of 'form filling' represents the establishment of
correspondences between the forms, on the one side, and events or
experiences at any level of reality, on the other side. Because
mathematical and logical structures can be evaluated without
reference to the constructs to which they are applied, they greatly
enhance the power to manipulate those constructs. Validity of
manipulations can be checked without distraction by content.
Contrary to the formal sciences, the factual or empirical sciences
produce knowledge about the world in the course of their operations:
their content is directly empirical. They are also concerned
with explaining experiences, and their results are subject to testing:
findings can be supported or weakened by empirical events. This
distinction accounts for the differences in the object or theme of
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the respective disciplines, and also for the difference in the type
of statements. The division further answers to the difference
in the method through which verifiable statements are checked
(BOTGE, 1959: Ch.2).
It should be added that, in some views of science, judgments of the
third type referred to above, that is, value or evaluative judgments,
are not considered acceptable as legitimate kinds of statements
within the framework of scientific discourse. The desire for
greater rigour within science led to the nineteenth century efforts
to eliminate metaphysical elements from science, as value judgments
are considered to be (e.g. the works of Ernst Mach, Heinrich Hertz,
Pierre Duhem and Henri Poincare are notable in this respect).
This view has prompted certain empiricist philosophers to distinguish
the verifiable, factually meaningful statements of science from the
unverifiable and allegedly factually meaningless statements based
on metaphysical speculations. The latter were rejected as
uninformative. In Popper's view, the distinction between scientific
and metaphysical statements can be based on the grounds that the
former are, at least in principle, falsifiable whereas metaphysical
statements are unfalsifiable even in principle (POPPER, 1963:pp.253 ff.).
However, there is a growing body of literature which indicates a
marked diversion from the position expressed above. Thus, it is
surprising to find, in the more recent years, a revived interest
in metaphysical speculation precisely among those philosophers who
are concerned with the philosophy and history of science. A number
of these workers have devoted much time and space to showing how
metaphysical speculations, and even myths, may develop into
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or contribute towards the development of scientific theories (POPPER,
1952: p.121*); (VAN MELSEN, 1952); (CASSIRER, 1956); (WATKINS, 1957);
(KORNER, 1957: P-97); (EEYERABEND, 1957/58). In particular,
Korner goes as far as to suggest that metaphysical statements
function in science as 'directives' or 'regulative principles'
tt
(KORNER, 1959). He distinguishes "between two kinds of metaphysics,
namely regulative which, roughly speaking, consists of proposals
of rules for the construction of theories,especially scientific
theories, and speculative metaphysics which comprises all kinds
of philosphising other than regulative and analytical philosophy..."
(KORNER, 1966: p.232)/31)
Logical or mathematical truth or validity or correctness has nothing
to do with empirical truth or validity or correctness (COHEN and
NAGEL, 1931+/1963: P«23). Formal sciences are not concerned with
explaining experience nor are their conclusions subject to empirical
confirmation. The criterion against which logic and mathematics are
evaluated is that of the absence of self-contradiction. Any logical
or mathematical system is derived from certain fundamental ideas
(axioms). Using these basic assumptions, some conclusions are valid
according to the adopted rules of manipulation and others are not
valid. The criteria by which formal sciences are evaluated are
internal to the sciences and are based largely on consistency,
( 32)
although factors such as economyw 'and elegance are often significant.
The formal sciences are, in general, deductive sciences (BUNGE, 1959:
p.32). Experience plays some suggestive role which is limited to
the formulations of the basic presuppositions (axioms) of the formal
sciences.
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The set of postulates, definitions, rules of formation of meaningful
expressions, and rules of deductive inference, all are necessary
andsufficient to demonstrate a theorem in the formal sciences.
Therefore, truth in logic and mathematics consists in the coherence
of a given statement with a previously admited system of ideas; and
( 33}
is not absolute but relative to that system.In comparison
to the formal sciences,the factual (or empirical) sciences appear
to differ on several important grounds. Firstly, their statements
do not contain only logical valiables which are neither true nor
false (i.e. symbols), but comprise interpreted signs. Secondly,
the logical consistency (or rationality) of a factual statement,
that is, its coherence whith a previously accepted system of ideas,
e.g. logic, is necessary but not sufficient to establish its truth
content. Finally, besides possessing logical consistency, factual
statements must be testable in experience (POPPER, 1959/72) : pp.Z+1-140;
(HEMPEL, 1965: P.1M).
The basic concept behind the principle of testability is that a
general statement purporting to explain phenomena should enable the
derivation of 'basic statements', that is statements about matters of
fact, which could subsequently be compared with actual descriptions
of observable aspects of the same phenomena. This process of
experimentation would result in confirmation of the statement
(or theory).^^
In order to maintain that an empirical statement is (probably) true,
propositions relating to observational and/or experimental data
are required to support the statement. Results from such testing
of a factual statement against experience do not represent
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a demonstration or proof in the manner of the formal sciences
(BENJAMIN, 1950/1965! p.5^3)• They are, for the most part,
provisional in the sense that further study could furnish better
approximations to the conceptual reconstructions of the segment of
reality that relates to the factual statement concerned. Therefore,
while formal statements and theories can reach a state of perfection
(relative to the specific system of ideas upon which they are based),
empirical statements and theories are essentially defective, in the
preceding sense, since they only meet the necessary condition for
perfectibility: they are never proved by their conforming with
experience but only rendered increasingly probable (according to number
and variety of confirming instances, or due to their successfully
passing falsification tests).
The use of highly abstract concepts in statements concerning
empirical scientific theories tends to generate problems during the
process of their testing against observed facts since there are often no
observable counterparts for the abstract concepts. This has led
philosophers of science, especially logical empiricists, to introduce
the well-known and extensively debated dichotomy between observation
statements and theoretical statements — often referred to as the
(35)
"dual-language thesis On this acco>unt, all. theoretical
concepts should be defined or entered into empirical theories
operationally; what has been called "the operational imperative",
first expounded by (BRIDGMAN, 1927).^^ Philosophical assessment
of " the operational imperative" has been, for the most part, relative
to the positivist account of scientific theories. This is eloquently
expressed in (PUTNAM, 1962: pp.21+0-251); and his analysis refers to
what is often called "the received view on the role of theories".
b3b-
The "operational imperative" is interpreted, within the positivist
view of theories, as the requirement that theoretical terms be defined
as explicit definitions in terms of an observation vocabulary which
specifies various operations and possible outcomes resulting from
such operations being performed (HEMPEL, 1965! PP-123-133)•
On the basis of arguments purporting to demonstrate that: (i) the
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positivist account of theoriesvJ''is untenable under specified
conditions and should be rejected (ACHINSTEIN, 1968: Ch.3-6); (PUTNAM,
1962); (SUPPE, 1971: PP-57-76); (SUPPE, 1972a : Part I, Section II-B);
and that (ii) the "operational imperative" is, consequently to (i) ,
also untenable (HEMPEL, 1952: p.1+1); (HEMPEL, 1965s PP-123-133)* most
philosophers of science have rejected the "operational imperative",
with few exceptions mainly among scientists practising in the
biological and social sciences.
The above differences in kind of statements, referents, and method
that may be said to distinguish the formal from the factual sciences
precludes their joint examination with respect to matters concerning
the methods employed in the task of achieving systematic knowledge
of the world of nature and, by potential extension, of the world of
man and society. The argument that there exist at least two types
of scientific method, that is, the logico-mathematical or formal
method'pertaining to the rational sciences, on the one side, and the
empirical or experimental method employed by the factual sciences,
(39)
on the other side, might be maintained provided that it is
acknowledged that the empirical method makes use of formal methods
of reasoning. This position is further corroborated by Mehlberg who,
in setting.out the limiting cases of the scientific method, views
the purely inferential procedures which constitute the logico-mathematical
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method as representing a limiting case of the method of science, at
the one extreme, characterised by a vanishing observational component.
At the other extreme, the limiting case of the general method of
science may be depicted by non-inferential procedures of the
empirical sciences (e.g. direct sense-perception, introspection),
characterised by a vanishing inferential component. Intermediary
cases also exist, e.g. fact-finding methods based on measurement or.
on indirect observation (i.e. through appropriate instruments), but
are located rather closer to the non-inferential limit of the
"scientific method" because they involve extensive observation and
a specifiable minimum of inference (MEHIBERG, 1958: p. 76).
Consideration of the subject matter of this chapter essentially directs
the ensuing discussion about scientific method towards the empirical
rather than the formal sciences. Consequently, all further references
to the "method of science" will denote the "experimental method" as
this is applied within the context of the sciences of nature and,
on some accounts, within that of the sciences of man and society.
